Gulf War Air Power Survey



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Part II
Support
Task Force Chief
Mr. Richard A. Gunkel

Authors
Mr. Ted Beck

Lt. Col. Donald G. Belle

Capt. Ariane L. Desaussure

Mr. Edgar L. Franklin

Mr. Fonce E. Gipson

Dr. Ronald B. Hartzer

Lt. Col. Harry L. Heintzelman, IV

Maj. Thomas R. MacPhail

Dr. James S. Nanney

Dr. Albert C. Pierce

Lt. Col. Lorraine K. Potter

Lt. Col. Michael L. Warden

Maj. Michael H. Whitaker
Contents
Report Acknowledgements ix

Introduction xi

1 Air Base Engineering and Services 1

2 Protecting the Air Bases 31

3 Contracting Support 55

4 Legal Support to Air Operations 65

5 Weather Operations 83

6 Mobilization and Personnel Support 103

7 Media and Public Affairs 135

8 Supporting The People 179

9 Medical Support 201

10 Conclusion 233

Index 289

Appendix

A Deployment of Engineering

and Services Forces 249
B Gulf War Air Base Characteristics 253
C Engineering Data as of 19 January 1991 261
D Services Data as of 19 January 1991 263
E MWR Program/Facility By Location 265

Appendix
F The Weather Information System 269
G Operations Desert Shield/Desert

Storm Ground Rules 275


H Public Affairs Chain of Command 277
I Guidelines for News Media 279
J Historical Comparison

of War Correspondence 281



Tables
1 Harvest Falcon Major Components

Used in the Gulf War 7


2 USAFE Billeting Support 28
3 Threat Level Matrix 35
4 Integrated Security Forces

of U.S. Air Bases 49


5 Contracts Transferred to Saudi Arabia 61
6 Composition and Strength

of USAF Ready Reserve 105


7 Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up,

22 August 1990 108


8 Selected Reserve Call-up,

14 November 1990 110


9 Partial Mobilization, 18 January 1991 111
10 Partial Mobilization Authorities

Compared to Number Activated 118


11 DOD Casualty Figures 129
12 Deployability Problems Associated With

Inadequate Dependent Care Plans 130


13 Opinion Poll 142
14 Opinion Poll 144
15 Opinion Poll 149
16 Opinion Poll 151
17 Average Weekly Transactions Processed 192
18 Medical Manpower Summary 206
19 Aeromedical Evacuation Data 224
20 Meteorological Tactical Equipment 273

Figures
1 AOR Air Bases 11
2 USAF Ground Defense Forces 32
3 Air Base Ground Defense 44
4 Weather Support Forces 84
5 Climatology for 10,000 Ft. or Lower Ceilings 85
6 Joint Air Component Planning Cycle 95
7 Total Force Mobilization Resources 104
8 Past Use of the Air Reserve Component 106

9 Selected Reserve and

Active Strength Comparison 112
10 Employment of Reserve Components

During Desert Shield 112


11 Guard and Reserve Support Unit Sorts Jul 1990 119
12 USAF Women Deployed and Total Force 126
13 Active Air Force Nondeployables By Type 131
14 Military Post Office Locations 196
15 September 1990-May 1991 SWA Mail Volume 198
16 Disease and Non-Battle Injury Rates 207
17 Air-Transportable Hospital Locations 208
18 Hospital Support of the Gulf War 210
19 Air Force Casualty Movement 216
20 Theater Casualty Flow Plan 217
21 CENTAF Aeromedical Evacuation

Decision Time 218



Report Acknowledgements
When the survey of support areas was assigned to the Logis­tics, Support, and Space Task Force under Mr. Richard A. Gunkel, it was decided that the functional areas would heavily contribute written materi­als in developing the Support Report. The responsibility for coordinating and managing these efforts, providing guidance, assessing inputs, editing, and rewriting materials fell upon Mr. Fonce E. Gipson. In addition, Mr. Gipson authored the chapters on materiel and contract­ing; morale, wel­fare, and recreation; and coauthored with Mr. Ted Beck the conclusions. Mr. Beck also produced the chapter on person­nel. The other chapters were written by Dr. Ronald B. Hartzer (air base engineering), Lt. Col. Donald G. Belle (air base defense), Capt. Ariane L. Desaussure with Lt. Col. Harry L. Heintzelman, IV (law of aerial warfare), Maj. Thomas R. MacPhail (weather operations), Dr. Albert C. Pierce with Lt. Col. Michael L. Warden (media and public affairs), Lt. Col. Lorraine K. Potter (chap­laincy), Mr. Edgar L. Frank­lin (finance), Maj. Michael H. Whitaker (postal operations), and Dr. James S. Nanney (medical affairs). For writing the stories of these functional areas, these authors are to be highly commended.
In the technical production of this work, we are indebted to Ms. Cecelia French and Mr. Alan P. Heffernan (for their adroit elec­tronic manipulation), Mr. Chris Pankow (for his thorough editing), and Ms. Barbara L. Gardien (for skillful layout and design).

