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| Afonso v. Bejjani, et al. A-1623-15T4 (App. Div. 2016)
http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/courts/appellate/a1623-15.opn.html Before Judges Sabatino, Nugent and Currier. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-5576-12. Mark A. Clemente argued the cause for appellant (Clemente Mueller, attorneys; Mr. Clemente, on the brief). Jessica J. Mahony argued the cause for respondents (Ruprecht Hart Weeks & Ricciardulli, LLP, attorneys; David Parker Weeks, of counsel and on the briefs; Ms. Mahony, on the briefs). Jonathan H. Lomurro argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Association for Justice (Lomurro, Munson, Comer, Brown & Schottland, LLC, attorneys; Abbott S. Brown, Christina Vassiliou Harvey and Mr. Lomurro, on the brief). PER CURIAM This appeal in a medical malpractice case concerns the application of the New Jersey Medical Care Access and Responsibility and Patients First Act ("Patients First Act" or "the Act"), codified in part at N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-41. In particular, we consider under subsection (a) of the statute whether the defendant physician's treatment of plaintiff in performing a surgical procedure on her leg, known as a phlebectomy, "involve[d]" his claimed specialty in family medicine. N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-41(a). The trial court ruled that the vascular surgeon who plaintiff retained to opine on the standard of care for the surgery was ineligible under the Act to present expert testimony against defendant at trial because the expert was not a family medicine specialist like defendant. The trial court excluded the expert and simultaneously granted defendant summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court's exclusion of plaintiff's proposed expert, despite deposition testimony by defendant himself that solely identified "vascular surgeons" as having the medical specialty that would encompass phlebectomies. However, in light of the confusion caused by defendant's testimony, we vacate summary judgment and remand this matter to afford plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to obtain an appropriate substitute trial expert specializing in family medicine. We derive the following background from the record. On July 28, 2010, defendant John A. Ricci, M.D., and co-defendant Fadi Joseph Bejjani, M.D., performed a phlebectomy1 on plaintiff, Elisangela Soares Afonso. This procedure was performed after Dr. Bejjani asked Dr. Ricci to teach him how to perform the surgery, to which Dr. Ricci agreed. The two doctors performed the procedure in Dr. Bejjani's office, with Dr. Ricci operating on plaintiff's left leg and Dr. Bejjani operating on her right. Neither doctor wrote notes at the time of the surgery documenting the procedure. Plaintiff went to an emergency room after the procedure, where she was diagnosed with multiple infected wounds. Plaintiff was then seen by Dr. Bejjani and Dr. Ricci at Dr. Bejjani's office. Dr. Ricci observed several superficial wounds, which he documented in a note. Plaintiff contends these wounds will leave her with permanent scarring and discoloration of her legs. Plaintiff filed the present medical malpractice action in the Law Division, which, as amended, names both Dr. Ricci and Dr. Bejjani as co-defendants. Three other similar medical malpractice lawsuits were also filed by the same plaintiff's attorney against Dr. Bejjani on behalf of other patients. Those lawsuits, along with plaintiff's present action against Dr. Bejjani, were consolidated for discovery purposes. After Dr. Bejjani refused to participate in discovery, the court dismissed his answers and suppressed his defenses. Judgments of default were subsequently entered against him individually. After proof hearings were held in three of the four cases, three default judgments were entered against Dr. Bejjani for specific sums in this case and two of the related cases. Dr. Bejjani has not appealed those judgments, nor has he participated in this appeal. In his answer to plaintiff's complaint, Dr. Ricci asserted that he is "a physician practicing in family medicine." His answer did not expressly state that the performance of phlebectomies is "involved" in his asserted specialty in family medicine. See R. 4:5-3 (requiring that "[a] physician defendant against a malpractice claim who admits to treating the plaintiff must include in his or her answer the field of medicine in which he or she specialized at the time, if any, and whether his treatment of the plaintiff involved that specialty."), see also Buck v. Henry, 207 N.J. 377, 396 (2011) (requiring the adoption of a court rule to implement these pleading requirements). Despite that omission, it is undisputed that at the ensuing Ferreira2 conference with the court, Dr. Ricci's counsel took the position that he was acting as a family medicine specialist when he operated on plaintiff's leg. Consequently, the trial court instructed plaintiff to obtain an Affidavit of Merit ("AOM") from a family medicine specialist to vouch for her allegations of