Jurisdiction: 6th Circuit
Miles v. Nashville Electric Service, No. 12-6028 (6th Cir., 5/9/13) [enhanced lexis.com version];
Finding the evidence indicate here resignation was voluntary rather than coerced, the trial judge dismissed the violation claim, and the appellate court affirmed.
Summary by Moore, Circuit Judge:
In this case, Plaintiff-Appellant Bilqis Miles (“Miles”) alleges that her former employer, Defendant-Appellee Nashville Electric Service (“NES”), interfered with her rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) in connection with Miles’s resignation from NES in May 2011. Miles suffered a psychotic break in April 2011 for which she was hospitalized, and for which she took medical leave under the FMLA. The day after returning to NES from her medical leave, Miles informed her supervisor that she would not be coming back to work, and she submitted a resignation letter. Although Miles sought to rescind her resignation three days later, NES refused to reinstate her. Miles then brought this action, contending that her resignation was coerced and that NES did not fulfill its duty under the FMLA to determine whether Miles was requesting further medical leave following her return to work. The district court The Honorable * Joseph M. Hood, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Kentucky, sitting by designation. granted summary judgment to NES, finding that the evidence demonstrated that Miles voluntarily quit her job, and that NES had no duty under the FMLA to second-guess her decision to resign. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.
AFSCME: negotiated contract, legislative appropriation, future wages at specified levels for state employees, NMSC affirmed NMCA and trial court
Jurisdiction: New Mexico
Update on final disposition of the case:
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NMSC - Dispositional Order of Affirmance, No. 33,792 (NMSC, 5/30/13); http://www.nmcompcomm.us/nmcases/NMSCUnreported/2013/SC33792.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
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NMCA - 2012-NMCA-114, http://www.nmcompcomm.us/nmcases/NMCA/2012/12ca-114.pdf; ___ P3.d ___,
Competition: non-compete, trade secrets; inevitable disclosure doctrine
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Holton v. Physician Oncology Services, LP, No. S13A0012 (GASC, 5/6/13); S13A0012. HOLTON v. PHYSICIAN ONCOLOGY SERVICES, LP et al.; http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=92d312ad-8ccc-4931-bf70-d257ab1a9eb8; 2013 Ga. LEXIS 414 [enhanced lexis.com version].
“Inevitable disclosure” is a controversial common law legal theory available in some states allowing an employer:
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to attempt to prevent a former employee from working for a competitor,
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if there isn’t non-compete agreement,
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to contend that because the former employee’s new job duties would inevitably require relying on using or disclosing the former employer’s trade secrets.
This legal theory might provide persuasive authority on other jurisdictions.
Summary by Hunstein, Chief Justice:
In this case involving restrictive covenants in an employment agreement, Michael Holton appeals from the grant of an interlocutory injunction prohibiting him from working in an executive capacity for a particular competitor of his former employer for one year. He also challenges the trial court’s ruling that he would inevitably disclose his former employer’s trade secrets and confidential information in violation of the trade secrets act and his confidentiality covenant if he went to work for the competing business. Because a stand-alone claim for the inevitable disclosure doctrine of trade secrets – untethered from the provisions of our state trade secret statute – is not cognizable in Georgia, we reverse the part of the order enjoining Holton from the inevitable disclosure and use of trade secrets. On the remaining issues, we dismiss as moot his challenge to the order enjoining him from working for the competitor until October 2012 and affirm the part of the order enforcing the confidentiality covenant.
Also see this article on choice of forum and conflict of laws by the Non-Compete & Trade Secrets Report at http://www.noncompetereport.com/2013/06/03/washington-forum-selection-clause-enforced-by-california-court/.
Hostile work environment: sexually explicit behavior, equally inflicted, evidence – pay and/or benefits – irrelevant, MNHRA
Jurisdiction: Minnesota
Rasmussen v. Two Harbors Fish Company d/b/a Lou’s Fish House et al., No. A11-2178 (MNSC, 5/22/13): A11-2178 [enhanced lexis.com version].
