Gulf War Air Power Survey

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Almost a quarter of a century after Vietnam, a security police man­power standard for wartime operations did not exist. In the late 1960s, U.S. Air Force officials had abandoned the manpower standards based upon the number of aircraft or other resources assigned, in favor of one tied to “hot war” conditions and other factors such as terrain, rules of engagement, and the area to be defended. Several surveys were con­ducted, but they all produced different answers and, as a result, the U.S. Air Force never developed a standard.⁸¹⁷

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Security police guard the air base. Rear area security operations must assure adequate protection of air bases in order that the theater com­mander can fight the battles without disruption of the air campaign.

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meant that, at least in some cases, U.S. commanders had to rely on host nation security forces or provide their own personnel to protect them and their assets. Some commanders did augment their security forces with mainte­nance, supply, and other personnel. In addition, some of the more junior security police commanders, in the beginning of the opera­tion, did not trust host nation security forces to provide that protection. They wanted the air base surrounded with U.S. Army military police or infan­try forces. ARCENT had of course massed its forces near the Kuwaiti border, in accordance with their understanding of the air-land battle concept and the desires of the USCINCCENT.⁸¹⁸ Commanders wanted to ensure their bases were protected against potential threats that could attack their personnel or equipment. Types of threats, examples, and appropriate responses to those threats were as indicated in Table 3.
CENTAF security police leaders had been working with their host nation country counterparts for years and were well aware of their air base defense capabilities. For example, when it was decided to beddown trans­port aircraft at Thumrait, Oman, CENTAF did not have sufficient security forces to protect the base, but host nation security forces were available to fulfill this role. Yet, the Military Airlift Command ques­tioned this decision, primarily because of a lack of U.S. security forces to guard the aircraft. CENTAF security police argued that Omani guards could provide the protec­tion. The greatest threat to U.S. personnel and assets was during the early part of the deployment when there were insufficient forces to withstand an Iraqi ground attack into Saudi Arabia. However, the threat in Oman was low, due to their distance from Iraqi forces, and after all, the operation was a Coalition effort. At first, Military Airlift was reluctant but, after further consultation with CENTAF, accepted its recommendations. Omani guards protected the C-130s for two days, until CENTAF could move its own security forces into position.⁸¹⁹ The primary danger came from terror­ists and surface-to-surface missiles. In Saudi Arabia, especially, the terror­ist threat decreased considerably because the Saudi government deported anyone suspected of harboring pro-Iraqi sentiments.⁸²⁰

Table 3 Threat Level Matrix
	Threat Level	Examples	Response
	Level I	Agents, saboteurs, sympathizers, ter­rorists	Unit/base/base clus­ter self-defense mea­sures
Level II	Small tactical units, unconventional warfare forces, guer­rillas	Self-defense mea­sures and response force(s) with sup­porting fires
Level III	Large tactical force operations including airborne, heliborne, amphibious, infiltra­tion operations, and major air operations	Requires commit­ment of a tactical combat force

Host nations had not been willing, in some cases, to undertake joint security-related operations in the past. Furthermore, CENTAF and ARCENT had differing opinions regarding rear area security.⁸²¹ Thus, air base secu­rity was bound to be a contentious issue during the deployment.

