Jurisdiction: Mexico
ADA: partial deafness in one ear, not substantially limited in the major life activity of hearing; difficulty concentrating; reduction-in-force (RIF); evidence – McDonnell Douglas; failure of prima facie case of discrimination; performance deficiencies not shown to be related to adverse employment action
Jurisdiction: U.S.D.C.E.D.PA
Mengel v. Reading Eagle Co., No. 11-6151 (U.S.D.C.E.D.PA., 3/29/13); http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-paed-5_11-cv-06151/pdf/USCOURTS-paed-5_11-cv-06151-0.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
Title VII: sexual harassment – hostile work environment – crude misconduct – severe and/or pervasive; adverse employment action – retaliation
Jurisdiction: 9th Circuit
Westendorf v. West Coast Contractors of Nevada, Inc., No. 11-16004 (9th Cir., 4/1/13); http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2013/04/01/11-16004.pdf; with an interesting partial concurrence and partial dissent [enhanced lexis.com version].
Hostile work environment cases often deal with the severity or pervasiveness, or both, of the misconduct. In this case it was occasional, isolated, sporadic, or trivial and a violation of company policy, but not bad enough to amount to severe and/or pervasive. Though even the United States Supreme Court has noted that the anti-discrimination laws aren’t intended as codes of civil behavior, the cost of litigation and the obligation of promoting good moral in the workplace should be enough to shut down misbehavior. Probably the best policy is a “zero tolerance” policy for harassment of any kind.
Summary by Arnold, Circuit Judge:
Jennifer Westendorf brought a Title VII action against her former employer, West Coast Contractors, claiming sexual harassment and retaliatory discharge. The district court granted summary judgment to West Coast, and Ms. Westendorf appeals. We affirm the judgment on the harassment claim, and reverse and remand the retaliation claim for further proceedings.
Background: Jennifer Westendorf worked as a project manager assistant for the company, and over her five months there:
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Her supervisor once referred to her job duties as “girly work”.
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He immediately apologized, she didn’t complain, but the president heard about it and spoke to the supervisor, and the supervisor complained to her.
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A coworker:
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referred to a female vendor as “Double D” and made other comments about how he admired her chest size,
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made boorish comments about feminine care products,
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spoke enviously about how women can have multiple orgasms
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suggested she clean the trailer while wearing a French maid’s costume, and
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repeatedly told her to “f----“ off during a disagreement.
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Her supervisor heard some of the coworker’s comments but did nothing to stop them.
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She complained to the company president, who then conducted an investigation, which included hiring a court reporter to record the statements of each witness.
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The president reprimanded the supervisor for failing to stop the coworker’s misconduct and was warned that he would be fired if such misbehavior happened again.
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Following the investigation, she felt her supervisor began petty criticism of her work and was ridiculing her in front of subcontractors.
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Finally, the pettiness escalated:
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Her supervisor lost his temper when she told a subcontractor that no company employees would attend the subcontractor’s social event because they were all going to the wedding of the supervisor’s daughter.
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Coworkers whined and tattled to the president, who blew up and fumed that he was sick of the drama and told her that she had a problem getting along with her supervisor and that it would be best if she packed her belongings, which she did, and was escorted from the building.
Appellate ruling:
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Disgusting behavior, but neither severe nor pervasive enough to survive a motion for summary judgment on the hostile work environment claim, but
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enough of a factual issue on retaliation to proceed to trial.
[Note: It’s not unusual that even if the discrimination claim fails, the retaliation claim ( and other claims ) may survive and succeed and result in a judgment of as much or more than for discrimination.]
Protected Activity: Cal-OSHA complaint, adverse employment action, termination of employment, retaliation, “cat’s paw”, no causal connection shown
Jurisdiction: California
Winston v. Countrywide Financial Corp. et al., No. B232823 (Cal.Ct.App. 2/19/13, unpublished):
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http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/nonpub/B232823M.PDF;
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http://www.google.com/#hl=en&gs_rn=7&gs_ri=psy-ab&cp=59&gs_id=5&xhr=t&q=Winston+v.+Countrywide+Financial+Corp.+et+al.,+No.+B232823&es_nrs=true&pf=p&output=search&sclient=psy-ab&oq=Winston+v.+Countrywide+Financial+Corp.+et+al.,+No.+B232823+&gs_l=&pbx=1&bav=on.2,or.r_qf.&bvm=bv.44442042,d.cGE&fp=7d6c36e61d74ed8b&biw=704&bih=1045;
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http://www.fearnotlaw.com/articles/article53750.html [enhanced lexis.com version].
$3M verdict reversed for failure to show causal connection between activities relied on as related to retaliation and termination of employment.
