Gulf War Air Power Survey
RED HORSE provides heavy engineering capability including runway preparation for airfields (above), and constructing ammunition storage sites (right)
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- Table 1 Harvest Falcon Major Components Used in the Gulf War
- Held in Reserve
- Laying the Foundation for Air Operations in the Gulf Region
- Figure 1 AOR Air Bases 46 Engineering Tasks
- Base engineers provide primary electrical power for base facilities early in deployment.
- Billeting personnel placed incoming troops in tents or hard billets and worked with engineers in planning tent cities (above). Mobile Kitchen Trailers fed troops at several sites (left).
- Engineering and Services Challenges
RED HORSE provides heavy engineering capability including runway preparation for airfields (above), and constructing ammunition storage sites (right). 2
ground and air combat roles and have a very structured training program. Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force engineer units are self-sufficient, but with different definitions. For example, Air Force RED HORSE units are self sufficient for about sixty days; Seabee battalions for ninety days. The key common ground is that all units need logistics support from host nation resources.763 Services personnel adopted the basic Prime BEEF concept in 1978 by creating the Prime RIBS (Readiness in Base Services) program. Using the mobile team concept, they provided base operations with food services, billeting, laundry, field exchange, and mortuary services. They deploy in teams of nine, eighteen, and twenty-five people. The Air Force first developed air transportable facilities in the 1950s, initiating the original portable-basing set, Gray Eagle, during the Vietnam War at Cam Ranh Bay and Phan Rang Air Bases. It was then renamed Harvest Eagle.764 In the 1960s and 1970s, basing sets incorporated new designs and were known as Harvest Bare.765 Then in the 1980s, the Harvest Falcon766 concept was originated, which combined aspects of both Harvest Eagle and Harvest Bare designs. Harvest Falcon was designed specifically for the Southwest Asia theater of operations (i.e., no freeze protection).767 During Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, major components of Harvest Falcon sets were used as shown in Table 1. Table 1 Harvest Falcon Major Components Used in the Gulf War
Engineering contingency teams had concentrated on developing wartime skills, such as rapid runway repair, damage assessment, and operation of Harvest Eagle field kitchens. Yet, in August 1990, Air Force engineers found themselves performing beddown operations with equipment and mobility basing sets they had never seen before.768 Laying the Foundation for Air Operations in the Gulf Region The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has been developing projects in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since 1951. Their first was rebuilding the airfield at Dhahran. Initially completed in 1956, this base became an important stopover point for U.S. Air Force and Navy aircraft.769 Under a May 1965 Engineer Assistance Agreement, they constructed the King Khalid Military City (KKMC); it was finished in 1988 as a complete city and base facilities to support a projected population of more than 50,000, with an airfield, hospital, and engineer center and school. In addition, the Royal Saudi Air Force working with the U.S. Air Force Logistics Command completed 2 major efforts to upgrade aircraft support facilities.770 Under a phased modernization and industrialization program implemented by the Saudi government in 1974, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and Headquarters Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) Foreign Military Sales Construction Engineers designed and constructed several bases, including three major basesDhahran, Taif, and Khamis Mushait. Five of these state-of-the-art bases were each capable of supporting nearly the entire Royal Saudi Air Force. In August 1990, the Air Force still had an eighteen-man engineer group in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia working on the Peace Shield program. When Coalition aircraft began arriving at these locations, facilities were sitting empty or nearly empty. In addition, Saudi Arabia had specifically identified forty-five civil airfields to support pilgrimages and the oil industry [forty-three supported the oil industry and two (Jeddah and Taif) supported pilgrimages].771 Contingency Planning Planning air operations for the Middle East was the responsibility of CENTAF, the air component of CENTCOM. Their engineering plans primarily consisted of prepositioning assets in Southwest Asia and conducting training exercises in the theater. Beginning in 1979, training exercises such as Bright Star were held every two years to practice deployment, beddown aircraft and people, and fly combat sorties. Beginning in 1981, the 4449th Mobility Support Squadron began limited bare base training at Holloman AFB, New Mexico, enrolling in the first class members of the Langley AFB, Virginia, and Shaw AFB, South Carolina, base engineer team. In anticipation of deployment, operational planners at CENTAF began selecting bases on 2 August 1990. Their initial criteria for selecting air bases and regional airfields included those with 10,000-foot runways or longer, at least 500,000 square feet of parking ramp, and with load classification numbers high enough to support aircraft under consideration. They evaluated both civilian and military