Human resources & employment law cumulative case briefs


Jurisdiction: Massachusetts



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Jurisdiction: Massachusetts
Dixon vs. City of Malden, No. SJC-11137 (3/4/13); http://www.socialaw.com/slip.htm?cid=21948&sid=120 [enhanced lexis.com version].
After the city terminated his employment, he sued for damages for violating of the Wage Act, alleging he had not been paid for accrued vacation time. This case may be of value in other jurisdictions as persuasive authority.
IRELAND, C.J.:
We transferred this case from the Appeals Court on our own motion to consider whether undifferentiated gratuitous weekly payments made by the city of Malden (city) to the plaintiff, Gary Dixon, after he was discharged covered his claim for unpaid vacation days under G. L. c. 149, §§ 148, 150 (Wage Act). The plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court dismissing his claim against the city. He asserts that a Superior Court judge erred in dismissing his claim under the Wage Act for vacation pay, costs, attorneys' fees, and treble damages on the ground that, although the manner of the payments violated the express language of the Wage Act, the city nevertheless compensated the plaintiff. Because we conclude that the city could not cast those payments as vacation pay after the fact and that the plaintiff is entitled to recover his vacation pay in addition to costs and attorneys' fees, we remand the case to the Superior Court for entry of a judgment consistent with our opinion.
FMLA, ADA: no obligation to provide light duty
Jurisdiction: 7th Circuit
James v. Hyatt Regency Chicago, No. 12-1511 (7th Cir., 2/13/13); http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/QA0MX2O4.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
Neither act requires an employer to create a position for an employee, such as provide light duty work to an individual who is unable – with or without accommodation – to return to the essential functions of his job.
Background:

  • March 2007 – Carris James, banquet steward, was punched in the eye during an incident not related to work and suffered a retinal detachment for which he underwent surgery in the following month.

  • Human resources provided him information about FMLA leave.

  • His physician, Dr. Scott, stated he could return to “light duty” on May 10, but did not state for how long.

  • April 25 – he requested FMLA leave, which was applied retroactively to include his previous related absences.

  • May 9 – he gave his employer additional documentation indicating he was “unable to work in any capacity.”

  • Subsequently he received disability benefits based upon that information – “unable to work in any capacity”.

  • May 11 – he submitted a medical certification stating that his condition could possibly lead to permanent incapacity.

  • His 12 weeks of FMLA ended on July 13, 2007. However, the collective bargaining agreement provided job-protected leave for up to one year from his original absence.

  • August – he submitted various pieces of documentation, including one release stating that though “visually impaired”, he could return to work – but documentation from Dr. Scott continued to state he was incapable of working in any capacity.

  • September 25 – he faxed a note yet another physician stating he could return to work with lifting and bending restrictions, but those restrictions would have precluded him from returning to the banquet steward position.

  • At this point his employer attempted to contact him for additional information, but no clarification was provided until January 2008, when Hyatt’s Workers Compensation and Safety Manager sent a letter directly to Dr. Scott, enclosing a return to work certification form, as well as a job analysis for the banquet steward position. Dr. Scott responded that James could return to work, but could not complete any task that required better than 20/200 vision. Hyatt then met with James and scheduled a return to work in the same position, shift, and seniority level as before his medical leave.



Appellate opinion: His claims of FMLA interference and ADA failure to accommodate were dismissed by the trial court, which the appellate court affirmed:

  1. The FMLA states that “if an employee cannot perform an essential function of [his] original position because of a physical or mental condition, the employee has no right to restoration to a different position under the FMLA.” [Note: Though the FMLA requires an employer to return an employee to either the position held at the time the FMLA leave began or to an “equivalent” position, it neither:

    1. requires an employer to restore an employee to a light duty position (which clearly isn’t equivalent) nor

    2. allows just returning before to the expiration of the allowed leave time.]

  2. Concerning his ADA claim of failure to accommodate him, it noted his visual impairment had been accommodated beginning in 1985.

  3. Finally, these factors were important to the court:

    1. his “conditional” and contradictory releases being provided by him,

    2. his application for disability benefits on the ground that he unable to work in any capacity, and

    3. not providing sufficient information for the company to understand the true nature of his condition, or to formulate or implement a reasonable accommodation. [Note: The accommodation process must be interactive and done in good faith.]

