Human resources & employment law cumulative case briefs
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- Jurisdiction: 5 th Circuit
- Jurisdiction: New Mexico
- Jurisdiction: 10 th Circuit
- Jurisdiction: 2 nd Circuit
- Jurisdiction: California
Jurisdiction: All Hollingsworth, et al v. Perry, et al., No. 12–144, 570 U.S. ____ (6/26/13); http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/12-144_8ok0.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Syllabus: After the California Supreme Court held that limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples violated the California Constitution, state voters passed a ballot initiative known as Proposition 8, amending the State Constitution to define marriage as a union between a man and a woman. Respondents, same-sex couples who wish to marry, filed suit in federal court, challenging Proposition 8 under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and naming as defendants California’s Governor and other state and local officials responsible for enforcing California’s marriage laws. The officials refused to defend the law, so the District Court allowed petitioners—the initiative’s official proponents—to intervene to defend it. After a bench trial, the court declared Proposition 8 unconstitutional and enjoined the public officials named as defendants from enforcing the law. Those officials elected not to appeal, but petitioners did. The Ninth Circuit certified a question to the California Supreme Court: whether official proponents of a ballot initiative have authority to assert the State’s interest in defending the constitutionality of the initiative when public officials refuse to do so. After the California Supreme Court answered in the affirmative, the Ninth Circuit concluded that petitioners had standing under federal law to defend Proposition 8’s constitutionality. On the merits, the court affirmed the District Court’s order. Held: Petitioners did not have standing to appeal the District Court’s order. Pp. 5–17. (a) Article III of the Constitution confines the judicial power of federal courts to deciding actual “Cases” or “Controversies.” §2. One essential aspect of this requirement is that any person invoking the power of a federal court must demonstrate standing to do so. In other words, the litigant must seek a remedy for a personal and tangible harm. Although most standing cases consider whether a plaintiff has satisfied the requirement when filing suit, Article III demands that an “actual controversy” persist throughout all stages of litigation. Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U. S. ___, ___. Standing “must be met by persons seeking appellate review, just as it must be met by persons appearing in courts of first instance.” Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U. S. 43, 64. The parties do not contest that respondents had standing to initiate this case against the California officials responsible for enforcing Proposition 8. But once the District Court issued its order, respondents no longer had any injury to redress, and the state officials chose not to appeal. The only individuals who sought to appeal were petitioners, who had intervened in the District Court, but they had not been ordered to do or refrain from doing anything. Their only interest was to vindicate the constitutional validity of a generally applicable California law. As this Court has repeatedly held, such a “generalized grievance”—no matter how sincere—is insufficient to confer standing. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 573–574. Petitioners claim that the California Constitution and election laws give them a “ ‘unique,’ ‘special,’ and ‘distinct’ role in the initiative process,” Reply Brief 5, but that is only true during the process of enacting the law. Once Proposition 8 was approved, it became a duly enacted constitutional amendment. Petitioners have no role—special or otherwise—in its enforcement. They therefore have no “personal stake” in defending its enforcement that is distinguishable from the general interest of every California citizen. No matter how deeply committed petitioners may be to upholding Proposition 8, that is not a particularized interest sufficient to create a case or controversy under Article III. Pp. 5–9. (b) Petitioners’ arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. Pp. 9– 16. (1) They claim that they may assert the State’s interest on the State’s behalf, but it is a “fundamental restriction on our authority “that “[i]n the ordinary course, a litigant . . . cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” Powers v. Ohio, 499 U. S. 400, 410. In Diamond v. Charles, 476 U. S. 54, for example, a pediatrician engaged in private practice was not permitted to defend the constitutionality of Illinois’ abortion law after the State chose not to appeal an adverse ruling. The state attorney general’s “letter of interest,” explaining that the State’s interest in the proceeding was “ ‘essentially co-terminous with’ ” Diamond’s position, id., at 61, was insufficient, since Diamond was unable to assert an injury of his own, id, at 65. Pp. 9–10. (2) Petitioners contend the California Supreme Court’s determination that they were authorized under California law to assert the State’s interest in the validity of Proposition 8 means that they “need no more show a personal injury, separate from the State’s indisputable