airfields. However, since published airfield reference information was dated 1985, much of the needed information was not available, thus complicating the selection process. In addition, Saudi Arabia and its neighbors had undertaken building or improving many of these airfields. Between 1985 and 1990, the following airfields were constructed: Al Kharj and King Fahd International Airport in Saudi Arabia, and Al Ayn in the United Arab Emirates and Shaikh Isa in Bahrain. Major airfield improvements had also been undertaken at Al Dhafra, Khamis Mushait, and Taif in Saudi Arabia, Seeb and Thumrait in Oman, and Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates.772 Consequently, the CENTAF staff and later the HQ TAC Battle Staff put together basing packages for individual air bases on the basis of very limited airfield data and no formal site surveys. Nevertheless, this information was critical in determining munitions storage, power generation, water requirements, and other infrastructure considerations to support sortie generation. With each plan, they determined base engineering and services requirements and prepared time-phased force and deployment data worksheets, passing this information to the Tactical Air Command Battle Staff for personnel and equipment sourcing.773 Deployment of Forces A CENTAF engineer deployed to Saudi Arabia on 7 August 1990. Working from the Royal Saudi Air Force Headquarters in Riyadh, he assigned personnel to conduct site surveys of potential Saudi airfields for use by incoming U.S. forces. Planning called for augmentation with the 10th Civil Engineering Flight, a Reserve unit from Bergstrom AFB, Texas.774 However, the speed of deployment and a delay in the call-up of reserves prompted cancellation of this unit's mobilization. As an alternative, Col. Michael A. McAuliffe, Deputy Chief of Staff for Engineering and Services at Tactical Air Command headquarters, quickly elected to assemble active duty personnel to fill this role. Colonel McAuliffe selected Lt. Col. Karsten H. Rothenberg, the Director of Air Force Foreign Military Sales Construction Engineers, Headquarters Air Force Logistics Command, to head the staff at Riyadh. Colonel Rothenberg was familiar with Saudi construction programs but had not been involved with the CENTAF mission or the bare base assets program. The deployment and number of all engineering and services forces to the theater of operations by the bases they supported is reflected in Appendix A. Force Beddown U.S. Air Force personnel were initially deployed to two primary locations, Dhahran and Riyadh. This soon grew to twenty locations in the region, one of which was King Fahd International Airport, near Dhahran. Under construction since the mid-1980s, this airport was scheduled to open in 1993. Although not all of the infrastructure had been built, the contractor suspended construction activities while American forces were present. Then there was Khamis Mushait Air Base, Saudi Arabia, a modern military airfield that provided state-of-the-art facilities. The aircraft shelters spread throughout the base, and the existing utilities, billeting and dining facilities, fire station, and fueling capabilities offered outstanding working and living accommodations. Appendix B provides air base characteristics of the bases supporting U.S. air operations. Figure 1 AOR Air Bases 46
Engineering Tasks Engineer taskings upon arrival at a base fell into four main categories: 1. Preparation of runways, runway lighting, navigational aid sites, and installation, utilities, fire protection, facility sitting, and latrines; 2. Sweeping aircraft ramps and aprons, ammunition storage areas, aircraft revetments, and erection of facilities; 3. Environmental and sanitation concerns, facility hardening, and road construction; and 4. Basic operation and maintenance of the base and continued training. The priorities and timing of the above tasks varied according to the threat, timing of the deployment (August versus December), host nation resources, and availability of equipment and bare base assets. The primary tasking was normally force beddown. Electrical power became a critical element at all beddown locations, not only for aircraft support equipment but for computer operations and air conditioning as well. For bare base operations, the Air Force used 60kW, 100kW, and 750kW generators, while early in the deployment, the smaller 60kW and 100kW portable generators provided primary electrical power to small clusters of tents or facilities. Such improvisions required frequent servicing of the equipment and refueling of generators, and often generator overload resulted in equipment failure. When those generators were later replaced or supplemented by 750kW diesel generators, those Air Force power production personnel not familiar with the CENTAF mission were unfamiliar with them. The problem was compounded by the unavailability of Technical Orders for the equipment. CENTAF Engineering did, however, overcome this situation by establishing power grids at the sites to provide electricity.775 Base engineers provide primary electrical power for base facilities early in deployment. 3