Introduction
The intent of this report is to capture and tell the stories of functional support areas. It is a truism that military commanders must carefully choose the exact mix of combat and support forces. Out of balance, this mix may spell disaster for combat operations and, in some cases, deter­mine the difference between victory and defeat. In view of rapidly changing geopolitical and world economic trends, the need to learn more about combat support operations for limited and regional contingencies is of obvious importance. This report, we hope, will contribute to that end, with focus on those support areas that project air power. This support can best be characterized as either direct support: supporting the air base and air operations; or indirect: supporting the people conducting air operations. Within this framework, support forces must be structured to provide support for both normal, noncombat opera­tions and intense combat operations (twenty-fours, seven days a week).
This characterization lends itself to a three-part description. The first concentrates on supporting the air base, with chapters on air base engi­neering and services, protecting the air base with its materials, and con­tracting support. The second part, support­ing air operations, discusses the law of aerial warfare, weather operations, mobilization, and personnel sup­port. The third area, supporting the people, consists of media and public affairs, providing for troop morale, and medi­cal support. The final chapter identifies spe­cific problems for further investigation and offers conclusions on support operations.
To elaborate on the first part, supporting the air base, the author examines air base engineering and services functions that pertain to building the air base infrastructure needed to support the overall mission of assigned aircraft. This chapter traces background material on air base construction and the force structure needed to accomplish that mission. It reviews Saudi modernization and industrialization program efforts concerning air base engineering, facili­ties, and support capabilities prior to the arrival of U.S. forces. The author addresses deployment of engi­neering forces to about twenty air bases throughout the region and the initial employment of those forces during Operation Desert Shield, inter­weaving Services-related functions, since they reported through engineer­ing channels. The transition to war in Operation Desert Storm and the engineering postwar denial of Iraqi access to southern Iraq air­fields conclude the deliberation on air base engineering and services.
Discussions on protecting the air base include prewar planning and security police manpower determination standards. Particularly empha­sized are air force structure requirements for protecting the air base and its assets. Here the author analyzes differences between the Army and the Air Force with regard to air base ground defense, their differing concepts of rear area security, and a deliberation of the different doctrinal perspectives. This part of the report then focuses on employ­ing security forces as a joint effort between Army, Air Force, and Coalition forces at various sites in the theater. The author discusses relations with host nation security forces as well as the gradual acknowledgment of mutual capabili­ties to protect both U.S. and Coalition assets and person­nel and ana­lyzes command and control issues with emphasis on the ground de­fens­es in terms of Air Force and Army relationship. The Air Force contends that rear area security is more important than does the Army, since the majori­ty of Army combat forces operate on the front lines. The Air Force contends, however, that Army close air support requirements pro­vided by the Air Force justify protection of high-dollar value assets by Army combat units. The final discussion of this part centers on maturing the security structure at beddown locations, materiel and contracting support related to the air base, including the services that support the air base.
The second major area of this report contains chapters that address direct or indirect functions that support air oper­ations. A chapter on law of aerial warfare discusses mobility, deployment, legal issues surrounding the activation of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, communications between forward and rear echelons, and international law pertaining to the Status of Forces Agreements between the United States, host nations, and civil­ian contractors. Air refueling of Coalition aircraft also involved the Status of Forces Agreements between the United States and host nations. Authors further deliberate rules of engagement, with specific emphasis on legal involvement in the targeting process, use of civilians, prisoner of war issues, and war claims. Civil law and legal assistance absorbed attention with regard to Service members and their families; the Soldiers and Sailors Relief Act particu­larly emphasizes reemployment rights of those returning from the Gulf War. Contracting in the theater of opera­tions, contract law dealing with leas­ing, and blanket purchasing agree­ments commanded attention because of their volume. A discussion of judge advocate redeployment includes issues surrounding property leased by the U.S. Government and property turned over to host nations.
The author identified the impact of the weather support structure on air operations in Southwest Asia, dealing with climatology as it was predict­ed and comparing it to actual conditions. The chapter deals with the impact of weather on tactics and the ability to launch missions in the theater of operations. It shows how joint weather support is provided and examines problematic issues of sharing weather informa­tion between Services; the value of weather sup­port; examples where missions were planned on the basis of accurate weather forecasting; and in conclusion, what type of equipment is needed to support air opera­tions.
