I. A. Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, and Pacific Fleet
Captain Safford summarized the information which he said indicated the objectives which the Japanese were preparing to attack, as follows
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- Admiral Ingersoll said that he did not recall when he saw the thirteen or fourteen part Japanese reply. (p. 429)
Captain Safford summarized the information which he said indicated the objectives which the Japanese were preparing to attack, as follows: "Going back to the late Spring of 1941, on May 22, we received positive proof of Japanese plans for the conquest of Southeastern Asia and the Southwest Pacific. On July 24, a high authority in Japan directed the withdrawal of merchant shipping from the Northeast Pacific, Southwest Pacific, and Indian Ocean. On September 4, we received information indicating Japan's determination to carry out her program of southward expansion and to expel the United States and England from China, Southeast Asia, and the Southwest Pacific. On October 15, we received unexpected confirmation of Japan's plans and intentions of the conquest of Southeastern Asia. In October, 1941, the Japanese Consuls were directing and advising the evacuation of Japanese Nationalists from the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, Philippines, Hawaii, America, and Europe. By October 28, this was in full progress. On November 4, we received important information that the internal situation in Japan, both political and economic, since the American embargo, had become so desperate that the Japanese Government PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 533 had to distract popular attention by a foreign war or else by bloodless diplomatic victory. On November 12, we received important information that the Japanese Government regarded November 25 as the dead‑line for negotiations then being conducted between the Japanese and American Governments to end. November 17, we received information from a very reliable source that Japan had no intention of attacking Russia in Siberia or she had changed her plans, if such intention ever existed. At one time, when it looked as if Moscow would fall, there were indications from several sources that Japan would invade Siberia. On November 24, 1941, we learned that November 29, 1941, Tokyo time, was definitely the governing date for offensive military operations of some nature. We interpreted this to mean that large scale movements for the conquest of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific would begin on that date, because, at that time, Hawaii was out of our minds. On November 26, we received specific evidence of Japan's intention to wage an offensive war against both Britain and the United States. On December 1, we had definite information from three independent sources that Japan was going to attack Britain and the United States, and, from two of them, that Japan would maintain peace with Russia. On December 4, 1941, we received definite information from two more independent sources that Japan would attack the United States and Britain, but would maintain peace with Russia. At 9:00 p.m. (Washington time), December 6, 1941, we received positive information that Japan would declare war against the United States, at a time to be specified thereafter. This information was positive and unmistakable, and was made available to Military Intelligence at this same time. Finally, at 10:15 a.m. (Washington time), December 7, 1941, we received positive information from the Signal Intelligence Service (War Department) that the Japanese declaration of war would be presented to the Secretary of State at 1:00 p.m. (Washington time) that date. 1:00 p.m. Washington time was sunrise in Hawaii and approximately midnight in the Philippines, and this indicated a surprise air raid on Pearl Harbor to about three hours. Kramer appended a note to this effect to the paper sent over from S. I. S. before presenting it to the Secretary of the Navy. I do not know whether or not a copy of this note was appended to the paper given to Admiral Stark. At this same time, information was also received indicating that Japan was about to commence hostilities against the British Empire. This information was sent over to S. I. S. immediately." (p. 357‑8) Captain Safford then discussed the distribution of information within the Navy Department and to the President and State Department, etc. His statement of the distribution by Commander Kramer from December 1 on was based, he said, on what Commander Kramer told him verbally. Commander Kramer said that he received no phone call on the night of December 6th‑7th and came in at 0900 on December 7th, received the 14th part of the reply and took it and the first 13 parts to Admiral Stark's office about 0900 where there apparently was a meeting He was not certain who was in Admiral Stark's office. He was in a hurry. Admiral Wilkinson was there (page 973). He then left the Navy Department at 0930 to make delivery to the White House, and was at the State Department at 0950 waiting for Secretary Knox in order to deliver this additional material. This delivery did not include the message setting 1 p.m. as the time for delivery of the reply. He did not get that until he returned to the Navy Department, at about 1020. He then found that a message had been received which directed delivery of the reply to the Secretary of State at 1300, and also other messages which directed destruction