Class action: erroneously certified , reversed and decertified based on Dukes v. Walmart


Jurisdiction: 9th Circuit
Wang v. Chinese Daily News, No. 08-55483 (9th Cir., 3/4/13);

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2013/03/04/08-55483.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
SOX, Wrongful Discharge: separate actions, not mutually exclusive, one does not bar the other
Jurisdiction: Washington
McEuen v. Riverview Bancorp, Inc., No. C12-5997 (U.S.D.C.WA.W.D., 2/21/13); Jackson Lewis article at http://www.jacksonlewis.com/resources.php?NewsID=4403; and The Columbian newspaper article at http://www.columbian.com/news/2012/dec/12/ex-riverview-worker-files-14m-suit/ [enhanced lexis.com version].
A federal Sarbanes-Oxley suit did not bar the former bank auditor’s claim for wrongful termination – public policy reasons for the two claims for relief are separate.
PDLL, CFRA, FEHA: pregnancy leave, no cap on length, statutory interpretation, reasonable accommodation
Jurisdiction: California
Sanchez v. Swissport, Inc., No. B237761 (Cal. Ct. App., 2/21/13); Jackson Lewis article at http://www.jacksonlewis.com/resources.php?NewsID=4400; http://www.thoitslaw.com/resources/Sanchez%20v.%20Swissport.PDF [enhanced lexis.com version].
The California Pregnancy Disability Leave Law allowance of four months of pregnancy leave has been ruled to be the beginning of the leave allowed, not the limit of it, and more leave possibly might be available under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. Practitioners need to read the article and the case for details, as well as remain alert to any possible further appeal.
INTRODUCTION
In a case of first impression, we are asked to determine whether an employee who has exhausted all permissible leave available under the Pregnancy Disability Leave Law (PDLL), Government Code section 12945, may nevertheless state a cause of action under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), section 12900 et seq. The superior court concluded that appellant, disabled by a high-risk pregnancy, failed to state a claim under the FEHA because her employer had granted her the maximum leave provided under the PDLL before terminating her due to her failure to return to work. We conclude the allegations in appellant’s first amended complaint (FAC) are sufficient to state a prima facie case under the FEHA for employment discrimination. Accordingly, we reverse the superior court’ order dismissing the FAC.
Title VII: litigation, sexual harassment, settlement, "reasonable" fees and costs, fee obligation not specified, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 – offer of judgment, employer must pay attorney fee
Jurisdiction: 7th Circuit
Juana Sanchez v. Prudential Pizza, No. 12-2208 (7th Cir., 3/4/13); http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2013/D03-04/C:12-2208:J:Hamilton:aut:T:fnOp:N:1093013:S:0 [enhanced lexis.com version].
This opinion distinguishes between ordinary contracts to settle and offers of judgment made under Rule 68, which is a very important distinction. The dispute arose because the settlement offer did not address attorney fees. Had it been an ordinary settlement offer outside of Rule 68, the plaintiff probably would not have been able to collect attorney fees and costs because that wasn’t covered – parties to a contract omit terms at their peril. However because it was a Rule 68 offer of judgment, different legal analysis applied:

  • After the “settlement”, the plaintiff sued for $140,000 in attorney fees. The trial judge reasoned that Title VII allows plaintiffs to recover attorneys' fees and said, "This court believes that costs and fees were specifically addressed by the terms of the offer of judgment.”

  • The appellate court also ruled in her favor and remanded [returned] the case the trial judge to determine "reasonable" fees and costs. According to the appellate panel, under Rule, which governs certain settlement offers, parties making offers must be clear about what they are offering, and it wasn’t clear if the offer of judgment included fees and costs:

Once more we must teach defendants making Rule 68 offers to be specific and clear in their offers. Any ambiguities will be resolved against them.