Concluding the second major part of the report is a chapter on mobi­lization and per­sonnel support. This chapter analyzes the U.S. Armed Forces structure and the call-up of Reserve and Air National Guardsmen. It addresses practices facing mobilization of reserve forces, training exercises, problems resolved over the last ten years, and deals with Re­serve and Air National Guard volunteerism. The chapter describes how in the build-up phase the United States created an offensive capability to extract Iraq from Ku­wait in conjunction with the presidential use of a partial mobiliza­tion authorization at the beginning of hostilities. It covers person­nel accountability of Active, Reserve, National Guard and demobi­lization issues, proce­dures and capabilities of Personnel Support Continu­ing Operations (PERSCO), casualty services, and Operation Yellow Ribbon along with family sup­port services. The chapter also addresses civilian personnel issues along with the use of contracting personnel in the Gulf War.
The last functional area, supporting people, begins with coverage of the media and the air war. It focuses on several central issues that may have multiroles relating to wartime media coverage. It deals with infor­mation affecting deci­sion­makers, politicians, the public, and the war fighters in the field; it analyzes influence on the will of a nation to fight. Three primary themes direct the attention of the reader: media coverage and public opinion as measured by the government in weighing public opinion and how the public weighs the progress of the war; media cover­age and political-military decisionmaking based on media coverage with its impact on future deci­sions; and me­dia coverage of combat operations with inher­ent problems of allowing the media to cover actual com­bat operations. Such may stem from a logistical perspective, from the risk of danger to media personnel, or they may involve operational security.
In providing for troop morale, a number of areas came under scruti­ny: those of chaplaincy, morale, welfare and recreation, finance, and postal services. Planning and deployment of chaplains, their role on the CENTAF commander's staff, and restriction placed on them during the Gulf War posed a number of problems and offered challenges associated with operat­ing in an Islamic country. Practic­ing of one's faith in the Gulf region, such as observing Jewish Holy days and the increased inter­est displayed by armed forces members in studying the scriptures provid­ed chaplains with valuable insight. Counseling was a major concern, both to Service members and their families back home. Discussion also focus­ses on problems associated with deployment and redeployment.
The limited facilities available to provide for recreation and boost morale and welfare in a desert environment and the disparity of operating conditions throughout the area of operations afforded some investigation. Service members did benefit from rest and recuperation activities, celebri­ty tours, and from donated equip­ment and supplies provided by the general public. On the home front, discussion centers on support activi­ties provided to family members of deployed personnel and Con­gressio­nal intervention due to a lack of support associated with de­ploy­ment.
A central responsibility of the deployed finance and comptroller personnel was to accommodate the financial needs of Service people and to satisfy con­tracting require­ments. A discussion addresses the skills and knowl­edge levels of finan­cial personnel and how associat­ed training prepared them for their mis­sion in a combat environment. It also reviews the problems associat­ed with a lack of a central command and control struc­ture and the quality of instructions being provided to field finance person­nel by some nineteen different agencies.
A brief survey of postal operations provides background material on mail operations during World War II and the role of the Air Force as single service manager in South­west Asia. Further discussion centers on deployment planning, existing postal infrastructure within the theater, mail-handling equipment and supplies, as well as interface require­ments and restrictions imposed by host nation customs. Discussion explores Congressio­nal intervention and establishment of free mail, as well as "Any Service Mem­ber" mail issues, the roles of the United States Postal Service, Mili­tary Postal Service Agency, Military Airlift Command, Federal Aviation Agency, and commercial mail-handling services.
Medical support analysis begins with a description of mobile medical facilities during the Gulf War, with central themes on deployment and setup of the first medical facility on 14 August 1990. The analysis highlights medi­cal and dental problems of Reservists and the lack of sufficient medical equipment and supplies during the early stages of the deployment. The author addresses the activation of contingency hospitals in Europe along with inadequate facilities and slow movement of medical equi­pment and supplies to set up operations. Some did not become operational until as late as 28 February 1991. An outline of aeromedical evacuation proce­dures and problems emphasizes Joint Chiefs of Staff casualty estimate planning. Other medical areas cover preventive medi­cine and aircrew medical support issues, prediction rates for in and out patient versus actual experience (which were much lower than expected), aircr­ew prob­lems such as fatigue and grounding of aircrews, biologi­cal and chemical warfare defense, as well as precautions taken against casual­ties and their associated problems.
Many of the writers involved in compiling this survey participated in the support force that deployed to the Middle East. In reflecting on the Gulf War, the read­er should keep in mind the purposes of the deploy­ment. The first one, in Au­gust 1990, supported defensive operations to deter further aggression by Iraq; the deployment in November 1990, supported offen­sive operations intended to extract Iraq from Kuwait.
Though this survey does not ex­haust every conceivable source, it does include materi­als provided by functional areas, which consist of:
• Written accounts from all levels, per­spectives, and functional areas
• Unit histories and interviews with key personnel
DOD, JCS, and Service reports and studies
SITREPS, message traffic, briefings, and official reports
• Air Force Reme­dial Action Program lessons learned
Joint Uniform Lessons Learned System (JULLS)
Hopefully, the conclusions reached as a result of this survey along with a discussion of issues and specific recommendations will spur further investigation within the functional areas discussed. It is realized, howev­er, that firm conclusions and implications for future combat support opera­tions will take time to evolve.

