I. A. Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, and Pacific Fleet



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Admiral Pye said that as to the directives in the November 27 dispatch concerning deployment, it would have been necessary to recall the Task Forces which were at that time absent, in order to prepare them from a logistic point of view and consequently, there was no deployment that could be made immediately which would have better prepared Task Force One; Task Force Two was on its way to ferry some fighting planes and was not expected to return for over a week; there appeared to be no action to be taken by the Fleet that would have better prepared it against an indefinite date of beginning operations, than that which was then in progress. Admiral Pye said that no change was made in the scheduled deployment of his task force after the November 27 dispatch. (p. 155)

Concerning the deployment referred to in the War Warning, Admiral Ingersoll said, "Again, this dispatch is addressed to both the Commander­-in‑Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and to the Commander‑in‑Chief, Pacific Fleet. The deployment referred more to the movements which were contemplated in the Asiatic Fleet regarding the withdrawal of forces from the Manila Bay area for operations contemplated elsewhere, and the movements in the Hawaiian area were those regarding observation, the establishment of patrols, and the reenforcement of outlying positions in our own islands. It will be remem­bered that an earlier dispatch in October had warned both Commanders-­in‑Chief against taking action which would provoke war." (p. 426)

The reason why Admiral Kimmel was not called upon to report what he was doing after the War Warning was Admiral Ingersoll said, because they knew that submarines were out on observation missions, that reenforcement of Wake and Midway was contemplated and they believed that the routine air patrols around Oahu and search patrols which had been in effect for some time were being continued. They believed at that particular time that the air patrol was by no means as complete as it should have been. (p. 926 and p. 427).
XVIII. REPETITION OF ARMY DISPATCH ON NOVEMBER 28th
On November 28th, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a copy of a dispatch to CincPac for information (Exhibit 19) which repeated a dispatch which had been sent by the Army to Commander, Western Defense Command, as follows:

"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue x Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action Possible at any moment x If hostilities cannot repeat not be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act x This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense x Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil population or disclose intent x Report measures taken x a separate message is being sent to G‑2 Ninth Corps Area re subversive activities in the United States x Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan x Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers"



The Navy dispatch continued that WPL‑52 was not applicable to the Pacific area and would not be planed in effect in that area, except as then in force in South­east Pacific Sub Area, Panama Coastal Frontier. It stated further: "Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act x be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL 46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur"
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 435
Exhibit 9 is the November 28 dispatch from CNO to CincPac.
A. GENERAL MARSHALL
General Marshall thought that he had seen the Army dispatch which was repeated in the Navy dispatch of November 28th (page 864). However, General Gerow did not think that Marshall had seen it. The language made Marshall believe that he had seen it particularly because the instruction that Japan must commit the first overt act came from the President. He had no recollection that the warning not to alarm the civilian population came from the same source (page 865).
XIX. REINFORCEMENT OF MIDWAY AND WAKE
It will be recalled that on November 26th dispatches had been sent to CincPac by the Chief of Naval Operations concerning the proposed reinforcement of Mid­way and Wake with Army planes and personnel, and requesting that Admiral Kimmel confer with General Short about this and advise the Chief of Naval Operations as soon as practicable (supra, page 56).
Captain Wellborn said that he thought that the background of the Navy's desire to have the Army take over the defense at Midway and Wake was that the Navy felt that the defense of the islands was an Army responsibility and that the small amount of Marine personnel and aviation available should be reserved for amphibious work. One method of reducing overhead requirements of the Marines was to relieve the Marine Corps Units of their static defensive duties. (p. 386)
On November 28th, dispatch 280627 (Exhibit 76) was sent by CincPac to OPNAV. This advised that ground crews and material to operate one squadron of Marine planes were being discharged at Wake.
Admiral Halsey left Pearl Harbor with Task Force Two on November 28. (p.291‑293)