of Japanese codes still on hand, and one which thanked the Ambassador for his services. This material was delivered to Admiral Stark at about 1030. He handed the "1 p.m. message" to Admiral Stark's aide at 10:30 or 10:45 and saw him take it in to Admiral Stark's desk. Document 41 of Exhibit 63 is the "1 p.m. message", which had been translated by Army. He then left to deliver this new material to the White House and the State Department. He handed the material to a State Department official, who customarily received such material for the Secretary of State, and who was to deliver it to Secretary Knox. He invited attention, verbally, to the time involved (page 965); that is, that this was 7:30 in Honolulu and a few hours before sunrise at Koto Bharu. He did not tell the naval officers this as he figured they would know it. The remarks he made were not to Secretary Knox himself but to the State Department official who handled this material for Secretary Hull and who was to deliver it to Secretary
Captain Heard, who was in charge of the Foreign Branch of ONI, stated that information about the Japanese reply was available in the Navy Department at 0900, 7 December 1941 (page 464). Sometime between 0900 and 1000 DONI took the Chief of the Far East Section, Commander McCollum, with him to CNO to present this information. This statement, he said, was based on official records, a report from McCollum, and an official statement of DONI made very shortly after the event (page 465). Lieutenant Commander Watts relieved McCollum at 0800, 7 December (page 466) Admiral Schuirmann testified that on the morning of December 7, 1941, he knew that the Japanese Ambassadors would present a note to the Secretary of State at 1 p.m. He knew the general tenor of the note that would be presented (page 204). The note was in the nature of an ultimatum. He was in Admiral Stark's office in the morning of December 7th, and Admiral Stark had the information which he had. Admiral Stark talked to General Marshall on the telephone. The Japanese asking for an appointment at 1 p.m. on a Sunday was quite unusual and out of the known routine of the foreign service (page 205) Admiral Stark concurred in a dispatch to be sent by General Marshall. The State Department was not advised of this dispatch (page 205). He also testified that information concerning delivery of the Japanese note at 1 p.m. was available to him between 0900 and 0930 on the morning of December 7th. He does not know when it got to the Navy Department (page 213). Admiral Schuirmann testified that he was aware of the contents of the Japanese message stating that a fourteen‑part reply would be sent, of the fourteen‑part reply, and of the "1 p.m. message." As to the "1 p.m. message," he repeated that he had this information at 0930 on December 7th, and believed that Admiral Stark received this information about that time (page 715). He talked to Admiral Stark about 1000 (page 214). General Marshall telephoned about 1030 (page 216). Admiral Schuirmann testified that Commander Kramer delivered this type of material and that no record was kept of time of delivery. He discussed the situation with Admiral Stark but not specific messages. When he went to Admiral Stark's office on December 7th, he recalled, he waited a while for Stark to come in at about 0930 (page 729). He then knew of the prospective 1 o'clock delivery of the "sharply worded" Japanese note and that it was a reply to the United States note of November 26th, and so informed Admiral Stark. Admiral Stark knew of this when General Marshall telephoned. He believes that Stark had delivered to him that morning "the book" containing the messages received the previous night. He is positive that the Army had the same information the Navy had (page 730). He personally did not think Japan was going to attack us (page 732). Admiral Stark testified that the outstanding thing in his mind concerning the evening of December 6th and the morning of December 7th was the "one p.m. message", which he learned about on the morning of December 7th. He did not remember the "14 part message" in reply to the State Department note of November 26th. Admiral Schuirmann, he said, may have given him a full picture on the morning of December 7th, and it is reasonable to assume that he did so (pages 789‑790). He stated that he had no information about the "14 part" reply or the "1 p m. message" until he arrived at his office on December 7th (pages 790‑791). He said that on the forenoon of December 7, 1941, he received information that the Japanese Ambassador would deliver a message to Secretary Hull at exactly 1300. He was talking to Admiral Schuirmann when General Marshall called and asked if he had this information. He first told General Marshall he did not think this information should be sent out, but instantly changed his mind and called General Marshall back, asking him to have the Army authorities inform the Navy. He asked General Marshall if he could get the message out quickly and offered to send it via Navy communications. General Marshall said he could get it out quickly. Admiral Stark recalled discussing with Admiral Schuirmann "the time element" in connection with the "one p.m. message" (page 170), but recalled no suggestion. made to him that this looked like a sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor. He did not recall what information he had about the Japanese message to be delivered at 1300, December 7, 1941, except the hour of delivery (page 172).