Generators began failing because of around-the-clock operations, and a severe shortage of filters and spare parts reduced the scheduled maintenance that could be accomplished. The Air Force established an eight-person depot repair capability for the 750kW generators at Thumrait, Oman. Of the 90 750kW diesel generators initially used, 50 came from prepositioning sites in Southwest Asia; only 10 were operational. Another 40 generators came from Holloman AFB, New Mexico; only 6 were operational. Of the 74 generators that failed to operate, some were missing parts, some had defective parts, and others required minor adjustments. The problem was attributed to the lengthy time in storage and nonuse.776 In August, a shortage of primary distribution centers complicated the establishment of efficient power distribution systems, which resulted in a lack of hookups to the primary electrical distribution source. By 26 September 1990, however, the Civil Engineering Maintenance, Inspection, Repair, and Training team at Kelly AFB, Texas designed acceptable replacements from commercial off-the-shelf components and shipped thirty-four primary distribution centers to the Gulf region sites and one to Sheppard Technical Training Center.777 Water availability, its storage, and distribution were critical elements at beddown locations. CENTAF Engineering established minimum secure water storage requirement of 100 gallons per person for 5 days of usage. Drinking water initially was supplied as bottled water from local sources, and at some sites, it came from existing water distribution systems connected directly to commercial water sources. Other locations, such as Cairo West, had to truck-haul water and store it in bladders, most common of which was the 20,000-gallon bladder. Seventeen sites possessed water purification units capable of producing up to 600 gallons of potable water per hour from either seawater or freshwater.778 Beddown of firefighters should take place before arrival of aircraft. However, in August and early September, aircraft sometimes preceded adequate fire services. At Cairo West, for example, few firefighters and no vehicles were available for the first two weeks, and this was true to varying degrees at other sites.779 Engineer teams also assisted in planning and construction of air base defense works such as berms, concertina wire fences, and bunkers to protect vital equipment and power plant sources, as well as barriers on roads to slow down vehicles. Base engineers assisted in bedding down medical personnel, which normally consisted of pouring concrete or asphalt floors for air-transportable hospitals, connecting utilities, maintaining generators and environmental control units, and erecting the TEMPER tents used to house the hospitals. The sophisticated medical equipment and water and waste requirements for sanitation posed particular power requirements. Specialized dietary requirements for patients imposed additional strains on the food service system.780 Services Tasks Although the Air Force feeding concept called for eating MREs (Meals, Ready to Eat) for the first ten days of a deployment, commanders were anxious to supplement the rations. Services personnel began to explore the availability of A Rations (fresh fruit, vegetables, meat, and baked goods) in the local area. Meanwhile, the HQ TAC Battle Staff worked with the Air Force Commissary Service to push B Rations (dehydrated and canned products not requiring refrigeration) to Southwest Asia. The Commissary Service also established a central distribution center for MREs and B Rations at the port of Ad Dammom, Saudi Arabia. Contract cook and mess attendant support augmented Air Force Services personnel at approximately half of the sites. Host nation assistance was generally limited to KP, serving, and ration handling services. Three sites, Jeddah, Khamis, Mushait, and Tabuk, were totally host nation contract feeding. Security and sanitation were major concerns wherever contractors were used. The potential for food sabotage and food-borne illness existed throughout the deployment. The use of contract food service workers required constant supervision by Services personnel. They trained the contract workers in sanitary food handling methods, but language and culture were barriers. The workers were third country nationals and few understood English or Western sanitation practices. Although measures were taken to prevent foodborne illness (FBI) or sabotage of the food supply, approximately 2,500 USCENTAF personnel experienced acute gastroenteritis in 15 FBI outbreaks. Billeting cadre placed incoming personnel in either tents or hard billets, maintained records of occupants, and assisted engineers in planning tent cities. Those who had been using automated systems stateside found themselves reverting to the stubby pencil and an index card system. When Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf ordered all troops out of hotels in 47 48 Billeting personnel placed incoming troops in tents or hard billets and worked with engineers in planning tent cities (above). Mobile Kitchen Trailers fed troops at several sites (left). 4
Tactical Field Laundry system was used to provide laundry capability in the desert (above and right). 5