Admiral Halsey said that he recalled clearly one conference on Novem­ber 27 when it was decided to send fighting planes to Wake. He said that he was with Admiral Kimmel that day until about six in the evening. The discussion of the defense of Wake and the dispatch of fighter planes was participated in by General Short, General Martin and some other Army officers and Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Brown, Admiral Bellinger and Admiral Halsey. He said Marine planes were selected because the Army could not fly their fighters more than 15 miles from the coast. (p. 297)

Admiral Halsey said that he recalled that there was some prior discussion of sending Army units to outlying bases and that Admiral Kimmel had looked upon those bases as part of the Fleet and for that reason he wished to confine the forces ashore to Marine and Naval personnel. It soon be­came evident that such a process could not be carried out and certain bases were picked, he said, to be garrisoned by Army forces.

Admiral Halsey said that when he left to go to Wake Island, he asked Admiral Kimmel how far Admiral Kimmel wanted him to go and Admiral Kimmel said, "Use your common sense." (p. 298)

Admiral Smith said that before Admiral Halsey left in the ENTERPRISE to deliver Marine fighters to Wake, he asked Admiral Kimmel what he should do in case he met Japanese forces. Admiral Kimmel said that in that case he was to use his own discretion. And, Admiral Halsey replied, that those were the best orders he had received, to keep his movements secret and that if he found even a Japanese sampan he would sink it. (p. 43)
that similar items would be landed at Midway.
Admiral Newton said that he was at Pearl Harbor from November 27 until the morning of December 5 and was temporarily in command of a task force because Admiral Brown departed around December 4 for a cruise to Johnston and Palmyra Islands to investigate landing craft conditions. He received no particular information concerning the international situation. (p. 316)

Although Admiral Newton was commander of the most powerful unit under the Commander Scouting Force, he never saw the October 16 dispatch nor was he ever informed of the contents of it and recalled no warnings or instructions mentioning preparatory deployments which were given to him thereafter. (p. 317) Admiral Newton said that he never saw or heard of
436 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the November 24, November 27 and December 3 dispatches. Except for what he read in the press, Admiral Newton during the period November 26 to December 5 did not learn anything indicating the increased danger of the situation with Japan. (p. 317)

When Admiral Newton left on December 5, he was directed to proceed to Midway to fly off a squadron of planes. He had the LEXINGTON, CHI­CAGO, PORTLAND and five destroyers on that mission. He considered the mission solely one to reinforce Midway and attached no special signifi­cance to the mission. He considered that there might be more danger from submarines than in the past and zig‑zagged his course and had scouring planes cover his advance. He gave no special orders regarding arming of planes or making preparation for war other than ordinary routine. (p. 318)

About November 26 or 27, Admiral Brown and his Task Force Three had returned to Pearl Harbor. They left Pearl Harbor on December 5.

Admiral Brown was of the view that the movement of the two task forces to the outlying islands after November 27, may have been in pursuance of the instructions contained in the dispatch regarding defensive deployment. (p. 141)
and that about December 1st ground material for temporary operation of twelve Army bombers would be sent, but that only six of such planes on Oahu were in operating condition. The dispatch also discussed the use of Army pursuit planes for insular defense and the need for additional, anti‑aircraft guns; the fact that Army troop reinforcements were being made on outlying bases but that such use was considered not advisable as Marines were available; that twelve Marine fighters would leave November 28th in a carrier for Wake; that other Marine planes would be sent to Midway later; and that on December 1st, twelve patrol planes would be sent from Midway to Wake, and those at Midway would be re­placed by planes from Pearl Harbor.

The Chief of Naval Operations replied on November 28th (Exhibit 75) in a dispatch stating that the steps described in CincPac's 280627 appeared to be the best that could be done under the circumstances. This also stated that the War Department would instruct the Commanding General to cooperate with the Navy in plans for use of Army pursuit planes and troops in support of Marines, and would endeavor to expedite plans for increase of anti‑aircraft defenses, but that it was doubtful if much improvement was possible soon. An immediate report on the effective defenses of all outlying bases and increases planned in the im­mediate future was requested.