General Marshall said that he first saw the "14 part message" and the "1 p.m. message" sometime Sunday morning, December 7, 1941 (page 873). He 'phoned Admiral Stark, and at first Admiral Stark did not think that any message to Hawaii was necessary because the recipients might be confused by too many messages. Admiral Stark 'phoned back in a few minutes, asking that the naval authorities be advised. General Marshall was informed, after sending some of his men back two and three times to the message center, that his message would be received within 30 minutes after dispatch. It was in the message center at 1150 and sent by radio to all points except Hawaii; they were unable to raise the Hawaiian station and therefore sent it by wire. General Marshall did not know this until afterwards (pages 873‑4). General Marshall estimated that he arrived at 10:30 a.m., Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, and first saw the "14 part message" and "1 p.m. message" shortly thereafter (pages 878‑9). He said that Admiral Stark did not inquire as to the rapidity of War Department communications in connection with dispatching the Army message of December 7, 1941 (page 879). Admiral Ingersoll said that he arrived at the office about 0900, December 7th. He did not recall any discussion with Admiral Stark about the fourteen part message or delivery thereof until Admiral Stark told him of his conversation with General Marshall (page 837). He stated that on the morning of December 7th, he knew that the Japanese Ambassador had requested an interview with Secretary Hull in the afternoon. At the same time, Admiral Stark told him that this had been discussed with General Marshall (page 831). Admiral Ingersoll said that there was no discussion on the morning of December 7th of the fact that 1 o'clock in Washington was sunrise at Pearl Harbor and midnight in Manila. Admiral Ingersoll said that he did not recall when he saw the thirteen or fourteen part Japanese reply. (p. 429) Admiral Turner said that he came to the Navy Department about 1030 or 1100 on December 7th. Admiral Stark called him and showed him a decrypted Japanese dispatch which required the Japanese Ambassador top resent the Japanese reply on the 7th. Admiral Stark said he had talked to General Marshall, who said he had sent a dispatch on the matter to Hawaii. Admiral Stark said that he thought Admiral Kimmel already had intercepted and decrypted the Japanese message; they thought that he had the 14 part reply and "1 p.m. message" (page 1000). He first recalled the time of delivery as 10:30 and corrected this to 1 p.m. He said that Secretary Hull had told Admiral Stark that he could not give the Japanese an appointment until 2:30 p.m. Admiral Turner thought from this dispatch that an attack on the United States or Britain was coming that day or the next (page 1000). They had been warned, he said, that the scrambler telephone was not secure and so the Navy Department did not use it for secret matters (page 1001). Admiral Noyes said he did not see the 14‑part message or delivery instruction prior to 7 December 1941 (page 1035, 1036); that there was no direct or convenient telephone circuit between CincPac and CNO on 7 December 1941 (page 1038) and that a Navy message from CNO, which had been designated for the fastest possible transmission, would be in CincPac's hands in a maximum of an hour (page 1044). According to Admiral Smith, CincPac was not kept well informed of developments by the Navy Department (page 565). He testified regarding Secretary Knox's visit to Pearl Harbor, after the attack, and statements made by him there (page 556‑57). He said that at lunch he joined Secretary Knox, Kimmel, Pye, Bloch, Short, Beatty (Aide to Secretary), and that the Secretary said: "Did you not get a warning on the 6th of December?" They said, "No," and the Secretary then continued: "We learned surreptitiously on the 6th of December that Nomura and Kurusu had orders to hold their last conference with Secretary Hull at 1 p.m. on Sunday, the 7th. I know that information was sent to Admiral Hart, and I thought, of course, it was sent to you." They never got that information (page 536 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 566). The Secretary also