Many states have a version of a “human rights act” (HRA), and this case might provide persuasive authority in other jurisdiction, state or federal.
Syllabus by the court:
1. That sexually explicit behavior was directed at men as well as women is not relevant to a determination of whether plaintiffs proved a claim for hostile work environment sexual harassment under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 43(3) (2012).
2. A plaintiff may prove a claim for hostile work environment sexual harassment under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn. Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 43(3), without proving loss of pay or other employment benefits.
3. An individual and sole owner of an employer whose conduct subjects the employer to vicarious liability for hostile work environment sexual harassment claims cannot be individually liable as an aider and abettor under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn. Stat. § 363A.14(1) (2012).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Arbitrations: employment, illusory agreement, conflict of laws – place where contract finalized, Texas law – violates NM public policy – not applied in NM
Jurisdiction: New Mexico
Flemma v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., et al., No. 33,353, ____-NMSC-___ (Slip Opinion, 5/30/13); http://www.nmcompcomm.us/nmcases/nmsc/slips/SC33,353.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
Summary by VIGIL, Justice:
{1} This case presents a conflict of laws issue that requires us to determine whether enforcement of an arbitration agreement, formed in the State of Texas, would offend New Mexico public policy to overcome our traditional choice of law rule, which requires that we apply the law of the jurisdiction in which the contract was formed. We conclude that the agreement formed in Texas would be unconscionable under New Mexico law, and it therefore violates New Mexico public policy. Thus, we apply New Mexico law and conclude that no valid agreement to arbitrate exists between the parties because Halliburton’s promise to arbitrate is illusory. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the district court for further proceedings.
Also see this article on choice of forum and conflict of laws by the Non-Compete & Trade Secrets Report at http://www.noncompetereport.com/2013/06/03/washington-forum-selection-clause-enforced-by-california-court/.
Union: public sector, non-union employees, home addresses and phone numbers, union may obtain
Jurisdiction: California
County of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles County Employee Relations Commission, et al., S191944 (5/30/13); S191944
[PDF] [DOC] [enhanced lexis.com version].
Summary by the Supreme Court:
This case involves the balance between an employee’s right of informational privacy1 and a union’s right to obtain information it needs to represent the employee in collective bargaining. The Service Employees International Union, Local 721 (SEIU) is the exclusive bargaining representative of all Los Angeles County (County) employees. The question here is whether SEIU is entitled to obtain the home addresses and phone numbers of all represented employees, including those who have not joined the union. We agree with both courts below that it is so entitled but reverse the Court of Appeal’s imposition of procedural requirements limiting disclosure.
Arbitration: litigation, FLSA – class action – collective action – waiver, D.R. Horton – NLRB lack of proper quorum
Jurisdiction: New York federal trial court
Dixon v. NBCUniversal Media, Inc.,
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Wage and Hour Counsel article http://www.wageandhourcounsel.com/2013/06/articles/federal/new-york-district-court-enforces-arbitration-agreement-waiving-right-to-proceed-collectively-on-flsa-claims/ and
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its case citation Dixon v. NBCUniversal Media, Inc.,
The analysis of this federal trial court and that of the article is very informative. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York found that the employee had agreed to arbitrate her FLSA claim, and thus it enforced the arbitration agreement she signed that waived her statutory right to class action litigation. One interesting twist is that she received no additional consideration for the subsequent changes to the ADR agreement, which usually is essential in order to be enforceable. However, the trial court found the changes were minimal. To be on the safe side, though, discuss this case with a competent employment attorney – paying some additional consideration for new terms might be more economical that hoping a court would find the changes minimal.
Background:
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She had been notified by email that:
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she would be covered by the company’s alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) program that covered “all claims that arise out of or are related to an employee’s employment”,
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it included as an example “[c]laims relating to compensation”, and
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it provided a link to a PowerPoint training course with a link to the employee manual containing the ADR provisions.