Background:
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Winston contended he was retaliated against for two events:
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July 2006 – some of his reports were reassigned to another employee after he had filed a complaint with California’s Division of Occupational Safety and Health regarding an alleged chemical exposure in the workplace.
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December 2006 – executives threatened to fire him after he refused to change an audit report to a rating agency to present the company’s succession planning practices in a manner more favorable version
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Acquisition of the company:
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2008 – Bank of America announced plans to acquire Countrywide Financial.
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Interview for position – not accepted as not be a “good fit”.
California law for wrongful termination resulting from retaliation:
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he or she engaged in protected activity,
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the employer discharged the employee, and
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a causal link existed between the protected activity and the discharge, such as a retaliatory motive against the employee that led to termination of employment.
Essential to a causal link is evidence that the employer was aware that the plaintiff had engaged in the protected activity.
Appellate ruling:
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No evidence presented that decisionmaker had unfavorable information at interview of previous matters.
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Decided not to hire for “legitimate and nonretaliatory” reasons:
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No open position for an executive with his expertise (interviewer already held the equivalent position).
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Winston’s base salary exceeded interviewer’s
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Found Winston to be arrogant during the interview and did not believe he would fit well with Bank of America’s corporate culture.
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Cat’s paw theory rejected for lack of causal link:
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BofA acquired countrywide for its loan portfolio, not its human resources employees.
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BofA hired none of the executives he relied in his contentions.
Arbitration: Title VII, "pattern-or-practice" claim, "substantive right to challenge systemic discrimination", class action allegations
Jurisdiction: 2nd Circuit
Parisi v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 11-5229 (2nd Cir., 3/21/13): http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/46c2a4fc-429f-4370-8124-6fe76d5efa22/2/doc/11-5229_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/46c2a4fc-429f-4370-8124-6fe76d5efa22/2/hilite/ [enhanced lexis.com version].
The ruling in this Title VII case is that the employees were bound by their arbitration agreement and must individually arbitrate Title VII "pattern-or-practice" claims. A further implication is that the reasoning in this case probably would also apply in Class action situations. Litigators outside of the 2nd Circuit, take note of the reasoning that might be found persuasive by other jurisdictions on the issues of:
Informative article by Constangy, Brooks & Smith, LLP, 3/29/13, at http://www.constangy.com/communications-448.html.
Wage and Hour: class action, insufficient statistical sample
Jurisdiction: California
Dailey v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., No. D061055 (Cal.Ct.App.Dist4.Div.1, 3/20/13); http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/D061055.PDF [enhanced lexis.com version].
Class action certification was not warranted – auto center managers and assistant managers alleged they were improperly classified as exempt and denied overtime, meal and rest breaks in violation of the California Labor Code.
The trail court denial of class action status was affirmed by the appellate court:
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The class representative could not rely on random statistical samples to establish liability,
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individual issues predominated over common issues case, and
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the class representative failed to show that the employer had a uniform policy of depriving managers of meal or rest breaks.
FMLA: transfer to new position, calculation of damages – “unduly speculative”- back pay – front pay, trial court – abuse of discretion – remanded to recalculate damages
Jurisdiction: 8th Circuit
Dollar v. Smithway Motor Xpress Inc., No. 11-2093 (8th Cir., 3/27/13); http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opns/opFrame.html [enhanced lexis.com version].
Trial courts have reasonable discretion in cases. However, in this case the appellate court held it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to estimate front-pay damages for a position Dollar had not held and under circumstances that had changed after she left on leave. Consequently, the front-pay damage award was vacated:
Plaintiff Christine Ann Dollar sued her former employer alleging violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2601etseq. Following a bench trial, the district court found in favor of Dollar and awarded a total of $296,112 in back pay, front pay, and liquidated damages. The defendants (collectively "Smithway") appeal, raising arguments regarding Dollar's ability to return to her prior position or to a different position that the employer identified for Dollar weeks before her termination. Smithway also raises issues regarding its own corporate identity and changes in its ongoing operations as relevant to the propriety and amount of the front-pay award. We vacate the front-pay award as unduly speculative given the unique circumstances of this case, but we affirm in all other respects.
Title VII: race, retaliation, adverse employment action, summary judgment dismissal affirmed
Jurisdiction: 10th Circuit
Rochelle v. Hy-Vee, Inc., No. 12-3259 (10th Cir., 3/22/13); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/12/12-3259.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
The employee failed to show that the change in the hours he was rescheduled to work amounted to legally significant adverse employment action:
Marquan Rochelle, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment to his former employer. He claims that the employer retaliated against him in violation of Title VII for complaining about racial discrimination. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm
Privacy: disclosure of private facts, written, oral
Jurisdiction: California
Ignat v. Yum! Brands, Inc., G046343 (CA.Ct.App.Dist.4Div.3, 3/18/13): http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G046343.PDF [enhanced lexis.com version].