interest in the validity of its law, than would California’s Attorney General or did the legislative leaders held to have standing in Karcher v. May, 484 U. S. 72 (1987).” Reply Brief 6. But far from supporting petitioners’ standing, Karcher is compelling precedent against it. In that case, after the New Jersey attorney general refused to defend the constitutionality of a state law, leaders of New Jersey’s Legislature were permitted to appear, in their official capacities, in the District Court and Court of Appeals to defend the law. What is significant about Karcher, however, is what happened after the Court of Appeals decision. The legislators lost their leadership positions, but nevertheless sought to appeal to this Court. The Court held that they could not do so. Although they could participate in thelawsuit in their official capacities as presiding officers of the legislature, as soon as they lost that capacity, they lost standing. Id., at 81. Petitioners here hold no office and have always participated in thislitigation solely as private parties. Pp. 10–13. (3) Nor is support found in dicta in Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, supra. There, in expressing “grave doubts” about the standing of ballot initiative sponsors to defend the constitutionality of an Arizona initiative, the Court noted that it was “aware of no Arizona law appointing initiative sponsors as agents of the people of Arizona to defend, in lieu of public officials, the constitutionality of initiatives made law of the State.” Id., at 65. Petitioners argue that, by virtue of the California Supreme Court’s decision, they are authorized to act as “agents of the people of California.” Brief for Petitioners 15. But that Court never described petitioners as “agents of the people.”All the California Supreme Court’s decision stands for is that, so far as California is concerned, petitioners may “assert legal arguments in defense of the state’s interest in the validity of the initiative measure” in federal court. 628 F. 3d 1191, 1193. That interest is by definition a generalized one, and it is precisely because proponents assert such an interest that they lack standing under this Court’s precedents. Petitioners are also plainly not agents of the State. As an initial matter, petitioners’ newfound claim of agency is inconsistent with their representations to the District Court, where they claimed to represent their own interests as official proponents. More to the point, the basic features of an agency relationship are missing here: Petitioners are not subject to the control of any principal, and they owe no fiduciary obligation to anyone. As one amicus puts it, “the proponents apparently have an unelected appointment for an unspecified period of time as defenders of the initiative, however and to whatever extent they choose to defend it.” Brief for Walter Dellinger 23. Pp. 13–16. (c) The Court does not question California’s sovereign right to maintain an initiative process, or the right of initiative proponents to defend their initiatives in California courts. But standing in federal court is a question of federal law, not state law. No matter its reasons, the fact that a State thinks a private party should have standing to seek relief for a generalized grievance cannot override this Court’s settled law to the contrary. Article III’s requirement that a party invoking the jurisdiction of a federal court seek relief for a personal, particularized injury serves vital interests going to the role of the Judiciary in the federal system of separated powers. States cannot alter that role simply by issuing to private parties who otherwise lack standing a ticket to the federal courthouse. Pp. 16–17. 671 F. 3d 1052, vacated and remanded. ERISA: former spouse, insurance proceeds, specific federal statutory terms -- FEGLIA Jurisdiction: All Hillman v. Maretta, No. 11-1221, 599 U.S. __ (6/3/13); http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/11-1221_7l48.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Though the specific holding in this case is limited to the rights of the spouse of a deceased federal employee’s spouse to sue a former spouse for proceeds paid to her as a beneficiary under the Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act (FEGLIA), consider that this case might provide persuasive authority in similar ERISA situations. Summary: The Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act of 1954 (FEGLIA) establishes an insurance program for federal employees. FEGLIA permits an employee to name a beneficiary of life insurance proceeds, and specifies an “order of precedence” providing that an employee’s death benefits accrue first to that beneficiary ahead of other potential recipients. 5 U. S. C. §8705(a). A Virginia statute revokes a beneficiary designation in any contract that provides a death benefit to a former spouse where there has been a change in the decedent’s marital status. Va. Code Ann. §20–111.1(A) (Section A). In the event that this provision is pre-empted by federal law, a separate provision of Virginia law, Section D, provides a cause of action rendering the former spouse liable for the principal amount of the proceeds to the party who would have received them were Section A not pre-empted.