* * *
Prudential Pizza’s offer was silent as to costs and fees. Pursuant to Webb and Nordby, we resolve the ambiguity against the offeror. Sanchez is entitled to attorney fees and costs under the Rule 68 offer she accepted. The judgment of the district court denying fees and costs is reversed and the case is remanded for an appropriate award of attorney fees and other costs, and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FMLA: a great collection of 2012 case briefs
American Bar Association, Section of Labor and Employment Law, Committee on Federal Labor Standards Legislation, 2013 Midwinter Meeting Report of 2012 Cases

Submitted by: Subcommittee on the Family and Medical Leave Act


http://www.fmlainsights.com/2013%20FMLA%20report%20%28ABA%29.pdf

Brief description of the contents of the PDF file:



  • page 1: list of contributors

  • pages i-xi: Table of Contents

  • pages 1-290: case briefs and citations

ADA: random alcohol testing, job-related, consistent with business necessity, mandatory for safety sensitive positions


Jurisdiction: U.S.D.C.W.D.PA
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. United States Steel Corporation, et al., Civil Action No. 10-1284 (U.S.D.C.W.D.PA, 2/20/13); http://www.employmentandlaborinsider.com/Blog.2.22.13.USSteel.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
This a trial court case, and orders and judgments of a trial court are binding only on the parties involved in the litigation. That means that it is not controlling law on anyone else, i.e. it is not binding precedent or controlling law on anyone else. Also, it may be appealed and produce a different result. However, it is briefed here so that litigators and human resources practitioners can be aware of it and benefit from the reasoning of the trial judge – which makes good sense.
A steel mill coke plant is a dangerous place where materials heated to intensely high temperatures, and safety certainly seems job-related and a matter of business necessity [“coke” is a special kind of coal used in manufacturing steel]. Conducting random alcohol tests on probationary employees at a coke plant is a sensible safety policy [and probably also an OSHA concern]. The trial judge ruled that the employer had the right under the ADA to conduct random alcohol tests on probationary employees at a coke plant, and it granted summary to the company in a class action filed by the EEOC. The "job related and consistent with business necessity" standard applies in ADA situations when an employer requires a current employee to undergo medical examination, and probationary employees fall into that category.
[Note: In Delgado, a worker was horribly burned in a smelter disaster and died three weeks afterwards. In deciding whether his widow’s claim was to be for workers’ compensation benefits or a wrongful death tort claim, an implied consideration was that such a workplace is very dangerous. Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., 2001-NMSC-034, 131 N.M. 272, 34 P.3d 1148; http://www.supremecourt.nm.org/pastopinion/VIEW/01sc-034.html; http://law.justia.com/cases/new-mexico/supreme-court/2001/c58e.html [enhanced lexis.com version]. Thus, high danger and safety concerns probably are important factors in examining ADA issues of "job related and consistent with business necessity".]
NLRB: Unfair settlement challenged and rejected
Jurisdiction: All (potentially)
Michels Corporation, 30-CA-081206 (12/19/12, unpublished)
The settlement agreement in this case was rejected, primarily because it did not meet the standards set forth in Independent Stave Co., 287 NLRB 740 (1987) [enhanced lexis.com version]. The Agreement stated:

  • the employer was to:

    • pay $7,500 to the former employee and

    • provide him with a neutral employment reference, and

  • the employee agreed not to seek reinstatement or apply for future employment with the employer.

  • Further:

  • The settlement agreement contained a broad confidentiality provision to “keep the terms of this Agreement strictly confidential and will not communicate or disclose to any other person, natural or otherwise, except as required by law, the contents of any term or provision contained herein or any other aspect of this agreement between the parties”, and

  • It provided neither

    • a notice-posting provision nor

    • provision for reinstatement of the employee.

This Jackson Lewis law firm article explains the case and the history and reasoning: http://www.jacksonlewis.com/resources.php?NewsID=4383.


WARN: 60-day layoff-notice requirement, abrupt adverse employment action, unforeseen business circumstances, bankruptcy, compliance not required
Jurisdiction: 5th Circuit
Angles v. Flexible Flyer Liquidating Trust, No. 12-60242 (5th Cir., 2/11/13); http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions%5Cunpub%5C12/12-60242.0.wpd.pdf; 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 2850 [enhanced lexis.com version].
The company experienced a number of problems that converged with other adverse factors to force unforeseen closure of the plant:

  • it had been struggling for a long time,

  • it had to recall a large number of go-karts,

  • a purchaser deferred an order of swing sets, and

  • a large payment for another transaction was withheld, etc.