Her supervisor disclosed to a coworker that Ignat suffered from a bipolar condition. This court no longer distinguishes between written and oral communications:
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Melissa Ignat appeals from a judgment of dismissal after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Yum! Brands, Inc., alleged to be Ignat’s employer, and Mary Shipma, her immediate supervisor, on Ignat’s single cause of action for public disclosure of private facts. The basis of Ignat’s suit was Shipma’s alleged disclosure to Ignat’s coworkers of her bipolar condition.
This is Ignat’s second trip to our court. She appealed from a prior dismissal on summary judgment after the trial court refused to consider a late-filed opposition. We sent the case back for a decision on the merits.(Ignat v. Yum! Brands, Inc. (Mar. 1, 2011, G043098) [nonpub. opn.].)
That decision took the form of the trial court granting summary judgment on the ground the right of privacy can be violated only by a writing, not by word of mouth. Because Ignat had not produced any document disclosing private facts, she could not pursue this cause of action. The trial court lamented the ‘irrationality’ of this rule, but felt itself bound by precedent.
We believe this rule–to the extent it is still observed –is outmoded and interferes with a person’s right to privacy without any corresponding benefit to any other right or policy. Other restrictions on liability for invasion of privacy serve other important interests, such as free speech or freedom of the press. But no one has come up with a good reason for restricting liability to written disclosures, and it has long been acknowledged that oral disclosures can be just as harmful.
Because the lack of a writing was the sole basis for the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, we reverse. We express only one opinion about the other issues raised in respondents’ motion.
Union: public sector, freedom of speech, First Amendment, use of dues, union activities, injunctions
Jurisdiction: 10th Circuit
Oklahoma Corrections Professional Association Inc., v. Doerflinger, No. 12-6238 (10th Cir., 3/25/13); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/12/12-6238.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
Litigators practicing in this area of public sector and union law may want to check this opinion to determine if it might in any way provide either positive or negative information applicable to their clients.
In affirming the ruling and analysis of the trial court, the appellate court stated:
It began that analysis by acknowledging “[t]he First Amendment prohibits government from abridging the freedom of speech; it does not confer an affirmative right to use government payroll mechanisms for the purpose of obtaining funds for expression.”
Sarbanes-Oxley, SOX: whistleblower, protected activity, definition significantly broadened
Jurisdiction: 3rd Circuit
Wiest v. Tyco Elec. Corp., No. 11-4257 (3d Cir., 3/19/13); http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/114257p.pdf, Good background article by Littler Mendelson at http://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/third-circuit-adopts-new-broader-standard-defining-protected-activity- [enhanced lexis.com version].
This is a case and article for litigators to study about the complexities of SOX and the conflicting rulings among various jurisdictions.
Summary Vanaskie, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Jeffrey Wiest brought an action under the whistleblower protection provisions set forth in Section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act(“SOX”), 18U.S.C.§1514A, and under Pennsylvania law against Appellees Tyco Electronics Corporation and several officers and directors of Tyco Electronics (collectively, “Tyco”).The District Court granted Tyco’s Motion to Dismiss the federal whistleblower claims, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, and denied Wiest’s Motion for Reconsideration. Concluding that the District Court erred in requiring that Wiest allege that his communications to his supervisors “definitively and specifically relate to” an existing violation of a particular anti-fraud law, as opposed to expressing a reasonable belief that corporate managers are taking actions that could run afoul of a particular anti-fraud law, we will reverse, in part, the dismissal of the federal whistleblower claims and vacate the dismissal of the state law claim.
Appellate majority reasoning and holding:
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The "definitively and specifically" standard conflicts with § 806 of SOX, which prohibits retaliation against employees for reporting information that they "reasonably believe" violates SOX – its previous decision in Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm’rs v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 992 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1993) stated that for the whistleblower provision to accomplish the goals of the statute, then "employees must be free from threats to their job security in retaliation for their good faith assertions of corporate violations of the statute."
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Looking at SOX legislative history of § 806, it also held that an employee must establish both a subjective, good faith belief that his or her employer violated a provision listed in SOX, and also that his or her belief must be objectively reasonable.
Dissent:
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This approach is overly broad because it doesn’t to take into account the statutory requirement that the whistleblower’a complaint relates to one of the six categories of federal law.
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This standard also could allow complaints that merely allege wrongdoing without also showing that the violation is even covered by § 806.
