Human resources & employment law cumulative case briefs
Jurisdiction: 4th Circuit
Download 5.55 Mb.
|
- Navigate this page:
- Jurisdiction: 5 th Circuit
- Jurisdiction: 9 th Circuit
- Jurisdiction: 11 th Circuit
- Jurisdiction: New Mexico
- Jurisdiction: 6 th Circuit
- Jurisdiction: 9 th Circuit – California law
- Jurisdiction: 10 th Circuit
- Jurisdiction: 7 th Circuit
- Jurisdiction: California
Jurisdiction: 4th Circuit Mercer v. The Arc of Prince Georges County, Inc., No. 13-1300 (4th Cir., 7/11/13); http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/131300.U.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Adverse employment actions taken in close time to, or during, FMLA leave can be dangerous because it arouse suspicion of leave interference. However, proof of a legitimate business reason can defeat a discrimination claim. The employee had taken FMLA leave, and around that time she had also received positive performance reviews. When her employer discovered previously unknown misconduct, her employment was terminated, and that was held to be justification for the adverse employment action. This case also demonstrates the importance of adequate investigation and documentation and independence of those deciding on the adverse employment action. Facts:
Litigation: Summary judgment in favor of the employer was affirmed by the appellate court:
FLSA: fluctuating work week, misclassified exempt, calculating overtime pay, federal regulations Jurisdiction: 5th Circuit Ransom v. M. Patel Enterprises, Incorporated, No. 12-50534 (5th Cir., 8/16/13); ; http://www.littler.com/files/RansomVsMPatelEnterprises.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. The method stated in the federal regulations is the correct method to use. Read the full decision for details, but basically, the fluctuating workweek method applies when an employee is paid a fixed weekly salary and is expected to work fluctuating weekly hours. Under the fluctuating workweek method established by Party City, the company intended to compensate workers for all hours worked, not to cap compensation at 55 hours in a week: After a jury found Abigail F. Ransom and fifteen other executive managers (collectively hereinafter, plaintiffs) of Party City, a retail chain, to be misclassified by their employer as exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., the plaintiffs became eligible for an award of overtime wages. Because the plaintiffs were paid a weekly salary, the trial court had to compute their hourly rate of pay in order to award overtime damages. Disregarding the so-called “fluctuating workweek” (FWW) method of determining overtime damages – a method established by precedent and relevant federal regulations as applicable in this case – the district court, presided over by a magistrate judge, instead determined overtime damages by using the magistrate judge’s unorthodox preferred methodology. The plaintiffs’ employer, M. Patel Enterprises, Incorporated2(“Party City”), contends this method of calculation was error, and we agree. We therefore REVERSE the ruling of the district court, VACATE the amount of actual damages awarded to plaintiffs as overtime and REMAND for recalculation. We further VACATE the award of liquidated damages and the amount of attorneys’ fees and REMAND for reconsideration. [Article to read for perspective and example – http://www.payrollnetwork.com/answerman-blog/may-i-utilize-%E2%80%9Cfluctuating-workweek-method%E2%80%9D-and-pay-overtime-lower-rate-and-potential.] Wages: tips, Section 181.79 Jurisdiction: Minnesota Karl, et al. v. Uptown Drink, LLC, et al., No. A12-0166 (MN SC, 8/14/13); http://mn.gov/lawlib/archive/supct/1308/OPA120166-0814.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Essentially, if an employer requires restaurant employees to pay for cash register shortages, customer walkouts and unsigned credit card receipts from their tips, then that violates Section 181.79 of Minnesota statutes on “unlawful deductions”. However, Minnesota practitioners need to read this case because for details because the analysis of their Supreme Court covers many pages. Arbitration, Litigation: class action, delayed request to compel, waiver, no prejudice Jurisdiction: 9th Circuit Richards v. Ernst & Young, LLP, No. 11-17530 (9th Cir., 8/21/13); http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2013/08/21/11-17530.pdf; http://www.littler.com/files/RichardsVsErnst&Young.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. D. R. Horton analysis rejected, joining 2nd and 8th Circuits. Summary by the appellate court: The panel reversed the district court’s denial of Ernst & Young, LLP’s motion to compel arbitration of state wage and hour claims asserted by the former employee plaintiff. The district court determined that Ernst & Young had waived its right to arbitration by failing to assert that right as a defense in an action brought by two former employees, whose action had been consolidated with that of the plaintiff. The panel reversed the district court’s judgment because the plaintiff had not established any prejudice as a result of Ernst & Young’s alleged delay in asserting its arbitral rights. Public Sector: independent contractor, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, property right or liberty interest, adverse employment action, failure of proof Jurisdiction: 9th Circuit Blantz v. California Dept. of Corr. and Rehab., No. 11-56525 (9th Cir., 8/15/13); http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2013/08/15/11-56525%20web-CORRECTED.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. State employees may take § 1983 legal action for certain due process or equal protection adverse employment actions if they can show their employer deprived them of a property right or liberty interest. However, note that many civil servants have employment protection guarantees, such as no termination except for good cause. What if the plaintiff is an independent contractor? We hold that a state agency does not create constitutionally protected property interests for its independent contractors simply by instituting performance review procedures. Even assuming independent contractors can ever have constitutionally protected property interests in their positions, something more is required: either an affirmative grant of tenure or a guarantee from the government that termination can occur only for cause. Absent such assurances, there is no cognizable basis for an independent contractor to assert an entitlement to her continued position that is constitutionally protected. Because Blantz’s orientation documents did not contain such assurances, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Blantz’s federal deprivation of property claim. * * *
