I. A. Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, and Pacific Fleet
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- Admiral Bloch said he did not recall that the Army radar net had ever been used in any tactical operation. (p. 20)
- Admiral Bloch said that the only arrangement the Navy had for obtaining information with respect to approaching aircraft or ships by visual observation was the signal tower. (p. 21)
- The conditions found by Commander Taylor about November 1, 1941, as to the Army warning system, which he reported to both the Army and the Navy prior to November 15, 1941, were as follows
- "By December 7, 1941, all telephone communication lines had been installed with the exception of the Civilian Air Raid Precaution Command lines, and
- Commander Taylor said that there was a 15‑mile dead area around Oahu in which the Army radar would not function. Prior to December 7 there was no visual system to supplement that weakness. (p. 351)
Admiral Bloch said that when General Short arrived in February, he and Admiral Bloch talked about the Army's radar system and as the net progressed to completion General Short, about September or October, told Admiral Bloch that he had no operators, that he wanted to begin to train operators and he wanted to know if there was anything Admiral Bloch could do to help him. Admiral Bloch requested the Commander‑in‑Chief to permit General Short to send a number of his men to sea for training which was done. As of December, Admiral Bloch thought that the net was still in the condition where all the kinks were not yet all out of it and they were still training operators and could not be depended upon, but Admiral Bloch had no knowledge as to whether they were standing any regular watches and early in December there was no means developed for controlling aircraft so as to differentiate by means of radar between friendly and other planes. (p. 11‑12) As to communications, Admiral Bloch said the communication plan gotten out in connection with 2CL called for a broadcast frequency from the Base Defense Commander to all ships and points. All ships and stations were required to listen at all times on that frequency. There were teletypes between the Army Headquarters and Admiral Bloch's Headquarters with a branch in Admiral Kimmel's office. There was telephonic communication 544 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK between Admiral Bloch's Headquarters and General Short's "Message Center". Admiral Bloch also had such communication from the Harbor Control and Command Posts, both at Honolulu and Pearl Harbor to the gates. There was also telephonic communication between the Harbor Control and the Artillery Headquarters. There were, Admiral Bloch said, means for rapid communication including communication from the "Interceptor Command" to Admiral Bloch's Headquarters. (p. 19) Admiral Bloch said that there was no naval officer specifically detailed at the Army Interceptor Command. After December 7, that Command was staffed by calling in a lot of young women from Honolulu and training them at that time, the Army asked for watch officers to communicate with the Navy, although Admiral Bloch said it had been his plan that the communications would be sent by Army people to the Navy. Nevertheless, Navy people were sent there on December 7. (p. 20) Admiral Bloch said he did not recall that the Army radar net had ever been used in any tactical operation. (p. 20) Admiral Bloch said that the Army was having a great deal of trouble getting the radar system to work; there was trouble with the electronics and the Army came to Admiral Bloch for assistance; the Army was referred to the Commander in Chief and an officer by the name of Taylor was sent to help the Army in an effort on the part of the Navy to get the Army's net going; he was not sent there with any orders as liaison and Admiral Bloch thought that he was there only in the capacity as an expert to assist the Army with their electrical and mechanical difficulties. (p. 20) Admiral Bloch had no confidence in the Army radar system because he knew that it was not completely set up; the operators were not completely trained; and there was no way so that friendly or hostile planes could be identified there being no IFF equipment. Admiral Bloch said that there was a standard procedure for aircraft approach to and departure from Oahu for Army and Navy planes and that in addition to Army and Navy planes, there were various commercial companies operating aircraft there. (p. 20) Admiral Bloch said that the Army had a number of observation posts on Oahu and adjacent islands, but that these were not manned unless there was a full alert and that not all of such posts had means of rapid communications with headquarters. (p. 20) Admiral Bloch said that the only arrangement the Navy had for obtaining information with respect to approaching aircraft or ships by visual observation was the signal tower. (p. 21) Captain Ramsey stated that about a week or ten days before December 7th, General Davidson asked Admiral Bellinger whether the Navy could furnish officer personnel to help man the radar system for 24‑hour operation and said that if the Navy did not supply the men, he could operate only in the critical hours of the morning and evening. The final decision was that the Navy could not supply the officers required at that time on a permanent basis. He did not know they reason (page 601). Admiral Bellinger stated that he was only slightly informed as to the Army radar system (page 686). Admiral Bellinger said that the Army Interceptor Command was not ready to perform its part in the protection of Pearl Harbor from the viewpoint of the radar installations and of their ability to control their fighter groups, the number of planes they had, and the general quality of their pilots. (p. 131) Commander W. G. Taylor testified that between October 1st and December 7th, he was assigned to temporary duty Commander Airforce, Pacific Fleet (page 609). He was loaned to the Army Interceptor Command in an advisory capacity to aid in setting up the air warning system. (3) Admiral Halsey said that he had sent his communication officer to work with the Army on the Army's radar system and that that officer had reported to him that the radar system was very backward as to its state of readiness. (p. 302) He had had experience with the British air warning