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She had attended an ADR training course that:
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explicitly described the binding nature of the ADR program and its application to wage hour claims,
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expressly stated that no class or collective actions would be permitted, and
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also informed her plaintiff that by choosing to continue to work for the company after July 1, 2009, she was agreeing to be covered by the ADR program after that date.
Trial court:
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Concerning the ADR program and some subsequent modifications:
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It found those factors sufficient to establish that her continued employment constituted acceptance of the arbitration agreement provisions.
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It rejected the plaintiff’s contention that she had never assented to a later version of the ADR program that was the basis of her employer’s motion to compel arbitration.
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Though she had been covered previously by the ADR program, the court found that it was sufficient for the employer to expressly remind the plaintiff that, despite minor changes made to the ADR program, employees previously covered by the program would continue to be covered.
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Contention that the waiver was per se unenforceable:
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She did not argue that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable because it effectively precluded her from vindicating federal statutory rights by making it financially impossible to pursue her claim, but rather, the plaintiff conceded that her claim was sufficiently large to pursue effectively as an individual claim [read the article for details on issues currently pending before the U.S. Supreme Court].
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Though the 2nd Circuit hasn’t yet ruled on this matter, a number of other jurisdictions have found “nothing in the text of the FLSA, its legislative history, or any inherent conflict between arbitration and the FLSA’s purpose, that would indicate congressional intent to preclude waiver of FLSA collective action claims”, and thus this trial court would follow the “vast majority” of courts enforcing waiver of the right to proceed collectively in an FLSA action.
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D.R. Horton issues: it refused to defer to the NLRB’s finding in that any waiver of the right to pursue an FLSA collective action violates the National Labor Relations Act. The court also noted that the Board may not have had a proper quorum and that courts, by an overwhelming majority, have rejected the reasoning in D.R. Horton.
Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX): whistleblower: ethics, misuse of funds, favoritism, adverse employment action, constructive discharge, administrative order affirmed
Jurisdiction: 10th Circuit
Lockheed Martin Corporation, V. Administrative Review Board, United States Department of
Labor, et al., No. 11-9524 (10th Cir., 6/4/13); 11-9524 [enhanced lexis.com version].
The Board’s decision in favor of the employee was affirmed, which is not surprising after reading about the misconduct.
Introduction by the appellate court:
Lockheed Martin Corp. (“Lockheed”) seeks to set aside a decision of the Administrative Review Board of the Department of Labor (the “ARB” or the “Board”) concluding Lockheed violated Section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley” or the “Act”). See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a). The Board affirmed the decision of an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), who concluded Lockheed violated the Act by constructively discharging employee Andrea Brown after she had engaged in protected activity. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(A) and 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(4)(A)1, this court affirms the decision of the Board.
Wage and hour: vacation pay, losing accrued time, collective bargaining agreement (CBA), waiver, California Labor Code § 227.3
Jurisdiction: California
Choate v. Celite Corp., No. B239160 (Cal.Ct.App., 5/2/13); [PDF] here - California Courts - State of California [enhanced lexis.com version].
If accrued vacation pay might be lost under a CBA, waiver of § 227.3 rights must be clear and unmistakable:
An employer in California must immediately pay a terminated employee for all of his "vested vacation time" unless the union representing that employee has negotiated a collective bargaining agreement that "otherwise provide[s]." (Labor Code, §§ 227.3, 201.)1 We hold that a collective bargaining agreement "otherwise provide[s]" and thereby abrogates an employee's statutory right under section 227.3 to immediate payment for vested vacation time only if the agreement clearly and unmistakably waives that right. Because the agreement in this case lacked this clarity, Celite Corporation (Celite) was required to immediately pay terminated employees for all their vested vacation time. We nevertheless reverse the trial court's judgment imposing waiting time penalties because Celite's nonpayment was not "willful."
