PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 427

428 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Mr. Hamilton, also of the State Department, said that on November 21st, there was a conference which the Secretary of State, Admiral Stark, General Gerow, and Mr. Hornbeck, Ballantine and he were present, and at which the general military and diplomatic situation in the Pacific was discussed (page 1073). There were later meetings at which he was not present, including one of the War Council on November 25th and also on November 28th (page 1074). Mr. Hamil­ton could not be sure whether the note of November 26th or the substance thereof was given to the Navy Department (page 1073)

Admiral Turner remembered the Japanese dispatch concerning the note to Japan of November 26th and he saw it on November 28th. He believed that Admiral Schuirmann had brought it over from Secretary Hull to show it to Admiral Stark, and that Admiral Stark had stated that there was no possibility of Japan accepting this note (page 995)

Admiral Stark stated that he did not recall the November 26th note to the Japanese (page 108) but that on November 27th, Secretary of State Hull had advised him that negotiations were terminated (page 109). Admiral Stark later testified that when first asked about this note he had not remembered it, but after reading it his recollection was refreshed, and that Admiral Schuirmann may have discussed this note with him at the time (page 809).

Admiral Schuirmann stated that to the best of his recollection he did not deliver a copy of the November 26th note to the Navy Department, nor did he specifically inform Admiral Stark of this note (page 217). He characterized this note as an "ultimatum" in the sense that no one expected the Japanese to accept its terms (page 716).

Admiral Turner said that negotiations with Japan had been conducted so as to delay war as long as possible in order to give the Army and Navy time to prepare for war (page 1013). He knew that the Army and Navy had recom­mended that no ultimatum be given to Japan (Exhibit 39A). He did not con­sider that the note of November 26th was an ultimatum, although he did not expect Japan to accept its terms (page 1015). He did not know whether Admiral Stark saw a draft of the November 28th note before it was sent, but Admiral Turner did see it. He said that no note given by one government to another is ever entirely acceptable (page 1018). He did not regard the note as important (page 1023), nor think it hastened the time of war because Japan was then already on the move (page 1024).

General Short testified that prior to December 7th, he had no knowledge of the State Department note of November 26th (page 283).

The court took judicial notice of the note of November 26th (page 147). A Japanese summary of the diplomatic situation and of the American proposal, and the reaction of the Japanese to that proposal, were contained in communi­cations intercepted, decoded and translated on November 28th. These were:

(1) An Army translation (Document 16, Exhibit 63) of a message from Wash­ington to Tokyo, dated November 26, 1941, in the "Purple" code and marked "Extremely urgent," Message #1180, reading:

"From NOMURA and KURUSU.

"As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situ­ation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one thing for saving the situa­tion. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that Presi­dent ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will cooperate for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific (just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, we will negotiate for this sort of an arrangement with all we have in us), and that you in return reply with a cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also gaining a little time. Considering the possibility that England and the United States are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their protection through mili­tary occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we should propose the estab­lishment of neutral nations, including French Indo‑China Netherlands India and Thai. (As you know, last September President ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrality of French Indo‑China and Thai.)

"We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them would be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel duty bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she would.