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Air Base Engineering and Services
Air Bases and Aerospace Operational Art
Background
A major contributing factor to the successful prosecution of the air campaign during Operation Desert Storm was the availability and opera­bility of a network of bases needed to support air power. To identi­fy air power, Gen. Curtis E. LeMay said: “When I speak of air strength, I am not speaking only of airplanes. I am speaking of airfields, depots, stock­piles, control and communications centers, highly trained and skilled manpowerand airplanes. These constitute air power.”756
Air bases have undergone a vast transformation since the early days of World War I, when they consisted of no more than grass or dirt run­ways, a few structures, and often livestock. The limited range of early aircraft dictated that most airfields be located as near the front lines as practical. Although simple in design, they were quite expansive. The Amanty field in France, for example, was large enough to accommodate assembly and take-off formation of eighteen to twenty aircraft.757
Recognizing the paramount importance of air bases and their need for dedicated engineering support, with the approach of WW II, Gen. Henry H. Arnold organized battalions of Aviation Engineers to support basing requirements of the growing Army Air Corps. By the end of the war, these units served in all theaters and had built or upgraded 568 airfields overseas.758 Army Air Forces planners generally divided airfields into 2 types: dry-weather and all-weather. Dry-weather fields had dirt or sand runways and parking areas unusable in wet weather. All-weather fields were surfaced with concrete, asphalt, crushed stone, coral, or matting. The IX Aviation Engineer Command was created to rehabili­tate and construct airfields on the European continent. By V-E Day, 8 May 1945, they had constructed or reconditioned 241 airfields.759 In the Pacific, airfields became a primary objective of island-hopping toward Japan, and the capture of an island's airfield or the construction of a new one was key in defending the region and extending the range for bomb­ers.760
The Korean War renewed the appreciation for adequate air bases. The introduction of several new aircraft, including jets, required longer and wider runways, larger taxiways and parking aprons, and more strin­gent design criteria. Engineers constructed 9,000-foot all-weather run­ways at Osan, Taegu, Kunsan, and Suwon, and during the Korean War, they built or upgraded 55 airfields.761
Inadequate basing limited the build-up of American forces in South­east Asia in the mid-1960s. To overcome the limitations, the Air Force built four major air bases in South Vietnam (Cam Ranh Bay, Phu Cat, Phan Rang, and Tuy Hoa). Often parked dangerously close together, aircraft offered a lucrative target for terrorists and presented a safety hazard. On one occasion, the accidental explosion of a bomb on a parked B-57 at Bien Hoa triggered a series of blasts that killed or injured 100 people and destroyed more than 50 aircraft and vehicles. In the face of such experience, engineers initiated a major program to construct revet­ments and aircraft shelters to protect the valuable assets.762
Engineering and Services
Air Force Engineers are organized into 2 basic types of units with complementary missions: Base Civil Engineering units and Civil Engi­neering RED HORSE units. Base Civil Engineering units, including Prime BEEF (Base Engineer Emergency Forces), participate with combat forces, providing direct support to the operational mission at each air base. The workforce in the United States is comprised of roughly 50 percent mili­tary and 50 percent civilians, who establish, maintain, and restore the base infrastructure and provide critical operational support, such as fire suppression and crash rescue. Prime BEEF is part of a Base Civil Engi­neering unit earmarked to deploy as 50-, 100-, 150-, and 200-person teams in support of contingencies. Civil Engineering RED HORSE units are wartime-structured engineers that provide a heavy engineering capability but not base-level operations and maintenance. Mobile, rapidly deploy­able, and largely self-sufficient for limited periods of time, they perform wartime tasks, such as major force beddown, heavy damage repair, bare­base development, and heavy engineering operations.
The Army, Navy, and Marine engineer units train essentially full time for their combat roles. These units have no peacetime base mainte­nance tasks although they may accept specific projects for team skill training. Two-thirds of the Army Engineer capability consists of reserves, and they focus on joint operations, Coalition warfare, with a theater of operations orientation. They train to support battlefield functionsmobility, counter­mobility, survivability, general support engineering, topography engineer­ing, and sustainment of all forces in the theater. The Navy Seabees focus on the sea-land bridge engineering problem and advanced base support; their force consists of about seventy percent re­serves, and their battalions rotate from home stations to deployed loca­tions for about six months at a time. Their training is conducted in close concert with the Marines for amphibious operations, and usually they are included in the amphibious assault follow-on force. The Marine engi­neers focus primarily on

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Prime BEEF establish, maintain, and restore base infrastructure and provide critical opera­tional support.

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