medical malpractice against Dr. Ricci. Plaintiff complied with the court's directive after the Ferreira conference, and served upon defense counsel a timely AOM from Everett W. Schlam, M.D., a licensed physician specializing in family medicine. Dr. Schlam, who has an active clinical practice in New Jersey in family medicine, attested in the AOM that "there exists a reasonable probability that the care, skill, or knowledge exercised or exhibited in the practice and work of [defendants], including [Dr. Ricci], fell outside of the acceptable, applicable professional standards as they apply to the defendants." Defendant concedes that the AOM from Dr. Schlam comports with the affidavit portion of the Patients First Act. The situation became complicated, however, by the testimony provided by Dr. Ricci at his deposition in June 2014. In responding to questions posed by plaintiff's counsel, Dr. Ricci provided responses that reasonably might be construed as stating that the singular medical specialty "involved" in conducting phlbectomies is the specialty of vascular surgery. In this regard, plaintiff highlights the following portions of Dr. Ricci's deposition answers: Q Is there a specialty in medicine that would be, that would encompass phlebectomies? A Vascular surgeons. Q Did you consider yourself an expert in phlebectomies in July, 2010? A I did not. Later on, Dr. Ricci provided the following testimony: Q If the procedures are performed by physicians other than vascular surgeons, would the physicians performing the phlebectomy be expected to conform to the same generally accepted medical standards as vascular surgeons? A Could you ask that -- I'm not sure what you're asking. [At the request of counsel, the question was read back to the witness.] A I believe so. [(Emphasis added).] Based on this deposition testimony, plaintiff's counsel decided to retain a vascular surgeon as an expert witness to testify at trial against Dr. Ricci and address how defendant deviated from the standards of care in performing the phlebectomy in this case. Plaintiff obtained such an expert report from Carl Warren Adams, M.D., a vascular surgeon. In his three-page report dated April 10, 2014, Dr. Adams criticized in multiple ways the manner in which Dr. Ricci performed the phlebectomy on plaintiff with Dr. Bejjani. He concluded that the defendant doctors "grossly departed and deviated from the accepted standard of care one would expect from a physician treating a patient [with] superficial venous insufficiency." Dr. Ricci moved before the trial court to bar Dr. Adams from testifying as a vascular surgeon in support of plaintiff's claims of deviation from the standard of care. His motion relied upon the following relevant portions of the Patients First Act: In an action alleging medical malpractice, a person shall not give expert testimony or execute an affidavit . . . on the appropriate standard of practice or care unless the person is licensed as a physician or other health care professional in the United States and meets the following criteria: a. If the party against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered is a specialist or subspecialist recognized by the American Board of Medical Specialties or the American Osteopathic Association and the care or treatment at issue involves that specialty or subspecialty recognized by the American Board of Medical Specialties or the American Osteopathic Association, the person providing the testimony shall have specialized at the time of the occurrence that is the basis for the action in the same specialty or subspecialty, recognized by the American Board of Medical Specialties or the American Osteopathic Association, as the party against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered . . . [ N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-41(a) (emphasis added)]. As part of his motion papers, Dr. Ricci included an expert report dated February 13, 2015, that his attorney obtained from a family medicine physician, Robert L. Perkel, M.D. Dr. Perkel opined that "it is acceptable and within the standard of care for a family medicine physician to perform this microphlebectomy procedure." Dr. Perkel did not address, however, the substance of the standard of care, and we presume that defendant has retained a different expert to address that substance. After hearing oral argument, the trial court granted Dr. Ricci's motion to exclude Dr. Adams' expert opinion. In its oral opinion, the court agreed with defendant's argument that Dr. Ricci is a specialist in family medicine, and the surgical procedure here "involve[d]" that specialty, thus requiring plaintiff to present an expert opinion from a similarly-specialized family medicine practitioner. The trial court did not comment in its short opinion about Dr. Ricci's deposition answers. Because the discovery period had run by that point, the court granted summary judgment to Dr. Ricci. Plaintiff now appeals, contending that the trial court misapplied the Patients First Act in an inequitable manner given the particular record in this case. The New Jersey Association of Justice ("NJAJ") has filed