§20–111.1(D). Warren Hillman named then-spouse, respondent Judy Maretta, as the beneficiary of his Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance(FEGLI) policy. After their divorce, he married petitioner Jacqueline Hillman but never changed his named FEGLI beneficiary. After Warren’s death, Maretta, still the named beneficiary, filed a claim for the FEGLI proceeds and collected them. Hillman sued in Virginia court, seeking recovery of the proceeds under Section D. Maretta argued in response that Section D is pre-empted by federal law. The parties agreed that Section A is pre-empted. The Virginia Circuit Court found Maretta liable to Hillman under Section D for the FEGLI policy proceeds. The State Supreme Court reversed, concluding that Section D is pre-empted by FEGLIA because it conflicts with the purposes and objectives of Congress. Held: Section D of the Virginia statute is pre-empted by FEGLIA. Pp. 6–15. FLSA: nonexempt status, route delivery driver – exempt outside salesman – determinative criteria – 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and DOL factors Jurisdiction: 5th Circuit Meza v. Intelligent Mexican Marketing, (5th Cir., 6/18/13); http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions%5Cpub%5C12/12-10785-CV0.wpd.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. This route driver delivered products, but spent the vast majority of his time selling them. Summary by Prado, Circuit Judge: Plaintiff–Appellant Florentino Meza appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment for his former employer, Defendant–Appellee Intelligent Mexican Marketing, Inc. (“IMM”). Meza claims he is entitled to minimum-wage and overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). IMM claims he falls within the FLSA’s exemption for outside salesmen, and the statute’s overtime and minimum-wage requirements do not apply to him. Because the record indicates that Meza spent the vast majority of his time selling goods or performing work incidental to his sales, we affirm. Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA): adverse employment action, employment terminated, too many implausible explanations, McDonnell Douglas – pretext Hitchcock v. Angel Corps, Inc., No. 12-3515 (7th Cir. 6/11/13) [enhanced lexis.com version]; Under the McDonnell Douglas evidentiary test, Jennifer Hitchcock:
thus reversed summary judgment in favor of her employer on the ground that . . . “a reasonable juror could also find the explanation on the official Form itself to be so ludicrous that Angel Corps is not to be believed.” Summary by Williams, Circuit Judge: Plaintiff Jennifer Hitchcock alleges that Angel Corps, a home care agency, fired her because she was pregnant, in violation of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. Angel Corps proffered multiple explanations for why Hitchcock was fired, all revolving around a bizarre incident involving the death of a 100-year-old potential client. After both parties consented to adjudication of the matter before the magistrate, he granted Angel Corps’s motion for summary judgment. We find that this was error. Hitchcock submitted evidence that the supervisor who fired her expressed animus towards pregnant women and treated Hitchcock differently after learning she was pregnant, only a few weeks before she was fired. Angel Corps’s many explanations for Hitchcock’s termination were shifting, inconsistent, facially implausible, or all of the above. Therefore, a reasonable jury could conclude that Angel Corps’s explanations were lies, and that Hitchcock was fired because she was pregnant. So we reverse and remand. Union: appeal and error – standard of review, employment law – collective bargaining, statutory interpretation – legislative intent Jurisdiction: New Mexico American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, et al., v. The City of Albuquerque, 2013-NMCA-063, Certiorari Granted, May 24, 2013, No. 34,132; http://www.nmcompcomm.us/nmcases/NMCA/2013/13ca-063.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. This case brief provides notice to litigators practicing in this area of law of the issues and status on appeal. Summary by the NM Court of Appeals, Fry, Judge: {1} The City of Albuquerque (the City) appeals the district court’s order granting multiple chapters of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (the Unions) injunctive relief. The district court ordered the City to honor expired collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) until new CBAs were successfully negotiated pursuant to the Public Employee Bargaining Act’s (PEBA) “evergreen provision.” See NMSA 1978, Section 10-7E-18(D) (2003). The City argued, in part, that its Labor-Management Relations Ordinance (LMRO), Albuquerque, N.M., Ordinances ch. 3, art. 2, §§ 3-2-1 to -18 (1974, as amended through 2002), was entitled to grandfather status under NMSA 1978, Section 10-7E- 26(A) (2003), and therefore exempt from compliance with the PEBA’s evergreen provision. Because we agree with the City and conclude that the City’s collective bargaining procedures are exempt from compliance with the evergreen provision, we reverse. FMLA: litigation, interference with rights, unable to return to work, refusal to reinstate, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2615(a)(1), 2617(a), evidence - implausible plaintiff, summary judgment dismissal affirmed Jurisdiction: 10th Circuit Glover v. DCP Midstream GP, LLC, No. 12-1185 (10th Cir., 6/13/13);  12-1185 [enhanced lexis.com version].
