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- Cooperation builds mutual trust and stabilizes relations for the long-term
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Relations ImpactGeneric Relations K2 CoopUS-China cooperation prevents balance-of-power politics and warKissinger 9 [Former National Security Advisor and Secretary of State for Nixon [Henry A. Kissinger, “Rebalancing Relations With China,” The Washington Post] According to conventional wisdom, the world economy will regain its vitality once China consumes more and America consumes less. But as both countries apply that prescription, it will inevitably alter the political framework. As Chinese exports to America decline and China shifts the emphasis of its economy to greater consumption and to increased infrastructure spending, a different economic order will emerge. China will be less dependent on the American market, while the growing dependence of neighboring countries on Chinese markets will increase China's political influence. Political cooperation, in shaping a new world order, must increasingly compensate for the shift in trade patterns. A cooperative definition of a long-range future will not be easy. Historically, China and America have been hegemonic powers able to set their own agendas essentially unilaterally. They are not accustomed to close alliances or consultative procedures restricting their freedom of action on the basis of equality. When they have been in alliances, they have tended to take for granted that the mantle of leadership belongs to them and exhibited a degree of dominance not conceivable in the emerging Sino-American partnership. To make this effort work, American leaders must resist the siren call of a containment policy drawn from the Cold War playbook. China must guard against a policy aimed at reducing alleged American hegemonic designs and the temptation to create an Asian bloc to that end. America and China should not repeat the process that, a century ago, moved Britain and Germany from friendship to a confrontation that drained both societies in a global war. The ultimate victims of such an evolution would be global issues, such as energy, the environment, nuclear proliferation and climate change, which will require a common vision of the future. At the other extreme, some argue that the United States and China should constitute themselves into a G-2. A tacit Sino-American global governing body, however, is not in the interest of either country or the world. Countries that feel excluded might drift into rigid nationalism at the precise moment that requires a universal perspective. America's great contribution in the 1950s was to take the lead in developing a set of institutions by which the Atlantic region could deal with unprecedented upheavals. A region hitherto riven by national rivalries found mechanisms to institutionalize a common destiny. Even though not all of these measures worked equally well, the end result was a far more benign world order. The 21st century requires an institutional structure appropriate for its time. The nations bordering the Pacific have a stronger sense of national identity than did the European countries emerging from the Second World War. They must not slide into a 21st-century version of classic balance-of-power politics. It would be especially pernicious if opposing blocs were to form on each side of the Pacific. While the center of gravity of international affairs shifts to Asia, and America finds a new role distinct from hegemony yet compatible with leadership, we need a vision of a Pacific structure based on close cooperation between America and China but also broad enough to enable other countries bordering the Pacific to fulfill their aspirations. Cooperation builds mutual trust and stabilizes relations for the long-termGarrett 4 – Director of the Asia Program at the Atlantic Council & Fellow @ United States Institute of Peace [Banning Garrett and Jonathan Adams, “U.S.-China Cooperation on the Problem of Failing States and Transnational Threats,” United States Institute of Peace, SPECIAL REPORT 126, SEPTEMBER 2004] The United States and China increasingly share perceptions of the threats and challenges emanating from failing states and recognize the need for preventive and remedial measures to address these dangers. This convergence of perspectives allows for the possibility of enhanced Sino-American cooperation, and such bilateral cooperation could be a central element in strengthening the United States and China’s broader strategic relationship over the next few years. Enhanced cooperation between the United States and China on failing states and transnational threats could have bilateral, regional, and global benefits. On the international level, both nations working together could marshal more resources to address common threats and challenges. They could jointly help improve the effectiveness of multilateral organizations. The bilateral benefits of such cooperation could include less misunderstanding of each side’s unilateral policies toward third countries, such as in the cases of the U.S. military presence in Central Asia and China’s activities in Myanmar, and a demonstration that the two countries can work together on issues of common strategic concern—a critical step toward building domestic support in each country for Sino-American strategic cooperation. In addition, acting jointly on specific problems could help build strategic trust between the United States and China at a critical point in the evolution of their bilateral relationship. These gains will be realized, however, only if flashpoints in Sino-American relations can be successfully managed and other obstacles overcome. To gain support within each country, cooperation should be mutually beneficial and based on common understanding and agreements. The U.S. approach to decision making will need to belie Chinese perceptions of a U.S. tendency to dictate to coalition partners. Although significant obstacles stand in the way of enhanced U.S.