Admiral Brainard said that a dispatch recently examined by him showed that it was contemplated that a group of vessels under Admiral Halsey's command would leave around December 1, 1941, to land reinforcements on Wake but he found no indication of his having seen the dispatch at the time. The daily movement sheets, he said, from 21 November to 10 December showed movements of the WRIGHT, but no carrier movements between Pearl Harbor, Wake and Midway. (p. 401)

Admiral Ingersoll said that they received reports of ship movements which were plotted and that he thought that the movements to Wake and Midway in early December were known at the time in Washington but he is not certain. He said that in keeping track of the dispositions of Admiral Kim­mel's ships they relied on the ship movements reports and in the quarterly schedules of employment. (p. 424)
In letters of December 2nd to Admiral Stark (post, pages 113-114), Admiral Kimmel further stated his views as to the desirability of using Army planes and personnel at Midway and Wake and his concern that the replacement of Marines would weaken the defense, would raise the question of unity of command, and that the increase in Army and Navy stations requiring Fleet support would inter­fere with offensive operations. (5)
Admiral Bloch discussed the various construction projects at Pearl Harbor and at the outlying islands. (p. 91‑92)

Admiral Bloch said that the security of the outlying islands, such as Wake, Midway, Johnston and Palmyra, was a matter of some concern in November 1941; that the water capacity of the islands was small and that as a result of having civilian construction workers present there, the garrisons were small; he was more apprehensive about an attack on Guam, Wake and Midway than on Oahu. (p. 94)

According to Admiral DeLany, during the tense period preceding December 7, the outlying islands such as Midway, Guam and Wake were a matter of
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 437
great concern to the Commander in Chief's staff. (p. 81) The proposal to change from Marine to Army garrisons caused additional worry and concern and was a subject of many conferences out there. (p. 81)

Admiral Smith stated that he did not believe that the dispatch concerning the reinforcement of outlying islands by the Army was considered related to the war warning of November 27. He said that the discussions concerning the outlying islands lasted several days and, as a result, there was a decided mental preoccupation with this on the part of the highest Army and Navy officers in Hawaii. (p. 63)

Captain Glover said that the decision to reinforce Wake had been made by the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet and that Captain Glover and Captain Moors did not share the view that it should be done. They did believe that Midway should be fortified. (p. 176)
XX. PEARL HARBOR—ESTIMATES OF THE SITUATION
A. ADMIRAL KIMMEL
Admiral Kimmel testified that after receiving the "war warning" dispatch of November 27th, his estimate was that the Japanese would move within the next few days by amphibious expedition against the Philippines or Kra, or possibly Borneo, and that there was a good chance of a mass submarine attack at Oahu. He did not expect an air attack at Pearl Harbor, although an air attack was still a "remote possibility" because, he said, of the tenor of the dispatches sent to him, the other information which he had, the difficulties of making such an attack, and information received from the Navy Department and from other sources indicat­ing that the greater portion of the Japanese carrier forces was in home waters. He thought that a primary cause for the "war warning" dispatch was the fact that diplomatic negotiations had ceased, and when the newspapers indicated that the negotiations were resumed, the warning lost much of its force. He further assumed that no ultimatum had been given to the Japanese because the Chiefs of Staff had recommended to the President that no ultimatum be given to them (page 301). He testified that the phrasing of the "war warning" dispatch and the phrasing of the dispatch of November 28th led him to believe that anything other than a submarine attach on Pearl Harbor was most improbable (page 302). In his testimony concerning the November 28th message, Admiral Kimmel stated that it furnished no new information and that it stressed that Japan should be permitted to commit the first overt act (page 325).

The "war warning," was discussed with ComFOURTEEN. A dawn fighter flight patrol was considered, but was not regarded as practical because of the limitations of the Army planes (page 303).

