Heg File Shaun, Julian, Taylor Heg Bad
Download 0.71 Mb.
|
- Navigate this page:
- AT : Iraq
- AT: Rising Powers
- AT: China
Heg InevitableGenericPower share of the US makes up for other sectorsBrooks & Wohlforth 8 (Stephen- Professor of Government B.A., Economics and Politics, UC Santa Cruz, M.A., M.Phil., Ph.D., Political Science, Yale University, and William- Professor of Government, B.A., International Relations, Beloit College M.A., International Relations, Yale University, M.Phil., Ph.D., Political Science, Yale University, “World Out of Balance- International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy”, Pg. 17) THE DISSOLUTION OF THE SOVIET UNION marked the emergence of historically unprecedented U.S. advantages in the scales of world power. No system of sovereign states has ever contained one state with comparable material preponderance.1 Following its invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the United States loomed so large on the world stage that many scholars called it an empire,2 but the costly turmoil that engulfed Iraq following the toppling of Saddam Hussein in 2003 quieted such talk. Suddenly, the limits of U.S. power became the new preoccupation. Many analysts began to compare the United States to Britain at the beginning of the twentieth century—an overstretched, declining, “weary Titan” that “staggers under the too vast orb of his fate.”3 What accounts for this sudden shift in assessments of American power? For most observers, it was not new information about material capabilities. As Robert Jervis observes, “Measured in any conceivable way, the United States has a greater share of world power than any other country in history.”4 That statement was as accurate when it was written in 2006 as it would have been at any time after 1991, and the primacy it describes will long persist, even if the most pessimistic prognostications about U.S. economic, military, and technological com- petitiveness come true. For most scholars of international relations, what really changed after 2003 were estimates of the political utility of America’s primacy. Suddenly, scholars were impressed by the fact that material preponderance does not always translate into desired out- comes. For many, theories of international relations (IR) that explain constraints on the use of power were vindicated by American setbacks in Iraq and elsewhere. AT: IraqHeg is inevitable- empirically proven.Brooks & Wohlforth 8 (Stephen- Professor of Government B.A., Economics and Politics, UC Santa Cruz, M.A., M.Phil., Ph.D., Political Science, Yale University, and William- Professor of Government, B.A., International Relations, Beloit College M.A., International Relations, Yale University, M.Phil., Ph.D., Political Science, Yale University, “World Out of Balance- International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy”, Pg. 32-33) Despite the weight of this evidence, elite perceptions of U.S. power had shifted toward pessimism by middle of the first decade of this cen- tury. As we noted in chapter 1, this was partly the result of an Iraq- induced doubt about the utility of material predominance, a doubt red- olent of the post-Vietnam mood. In retrospect, many assessments of U.S. economic and technological prowess from the 1990s were overly optimistic; by the next decade important potential vulnerabilities were evident. In particular, chronically imbalanced domestic finances and accelerating public debt convinced some analysts that the United States once again confronted a competitiveness crisis.23 If concerns con- tinue to mount, this will count as the fourth such crisis since 1945; the first three occurred during the 1950s (Sputnik), the 1970s (Vietnam and stagflation), and the 1980s (the Soviet threat and Japan’s challenge). None of these crises, however, shifted the international system’s struc- ture: multipolarity did not return in the 1960s, 1970s, or early 1990s, and each scare over competitiveness ended with the American position of primacy retained or strengthened.24 AT: Rising PowersCounterbalancing takes out rising powersBrooks & Wohlforth 8 (Stephen- Professor of Government B.A., Economics and Politics, UC Santa Cruz, M.A., M.Phil., Ph.D., Political Science, Yale University, and William- Professor of Government, B.A., International Relations, Beloit College M.A., International Relations, Yale University, M.Phil., Ph.D., Political Science, Yale University, “World Out of Balance- International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy”, Pg. 38-39) In this chapter, we show that the theory does not predict and histori- cal experience does not imply that there will be efforts to counter- balance the United States today. Balance-of-power theory predicts that states try to prevent rise of a hegemon. While scholars debate the historical evidence for this proposition, they fail to register a point important for constraints on U.S. power today: Even if a potential hegemon must be concerned about counterbalancing, the theory yields no such implication for one that has already established its material primacy. We argue that once a country achieves such a position, it has passed a threshold, and the effect of increasing power is reversed: the stronger the leading state and the more entrenched its dominance, the more unlikely and thus less constraining are counterbalancing dynamics. Our explanation for the absence of counterbalancing against the United States emphasizes a simple point: counterbalancing is and will long remain prohibitively costly for the other major powers. Because no country comes close to matching the comprehensive nature of U.S. power, an attempt to counterbalance would be far more expensive than a similar effort in any previous international system. Matching U.S. capabilities could become even more formidably costly, moreover, if the United States decided to increase its defense expenditures (cur- rently around 4 percent of GDP) to Cold War levels (which averaged 7.5 percent of GDP).4 AT: ChinaHeg is inevitable—Kagan is wrong and China is weakMasud 12 [Kazi Anwarul Masud, Bangladesh - former Secretary and ambassador at Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea and Germany, “American primacy in international affairs”, http://theindependentbd.com/paper-edition/editorial/post-editorial/92992-american-primacy-in-international-affairs.html, February 3, 2012] But neo-conservatives like Robert Kagan in his recent book The World America Made continues to reassert that it would be folly for the US and the world at large to let the Americans to take time-out from its global responsibilities. ¶ He considers it as “illusion” political scientist John Ikenberry’s argument that even with diminished American power “ the underlying foundation of liberal international order will survive and thrive” for several reasons. Kagan argues that great powers rarely decline suddenly. ¶ Besides measuring a nation’s relative power depends on some basic indicators: the size and influence of its economy relative to those of other competing powers; magnitude of its military power; and the influence it wields in international affairs. In 1969 the US produced a quarter of the global economic output and it remains so even today. ¶ China may become the largest economy in the world in a few decades but there is no guarantee that the short term economic decisions now being taken in an authoritarian system will remain constant in the long term when a richer middle class may not wish to barter away its freedom any longer for material gains. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 0.71 Mb. Share with your friends:
|