CENTAF built its security police force on the basis of criteria outlined in Air Force Regulation 207-1, “The Air Force Physical Security Pro­gram,” and Air Force Regulation 125-37, “The Installation and Re­sources Protection Program,” with added manpower requirements factored in for force protection, internal air base ground defense, and limited external screening missions. Ground defense operations focused primarily on internal base security operations and placed the responsibility for external security on host nation or ARCENT forces.
Rear Area Security During Joint Operations
Rear area security operations must assure adequate protection of air bases in order that the theater commander can simultaneously fight the deep, close, and rear battles without disruption of the air campaign. Inherent in rear area security operations is the need for early establish­ment of a theater-wide air base ground defense network that incorporates U.S. Army support during threat levels II and III. Evolving doctrine draws heavily on command, control, communications, and intelligence (C³I) and places demands on sensor and deep strike weapons technology.⁸²² Associated host nation warning and detection mechanisms that appropri­ately assess and counteract hostile threats must also be an integral part of the C³I network and must be compatible with U.S. equipment.
According to General Horner, “The initial deployment of air, naval, and ground forces was intended to deter an Iraqi ground attack and defend key ports and air fields along the Saudi northern gulf coastdisposition of forces eventually was expanded to block the two eastern avenues of approach.”⁸²³ The area defense plan called for establish­ing initial defenses near Al Jubay and Dhahran and for using air power to reduce Iraqi combat capabilities that could be applied against U.S. and Coalition forces. During this initial phase, USCINCCENT considered air power crucial in deterring an Iraqi attack, thereby putting attendant stress on U.S., host nation, and Coalition security forces.⁸²⁴ For example, there was a fury of activity to ensure that stinger missile teams and other point air defense systems were quickly moved into the bases. Work shifts were extended and military working dog teams deployed to give air bases an early warning capability, especially at the most critical bases.⁸²⁵
However, there was some difficulty in establishing the Army's role in the defense of air bases and how air bases fit into the joint rear area security scheme. This was exacerbated by the fact that very few Air Force and U.S. Army security force leaders were thoroughly familiar with rear area operations. Except for limited discussions above the unit level, there was little knowledge and even less understanding of the U.S. Army's role in establishing theater rear area operations and when they would participate in airbase ground defense operations. Despite years of exercises and joint training efforts at the unit level, the divergent expecta­tions of Army and Air Force leaders became manifest throughout the initial employment of their forces.⁸²⁶
Security planners at CENTAF expressed concerns to ARCENT with regard to rear area security procedures, and while there was agreement that there should be a focus of primal combat operations, these operations were constrained by U.S. Army and Air Force force structures. As long as the U.S. Army leadership was reluctant to commit combat maneuver forces to rear area operations, and as long as Army reservists represent the bulk of rear area personnel, including rear area security, all requiring a Presi­dential call‑up of reserves, rear area security will remain a source of irritation to both the Air Force and the U.S. Army.
These conflicts of interest stemmed from differing Army and Air Force views of joint rear area security concepts. As noted, the Army is primarily concerned with front-line troops, where it concentrates its com­bat forces.⁸²⁷ New Army doctrine stressed “base defenses, an increased combat role for military police, and the employment of major combat units in the rear area”but only when necessary.⁸²⁸ The Air Force, on the other hand, tended to believe that rear area bases had to be defend­ed at all costs, because from these bases close air support and battlefield air interdiction missions were launched in support of the land campaign.⁸²⁹ However, the Air Force realized that some bases were more critical than others and did not want to extend this policy to all its bases. [DELET­ED]⁸³⁰
While the Air Force viewed air base ground defense as a crucial Army mission, the U.S. Army's major concern naturally lay at the front or forward line of troops. In the Army's view, air base ground defense was just one of many rear area security issues. Its slightly more than 17,000 military police guarded some 9,000 kilometers of supply routes, 172 critical facilities, and eventually more than 84,000 prisoners of war and civilian internees, in addition to normal “police functions.” In some cases, Army and Air Force rear area security interests coincidedbut not necessarily for the same reasons. A good case in point was Dhahran and the smaller bases around it. From an Air Force perspective, air base ground defense in this area was critical because of the number of high-value assets and personnel bedded down there. In this instance, the Army agreed, but mainly because Dhahran was the primary port of entry for its equipment and personnel. In other words, where Army and Air Force interests coincidedthere was little conflict.⁸³¹
While they agreed in principle on the major aspects of rear area security, the Air Force and Army differed on the methods and procedures necessary to achieve it. For example, CENTAF's position was that at some point, Air Force ground defense force commanders should have opera­tional control of forces designated for the air base ground defense mis­sion, so that they would have them available when and where they were needed. On the other hand, ARCENT was concerned with rear area securi­ty issues that went beyond the scope of air base ground defense and wanted to maintain operational control over all its forces until such time as the threat of attack on CENTAF sites became imminent.⁸³² The Army was prepared to provide what it called “active” air base ground defense to those loca­tions within the “combat zone,” but the Air Force rarely established bases or bedded down valuable assets in areas that close to the front lines.⁸³³

