Human resources & employment law cumulative case briefs
Jurisdiction: 10th Circuit
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Jurisdiction: 10th Circuit Gilkey v. Protection One Alarm Monitoring, Inc., No. 13-3089 (10th Cir., 7/3/13); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-3089.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Summary judgment dismissal in U.S.D.C.KS, No. 6:12-CV-01150-EFM, affirmed:
ADA:
ERISA: long term disability (LTD) benefits, denial, dismissal not arbitrary and capricious Jurisdiction: 6th Circuit White v. Security First Associated Agency, Inc., et al, No. 12-1287 (6th Cir., 6/28/13, unpublished); http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/13a0614n-06.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. ADA: The disabled employee’s request for a reasonable accommodation must be one that would allow the employee to perform 'essential functions' of original job, and rejection of this employee’s request for permanent part-time duty was appropriate, as was dismissal of her retaliation claim. ERISA: Denial of her LTD claim was appropriate and dismissal of it by the trial court was not “arbitrary and capricious”. Wage and Hour: living on site, on call, calculating overtime, class action Jurisdiction: California Mendiola et al., v. CPS Security Solutions, Inc., et al., No. B240519 (Cal.App.2nd, 4th, 7/3/13); http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B240519.PDF [enhanced lexis.com version]. This is a complex case best read by practitioners for all of the details. Summary by the appellate court: Appellants CPS Security Solutions, Inc., CPS Construction Protection Security Plus, Inc. and Construction Protective Services, Inc. (collectively “CPS”) provide security guards for building construction sites throughout California. A number of the security guards employed by CPS are designated “trailer guards.” They are thus described because in addition to their regular patrols, they are expected to spend the night at their assigned jobsite s in CPS - provided residential-type trailers, in order to be available to investigate alarms and other suspicious circumstances and to prevent vandalism and theft. During these nighttime periods, CPS considers the trailer guards “on call,” and generally compensates them only for the time spent actively conducting investigations. In 2008, two lawsuits were filed against CPS, alleging violations of California law governing minimum wage and overtime compensation and seeking to represent the same class of California trailer guards. The trial court consolidated the cases and certified the class. Currently on appeal is the court’s order granting a preliminary injunction requiring CPS to compensate trailer guards for all on - call time spent in the trailers. At issue are two distinct periods: weekdays, when the trailer guards are on patrol eight hours and on call eight hours, and weekends, when they are on patrol 16 hours and on call eight hours. We conclude that CPS must compensate the trailer guards for the nighttime hours spent on the jobsites during the week, as the trial court ruled. However, in accordance with settled principles of California law, we conclude that CPS is permitted to deduct eight hours for sleep time on those weekend days when the trailer guards are on duty for 24 hours. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part. Wage and Hour: class action, arbitration, handbook, incorporation by reference, prior owner, substantial evidence Jurisdiction: California Avery, et al., v. Integrated Healthcare Holdings, Inc., et al., No. G046202 (Cal.App.4th.3rd, 6/27/13, not certified for publications); http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/nonpub/G046202.PDF [enhanced lexis.com version]. Summary by the appellate court: Defendants and appellants appeal from an order denying their motions to compel plaintiffs and respondents to individually arbitrate the wage and hour claims they allege in this class action. Integrated relies on an arbitration policy contained in an employee handbook issued by Tenet Healthcare Corporation (Tenet), the previous owner of the four hospitals where Plaintiffs work , and a revised arbitration policy Integrated issued as part of a new employee handbook. Integrated contends Plaintiffs agreed to the arbitration policy by signing various documents acknowledging and agreeing to the policy. We affirm the trial court’s decision denying Integrated’s motions because Integrated failed to establish Plaintiffs agreed to the specific arbitration agreement Integrated submitted to the trial court. Initially, we conclude Integrated is limited to the arbitration policy contained in the employee handbook issued by the prior owner of the hospitals because Integrated issued the revised employee handbook and arbitration policy after Plaintiffs’ claims accrued and the origin al class action complaint was filed. Substantial evidence in the record establishes one Plaintiff did not sign any document acknowledging or agreeing to the original arbitration policy. Moreover, she did not impliedly agree to that policy by continuing to work at the hospitals because she did not receive notice of its existence. As for the other seven Plaintiffs, Integrated submitted a confusing patchwork of acknowledgments and other forms these Plaintiffs signed, but none of these documents refer to the specific employee handbook Integrated filed as the source of the arbitration policy. To the contrary, the documents Plaintiffs signed either refer to an entirely different document as the source of the arbitration policy or fail to meet the legal standards for incorporating by reference an arbitration policy or other document. Without sufficient evidence of the actual arbitration policy to which Plaintiffs agreed when they signed the acknowledgments and other documents, we may not enforce the policy against Plaintiffs. Litigation: federal civil procedure, diversity, removal to federal court – Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), time limits, subsequent new information Jurisdiction: 9th Circuit, California Roth v. CHA Hollywood Medical Center, No. 13-55771 (10th Cir., 6/27/13); http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2013/06/27/13-55771.