He considered that the action of the Navy Department in failing to make any change in his plans to send carriers to Midway and Wake indicated that the Navy Department expected no immediate activity in either the outlying areas (page 307) or in the Hawaiian area (page 309).

He further testified that the day after receipt of the "war warning" of Novem­ber 27th, he had a conference with General Short, attended by members of their staffs.


Admiral Smith said that there was no set hour for a Staff conference, that Admiral Kimmel had a conference practically every day and would send for the people that he wanted; he would usually have over officers from the Fleet and very frequently would have Admiral Bloch and Admiral Pye, especially Admiral Pye, at such conferences (p. 34).
He said that while he presently did not recall the incident that General Short testified to a statement made by McMorris at that conference, in response to a question by General Short, to the effect that there was no chance of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

Finally, he testified that the message of November 27th followed a pattern that he had been continuing for some time, and that he felt that before hostilities commenced he would receive additional information which would be more definite. When the attack came without this information, he was inclined to blame him­self for not having been smarter, but when he found some time later that the information was in fact available in the Navy Department which would have changed the action taken by him had he known it, he felt differently about the matter. If he had had that information, he said, he would have thoroughly alerted all shore going activities, including the Army, and in all probability would have had the Fleet put to sea in an intercepting position, and would have instituted reconnaissance to the best of their ability.


438 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Kimmel admitted, however, that during the entire period when he was CincPac, he maintained the same estimate as was set froth in his letter of February 18th (Exhibit 30), which stated that "a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor is a possibility . . ."
B. ADMIRAL BLOCH
Admiral Bloch testified that he had estimated that if the Japanese did attack Pearl Harbor, it would be by (1) submarine attack, (2) blocking the channel, (3) laying mines, (4) sabotage. He believed that an aerial torpedo attack could not be successful and if there were an air attack it would be by bombs (page 409). He considered an air attack on Pearl Harbor as a remote possibility (page 394). He saw the "war warning" dispatch, conferred with Admiral Kimmel and did not disagree with his conclusions.
On November 27, after the receipt of the "War Warning", the Chief of Staff brought over a paraphrase of the dispatch. Admiral Bloch saw Ad­miral Kimmel the next morning. There were others present but he does not recall who they were. There was a term in the dispatch concerning defense deployment. Just what Admiral Kimmel's opinion was Admiral Bloch did not know, but they had at that time two submarines at Midway and two at Wake. (p. 14)
The dispatch concerning the sending of planes to Midway and Wake (Exhibit 18) did not change his estimate (page 394). The part of the November 28th dispatch which impressed him was the desire that Japan should be allowed to commit the first overt act and that the public should not be alarmed (page 395)
Admiral Bloch said that after the War Warning of November 27, negotia­tions between Japan and the United States were resumed and that this had a very definite effect on his mind. Also, he said he had no feeling of impend­ing hostilities in the Hawaiian area around the 7th of December. (pp. 15 and 16)

Admiral Bloch volunteered at the end of his testimony a statement that the Navy Department had more information than they had in Hawaii; that a number of warnings were sent to them; that the Navy Department had in the War Plans a means of putting into effect all of the plans prior to "M" day; that such action would have been more effective than the warnings sent out; and in this connection he referred to the State Department note of November 26 concerning which he had no knowledge until after December 7.

Admiral Bloch said that he had not seriously considered nor had he heard anybody else talk about the influence on public opinion in the United States which an attack on Pearl Harbor would produce. (p. 88)

Prior to December 7, Admiral Bloch was of the opinion that a carrier attack against Hawaii prior to a declaration of war was remote; one important con­sideration was his belief that a large body of surface vessels could not cross such a large expanse of water without the Navy having some knowledge. (p. 89)

Admiral Bloch said that although he could not recall that any officer had ever expressed the opinion that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was improbable; yet he was definitely of the opinion that such an attack was remote although he is unable to analyze that opinion and to determine the various factors which had caused him to reach that opinion. (pp. 89 and 90)