an amicus brief supporting plaintiff's position.3 The controlling precedent in this context is the Supreme Court's opinion in Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 484-85 (2013). In Nicholas, the plaintiff was treated for carbon monoxide poisoning. Id. at 467. The plaintiff presented expert testimony from a physician board-certified in internal and preventative medicine, which included the treatment of carbon monoxide poisoning. Ibid. Defendants, however, were board-certified specialists in emergency and family medicine. Ibid. In denying defendant's motion for summary judgment, the trial court allowed the expert's testimony, based on the notion that he was an expert in the treatment given to plaintiff. Id. at 468. The Court reversed, holding that the expert presented must specialize in the same specialty as the defendant physicians.4 Id. at 482. In so holding, the Court noted that carbon monoxide poisoning fell within both the defendants' specialties and the expert's specialties. Id. at 487-488. Here, there is a sufficient basis in the record to support the trial court's determination that the Patients First Act requires plaintiff to present expert testimony from a family medicine doctor. The ABMS has defined "family medicine" in a broad manner sufficient to encompass a surgical procedure such as a phlebectomy. In addition, the AOM that plaintiff obtained from Dr. Schram and the expert report that defense counsel procured from Dr. Perkel also signify that a phlebectomy can be performed by a family medicine specialist as well as a vascular surgeon. The trial court did not misapply its discretion in evidence rulings, see Dinter v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 252 N.J. Super. 84, 92 (App. Div. 1991), nor the governing law set forth in the statute and by the Supreme Court in Nicholas. The specialties may overlap, but in such an instance of overlap, the plaintiff's testifying expert must be of the same specialty as defendant. That said, Dr. Ricci's deposition answers unfortunately injected confusion in this case, perhaps in part by not qualifying his responses when plaintiff's counsel posed the question about the applicable specialty with singular phrasing. Defense counsel did not follow up at the deposition with a clarifying question. Moreover, the report of Dr. Perkel was obtained only about a month before the discovery period ended. Given these circumstances, it is inequitable to not afford plaintiff an opportunity to obtain a substitute report from a family practice specialist, possibly Dr. Schram, with an appropriate opportunity for the defense to obtain a responsive report. See Hill Int'l Inc. v. Atlantic City Bd. of Educ., 438 N.J. Super. 562, 594-95 (App. Div. 2014) (affording plaintiff time to obtain a replacement AOM where the pertinent specialty was a reasonable source of confusion), appeal dismissed, 224 N.J. 523 (2016). We therefore vacate summary judgment and remand the case for that purpose. A case management conference shall be held on remand within forty-five days. Affirmed in part, remanded in part. We do not retain jurisdiction. 1 A phlebectomy has been defined as an "[e]xcision of a segment of a vein, performed sometimes for the cure of varicose veins." Stedman's Medical Dictionary 1481 (28th ed. 2006). As described in Dr. Ricci's deposition, a phlebectomy entails the "removal of varicose veins through small puncture sites in the skin using a [surgical] hook." At times in the record, the procedure in this case is also referred to as a "microphlebectomy." 2 In Ferreira v. Rancocas Orthopedic Assocs., 178 N.J. 144 (2003), the Court determined that "a 'case management conference [shall] be held within ninety days of the service of an answer in all malpractice actions' . . . [where] a 'defendant [is] required to advise the court whether he has any objections to the adequacy of the affidavit' that has been served on him." Buck, supra, 207 N.J. at 394 (quoting Ferreira, supra, 178 N.J. at 154-55); see also Meehan v. Antonellis, 226 N.J. 216, 221 (2016) (reinforcing the importance of such a conference). 3 We need not reach all of the arguments raised by amicus, including its assertion that the Patients First Act violates the separation-of-powers doctrine. 4 The Court very explicitly stated that "plaintiffs cannot establish the standard of care through an expert who does not practice in the same medical specialties as defendant physicians." Nicholas, supra, 213 N.J. at 468. However, the Court later noted that the requirements of the Patients First Act apply when the treatment at issue falls within the defendant physician's American Board of Medical Specialties ("ABMS") specialty. Id. at 482. The Court does not expand further on how these two requirements relate, as the treatment in that case was explicitly determined to fall within the defendants' specialties. Id. at 487. Angelo v. Bergman, A-2392-15T2 (App. Div. 2017) http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/courts/appellate/a2392-15.opn.html Before Judges Fisher and Leone (Judge Fisher concurring). On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-3937- 13.