Failure of proof. Accounts of the situation varied greatly, but - Following discovery, DCP moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court described Glover’s account of his attempts to return to work as implausible and concluded he had been permissibly terminated for failing to return to work at the end of his leave. After reviewing the trial court record, the appellate court affirmed dismissal by the trial court. Title VII: litigation, dismissal - Rule 12(b)(6) - failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted, adverse employment action – not hired, discrimination - race, color, religion, and national origin, evidence – McDonnell Douglas – no prima facie case shown – valid non-discriminatory reason – pretext not shown Jurisdiction: 10th Circuit Desai v. Panguitch Main Street, Inc., et al., No. 12-4197 (10th Cir., 6/5/13); 12-4197 [enhanced lexis.com version].
Dismissal of pro se [representing self] case affirmed for numerous failures of proof. Summary of the most pertinent part: * * * Mr. Desai had not demonstrated that he met the Main Street Manager job requirement that he have the ability to work well with the public, governmental entities and diverse personalities. The court cited the evidence that Mr. Desai had accused public officials of embezzlement, bribery and dishonesty and had numerous disputes with local officials and business owners. Further, the court ruled that Mr. Desai did not demonstrate that he had experience running a public entity or public program. Litigation: class action –Rule 23(a)- lack of commonality, FLSA – misclassification of assistant branch managers – exempt status Jurisdiction: 2nd Circuit Cuevas v. Citizen’s Financial Group, No. 12-2832-cv (2nd Cir., 5/29/13, unpublished); see URL link in the article cited below [enhanced lexis.com version]. This opinion provides helpful analysis, and the appellate court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded [returned] it to the trial court with specific instructions about how to analyze the duties of the employees in question in order to resolve factual disputes about that factor in determining commonality of facts at issue throughout the proposed class litigation. The Littler Mendelsohn article provides valuable perspective – http://www.wageandhourcounsel.com/2013/06/articles/class-actions-2/second-circuit-vacates-and-remands-certification-in-misclassification-class-action/. Title VII: lactation, working mothers, EEOC Jurisdiction: 5th Circuit Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Houston Funding II, Limited; Houston Funding Corporation, No. 12-20220 (5th Cir., 5/30/13); 12-20220 [enhanced lexis.com version]. JOLLY, Circuit Judge: The question we must answer in this appeal is whether discharging a female employee because she is lactating or expressing breast milk constitutes sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. We hold that it does. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), on behalf of Donnicia Venters (“Venters”), sued Houston Funding II, Ltd. and Houston Funding Corp. (“Houston Funding”), alleging Houston Funding unlawfully discharged Venters because she was lactating and wanted to express milk at work. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Houston Funding, finding that, as a matter of law, discharging a female employee because she is lactating or expressing milk does not constitute sex discrimination. We VACATE and REMAND. Wage and hour: overtime exemption, manager, multitasking, California law, FLSA differs Jurisdiction: California Heyen v. Safeway Inc. et al., B237418 (Cal.App.Dist.2Div.4, 5/23/13);
California law and administrative ruling differs from FLSA – 515 of the California Labor Code § 515 and Industrial Wage Commission Wage Order 7 – Mercantile Industry – provide that an exempt executive employee must be:
Summary by the court: Plaintiff/respondent Linda Heyen is a former assistant manager for defendant/appellant Safeway Inc. (Safeway). After Safeway terminated her employment, Heyen brought this action to recover unpaid overtime pay, contending Safeway should have classified her as a “nonexempt” employee because she regularly spent more than 50 percent of her work hours doing “nonexempt” tasks such as bagging groceries and stocking shelves. An advisory jury and the trial court agreed with Heyen and awarded her overtime pay of $26,184.60, plus interest. Safeway appeals, contending that the trial court failed to properly account for hours Heyen spent simultaneously performing exempt and nonexempt tasks—i.e., “actively . . . manag[ing] the store while also concurrently performing some checking and bagging of customer grocery purchases.” Safeway urges that, consistent with federal law, the trial court should have classified as “exempt” all hours during which Heyen simultaneously performed exempt and nonexempt tasks. Because the court failed to do so, Safeway claims it prejudicially erred, requiring a reversal of the judgment. We disagree with Safeway’s analysis as inconsistent with California law. Hence, we affirm the judgment for Heyen. ADA: surgical nurse, narcotics theft, history of substance abuse, rehabilitation issues, return to work, position already filled, accommodation, patient safety Jurisdiction: 2nd Circuit What to do in this kind of situation? Ogletree Deakins’ article provides an excellent discussion, as does the analysis of Warren W. Eginton, Senior United States District Judge analysis in his Memorandum Of Decision On Defendant’s Motion For Summary Judgment:
Most cases can be adequately briefed, but in complicated situations such as this one, it seems more valuable to you practitioners to be able read all of the details without my attempts to accurately brief the matter. Arbitration: litigation, standards of appellate review, employment contract, broadly worded mandatory-arbitration provision Jurisdiction: All URL links:
This unanimous decision clarifies the standard of review federal courts must use when reviewing an arbitrator’s decision on the issue of whether parties contemplated class arbitration when they entered into a broadly worded mandatory-arbitration provision. In controversy was whether the employer included a mandatory arbitration clause in its Primary Care Physician Agreement governing reimbursement of medical fees to doctors in its system. The arbitration clause provided that: No civil action concerning any dispute arising under this Agreement shall be instituted before any court, and all such disputes shall be submitted to final and binding arbitration in New Jersey, pursuant to the Rules of the American Arbitration Association with one arbitrator. Syllabus: Respondent Sutter, a pediatrician, provided medical services to petitioner Oxford Health Plans’ insureds under a fee-for-services contract that required binding arbitration of contractual disputes. He nonetheless filed a proposed class action in New Jersey Superior Court, alleging that Oxford failed to fully and promptly pay him and other physicians with similar Oxford contracts. On Oxford’s motion, the court compelled arbitration. The parties agreed that the arbitrator should decide whether their contract authorized class arbitration, and he concluded that it did. Oxford filed a motion in federal court to vacate the arbitrator’s decision, claiming that he had “exceeded [his] powers” under §10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U. S. C. §1 et. seq. The District Court denied the motion, and the Third Circuit affirmed. After this Court decided Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U. S. 662—holding that an arbitrator may employ class procedures only if the parties have authorized them—the arbitrator reaffirmed his conclusion that the contract approves class arbitration. Oxford renewed its motion to vacate that decision under §10(a)(4).The District Court denied the motion, and the Third Circuit affirmed. Held: The arbitrator’s decision survives the limited judicial review allowed by §10(a)(4). Pp. 4−9.
Thus, the sole question on judicial review is whether the arbitrator interpreted the parties’ contract, not whether he construed it correctly. Here, the arbitrator twice did what the parties asked: He considered their contract and decided whether it reflected an agreement to permit class proceedings. That suffices to show that he did not exceed his powers under §10(a)(4). Pp. 4−6.
FMLA: psychosis, resignation letter, coercion claimed – evidence found voluntary, summary judgment dismissal Download 5.55 Mb. Share with your friends:
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