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Generally, 30 days is the time limit under federal statute for a defendant to remove a diversity of citizenship case from state court to federal court. However, there is an exception when the defendant learns new information from the plaintiff(s), such as receipt of a pleading or other document from the plaintiff(s). In this case, the defendants initially did not qualify for removal based on information they discovered from their own investigation because neither of the 30-day periods for removal had been triggered by information received from the plaintiffs. However, that changed when additional information came from the plaintiffs. Fletcher, Circuit Judge: Defendants appeal from the district court’s remand to state court under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”). 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1). The district court construed 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) and (b)(3) to permit removal only during the two thirty-day periods specified in those subsections. It held that removal was improper because defendants had not sought removal during either such period. We granted review and now reverse. Litigation: federal civil procedure, removal to federal court
Jurisdiction: 9th Circuit Watkins v. Vital Pharmaceuticals, No. 13-55755 (10th Cir., 7/2/13); http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2013/07/02/13-55755.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Though this is a consumer case, the holding would also apply to employment and other cases. Essentially, the allegations on behalf of the plaintiffs were that the controversy involved a potential class of “thousands of consumers throughout the United States” and alleged “the aggregate of damages sustained by the Class are likely in the millions of dollars.” The company removed to federal court, filing two declarations stating that the amount in controversy was more than $5 million. The trial court, acting on its own, decided that the company did not have adequate evidence of the amount in controversy. Its notice of removal merely “averred” its sales exceeded $5 million and a declaration by its counsel only “vaguely and conclusorily” alleged that the required amount was in controversy. The appellate court agreed with the district court that a defendant is required to prove the amount in controversy by a “preponderance of the evidence.” [Interestingly, the scrutiny of the amount in controversy seems cursory because the appellate court noted the CAFA allegations were “undisputed in the district court”, which indicates it apparently did not examine them to see if they actually met the standard of “preponderance of the evidence”. Yet the appellate court on its own motion then sent the case back to the trial court. Being a “gatekeeper” would seem to imply paying diligent attention to the traffic.] Restrictive covenant: contracts, sufficient consideration, continued employment Jurisdiction: Illinois Fifield et al. v. Premier Dealer Services, Inc., 2013 IL App (1st) 120327 (06/25/13); http://www.state.il.us/court/Opinions/AppellateCourt/2013/1stDistrict/1120327.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. In an earlier case from another state jurisdiction, the appeal held that continued employment in and of itself was sufficient contractual consideration to support a change in terms of an employment agreement already in effect. State courts differ on this issue, and Illinois has ruled that in order for continued employment to be sufficient consideration for a new condition, the employee must have been employed for at least two years. Practitioners and litigators might want to study this Illinois case to see if there is any persuasive authority that might apply elsewhere. Public Sector:
Jurisdiction: New Mexico Beggs, et al., v. City of Portales, 2013-NMCA-068, certiorari not applied for; http://www.nmcompcomm.us/nmcases/NMCACurrent.aspx/NMCA/2013/NMCA/2013/NMCA/2013/13ca-068.