Robert G. Ricco, attorney for respondent. PER CURIAM Plaintiff Anthony Angelo appeals the trial court's January 8, 2016 order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Joel Bergman, his former attorney. We affirm. I. The parties' statements of undisputed material facts include the following. Plaintiff brought a medical malpractice case against a pain management doctor. Plaintiff was represented by Bergman during the trial, at which Dr. Antonio Aldrete testified as plaintiff's expert witness. In 2011, after three days of trial, plaintiff settled that case for $200,000. In 2013, plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Bergman, the attorney who negotiated the settlement on his behalf. Plaintiff hired Anthony Ambrosio, an attorney, as an expert to write a report on plaintiff's allegations of legal malpractice. Ambrosio issued his report in December 2014. He was deposed in September 2015. Based on Ambrosio's deposition, Judge Vicki A. Citrino found Ambrosio rendered a net opinion. The court dismissed plaintiff's legal malpractice claim on summary judgment. II. If "a trial court is 'confronted with an evidence determination precedent to ruling on a summary judgment motion,' it 'squarely must address the evidence decision first.' Appellate review of the trial court's decisions proceeds in the same sequence[.]" Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 53 (2015) (quoting Estate of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 384-85 (2010)). "On appeal, then, those rulings will be gauged separately: the evidentiary ruling under an abuse of discretion standard, and the legal conclusions undergirding the summary judgment motion itself on a plenary de novo basis." Estate of Hanges, supra, 202 N.J. at 385. We must hew to those standards of review. III. "Legal-malpractice suits are grounded in the tort of negligence." McGrogan v. Till, 167 N.J. 414, 425 (2001). "The elements of a cause of action for legal malpractice are (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship creating a duty of care by the defendant attorney, (2) the breach of that duty by the defendant, and (3) proximate causation of the damages claimed by the plaintiff." Ibid. "As in nearly all malpractice cases, plaintiff needed to produce an expert regarding deviation from the appropriate standard." Garcia v. Kozlov, Seaton, Romanini & Brooks, P.C., 179 N.J. 343, 362 (2004). "As 'the duties a lawyer owes to his client are not known by the average juror,' expert testimony must necessarily set forth that duty and explain the breach." Buchanan v. Leonard, 428 N.J. Super. 277, 288 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting Carbis Sales, Inc. v. Eisenberg, 397 N.J. Super. 64, 78 (App. Div. 2007)), certif. denied, 213 N.J. 534 (2013). "[W]ithout expert testimony, a jury simply does not have the knowledge, training, or experience to decide the settlement value of plaintiff's claim." Kaplan v. Skoloff & Wolfe, P.C., 339 N.J. Super. 97, 104 (App. Div. 2001) (quoting Kelly v. Berlin, 300 N.J. Super. 256, 269 (App. Div. 1997)). "The net opinion rule is a 'corollary of [N.J.R.E. 703] . . . which forbids the admission into evidence of an expert's conclusions that are not supported by factual evidence or other data.'" Townsend, supra, 221 N.J. at 53-54 (citation omitted). "The net opinion rule is succinctly defined as 'a prohibition against speculative testimony.'" Harte v. Hand, 433 N.J. Super. 457, 465 (App. Div. 2013) (citation omitted). "That is, an expert's bare opinion that has no support in factual evidence or similar data is a mere net opinion which is not admissible and may not be considered." Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 372 (2011); see Townsend, supra, 221 N.J. at 57-59. A. Plaintiff argued Bergman committed legal malpractice in valuing the case at $200,000. Plaintiff retained Ambrosio as his expert to show a breach of the standard of care for legal malpractice. In his expert report, Ambrosio opined: "Bergman was negligent in advising Plaintiff to settle his case for $200,000. From a review of other jury verdicts and a reasonable assessment of the case based on my experience, a reasonable settlement value of this case was $500,000." However, in his deposition, Ambrosio conceded defendant's considered opinion of "[$]200,000 and take this and go home is a judgement call and is not malpractice." He also agreed "the real issue of this case" was not "whether [$]200,000 was fair or not."1 Thus, Ambrosio "completely abandoned his original opinions concerning [the] deviation from the . . . accepted standard of care" on the valuation issue. Ritondo by Ritondo v. Pekala, 275 N.J. Super. 