system and was familiar with radar development at the time. In working with the Army, he worked mainly on liaison between the air warning systems and the commands; he worked in an advisory capacity (page 611). He had been detailed to the job at the direction of. Admiral Kimmel around the middle of November, at the request of the Army (page 622). PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 545 He first reported to the Army as an advisor about the second week in November and called a conference at which he submitted a memorandum which was prepared because of the difficulty in getting the Information Center set up. (4) Commander William E. G. Taylor completed a naval flight course and was commissioned an Ensign in 1926; after a year's service, he resigned his commission and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the Marine Corps Reserve. He served as an instructor specializing in fighter aircraft, and was placed on inactive duty as a Captain in the Marine Corps Reserve in 1934. He then had various jobs as a pilot, and was commissioned a Sub‑Lieutenant in the British Naval Reserve Force in September, 1939, and thereafter engaged in various combat operations with the British. (p. 338‑340) He said that the British fighter operations were very effectively directed while the planes were in the air. The general assumption was that the direction was employing a system of advanced electronics for interception of enemy aircraft. (p.341) Commander Taylor, while serving with the British, made reports to United States Naval representatives and endeavored to get as much information as he could on the methods of fire control used by the British. (p. 342) Commander Taylor returned to the United States in an effort to get from the British faster fighter craft which could be used by the Fleet and the Fleet air arm. (p. 342) Commander Taylor was next transferred to the British Royal Air Force on October 2, 1940, and was assigned to an R. A. F. squadron known as 242 in order to get operational experience before taking over his own squadron. He said that it was generally accepted that the major reason for the success of the R. A. F. fighter during the so-called Battle of Britain was the magnificent fighter direction control which the British had. (p. 343) During this period of service with the Royal Air Force, Commander Taylor became more interested in the patrol system used by the British and continued to make reports to the American Naval Attaché. Commander Taylor said that both the American Army and the American Navy had a large number of observers who were studying the Royal Air Force system, and that his impression that all of the information was made available to them, but that it did not appear that these observers brought back the full importance of the method used by the British. (p. 343‑4) Commander Taylor said that he had made a full report to various officers in the Bureau of Aeronautics and particularly sought out the officer who was at that time in charge of radar development. Commander Taylor could arouse no interest in the use of this radar for fighter direction. (p. 344) In July, 1941, after having had his own squadron for six months, Commander Taylor was advised by the British that because of his age they were going to make him a Wing Commander in charge of a fighter operational unit. He asked to be allowed to go back either to the British Navy or to be returned to the American Navy. He was commissioned in the American Navy in July, 1941, given a special assignment to visit several radar stations, and reported to the Bureau of Aeronautics in August of 1941. (p. 345) Commander Taylor was given various lecturing assignments to ships in the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, and he arrived at Pearl Harbor in October, 1941, where he spoke to Admirals Halsey and Kimmel, among others. He lectured to the Army fighter squadrons at Wheeler Field and lectured to the pilots of the SARATOGA and ENTERPRISE. He found that the ENTERPRISE fighter direction was considerably behind the British methods but had progressed much further than any other ship. He found that the ENTERPRISE had had their radar equipment for some time, the SARATOGA had no radar, and the LEXINGTON had recently acquired radar. In all ships equipped with radar, all hands were going through a training period. Commander Taylor was recalled by a dispatch from Admiral Kimmel which stated that the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, desired Commander Taylor's assistance for technical purposes. (p. 347) The conditions found by Commander Taylor about November 1, 1941, as to the Army warning system, which he reported to both the Army and the Navy prior to November 15, 1941, were as follows: "During the first week in November, we inspected all of the installations and plans for the air warning system and I found these facts to be true; (1) Construction and maintenance of the air warning system was a Signal Corps function directly under the cognizance of the Chief Signal Officer, Staff of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. This Command 546 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK appeared to have little conception of the vast function of the air warning system and exhibited very little interest in expediting its installation. At no time before December 7, 1941, did this Command furnish either the authority or impetus badly needed to get the work or organization properly started. (2) The actual operation of the air warning system—that is, the evaluation and dissemination of radar information and the control of fighter defense—was under the Interceptor Command. The Interceptor Command fully realized the importance of the air warning system. Although the officers concerned were not fully informed of its complicated functions, they were willing and eager to take advice and lend all assistance in their power to help complete its installations. They seemed relatively impotent, however, in getting assistance needed from the Commanding General's Staff. (3) One Captain of the Air Corps and one Captain of the Signal Corps had been through the Air Warning School at Mitchell Field, New York. It was with these two officers that I worked. Both were capable and energetic. They worked twelve to fifteen hours a day, seven days a week, in an attempt to speed up completion of the air warning system. (4) The