FMLA: litigation – dismissed for discovery abuse – “wholesale obstruction” of discovery process, stress and headache claims, interference, retaliation, wrongful termination, various common law claims
Jurisdiction: 10th Circuit
Rodriguez v. Presbyterian Healthcare Services, et al., No. 12-2151 (10th Cr., 5/22/13); 12-2151 [enhanced lexis.com version].
Title VII: race, gender, disparate treatment, retaliation, McDonnell Douglas – failed to establish prima facie case, failure to exhaust administrative remedies, untimely claim under 300-day rule
Jurisdiction: 10th Circuit
Murdock v. City of Wichita, Kansas, No. 12-3279 (10th Cir., 5/23/13); 12-3279 [enhanced lexis.com version].
Affirmed district court’s dismissal for numerous failures of proof and failures to meet statutory requirements.
ADA, MHRA, ADEA: epileptic seizures, mammography technician, unable to perform essential functions, many reasonable accommodation tried without success, not a “qualified individual with a disability” (QIWAD); adverse employment action, summary judgment dismissal affirmed
Jurisdiction: 8th Circuit, Missouri
Olsen v. Capital Region Med. Ctr., No. 12-2113 (8th Cir., 5/7/13); 122113P.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
This case is an example of an employer having done more than enough for its employee.
Summary judgment in favor of her employer was affirmed:
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Duties included performing mammography examinations, positioning patients for the procedure, controlling the equipment, ensuring patient safety, and tending to patients’ physical and psychological needs epileptic seizures at work that caused her to lose orientation and muscle control, and also to repeatedly fall and sustain various injuries.
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Placed on administrative leave in 2004.
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In an effort to provide reasonable accommodations, her employer provided numerous accommodations to eliminate environmental triggers to her seizures, such as:
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removing mold,
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investigating cleaning agent ingredients,
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having other technicians handle patients who wore heavy perfumes,
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installing anti-glare filters on lights,
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eliminating scrolling from computers,
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covering x-ray films to reduce brightness,
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permitting to wear sunglasses, and
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educating her co-workers regarding epilepsy and how to treat someone who is seizing.
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Placed her as a temporary file clerk, but after two more seizures she again was placed on administrative leave.
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After a change in medications, she told her employer her seizures were under control.
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Her employer offered to reinstate her at her previous rate of pay with full benefits, which she rejected, and her employment was terminated.
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Her contention that she was a qualified individual with a disability was that she could perform all of her duties, except during a seizure, and that the only accommodation she required was intermittent leave to recover following a seizure, was rejected, as was her contention that her employer failed to engage in an interactive accommodations process.
Arbitration: litigation; appeal and error: standard of review; civil procedure: arbitration; contracts: consideration; employment law: collective bargaining; disciplinary action; employee grievances; labor unions; and termination of employment; government: municipalities; officers; ordinances; and public employees; jurisdiction: district court; remedies: arbitration; and writ of prohibition; torts: NM Tort Claims Act
Jurisdiction: New Mexico
Luginbuhl v. City of Gallup Police Department, No. 2013-NMCA-053 (3/11/13, Certiorari not applied for); http://www.nmcompcomm.us/nmcases/NMCA/2013/13ca-053.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
M. Monica Zamora, Judge
{1} Petitioner David Luginbuhl appeals from the district court’s denial of his petition for injunctive relief seeking to block the City of Gallup (City) and the Gallup Police Department (GPD) from forcing him to resolve his employment dispute through arbitration. Petitioner argues that because he is not a dues-paying member of the Gallup Police Officer’s Association (Union), he should not be forced to abide by the arbitration clause of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the Union, which represents members of the GPD, and the City, but rather that he should be allowed to pursue relief immediately in the district court to seek redress for his dismissal from the GPD. We disagree, and we affirm the district court for the reasons that follow.