said, "Frankly, I know of no one in the War Department or in the Navy Department, not even Kelly Turner, who expected an air attack on Pearl Harbor" (page 567). Admiral Smith said that it is easy to deduce from the 1 o'clock delivery dispatch, which they received after the attack, that Pearl Harbor was a logical place of attack as the time indicated was sunrise there. XXXII. CONDITIONS AT PEARL HARBOR PRIOR TO ATTACK A. THE SHIPS IN PORT Admiral Hewitt's investigation developed that at the time of the attack, the forces of the Pacific Fleet were, according to Admiral Kimmel (Exhibit 73), disposed partly in port and partly at sea as follows: (1) In Pearl Harbor: (a) Task Force One, Vice Admiral Pye commanding (less one battleship, one light cruiser and one destroyer) comprising five battleships, four light cruisers, seventeen destroyers, two light cruisers, and four mine layers. (b) Task Force Two (under the command of Vice Admiral Halsey, who was at sea with units thereof constituting a separate task force—Task Force Eight) comprising three battleships, eight destroyers; one light cruiser, and four mine layers. (c) Task Force Three (less detached units under command of Vice Admiral Brown at sea, and less a separate task force—Task Force Twelve—which was at sea under Rear Admiral Newton's command) comprising two heavy cruisers, and four mine layers which were under overhaul. (d) Five submarines and the submarine tender PELIAS of Task Force Seven. (e) The TANGIER, HULBERT, CURTISS, and THORNTON, and Patrol Squadrons (VP 11, 12, 14, 22, 23, and 24‑a total of about sixty planes) of Task Force Nine. (f ) Marine Air Squadrons VMSB 232 and VMJ 252 (a total of twenty planes) at Ewa, Oahu. (g) Two destroyer tenders and the Base Force, consisting of the ARGONNE, plus auxiliaries and repair, vessels, and planes of Base Force Aircraft Squadrons VJ‑1, VJ‑,2, and VJ‑3, as follows: 19 J2F, 9 JRS, ,2 PBY‑1, 1 J2V. (2) At sea: (a) Task Force Eight (Vice Admiral Halsey commanding) consisting of one aircraft carrier (ENTERPRISE), three heavy cruisers and nine destroyers, located 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor, standing to eastward, was returning to Pearl Harbor after landing a Marine Air Squadron at Wake Island. (b) Task Force Three (Vice Admiral Brown commanding), less units in port, consisting of one heavy cruiser and one mine laying squadron, less two of its divisions, was exercising with landing boats at Johnston Island. (c) Task Force Twelve (Rear Admiral Newton commanding), ordinarily a component of Task Force Three, consisting of one aircraft carrier (LEXINGTON), three heavy cruisers, and five destroyers, located about 425 miles Southeast of Midway, was proceeding on a westerly course to land a Marine Air Squadron on Midway Island. (d) One heavy cruiser and one mine laying division, ordinarily a part of Task Force Three, were engaged in "normal operations" at sea southwest of Oahu. (e) Four submarines of Task Force Seven, somewhere at sea en route to Pearl Harbor. (3) At other places: (a) At Midway Island, two submarines of Task Force Seven and Patrol Squadron VP‑21 (consisting of twelve, planes) of Task Force Twelve. (b) At Wake Island, two submarines of Task Force Seven and a Marine Air Squadron. (e) At Johnston Island (in addition to Task Force Three, undergoing exercise), two Base Force PBY‑1 planes. (d) At Mare Island, five submarines of Task Force Seven. (e) At San Diego, four submarines of Task Force Seven. To sum up: At Pearl Harbor, there were eight battleships, two heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, two old light cruisers, one old cruiser mine layer, eight destroyers, five submarines, twelve mine layers, two destroyer tenders, one submarine tender, four aircraft tenders, various auxiliary and repair ships, and 111 aircraft of various types, of which nine were under overhaul: At sea, there were two aircraft carriers, eight heavy cruisers, fourteen destroyers, four submarines, PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 537 and one mine layer squadron less one division. At other places, there were thirteen submarines, fourteen Navy patrol planes and one Marine Air Squadron. Except as to Task Forces Eight and Twelve, which were on special