Arbitration, Litigation: employment law – adverse employment action – employee grievances, appeal and error – standard of review, civil procedure – summary judgment – remedies – declaratory judgment
Jurisdiction: New Mexico
Horne v. Los Alamos National Security, L.L.C., No. 33,135 (NMSC, 1//13); 2013-NMSC-004; http://www.nmcompcomm.us/nmcases/NMSC/2013/13sc-004.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
Bosson, Justice:
This case arises from an employee grievance at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), operated by Los Alamos National Security, LLC. After succeeding in arbitration, the employee, John Horne, filed a lawsuit in state district court in 2008, in which he alleged more expansive claims arising out of the same subject matter covered in the arbitration agreement. LANL objected, claiming that it should not have to defend against claims that either were subject to arbitration or were waived by the arbitration agreement. Accordingly, we discuss the consequences that follow when an employee voluntarily contracts to arbitrate grievances and what the employee must do to preserve a subsequent lawsuit if that is his intention. In this case we side with the district court’s ruling in favor of LANL, and in so doing, reverse the Court of Appeals.
Class Actions: CAFA, 28 U.S.C. § 1453, removal of class actions, jurisdictional amount, stipulation
Jurisdiction: All
Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Knowles, No. 11–1450 568 U.S. ____ (3/19/13); http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/11-1450_9olb.pdf; 2013 U.S. LEXIS 2370 [enhanced lexis.com version].
28 U.S.C. § 1453: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/1453 [annotated lexis.com version].
Summary by the Court:
The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) gives federal district courts original jurisdiction over class actions in which, among other things, the matter in controversy exceeds $5 million in sum or value, 28 U. S. C. §§1332(d)(2), (5), and provides that to determine whether a matter exceeds that amount the “claims of the individual class members must be aggregated,” §1332(d)(6). When respondent Knowles filed a proposed class action in Arkansas state court against petitioner Standard Fire Insurance Company, he stipulated that he and the class would seek less than $5 million in damages. Pointing to CAFA, petitioner removed the case to the Federal District Court, but it remanded to the state court, concluding that the amount in controversy fell below the CAFA threshold in light of Knowles’ stipulation, even though it found that the amount would have fallen above the threshold absent the stipulation. The Eighth Circuit declined to hear petitioner’s appeal.
Held: Knowles’ stipulation does not defeat federal jurisdiction under CAFA. Pp. 3−7.
(a) Here, the precertification stipulation can tie Knowles’ hands be-cause stipulations are binding on the party who makes them, see Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings College of Law v. Martinez, 561 U. S. ___. However, the stipulation does not speak for those Knowles purports to represent, for a plaintiff who files a proposed class action cannot legally bind members of the pro-posed class before the class is certified. See Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U. S. ___, ___. Because Knowles lacked authority to concede the amount in controversy for absent class members, the District Court wrongly concluded that his stipulation could overcome its finding that the CAFA jurisdictional threshold had been met. Pp. 3−4.
b) Knowles concedes that federal jurisdiction cannot be based on contingent future events. Yet, because a stipulation must be binding and a named plaintiff cannot bind precertification class members, the amount he stipulated is in effect contingent. CAFA does not forbid a federal court to consider the possibility that a nonbinding, amount-limiting, stipulation may not survive the class certification process. To hold otherwise would, for CAFA jurisdictional purposes, treat a nonbinding stipulation as if it were binding, exalt form over sub-stance, and run counter to CAFA’s objective: ensuring “Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national importance.” §2(b)(2),119 Stat. 5.
It may be simpler for a federal district court to value the amount in controversy on the basis of a stipulation, but ignoring a nonbinding stipulation merely requires the federal judge to do what she must do in cases with no stipulation: aggregate the individual class members’ claims. While individual plaintiffs may avoid removal to federal court by stipulating to amounts that fall below the federal jurisdictional threshold, the key characteristic of such stipulations—missing here—is that they are legally binding on all plaintiffs. Pp. 4−7. Vacated and remanded. BREYER, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous court.
Attorneys: ethics, professional conduct, communication with represented opposing parties
Jurisdiction: California
San Francisco United Sch. Dist. ex. rel. Contreras v. First Student, Inc., No. A134405 (Cal.Ct.App., 2/19/13); http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A134405.PDF [enhanced lexis.com version].
Generally, an attorney cannot communicate directly with opposing parties who are represented by an attorney(s), and this is the sane in California’s Rules of Professional Conduct – no direct or indirect contact. However, in a qui tam* action this appellate court vacated the trial judge’s injunction order prohibiting such communication:
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it violated California’s prohibition against employer interference with employee communications and
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there were First Amendment free speech concerns.
[Note: The phrase “qui tam” refers to a legal action to recover a penalty under a statute – this is to encourage actions by an individual or individuals that otherwise might not be taken and gives part of the penalty to the individual or individuals bringing the action and the rest to the state or a public entity.]
NLRB: strike, absences, reasonably foreseeable risk of imminent danger, adverse employment action, firing upheld
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