Extensive legal analysis and discussion follows for litigators in this area of the law to study.
FEHA: harassment, severe, pervasive, retaliation, disparate treatment, Title VII similarities, constructive discharge, summary adjudication dismissal affirmed
Jurisdiction: California
McCoy v. Pacific Maritime Association, et al., No. B210953 (Cal.Ct.App.Dist.2Div.4, 5/14/13): B210953
[PDF] [DOC] [enhanced lexis.com version].
Plaintiff essentially failed to prove her case.
Summary by the appellate court:
We conclude: The court did not err in summarily adjudicating the sexual harassment and emotional distress claims, because the harassment was not so severe and pervasive as to alter the conditions of appellant’s employment, and respondents’ conduct failed to meet the extreme and outrageous standard necessary for the emotional distress claim; the court properly found respondent PMA was not appellant’s employer as that term is used in FEHA; and the court did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial. We also conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence, except as to evidence of sufficiently similar retaliation by respondents against other employees. Finally, we conclude there was substantial evidence to support the jury verdict in appellant’s favor on the retaliation claim and thus the court erred in setting aside that verdict.
Respondents assert in their protective cross-appeal that the trial court erred in denying them partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict regarding the economic damages award because appellant failed to establish she was constructively discharged. We conclude a constructive discharge is not a prerequisite to an award of economic damages for discrimination under FEHA.
The judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
Wage and hour: managers supervising while performing non-exempt tasks are to be classified as non-exempt
Jurisdiction: California
Heyen v. Safeway, No. B237418 ((Cal.Ct.App.Dist.2Div.4, 5/23/13): B237418
[PDF] [DOC] [enhanced lexis.com version].
Summary by the appellate court:
Plaintiff/respondent Linda Heyen is a former assistant manager for defendant/appellant Safeway Inc. (Safeway). After Safeway terminated her employment, Heyen brought this action to recover unpaid overtime pay, contending Safeway should have classified her as a “nonexempt” employee because she regularly spent more than 50 percent of her work hours doing “nonexempt” tasks such as bagging groceries and stocking shelves. An advisory jury and the trial court agreed with Heyen and awarded her overtime pay of $26,184.60, plus interest.
Safeway appeals, contending that the trial court failed to properly account for hours Heyen spent simultaneously performing exempt and nonexempt tasks—i.e., “actively . . . manag[ing] the store while also concurrently performing some checking and bagging of customer grocery purchases.” Safeway urges that, consistent with federal law, the trial court should have classified as “exempt” all hours during which Heyen simultaneously performed exempt and nonexempt tasks. Because the court failed to do so, Safeway claims it prejudicially erred, requiring a reversal of the judgment.
We disagree with Safeway’s analysis as inconsistent with California law. Hence, we affirm the judgment for Heyen.
Wage and hour: litigation, class action certified, driver – compensated formula rather than straight hourly rate – meals, rest
Jurisdiction: California
Bluford v. Safeway Stores, Inc., No. C066074 (Cal. Ct. App. Dist. 3); C066074
[PDF] [DOC] [enhanced lexis.com version].
Summary by the appellate court:
This appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of class certification in a wage and hour action. Plaintiff Kenneth Bluford sought to certify a class of plaintiffs in his action against his employer, defendant Safeway, Inc. He claims Safeway violated statutory and regulatory laws requiring it to provide its employees with paid rest periods, earned meal periods, and sufficiently itemized wage statements.
The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion to certify a class. It ruled individual issues predominated over common issues on the rest period and meal period claims, and that plaintiff failed to allege a common injury resulting from the inadequate wage statements.
We reverse. Insufficient evidence supports the trial court’s ruling, as common issues predominate over individual issues, and plaintiff in fact alleged a common injury resulting from the wage statements. We order the trial court to grant plaintiff’s motion.
Litigation: new procedures for summary dispositions, expedited trial, cases less than $100,000 at issue
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