FLSA: overtime exemption, automobile-dealership service writers and service advisors, §13(b)(10)(A) definition of "salesman, partsman, or mechanic"


This narrow area of wage and hour law is not briefed, but an informative article can be found at: http://www.wage-hour.net/post/2013/02/25/Courts-Arent-Buying-USDOL-Service-Writer-Service-Advisor-Comments.aspx.
ADEA: unclear reason for adverse employment action, termination of employment – fired or resigned, McDonnell Douglas, pretext, material fact issues – summary judgment inappropriate
Jurisdiction: 3rd Circuit
Burton v. Teleflex Incorporated, et al., No. 11-3752 (3rd Cir., 2/20/13); http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/113752p.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]
Summary by the appellate court:
Appellant Mary Burton (“Burton”) alleges that her employer, Teleflex Inc. (“Teleflex”), terminated her employment in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Burton also alleges various state law discrimination, contract, and tort claims against Teleflex. Teleflex claims that it did not terminate Burton’s employment, but that she in fact resigned her position. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment in favor of Teleflex on Burton’s discrimination claims, finding that Burton had resigned, and that even if she had not, she could not demonstrate that Teleflex’s purported justification for sending her the letter “accept[ing her] resignation” was pretextual. The District Court also granted summary judgment to Teleflex on all of Burton’s state law claims. Because the record clearly demonstrates that a dispute of material fact exists as to whether Burton resigned or was terminated, we vacate the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on Burton’s discrimination claims and breach of contract claim. We affirm the grant of summary judgment on Burton’s claims for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, wrongful interference with contractual relations, and defamation.
FMLA: employee failed to provide medical certification within 15 days, ignored two extensions, lack of diligent good faith effort, 29 CFR 825.305(b), adverse employment action, no interference, no retaliation, rights and responsibilities
Jurisdiction: 1st Circuit

Citations and URL links:



  • Brookins v. Staples Contract & Commercial Inc., NO. 11-11067-RWZ (U.S.D.C.MA, 2/12/13) [enhanced lexis.com version]

  • FMLA regulation: 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(b) [annotated lexis.com version]

  • Explanatory article:http://www.fmlainsights.com/certification/employees-lack-of-diligence-in-obtaining-timely-medical-certification-destroys-her-fmla-claim/

Recent amendments to FMLA regulations set forth both rights and responsibilities of both employees and employers, both of whom owe each other a duty of good faith and diligence, and this case demonstrates the need for training in policies and practices and in rights and responsibilities of all concerned.


Ronita Brookins’ job was to review customer orders for credit card fraud. Over a period of years she suffered from breast cancer, was off from work for several years, and after she returned she had a series of questionable unexcused absences for which she was in jeopardy of being fired. When questioned about her absences and other problems of deficient performance, she stated the cancer had recurred and that many of the absences were for treatment of that. Staples apparently gave her the benefit of the doubt, but required her to provide medical certification within 15 calendar days as required by FMLA regulations. She failed to do that, and then she was given a 7-day extension, and then another 7 days. After about a month without required FMLA medical certification, her employment was terminated because of unexcused absences in violation of written company policy. The federal trial judge dismissed her case in a Memorandum of Decision filed on February 12, 2013.
Title VII: race, religion, gender discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation, and constructive discharge, performance deficiencies, better-qualified person selected, appeal dismissed
Jurisdiction: 10th Circuit
Paige v. Donovan, No. 12-1014 (10th Cir., 2/19/13); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/12/12-1014.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
Her appeal was denied for failure to comply with procedures and for failure of proof, and the judgment of the district court was affirmed. This case doesn’t deal with new concepts, is primarily of interest to litigators, and therefore isn’t briefed, though one may read it if interested.
Credit checks: hiring, pre-employment credit check, race, disparate impact, lack of valid scientific evidence
Jurisdiction: Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, No. 1:10 CV 2882
The controlling law of this federal trial court case is limited to the parties to the litigation, but its legal reasoning is persuasive and could be valuable in other jurisdictions. Read this informative article from The Delaware Employment Law Blog, Lauren E.M. Russell, Associate, Young, Conway, Stargatt & Taylor, LLP: http://www.delawareemploymentlawblog.com/2013/02/give-me-some-credit-eeoc-credit-check-case-dismissed.html. Case URL link:

http://www.employeescreen.com/iqblog/wp-content/uploads/EEOC-v.-Kaplan.pdf.
This Memorandum of Opinion and Order provides twenty-three pages of detailed legal analysis. Essentially, the EEOC case was dismissed by summary judgment:

  • The federal trial court first excluded the expert witness testimony offered by the EEOC as scientifically unsound (expert witness testimony is essential in disparate impact cases, because they rise and fall on the percentage of job applicants from a given classification as compared to the percentage of hires in the same classification).