Despite these differ­ences, ARCENT and CENTAF did join together on some issues. One such point of agreement was that base clusters should be used as the building blocks for the rear area security system.⁸³⁴
Fundamental to the resolution of the issues was the need for Air Force planners to acknowledge the Army's view with respect to the difficulty and complexity of the security problems. For example, designa­tion of the front and rear lines may become “blurred,” and the commit­ment of combat ground forces to static defense could render decisive offensive operations ineffective and thereby delay enemy defeat. On the other hand, U.S. Army planners had to acknowledge the pivotal role of air power to the theater campaign and to acknowledge the fact that the air component projects its combat power from the rear area, and as such must be appropriately protected. In fact, these issues were never com­pletely resolved, despite the fact that both General Horner and Lt. Gen. John Yeosock, ARCENT, discussed it in official letters.⁸³⁵
The operational objectives of U.S. and Allied forces in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm evolved in concept with the ongoing buildup of U.S. military capabilities in the theater. The relationship between strategic goals and force potential is interactive and variable overtime. . . . earlydeploying forces played more [of] a deterrent [rather] than a defensive role. . . . As the U.S. buildup continued and allied defensive positions were consolidated, a broader range of military options to enhance both deterrence and defensive prospects became possible. Logistics support and command and control in the theater influenced other options and capabilities. A defense with air and light ground forces was probably feasible by mid-September. This type of defense would have worn down the Iraqi forces at the sacrifice of territory.⁸³⁶

For Air Force planners, the key issue was to ensure that no Air Base was sacrificed. With the further arrival of ground forces through October, the defensive potential of the allied forces was more fully real­ized. The Phase II buildup in early November assured a successful defense and opened a range of offensive options.⁸³⁷
Development of Rear Area Security
The joint rear area security structure was slow to materialize. In fact, the rear area security command structure was so slow in maturing that it was difficult to address security requirements of the Coalition forces without some confusion and duplication of effort.⁸³⁸ This occurred be­cause many of the combat service support units that make up the rear area security system consist primarily of reserve and national guard units. They are mobilized and deployed in the later stages of the force deploy­ment schedule and do not compete well against combat units for early air and sea lift.⁸³⁹ The preliminary CENTAF security police contacts with CENTCOM and ARCENT military police units had been established prior to Operations Desert Shield deployment. The initial air base ground defense priorities were identified to ARCENT by a CENTAF message on 8 August 1990.⁸⁴⁰ On 27 August 1990, the CENTAF security police and ARCENT military police staffs met to prepare more formalized plans for air base ground defense support. They identified the King Fahd and Dhahran areas as the initial two priorities for military police support, followed by the Riyadh and King Khalid International Airport areas. CENTAF informed ARCENT that it would reassess its priorities and refine them once evaluations of the air bases were clarified. ARCENT then informed CENTAF that their military police support to air bases would assume number one priority in their operations order.⁸⁴¹ There was, however, no mutual understanding of what constituted an acceptable level of risk with respect to vulnerability of air bases.⁸⁴² Also, it did not take into account the requisite degree of “dedicated” support that military police forces would be able to provide. This was significant because the military police forces were a vital, if not pivotal, element that linked the Air Force air base ground defense troops with other rear area support units.⁸⁴³
By 28 September 1990, officers from the U.S. Army 22d Support Command made initial contact with CENTAF security police to begin a formal process in developing the rear area support group structure. The intent was to coordinate unit actions for rear area operations. They determined the number of air base ground defense liaison teams made surveys of the terrain, and determined among other things where the Rear Tactical Operations Centers would be established.
The primary focus of security and air base ground defense initia­tives was to contribute to a cohesive rear area security system and to combine the right force mix to stifle, thwart, or take away the initiative from the enemy. As stated earlier, the rear area security concept used base clusters as the building blocks of the security scheme. The air bases were consid­ered clusters within themselves; therefore, the ground defense command­ers developed directives and operating procedures to provide a capability to increase responsiveness of units to react to enemy activi­ties. This was achieved by continuously sorting and assessing intelli­gence data provided by the security intelligence networkwith confidence that the system would provide the early warning necessary to alert base units of potential attack. This, of course, required an iterative methodolo­gy in which each successive step in developing the rear area security plan continuously refined the previous one.

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