. . . [T]he defendants here are not alleged to have precluded Blantz from all government employment, only employment with the CDCR. Blantz allegedly has been barred from employment with one division of the state government; but she is free to seek other nursing positions with the state. Thus, she has not alleged an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty. See Llamas, 238 F.3d at 1128 (holding that the government had not deprived plaintiff of liberty when plaintiff was barred from future employment with one community college district, but was free to pursue employment elsewhere). FLSA: settlement, court approval, agency approval, voluntary, attorney – not involved, fairness issue Jurisdiction: 11th Circuit Nall v. Mal-Motels, Inc., No. 12-13528 (11th Cir., 7/29/13); http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/ops/201213528.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Though some FLSA cases can be settled without agency or court approval, an important issue is whether the settlement was truly voluntary. Approval is required to ensure that an employee’s rights are protected and that the settlement is fair. Here, the employee was claiming almost $4,000 unpaid overtime and the same amount for liquidated damages. She had accepted a smaller amount in exchange for dismissal and release of liability, but later renounced that settlement. Her attorney had not been involved and requested the court to set aside the “settlement”. Despite that request, the federal trial court ultimately dismissed her claim because of the “settlement”. Using keener analysis, the appellate court reversed the trial court. Background:
Arbitration: unfair, one-sided, not enforced
Jurisdiction: New Mexico Figueroa, et al., v. THI of New Mexico at Casa Arena Blanca LLC, et al., 2013-NMCA-077 (NMCA, certiorari denied):
This is a wrongful death tort case, but it affirms New Mexico’s position on unfair arbitration agreements, so one can reasonably conjecture the same would apply in an employment law situation. Summary by the appellate court: {1}This case requires us to examine whether an arbitration agreement that a nursing home requires to be signed as a condition of admission is substantively unconscionable. Agreeing with the district court that the agreement is unfairly and unreasonably one-sided in favor of the nursing home, we affirm. NLRB: appropriate bargaining unit, employer, burden of proof, "overwhelming community of interest", stare decisis – precedent, adjudication – rulemaking, legislating prohibited Jurisdiction: 6th Circuit Kindred Nursing Centers East v. NLRB (Aug. 15, 2013). http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/13a0231p-06.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. This case discusses an important point of constitutional law and administrative law:
Summary by the appellate court: Under federal labor law, workers in the private sector who wish to be represented by a union must petition the National Labor Relations Board to hold an election to determine if a majority of the workers wants union representation. Federal labor law gives the Board wide discretion to delineate the “bargaining unit,” the term for the group of workers that will vote on union representation. Kindred Nursing Centers East, LLC, a nursing home operator, has petitioned for review of the Board’s order that a bargaining unit of Certified Nursing Assistants “constitute[d] an appropriate unit.” Specialty Healthcare and Rehab. Ctr. of Mobile, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 83, 2011 WL 3916077 (2011). The Board has petitioned for enforcement of the order. The central issue in this case is whether the Board acted within its discretion in deciding Specialty Healthcare. We conclude that it did, and we therefore DENY Kindred’s petition for review and GRANT the Board’s cross-petition for enforcement. Litigation: Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA)
Jurisdiction: 9th Circuit – California law Urbino v. Orkin Services of California, Inc., Nos. 11-66944, 11-6700, and 12-55064 (9th Cir., 8/13/13); http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2013/08/13/11-56944.pdf; 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 16718 [enhanced lexis.com version] Summary by the appellate court: The panel held that the federal courts lacked subject over this California dispute, vacated the district court’s order denying plaintiff’s motion to remand, and directed the district court to return the matter to state court for resolution. Under California’s Private Attorneys General Act of 2004(“PAGA”), if the state agency declines to investigate labor code violations, an aggrieved employee may commence an action against the employer. Plaintiff filed a representative PAGA action, and defendants removed the matter to federal court on the basis of diversity, based on evidence that the aggregated claims of the individual employees could result in liability in excess of the minimum jurisdictional requirements under 28U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). The panel held that the recoveries at issue cannot be aggregated to meet the amount in controversy requirement, and therefore there was no federal diversity jurisdiction. Judge Thomas dissented because he would conclude that claims under PAGA can be aggregated in determining whether diversity jurisdiction exists, and therefore the district court properly exercised diversity jurisdiction. Title VII, FMLA:
Jurisdiction: 10th Circuit Borwick v. T-Mobile West Corporation, No. 13-1023 (10th Cir., 8/7/13); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-1023.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Independent investigation conformed suspicions of poor performance and revealed misconduct – hanging up on customers. Summary by the appellate court: Tonya Borwick appeals the district court’s summary judgment dismissal of her complaint against her former employer, T-Mobile West Corporation (T-Mobile), alleging gender discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) and 2000e-3(a), and interference with her rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA),29 U.S.C. § 2615. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. Title VII and McDonnell Douglas: Summary judgment was appropriate because she failed to meet her burden to show a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether T-Mobile’s asserted reason was not its true reason for terminating her, but rather was s pretext for discrimination.