  • Absent any statistical evidence demonstrating an adverse impact caused by the use of credit checks, the EEOC's case had to be dismissed.

Title VII: gender, deficient performance, policy violations, Performance Improvement Plan (PIP), adverse employment action, two reasons for termination, retaliation


Jurisdiction: 6th Circuit
Jones v. St. Jude Health S.C., Inc., No. 11-4211 (6th Cir., 11/8/12); http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/12a1162n-06.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
Cheryanne Jones was terminated for a couple of reasons: performance problems and violation of company policy, and the adverse employment action decisions were made independently by two different supervisors. The appellate court found the performance decision somewhat suspect, but not the policy violation adverse employment action. When there is more than one reason for an adverse employment action, be clear in each case how each reason is involved in the entire situation.
FEHA [similar to ADA]: Cal. Government Code § 12940(a)(1), arthritis, broken foot, extended absence from work, no reasonable accommodation available, employment terminated while on leave for reason other than medical leave
Jurisdiction: 9th Circuit
Lawler v. Montblanc North America, LLC, No. 11-16206 (9th Cir., 1/11/13); http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2013/01/11/11-16206.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
This case decided on California law also might be of value as persuasive authority in other jurisdictions because of the similarity of applicable portions FEHA to ADA concepts.
Cynthia Lawler, manager, suffered from arthritis and her physician recommended part time work, and she requested accommodation. The human resources director responded by letter requesting a written note from the physician detailing :

  1. the nature, severity and duration of her impairment;

  2. the activities the impairment limits;

  3. the extent to which the impairment limits her ability to perform those activities; and

  4. what, if any, accommodation can be provided that would enable her to perform the essential functions of her position.

Complications arose:



  • Before being able to obtain that written information she fell and broke her foot, and her physician recommended a month off from work.

  • At the end of the month she presented another medical note stating she would need to be off from for an additional three months.

  • The human resources direct wrote to her physician listing her job duties and asking whether the company could provide any reasonable accommodation that would permit her to resume being regularly present at the store and performing her duties.

  • The response from her physician a few weeks later stated that she could not work during the three month period.

  • A week later the human resources director called to inform her that the company was terminating her employment, and then followed up with a letter stating:

As we advised you in our email of July 29, 2009, it is essential for a boutique manager to be in regular attendance at the boutique. Nevertheless, you have been absent since September 5, 2009, and your doctor has advised that you are unable to return to work until early January 2010. Because we must have a manager in the Valley Fair boutique, we must replace you.


Ms. Lawler then sued alleging violations of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”),disability discrimination, retaliation, and harassment, among other things.
Summary judgment dismissal was affirmed:

  • She was found to be completely disabled and unable to work.

  • Section 12940(a) of FEHA prohibits an employer from discharging a physically disabled employee because of that employee’s physical disability, but An employer may lawfully discharge an employee who “is unable to perform his or her essential duties . . . even with reasonable accommodations.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(a)(1). In order to establish that a defendant employer has discriminated on the basis of disability in violation of FEHA, the plaintiff employee bears the burden of proving he or she was able to do the job, with or without reasonable accommodation.”

  • Lawler was not able to do the job, regardless of accommodation because she was completely disabled from working since October 2009.

  • The retaliation and harassment claims were also dismissed because. Montblanc had a legitimate business reason for terminating her – it needed a store manager during the busy season and there was no indication that she could return to work. Also, she provided no evidence that the company had a discriminatory motive for the termination her employment, and it had a legitimate business reason.

FMLA: termination of employment after leave, adverse employment action, discovery of misconduct close to taking FMLA leave, falsified delivery times, violation of company policy, similarly situated male employee treated the same


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