-Chinese cooperation on the problems posed by failing states and transnational threats, the impetus to overcome these obstacles may strengthen rather than weaken in the next few years, especially if the problems become increasingly prominent. Closer Sino-U.S. coordination will not only serve U.S. and Chinese interests with regard to minimizing the threats emanating from failing states but also build mutual trust and provide a crucial strategic complement to the growing U.S.-China economic relationship, thereby underpinning long-term stability and development of U.S.-China relations. Asian Integration – High NowAsian interdependence is high now but can declineEconomist 14 [(economics news source) “The flying factory Asia has built a web of economic interdependence which China would be ill-advised to unravel” Nov 15th 2014] AT As a result, East Asia has become one of the most interconnected regions in the world. Trade among EU nations remains even more extensive, but they are part of a single market whereas East Asia has only a tangle of free-trade agreements. As Prema-chandra Athukorala, an economist based in Australia, points out, network trade has been the most dynamic part of world manufacturing exports since the 1990s. The share of East Asian developing countries increased from 14% in 1992-93 to over 30% in 2007-08, with China the main driving force (see chart 1). Such is the pull of China within this new “Factory Asia” that the currencies of most countries in the region now track the Chinese renminbi more closely than they do the American dollar, reckon Arvind Subramanian and Martin Kessler, formerly of the Peterson Institute. Yet for all its power, China is still only a part of the spider’s web, not the centre of it. “What makes the region unique is that you have a tight fit between regional and global integration. The supply chain is linked to final-goods markets in the United States and the EU,” says Razeen Sally of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in Singapore. Global trade has slowed down in the past two years, and in 2012 East Asian trade with the rest of the world for the first time made no contribution to growth. Yet despite the lingering fallout from the 2008 global financial crisis the network effect is still going strong. Exports, especially to America, have shown signs of picking up this summer. Sudhir Shetty, the World Bank’s chief economist for East Asia and the Pacific region, expects the emerging countries in his area to grow by 7% this year, far faster than anywhere else in the developing world. China’s slowing growth rate remains a concern, but the ten members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), including Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam, are trying to make their region more self-sustaining. Next year ASEAN plans to establish an “economic community”—a single market to make network trade more seamless. But China’s assertiveness over disputed territories in the South and East China Seas has put it at loggerheads with important trading partners such as Vietnam and Japan. As yet the economic costs have been bearable, but the risks are high. James Reilly of the University of Sydney thinks that China’s new posturing is a revival of an old practice known as economic statecraft, meaning it is deploying its wealth for strategic foreign-policy purposes. This practice involves both carrots and sticks. In Asia the carrots have included pipelines, railways and trunk roads that China has provided around the region, mainly to supply its own economy with raw materials, but with wider benefits, especially for its poorer neighbours. But there is also coercion, even if this is often counterproductive. In 2012, for example, Chinese officials indirectly encouraged a consumer boycott of Japanese goods as Japan reasserted its claim to disputed islands it calls the Senkakus and the Chinese call the Diaoyus. Customs officials tightened up inspections of Japanese imports. Yet Japan did not back down. Instead, it got closer to neighbours in the region who also objected to Chinese aggressiveness, says Mr Reilly. In the same year Chinese restrictions on banana imports from the Philippines led to a backlash among Filipinos that brought their country closer to America. Bonnie Glaser of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, a think-tank in Washington, says China may even be pursuing economic integration to strengthen its leverage. “China’s strategy is to weave together a network of economic interdependence. It is using the centrality of its power to persuade other nations that to challenge China on territorial issues is simply not worth it.” But its neighbours are not sitting placidly by. Last summer Chinese businesses in Vietnam were attacked by locals after a Chinese state-owned oil firm put an oil rig in waters that both countries lay claim to. Since then, American officials say, its allies in the region have become somewhat keener to move into America’s economic orbit to keep China in check. Japanese investment in China fell to $9.1 billion in 2013, from $13.5 billion the year before. At the same time Japan’s investment in ASEAN more than doubled, to $23.6 billion. Myanmar, until recently a satrap of China, is opening up to the West. Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 1.87 Mb. Share with your friends:
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