FMLA, no retaliation: Proof was that she would have been fired anyway, leave or not. Title VII: religion
Jurisdiction: 7th Circuit Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, Inc., No. 12–3820 (7th Cir., 7/31/13); http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2013/D07-31/C:12-3820:J:Hamilton:aut:T:fnOp:N:1177791:S:0; Findlaw http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-7th-circuit/1640579.html; 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 15610 [enhanced lexis.com version]. What amounts to religious matter under Title VII protection? It is critically important to take each request seriously and make a valid investigation and determination rather than an uninformed decision. Summary by the appellate court: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of religion. Among other consequences, the law requires a covered employer to provide a reasonable accommodation for an employee's request to participate in a religious observance or practice if an accommodation would not cause the employer undue hardship. Plaintiff Sikiru Adeyeye made such a request to his former employer, defendant Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, after his father's death. Adeyeye is a native of Nigeria who moved to the United States in 2008. He requested several weeks of unpaid leave so he could travel to Nigeria to lead his father's burial rites. He explained to Heartland that his participation in the funeral ceremonies was “compulsory” and that if he failed to lead the burial rites, he and his family members would suffer at least spiritual death. Heartland denied Adeyeye's request, but he traveled to Nigeria for the ceremonies anyway. He was fired when he returned and reported to work. Adeyeye filed this suit under Title VII for failure to accommodate his religion. The district court granted summary judgment for Heartland, finding that Adeyeye's two written requests did not present evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that he had provided Heartland notice of the religious character of his request for unpaid leave. We disagree. Whether or not Adeyeye's letters might have justified holding as a matter of law that they provided sufficient notice of the religious nature of his request (a question we do not decide), they certainly are sufficient to present a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Heartland had notice of the religious nature of the request. We also find that genuine issues of material fact prevent us from affirming summary judgment on any of the other grounds argued by Heartland. We reverse the district court's judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Arbitration: collective bargaining agreement (CBA), common law claim barred
Jurisdiction: California Wade v. Ports American Management Corp., No. B238224 (Cal.App.2nd,4th, 8/2/13); http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B238224.PDF [enhanced lexis.com version]. Calvin Wade, African-American, maritime worker, proceeded pursuant to the CBA with his allegation of discrimination, as required by the CBA. The arbitrator found against him and ruled his layoff was proper. Wade then filed in state court alleging the CBA arbitration agreement did not bar a claim of violation of California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). However, he did not proceed under the FEHA because the time for filing had elapsed. Instead, he filed on the common law theory of wrongful termination. The trial court granted summary judgment because the CBA barred such claims, and the appellate court affirmed. Summary by the appellate court: Camargo v. California Portland Cement Co. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 995(Camargo), held that a labor arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) has no preclusive effect on a claim pursuant to the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Government Code section 12940 et seq., unless the parties expressly agreed to arbitrate FEHA claims. (Camargo, at p.1008.) On appeal, Calvin Wade contends this holding should be extended to common law claims related to the FEHA, such as a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. We disagree, as there is no comprehensive statutory scheme applicable to FEHA-related common law claims comparable to the FEHA. In the alternative, appellant contends the arbitration had no preclusive effect, as it did not address his racial discrimination claim. We conclude the arbitration encompassed that claim. Accordingly, we affirm the grant of a summary judgment in favor of respondents Marine Terminals Corporation and Ports America Management Corporation (collectively MTC) on appellant’s cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Litigation: intoxication, employer liability, summary judgment, jury question Download 5.55 Mb. Share with your friends:
|