air warning equipment and communications system were largely field or mobile equipment and the entire system was temporary. However, with the exception of the ground‑to‑air and air‑to‑ground radio equipment, the system was adequate to serve its purpose as was later proved. ( 5) There were only five Army mobile radar equipments in the Hawaiian area. These equipments had been in Oahu about three months. The five sets were installed and, in my opinion, as well sited as terrain would permit and were the absolute minimum needed to cover the entire seaward search for the Island. The radar equipment itself was inferior to any I had seen before. The deficiency in the equipment, however, was due to crude mechanical construction rather than to any electronic fault. This made the operation of the equipment difficult and slow, with the result that the reported azimuth readings were frequently very inaccurate and the reports were slow in coming in. The equipment had a reliable range of eighty to one hundred miles. A "dead" area existed through a fifteen miles radius from the equipment. It was, therefore, impossible to pick up aircraft plots within the first fifteen miles off shore. At each radar station, there was at least one officer or sergeant well trained to operate and maintain the equipment. In addition, there were seven or eight other enlisted operators under instruction at each station. All stations were under‑manned for twenty‑four operation. At the time of my inspection either commercial or Signal Corps field telephone lines had been installed between the radar stations and the Information Center. (6) The Information Center itself had been planned on an Area Command scale similar to the Boston or New York Information Centers and was too large in scope to effectively handle raids on the small Island of Oahu. The building was a temporary, wooden building and had been just been completed at the time of my inspection. The communications equipment was mostly field telephone equipment of the type developed during the last war. Positions had been provided for controllers and liaison officers, but liaison command lines had not been installed. These were not installed, primarily, because the activities at which the liaison command lines were to terminate were uninformed as to the purpose concerning the air warning system and because the Commanding General had not taken the steps to coordinate these activities with the air warning system. The Signal Corps had furnished sufficient plotters to man two watches only. These were just starting their training at the time of my inspection. There were no controllers or liaison officers available at this time and no provisions had been made to provide them. (7) The anti‑aircraft batteries had installed a command post but no liaison had been established between the anti‑aircraft command and the Information Center. (8) No attempt had been made to secure control of the anti‑aircraft guns of ships in harbor. (9) No liaison had been established between the searchlights and the Information Center. (10) No attempt had been made to disperse the fighter squadrons at Wheeler Field. (11) No automatic aircraft recognition system was installed which would identify all types of aircraft. (12) No aircraft approach lane system had been planned. (13) No system for identifying aircraft approaching Oahu by reports from parent aviation activities had been organized. (14) No visual observers reporting system had been organized. . . " "By December 7, 1941, all telephone communication lines had been installed with the exception of the Civilian Air Raid Precaution Command lines, and PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 547 the command lines from the Information Center to five fighter squadron dispersal points at Wheeler Field: Direct command lines were installed from Liaison positions in the Information Center to the various Army and Navy commands and activities. The civilian line had not been completed due to the fact no air raid center had been set up in Honolulu. The command lines to the fighter dispersal points were not completed, due to switchboard complications at Wheeler Field. Two fighter squadrons were dispersed, one at Bellows Field and one at Haliena Field. The dispersal of the remaining fighter squadrons was awaiting installation of command lines. An excellent liaison had been established between the Army anti‑aircraft batteries (three and five inch) and searchlights. About 15 November, I was instructed by CinCPac's Staff to request control of anti‑aircraft guns of ships in harbor from Com 14. This request was refused by Com 14 on the grounds that 'No Army organization would control guns on any naval vessel. If anything comes over, we will shoot it down.' However, this control was voluntarily turned over to the Information Center on December 9, after ships' guns had shot down USS ENTERPRISE aircraft. At the same time, I was also instructed by CinCPac to request naval liaison officers for the Information Center from Com 14. His Chief of Staff informed me that these liaison officers should come from the Fleet. I was referred to Commander, Patrol Wing Two. I was told by Commander, Patrol Wing Two, that no liaison officers were available in that Command. I returned to CinCPac and reported my failure to obtain naval liaison officers. CinCPac's Operations Officer informed me that he would take steps to find some. These officers did not report to the Information Center until December 8. I was further instructed by CinCPac to confer with Commander, Patrol Wing Two, in order to establish an aircraft identification system and aircraft approach lanes to Oahu. A conference was held at the Information Center, between November 15 and 20, at which officers from all flying activities were present to discuss these matters. It was decided by the aviation activities concerned that these systems would not be put into effect until war was declared, because it was felt that activating these systems prior to that time would complicate crowded flying conditions and hinder flying training. The Army stated that movements of aircraft from the United States to the Southwest Pacific were secret, and it was, therefore, not desirable to report those movements at that time. It should be noted that without an aircraft movement reporting system to the Information Center, it was impossible for the Information