109, 116 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 139 N.J. 186 (1994). This case is similar to Ritondo. In that medical malpractice action, plaintiff's medical expert, on crossexamination, "effectively retracted" his direct testimony as to the doctor's deviations from the standard of care. Ibid. After reaffirming his original opinions on redirect, the expert again retracted that testimony on re-cross. Id. at 115. We were persuaded "that the value of testimony given by a witness on direct examination may be entirely nullified by admissions on cross- examination." Id. at 116. Similarly, Ambrosio's testimony negated his opinions in his report. Plaintiff cites a portion of the deposition where Ambrosio stated he was not "retracting that portion of [his] expert opinion that alleges malpractice based on an improper valuation of the case at $200,000."2 However, later in his deposition Ambrosio conceded that "valuation is an art," that you "[c]an't fault" Bergman for "giving his best judgment that this is [plaintiff's] best chance to settle" if that was "his considered opinion," and that his advice to settle for $200,000 was "not malpractice." Plaintiff argues Bergman recommended the $200,000 settlement because he mistakenly believed the medical malpractice case would be dismissed before it reached the jury. Plaintiff cites Ambrosio's report which stated: A reasonably prudent and competent attorney who reviewed Aldrete's trial testimony would conclude that there was no question that this case would reach a jury. Thus, Bergman acted below the applicable standard of care in advising Angelo to settle the case for $200,000, as Bergman has indicated the only reason that he advised Angelo to settle the case [w]as the inability to prove the negligence and malpractice. Nonetheless, Ambrosio abandoned the core of that opinion when he admitted in his deposition that a $200,000 settlement was not malpractice. B. In his report, Ambrosio stated "an additional element of the Defendant's malpractice is the failure to adequately explain the mechanics of the settlement." In open court in plaintiff's presence, Bergman stated "there's been an agreement as to a High/Low in this case," and "[$]200,000 is the low and [$]500,000 is the high." He stated that he had spoken to plaintiff and gone through the evidence and that they had decided not to proceed further with the case. Counsel and the trial court agreed to enter a judgment of no cause dismissing the case with prejudice. On March 25, 2011, plaintiff and Bergman signed a General Release explaining that plaintiff was releasing his claims against the doctor and in return he would "receive the amount of $200,000.00." The signed release stated that "the terms of the settlement and this Release have been completely read and explained to [plaintiff] by [Bergman]," that plaintiff "fully understands . . . the terms of the settlement and of this Release," and that he "entered into the settlement and signed this Release voluntarily" and "without any undue influence." Ambrosio was unaware of this release when he wrote his report. When confronted with the release in his deposition, Ambrosio testified: Q. What is the significance of [plaintiff] entering into a settlement agreement or in this case, a general release, a month after the settlement was entered into in open court? A. Well, the only way he is going to get any money is to sign this release. So this is, again, an opportunity for him to reject the settlement. Q. Now, is it significant that he didn't reject the settlement? A. I am afraid it is. . . . It sort of undercuts his credibility, frankly. . . . .
Q. What would – how would his case in this case be different if he had refused to sign that release? . . . .
A. He probably would be in a position to move to vacate the settlement, based upon he didn't give proper consent. But that [signature of the release] undercuts any ability to do that. Q. Does that mean now that, in fact, in reality, he gave consent to Mr. Bergman and wanted to go forward with the settlement? . . . .