missions to reenforce Wake and Midway Islands, the dispositions of Pacific Fleet Units as noted above were in accordance with a previously worked out fleet employment schedule (Ex., 73; Hew. page 605). Admiral DeLany stated that the ships were in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, in accordance with the operating schedule of the Fleet; the principal mission in late 1941 was training, and they had no orders from Washington to discontinue (page 507). Admiral Smith said that after the reorganization of the Pacific Fleet to three task forces, one task force was always at sea and very often two, and they held exercises against one another; sometimes all three task forces would be at sea at the same time. (p. 35) As Operations Officer, one of Admiral DeLany's duties was the preparation of "Schedules of Employment." These were originally prepared on a quarterly basis about six weeks before the end of the quarter, and a considerable number of these were printed and widely distributed. (p. 83) The schedules provided for patrol of the operating areas and for air patrol coverage, entrances and sorties, primarily because they felt that the possibility of a submarine attack in the operating areas was something that they had to guard against and also to prevent any blocking of the channel in and out of Pearl Harbor (p. 84). On December 7, Commander Paul C. Crosley was Flag Secretary on the Staff of the Commander‑in‑Chief, Pacific Fleet. He produced a copy of the Pacific Fleet employment schedule, dated August 13, 1941, which was incomplete since Enclosure A was missing. Enclosure A was a photostatic copy of a diagrammatic layout of the schedule as written in the letter. (p. 179) Commander Crosley also produced a proposed employment schedule dated November 10, 1941. (p. 180). Commander Crosley produced copies of the employment schedules for Task Forces 1, 2 and 3 for the second quarter of the fiscal year 1942, and discussed the method of printing and distributing same. (p. 181). Admiral Brainard did not recall any changes which had been made in the employment schedules for the last quarter of 1941 which had been submitted by the Pacific Fleet. He said that a rather general freedom of action was given to the Fleet Commanders as to changes in the operating schedules. He recalled that about the middle of 1941, the schedules were changed from type schedules to task force schedules after the Commander‑in‑Chief had established a task force organization. (p. 401) Admiral Pye stated that the task forces rotated days at sea and in port; the days and dates varied. A task force could be figured to stay in port for nine to fourteen days (page 430). His task force, Task Force One, was in Pearl Harbor from November 27th until December 7th (page 418). Admiral Pye said that it did not occur to him at any time between November 27 and December 7 to take the ships to sea because of the Army's inadequacy since it was his confirmed opinion that the greatest danger was from submarines. (p.169) On December 7, 1941, Task Force One was in port, except for the SARATOGA, which was on the West Coast. Task Force Two was at sea; the ENTERPRISE was delivering planes to Wake; Bat. Div. One of Admiral Halsey's Task Force Two was in port. Task Force Three was conducting operations at sea; and Task Force Three's carrier, the LEXINGTON had gone to Midway to deliver planes (page 539). The COLORADO was on the West Coast, and the PENNSYLVANIA was in drydock at Pearl Harbor (page 540 Admiral McMorris said that one of the considerations that prompted leaving the battleships of Task Force Two when the ENTERPRISE was sent to Wake with Marine planes, was the possibility of a clash with some Japanese ships and they did not want to handicap the carrier and its light forces with the slower battleships (pages 891‑2). The Fleet, he said, was operating under a schedule, but no directive had been received to keep the Fleet in Pearl Harbor at that particular time (page 893). Admiral Kimmel testified that about two‑thirds of the Pacific Fleet were in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, because Task Force One and Task Force Two overlapped in schedule for a few days (page 369).
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