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late August 1990, and on to a base because of the terrorist threat,781 the majority of the people then lived in TEMPER tents, but others lived in facilities such as Eskan Village at the southern edge of Riyadh, a massive housing compound of multibedroom villas in single-story and high-rise configurations, which the Saudi government offered to the U.S. military in mid-August.782 General Horner selected Col. George G. Giddens to serve as the Vice Commander for Combat Support operations at Eskan Village because of his prior experience in supporting contingency operations in Korea. Prior to the start of hostilities, about 18,000 U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine personnel were housed there with monthly base support contracts exceeding $2 million. The move into Eskan Village involved a $26-million contract through the Saudi government to provide furniture and other necessities.783 Prime RIBS provided field feeding support at the compound, operating three Harvest Falcon 9-1 kitchens, augmented with Saudi-provided contract laborers. Among the services provided was the Tactical Field Laundry system used to provide a laundry capability, but it fell short of expectations. The system consumed high volumes of water (240 gallons per hour) and suffered frequent and continuous mechanical failures. Of the 62 laundry systems in theater, fewer than half were in operation; 13 sites provided some level of contractor laundry service.784 A mortuary capability, critical from the outset of the deployment, was a task assumed by the Air Force as the Executive Agent for mortuary affairs until outbreak of hostilities, when the Army became responsible. On 15 August, a six-member team (four military and two civilian) led by Maj. Keith A. Howell, from Headquarters Air Force Engineering and Services Center, Tyndall AFB, Florida, deployed to assume control of mortuary affairs at Dhahran Air Base, Saudi Arabia. Upon arrival, the team coordinated with the other Services and assured that people in the field were well-trained and possessed the equipment needed to handle casualties. Each of the sites received a Mini-Morgue kit to establish their own remains processing capability. Although the sites were well-prepared for casualties, issues such as contaminated remains and procedures for the transfer of executive agency to the U.S. Army were problem areas throughout the deployment.785 Engineering and Services Challenges The fact that combat crews were deployed ahead of the support tail created problems for engineers and other support functional areas. For example, at Al Dhafra, United Arab Emirates, F-16 pilots from Shaw AFB, South Carolina slept under the wings of their aircraft upon arrival. In many cases, adequate latrines and shower facilities were unavailable to handle the number of people arriving. Food services personnel faced many similar obstacles. In some cases, contracts for food handling had already been established, causing confusion and often resulting in contract modification or renegotiation.786 Most engineers had never trained on the setup of Harvest Falcon equipment, and when TEMPER tents and utility systems began to arrive, many without technical orders, the engineers were uncertain as to what constituted a complete set, how they were to be assembled, or how to repair the equipment. To remedy this situation, CENTAF Engineering obtained three sets of technical orders, reproduced sufficient copies, and distributed them to the sites.787 Furthermore, the delivery of Harvest Falcon equipment was delayed, parts were missing, shipping containers inappropriately marked, and in some cases, equipment was appropriated by organizations other than the consigned.788 War Readiness Spares Kits (WRSK) for several Harvest Falcon items often did not accompany the delivery or were incomplete. In October 1990, CENTAF reported: “We only have to date, 60 percent of the required WRSK kits in theater for electrical generators and the fill rate on some kits is less than 30 percent.”789 Inevitably, the most critical items were missing from the kits. Filters for generators were scarce, and engineers resorted to improvising with panty hose. Spares shortages forced operators to “abuse” their equipment. Many generators, for example, were operated for 16 maintenance cycles without any routine maintenance.790 A major problem for engineering and services personnel was their inability to monitor and control prepositioned equipment (primarily Harvest Falcon assets) and vehicles, a release, delivery responsibility assigned to the CENTAF Logistics Directorate. In mid-November, Colonel Rothenberg observed: “CENTAF Engineering continues to have little to no insight into the availability of Harvest Falcon assets, and the organization was often in a quandary over the management, division, and delivery of unknown numbers of equipment to sites that needed the equipment”791 Even as late as February 1991, CENTAF Engineering reported they did not know how many water purification units, laundry units, latrines, mobile kitchens, and 150-cubic-foot refrigeration units were available for use.792 The multicommand and multiService presence at some bases also presented challenges for the engineers and Services people. At King Fahd, for example, elements of the 1st Special Operations Wing, the 23d and 354th Tactical Fighter Wings, and units from the U.S. Army's 101st and 82d Airborne Divisions were collocated, and engineers found themselves in separate living and working compounds. Although this contributed to unit integrity, it led to base operating inefficiencies.793 Additionally, Prime RIBS provided Tactical Field Exchange services to Special Operations and U.S. Army forces. They were also tasked to assume remains recovery, since these units deployed without Mortuary Affairs capabilities. Directory: sgp -> library sgp -> Sgp country Programme Strategy for op6 sgp -> Itu-d study groups sgp -> Internship with Congressional Campaign Exploratory Committee — Only 4 spots left! sgp -> Using Well Logs in the Petroleum Industry sgp -> Telecommunication development bureau itu-d study groups Download 5.55 Mb. Share with your friends:
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