A. Yes, that's what that means. Ambrosio conceded that plaintiff knew he would get $200,000 in the settlement, and that plaintiff knew the settlement would end his medical malpractice case. When asked about plaintiff's claim "he didn't even know the amount of the settlement for six months after it took place," Ambrosio testified he did not "find it credible."3 Accordingly, Ambrosio in his deposition effectively negated his prior opinion that plaintiff did not understand he was settling his case for $200,000. Plaintiff argues that what Bergman referred to as "a highlow agreement" was a fraud. We agree the parties did not enter into a true high-low agreement, which is designed to limit the parties' risks from the jury's verdict.4 Rather, the parties entered into the so-called high-low agreement at the same time as they settled the case for $200,000, so there was no risk from a jury verdict. Despite counsel misrepresenting to the trial judge in the medical malpractice action that the parties had entered into a "high-low agreement," it is undisputed the parties really settled the case for $200,000. It appears the parties characterized their $200,000 settlement as a "high-low agreement" to allow the doctor to pay plaintiff the $200,000 without having to report any malpractice. We do not endorse the parties' deliberate mislabeling of their medical malpractice settlement. Nonetheless, plaintiff failed to show it breached a duty to him or damaged him. Ambrosio testified there was no "impropriety in reaching a settlement . . . in order to allow the doctor not to have to report" malpractice, adding: "It happens oftentimes. It is a big incentive for settlement." In any event, the so-called high-low agreement did not change the essentials of the settlement for plaintiff – dismissal of his case in return for $200,000 – which Ambrosio conceded plaintiff understood. Thus, Ambrosio's "negation" in his deposition testimony of the key portions of his report "was a clear and unequivocal withdrawal of his opinion. As a result, [plaintiff was] left without proof of any deviation of the standard of care, a necessary element of [his] claim." Ritondo, supra, 275 N.J. Super. at 116. 5 That rendered Ambrosio's report a net opinion which the trial court properly precluded. A reviewing court will overturn a trial court's decision to preclude expert opinion only "'when a decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'" U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012) (citation omitted). We find no abuse of discretion here. Thus, Ambrosio did not show a breach of the standard of care in Bergman's advice to settle or his explanation of the mechanics of the settlement. Plaintiff nonetheless argues Ambrosio's references to the Rules of Professional Conduct were sufficient to establish a standard of care. Plaintiff notes that under the ethics rules "[a] lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to settle a matter." R.P.C. 1.2(a). Ambrosio also cited ethics rules that "[a] lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter," and "shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation." R.P.C. 1.4(b), (c). However, particularly after being confronted with the release signed by plaintiff, Ambrosio conceded that plaintiff was informed of the status of the matter, was able to make informed decisions, and decided to settle the case for $200,000. Given Ambrosio's concessions in his deposition, plaintiff could not show Bergman violated the ethics rules.6 In any event, "the assertion that an attorney has violated one of our ethical rules does not give rise to a cause of action." Green v. Morgan Props., 215 N.J. 431, 458 (2013). "[S]tate disciplinary codes are not designed to establish standards for civil liability but, rather, to provide standards of professional conduct by which lawyers may be disciplined." Baxt v. Liloia, 155 N.J. 190, 202 (1998). "Although the Rules of Professional Conduct may inform the scope of an attorney's duties, those rules do not, in themselves, create a duty, and a violation of those rules, standing alone, does not form the basis of a cause of action." Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161, 182 n.8 (2005). Ambrosio could cite the ethics rules to support his opinions on the standards of care. Baxt, supra, 155 N.J. at 199-200; Carbis Sales, supra, 397 N.J. Super. at 79. However, those ethics rules could not support a cause of action after his repudiation in his deposition of any breach of those standards, and the resulting exclusion of his net opinion. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that Ambrosio's report amounted to a net opinion and was properly excluded. IV. The exclusion of Ambrosio's net opinion left plaintiff without admissible expert testimony. As expert testimony was required to carry plaintiff's burden to show legal malpractice, the trial court properly granted summary judgment. See R. 4:46- 2(c) and Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995). Plaintiff's remaining arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We need not address Bergman's remaining arguments. Affirmed. Directory: cmsAdmin -> uploads uploads -> Farmers State Bank Real Estate uploads -> Farmers State Bank Real Estate uploads -> Farmers State Bank Real Estate Download 2.17 Mb. Share with your friends:
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