Captain Earle said that they had considered the estimate indicating that the most likely form of attack would be by air, but somehow or other they always felt that it couldn't happen here and that the Japanese would not take that chance. (p. 377)
C. ADMIRAL PYE
Admiral Pye testified that he saw the November 24th dispatch (warning of an aggressive move in any direction) on November 29th. He recalled no decisions made as a result of it (page 424)
Admiral Pye said that on November 29, he had a conference with Admiral Kimmel during which Admiral Kimmel showed him the November 24 message and called in his Intelligence Officer who explained the locations of the enemy forces, indicating no unusual activity in the Naval forces of the Japanese navy. They discussed possible action to be taken by Task Force 1 which was the only Task Force in port aside from the battleships of Task Force 3
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 439
and decided that there was no action that could be taken by that Task Force which would better prepare them for the possible action that might come. (p. 153)

Admiral Pye said that he was not present at any conferences between Admiral Kimmel and his staff or other senior officers. In his own discussions with Admiral Kimmel, there was no mention of the possibility that Oahu might be attacked by air. For some months there had been a feeling that a surprise attack by submarines might be possible. His feeling in this con­nection was based on the belief that a submarine attack could be made without definite proof that it was enemy action but an air attack could not. In the absence of any protection by carriers it was felt that the Fleet in port with the presumed effectiveness of the Army air forces would be in a better posi­tion for defense than they would be at sea. Admiral Pye also saw the war warning message on the same day, i.e., on November 29. (p. 154)

Admiral Anderson said that the war warning was shown to a group of Flag officers including Admiral Anderson in the office of the Commander in Chief. Under the war plans in force, Admiral Anderson had no specific duties to perform. He said that he knew that there were two task forces at sea and knew that there was an excellent plan in existence for long distance daily air reconnaissance. He assumed that whatever was considered necessary to be done was being taken care of. (p. 393)

Admiral Anderson said that his ideas during early December were that he expected the Japanese would not attack farther east than the Philippines. He was influenced in all his thoughts as to security by the knowledge or what he thought was the knowledge that a long distance daily reconnaissance by air was being maintained. He assumed that such distant air reconnaissance was being maintained and said that he had read a very complete plan for such daily reconnaissance and knew that it had been placed into effect but did not know that it had been discontinued prior to December 7. (p. 394)
He felt that this dispatch indicated an attack on the Philippines or Guam. He saw the "War Warning" at the same time and discussed it with CincPac. It was sent to several addressees. The "War Warning" to him was nothing more than they had been receiving for some time (page 425) He did not see the November 28th message until after December 7th (page 427).

Admiral Pye testified first that he had not made any estimate of the situation during the period November 27th to December 7th (page 429). In response to the Court's questions he then stated that the maneuvers which he was on had not prevented him from making an estimate, but that he had made no written esti­mate (page 434). He kept a running mental estimate. He considered a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor as a possibility but not a probability (page 435) He thought it a bad move because it was the one thing to unite the United States people in an all‑out effort, and therefore that it was unlikely to be undertaken (page 435). He considered a submarine attack the most likely act in advance of war (page 436). Before the attack he felt the defense measures taken were con­sistent with the situation; they thought torpedoes could not be launched from the air in waters less than 75 feet deep (page 436); and a bombing attack alone would not have been profitable (page 437)

He thought an air attack on Pearl Harbor was remotely possible and did not consider that such an attack would be made before diplomatic relations were broken off (page 438).

Admiral Pye stated that WPL‑46 required the Fleet to leave Pearl Harbor, but there were no carriers in port and the Fleet at sea without carriers would be more vulnerable than in port; moreover, Intelligence had indicated that all major units of the Japanese fleet were in home ports. No additional security measures were taken in his command. So far as the Pacific Fleet was concerned, the phrase "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment prior to carrying out tasks assigned in WPL-46" was meaningless, according to Admiral Pye (page 426).



He did not know if CincPac had made a direct estimate as to air attack (page 426) .

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