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Summary by the appellate court: {1} The opinion originally filed in this case on April 2, 2013, is withdrawn, and this Opinion is filed in its place. Defendant’s motion for rehearing is denied. {2} Plaintiffs, retired employees of the City of Portales (the City), brought suit against the City seeking to recover damages for reduced, and eventually terminated, health insurance reimbursement payments. Plaintiffs appeal the district court’s order granting summary judgment on the basis that Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The district court concluded that Plaintiffs’ claims began to accrue in 2001 when the City stopped offering Plaintiffs health insurance coverage under the City’s group plan and stopped reimbursing Plaintiffs for seventy-five per-cent of their health insurance premiums. Plaintiffs argue on appeal that the statute of limitations did not begin to accrue until the City completely terminated their health insurance reimbursement payments in 2005. Alternatively, Plaintiffs argue that the City should be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense due to its representations upon which Plaintiffs relied. We affirm the district court’s ruling insofar as it relates to the City’s alleged agreements (1) to keep Plaintiffs on the City’s own health insurance plan, and (2) to reimburse Plaintiffs seventy-five percent of their health insurance premiums. We reverse to the extent that Plaintiffs claim entitlement to reimbursement amounts lower than seventy-five percent, which claim would not have begun to accrue until the City completely terminated the reimbursement payments in 2005. Litigation: class action: arbitration, exclusion from settlement, dismissal with prejudice, appeal barred – moot – finality Jurisdiction: 10th Circuit Eatinger, et al. v. BP America Production Company, No. 12-3243 (10th Cir., 6/27/13); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/12/12-3243.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Chesapeake Energy Corporation, Chesapeake Operating, Inc., and Chesapeake Royalty, L.L.C. appealed from the district court’s order excluding them from the class action settlement in this case. However, the appellate court ruled that because the district court had already approved the settlement and dismissed the underlying case with prejudice [e.g., ended at the trial court level with absolute finality], the case was over and thus barred from appeal: There is, therefore, no opportunity for Appellants to challenge the fairness of the settlement agreement. And, under the plain terms of the approved agreement, * * * Appellants are not entitled to any relief, regardless of whether it could theoretically be possible for Appellants to recover some amount from the administrative fund or the final unclaimed distribution account. For the foregoing reasons, we GRANT the Class’s motions to dismiss and DISMISS this appeal as moot [e.g., ended with absolute finality]. Arbitration: contract, litigation, unconscionability – affirmative defense – burden of proof, federal preemption – Federal arbitration Act (FAA) – nursing home exception Jurisdiction: New Mexico Strausberg v. Laurel Healthcare Providers, LLC, et al., No. 33,331, (NMSC, 6/27/13); http://www.nmcompcomm.us/nmcases/nmsc/slips/SC33,331.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Introduction: {1} In this case we address which party has the burden to prove that a contract is unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable. Plaintiff Nina Strausberg signed an arbitration agreement as a mandatory condition of her admission to the Arbor Brook Healthcare nursing home. Despite having signed the arbitration agreement, Plaintiff subsequently sued Arbor Brook and several other defendants for alleged negligent care. Defendants moved the district court to compel arbitration and to dismiss Plaintiff’s case. In response, Plaintiff argued that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable. The district court found that Plaintiff had failed to prove unconscionability and, therefore, granted Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration. {2} The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the district court erred by putting the burden on Plaintiff to prove unconscionability. Strausberg v. Laurel Healthcare Providers, LLC, 2012-NMCA-006, ¶¶ 21, 23-24, 269 P.3d 914. The Court of Appeals held that “when a nursing home relies upon an arbitration agreement signed by a patient as a condition for admission to the nursing home, and the patient contends that the arbitration agreement is unconscionable, the nursing home has the burden of proving that the arbitration agreement is not unconscionable.” Id. ¶ 20. {3} We disagree and hold that Plaintiff has the burden to prove that the arbitration agreement is unconscionable because unconscionability is an affirmative defense to contract enforcement, and under settled principles of New Mexico law, the party asserting an affirmative defense has the burden of proof. We also hold that the Court of Appeals’ holding is preempted by federal law because it treats nursing home arbitration agreements differently than other contracts. Accordingly, we reverse and remand this case to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the district court erred by granting Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration. NM OMA: litigation, breach of contract – waived rights, Open Meetings Act – moot Jurisdiction: New Mexico Palenick v. City of Rio Rancho, No. 33,380 (NMSC, 6/27/13); http://www.nmcompcomm.us/nmcases/nmsc/slips/SC33,380.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Substantial evidence showed plaintiff had waived his right to a contract claim, which made his claim of violation of the OMA moot [i.e., nothing more left to decide]. Maes, Chief Justice: {1} This appeal stems from the termination of Rio Rancho’s City Manager, James Palenick (Palenick), and requires us to address the narrow issue of whether Palenick is estopped from pursuing a breach of contract claim against the City of Rio Rancho (the City) based on an alleged violation of the Open Meetings Act (OMA), NMSA 1978, Sections 10- 15-1 to -4 (1974, as amended through 2009). We conclude that there is substantial evidence to support the district court’s finding that Palenick waived his right to pursue a breach of contract claim against the City based on an alleged violation of the OMA. Because we conclude that Palenick waived his right to pursue a breach of contract claim, we need not decide whether there was in fact a violation of the OMA. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA): Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PP ACA), prescriptions – drugs, devices – contraceptive-coverage – birth control – abortifacients – devices, religious beliefs – objections Jurisdiction: 10th Circuit Hobby Lobby Stores. Inc., et al., v. Kathleen Sebelius, in her official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services, et al., No. 12-6294 (10th Circuit, 6/27/13); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/12/12-6294.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. This 165-page case needs to be studied by practitioners in this area of law. Tymkovich, Circuit Judge: This case requires us to determine whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the Free Exercise Clause protect the plaintiffs—two companies and their owners who run their businesses to reflect their religious values. The companies are Hobby Lobby, a craft store chain, and Mardel, a Christian bookstore chain. Their owners, the Greens, run both companies as closely held family businesses and operate them according to a set of Christian principles. They contend regulations implementing the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act force them to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs. In particular, the plaintiffs brought an action challenging a regulation that requires them, beginning July 1, 2013, to provide certain contraceptive services as a part of their employer-sponsored health care plan. Among these services are drugs and devices that the plaintiffs believe to be abortifacients, the use of which is contrary to their faith. We hold that Hobby Lobby and Mardel are entitled to bring claims under RFRA, have established a likelihood of success that their rights under this statute are substantially burdened by the contraceptive-coverage requirement, and have established an irreparable harm. But we remand the case to the district court for further proceedings on two of the remaining factors governing the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction. FLMA, ADA/RA: employee request – text message – insufficient information – leave denied – no interference, Employee Assistance Program (EAP) – no disparate treatment –insufficient proof of disability – no retaliation Jurisdiction: 5th Circuit Lanier v. University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center, No. 12-10928 (5th Cir., 6/12/13, Summary Calendar); http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions%5Cunpub%5C12/12-10928.0.wpd.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. FMLA requests must sufficiently state enough information to alert an employer that a leave request is made under the FMLA. The employee’s brief text message contained insufficient information to notify her employer that she was requesting FMLA leave (her father had suffered a heart attack), and the court ruled there was no violation of the Act. Rather than telephone her supervisor, she sent a text message to her supervisor stating she would not be able to be on call that night because her father was in the emergency room. She also failed to prove her disability discrimination and retaliation claims. FMLA, Title VII: pregnancy, accommodation request – limited duty – disparate treatment, adverse employment action – employment terminated, retaliation, lack of subject matter jurisdiction Jurisdiction: 10th Circuit Freppon v. City of Chandler, et al., No. 12-6176 (10th Cir., 7/1/13)); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/12/12-6176.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Matheson, Circuit Judge: Plaintiff Sabrina Marie Freppon filed suit against her former employer, the City of Chandler, Oklahoma (the City). She alleged gender/pregnancy discrimination against the City in violation of Title VII because (1) it denied her request for a light duty assignment to accommodate her pregnancy and forced her to take a twelve-week unpaid leave of absence under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), and (2) it terminated her from her job as a police officer. Ms. Freppon also alleged that the City retaliated against her in violation of Title VII because she complained to the Chief of Police, Matt Mattheyer, that male police officers had been allowed to modify their work duties when they were temporarily unable to perform all of their normal duties. Finally, Ms. Freppon asserted claims under Oklahoma law against the City and Lt. Steve Simon. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the City on Ms. Freppon’s Title VII claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims.1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We remand Ms. Freppon’s termination claim to the district court with instructions to dismiss it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm the grant of summary judgment as to her remaining Title VII claims. ERISA: litigation, benefits plan change, defined benefit, defined contribution, economic downturn, failure to contribute, notice by employer, employee questions, violation conceded, ERISA – 29 U.S.C. § 1054(h) – § 204(h) notice, discretion of district court award, “egregious” notice failure Download 5.55 Mb. Share with your friends:
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