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Its try or die for the aff—heg decline causes US-China war and regional blocs that escalates to large scale conflict


Herd 11 [Graeme P. Herd, Head of the International Security Programme and Co-Director of the International Training Course in Security Policy at the GCSP accredited by the University of Geneva,“The Global Puzzle: Order in an Age of Primacy, Power-Shifts and Interdependence”, Geneva Papers Research Series, 2011]

What are the strategic effects of this power-shift? Stephen Walt, a leading US realist international relations theorist, argues that China’s economic rise renders security competition with the US “virtually inevitable”, evidencing the rapid expansion of Chinese military, particularly naval, capability as “a classic manifestation of great power status”:¶ “Beijing is seeking to build its economy, then expand its military capacity, achieve a position of regional dominance, and then exclude other major powers from its immediate neighborhood.”30 With regards to the US-China relationship, Minixin Pei reinforces¶ this conflictual narrative, arguing that: “Because of the deep and unbridgeable differences between the two countries in terms of their political values, conceptions of international order and geopolitical interests, constant frictions, even minor conflicts, should be the rule.”31 Martin Jacques understands friction as a consequence of power¶ shifts: “Google and climate change are relatively new disputes. But we should not be¶ surprised by them. China’s rise means that it is now involved in areas of the world and on issues where previously it had little or no stake. As China becomes a global power¶ it is bound to come into conflict with the United States on a number of subjects.”32¶ Paul Krugman paints the portrait of a “rogue economic superpower, unwilling to play by the rules” of the game, citing “China’s grossly protectionist exchange-rate policy” as key evidence.33¶ If such trends continue and grow, we might hypothesis that a Hobbesian zerosum, hierarchy and balance-of-power world order would emerge, one in which¶ Great Power competition is unconstrained and aggressive self-help behavior the order of the day. Great Powers would consolidate their order-producing and managerial role in their hinterlands and regional neighbourhoods. Geopoliticalbloc formation would result. Regional hegemons could use hard coercive force if¶ necessary, but trade concessions, development assistance and market access or¶ denial would more likely be the sticks and carrots of first resort. A re-division of¶ the world in the 2010s and 2020s into multiple regionalisms creates the 21st century¶ variant of a competing mercantilist 19th century regional order.34 According¶ to this “multiple regionalisms” scenario, regional collectivities of diverse political units consolidate around regional hegemons: limited inter-regional cooperation occurs only when benefits are very apparent; regional hegemons organize and¶ structure intra-regional cooperation. In this competitive paradigm, the principle¶ of legitimate authority as embodied by states co-exists with the principle of exchange¶ as characterised by the efficiency of decentralised markets and embraced¶ most strongly by transnational corporations.35 The principle of solidarity, enacted¶ most widely by participative collective movements operating in increasingly transnational¶ and global civil society groups is subordinate. Under such conditions,¶ the previous durable, tolerable hegemony exercised by a single state – the US – is¶ understood to be “decreasingly sustainable”.36

Unipolarity reduces the likelihood of war.


Donovan 4 (Edgar, Works for the Department of Defense. “American Unipolarity: Is it a Sustainable Model Towards a More Peaceful World Order?”http://www.eddiedonovan.com/publications/IRFINAL2.pdf, March 24, 2004)

Uncontestable unipolarity as in the case of America's current position in the world creates massive disincentives for other powers to challenge hegemonic rivalry thus eliminating the threat of world war. Furthermore, as in the case of Gulf War I, America will also be able to contain and/or confront geopolitical crisiscs thereby reducing regional security dilemmas that during past multipolar eras would have certainly led to full scale regional conflicts. The end result will be an average smaller percentage of the overall world population killed due to war operations than in previous bipolar or multipolar eras.


AT: Impact Turns

Balance of power theory conclude unipolarity is peaceful.


Wholforth 7 (William C.- Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. The MIT Press Journal- “The Stability of a Unipolar World”. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/wohlforthvol24no1.pdf Sep. 5, 2007)

Unipolarity favors the absence of war among the great powers and compara- tively low levels of competition for prestige or security for two reasons: the leading state’s power advantage removes the problem of hegemonic rivalry from world politics, and it reduces the salience and stakes of balance-of-power politics among the major states. This argument is based on two well-known realist theories: hegemonic theory and balance-of-power theory. Each is con- troversial, and the relationship between the two is complex.35 For the purposes of this analysis, however, the key point is that both theories predict that a unipolar system will be peaceful. how to think about unipolarity Hegemonic theory has received short shrift in the debate over the nature of the post–Cold War international system.36 This omission is unwarranted, for the theory has simple and profound implications for the peacefulness of the post–Cold War international order that are backed up by a formidable body of scholarship. The theory stipulates that especially powerful states (“hegemons”) foster international orders that are stable until differential growth in power produces a dissatisaed state with the capability to challenge the dominant state for leadership. The clearer and larger the concentration of power in the leading state, the more peaceful the international order associated with it will be.

Unipolarity generates less incentives for power competition.


Wholforth 7 (William C.- Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. The MIT Press Journal- “The Stability of a Unipolar World”. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/wohlforthvol24no1.pdf Sep. 5, 2007)

In sum, both hegemonic theory and balance-of-power theory specify thresh- olds at which great concentrations of power support a peaceful structure. Balance-of-power theory tells us that smaller is better.40 Therefore one pole is best, and security competition among the great powers should be minimal. Hegemonic theory tells us that a clear preponderance in favor of a leading state with a comprehensive power portfolio should eliminate rivalry for pri- macy. Overall, then, unipolarity generates comparatively few incentives for security or prestige competition among the great powers.






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