Center to determine whether radar reports were of friendly or of hostile aircraft. CinCPac's Operations Officer stated, however, that their Operations Office was prepared to report the movements of aircraft under their cognizance at any time this information was requested. Some doubt existed as to whether the Signal Corps (Hawaiian Department) or Interceptor Command should furnish controllers. As no controllers seemed to be forthcoming from the Hawaiian Department, Interceptor Command decided to use Squadron Commanders as controllers at the Information Center. These officers were heavily occupied with training their squadrons and were seldom available for controller training. However, no other source of controllers seemed to exist. Bomber Command, G. H. Q., and G‑2 liaison officers were not made available until several days after December 7, when their importance at the Information Center was finally realized. Interceptor Command had taken the initiative in the training of Information Center plotters. This training was progressing satisfactorily when, during the last week in November, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, ordered that the radar stations would operate only between 0400 and 0700. I was informed that the decision to limit the operating hours was made to prevent breakdown of the radar equipment from prolonged operation. Training which had been conducted from 0800 to 1700 daily only, due to the shortage of radar operators and plotters, was necessarily limited to the hours of 0400‑0700 by the order. The Information Center, therefore, virtually ceased to function except during those hours. I informed CinCPac's Operations Officer of the situation as it existed on about 1 December and was told that in view of the failure of the responsible commanders to take action to provide necessary personnel and to activate the Information Center on a twenty‑four basis, he would initiate a letter requesting the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to take action immediately. I do not know whether this letter was ever written, or not. However, no action was taken up to December 7." (P. 350‑351) 548 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Commander Taylor said that there was a 15‑mile dead area around Oahu in which the Army radar would not function. Prior to December 7 there was no visual system to supplement that weakness. (p. 351) Commander Taylor said that the Army's radar operators and maintenance men at radar stations were insufficient in number and were not fully trained even up to December 7. (p. 352) Commander Taylor said that he had asked the Navy for six liaison officers for the Information Center, and on December 8 he received ten who were survivors from the CALIFORNIA. He had also asked ComFOURTEEN to whom he was directed by the Commander in Chief's Staff, that control of the anti‑aircraft guns on naval vessels in the harbor should be held by the Information Center; also that some action be taken to identify aircraft approaching Oahu; and that a letter be sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to expedite putting the Information Center on a 24-hour basis. (p. 352) Commander Taylor said he made full reports to the Staff of the Commander in Chief as to the inadequacy of the Army Air warning system. (p. 352) He was quite sure that the Commander in Chief's Staff fully realized the situation. His recommendation in regard to the Army air warning system was made on November 24, 1941. The memorandum containing his recommendation was introduced in evidence, marked Exhibit 62, and read to the Court. This covered a meeting held for the purpose of determining how quickly the Information Center could be made fully operative on a wartime basis; attended by Army and Navy officers who agreed as to the importance of the Center and as to the necessity for liaison watch officers from each activity to transmit information; information was to be drawn from various sources including naval aircraft; the system was being operated 0700 to 1130 but should be on a full‑time basis; ComFOURTEEN should be approached with a view of obtaining naval liaison officers; confusion during exercises due to the number of planes could be controlled (1) by having all flights reported by parent units; (2) by enforcing aircraft approach procedure; (3) by requiring approaching planes to report at least 60 miles before coming in (CincUS had ordered radio silence of all aircraft during joint exercises, this was to be discussed for a decision as to its value); IFF was not available; the question of gun control of ships in port was to be discussed with CincUS also it was decided to investigate the possibility of using naval radar to supplement land radar in an emergency. Very little was done as a result of this memorandum, he said, because they were unable to get more personnel. It was the Army's duty to supply personnel, with the exception of the Navy liaison officers (page 619). He personally requested CincPac's, ComFOURTEEN's Chief of Staff and Admiral Bellinger to supply liaison officers and was told that they were not available, but would be ordered to report to the Information Center as soon as possible. Liaison officers were essential to the proper dissemination of information (page 620). Their absence here, however, actually made little difference so far as the Navy liaison was concerned. Commander Taylor said that the air warning system could have been made operative sooner if there had been some impetus behind it with enough power to get the things needed (page 621). This impetus should have come from the Hawaiian Department, U. S. Army. He remained with the Army for one month after December 7th, and at the end of seven days the Information Center was running smoothly. The war made it easier to get liaison officers (page 621). Even if information from the radar were properly plotted, it would have been impossible to tell if planes were Japanese or whether they were United States planes; without some method of identification, radar cannot tell friend from foe. The Information Center is for the purpose of determining what friendly planes are in the air so that if a radar track is picked up that does not correspond to the course of the friendly planes it is presumed that it is the track of enemy planes. The radar equipment of the Army, he said, was adequate to do a fair job in the morning. Communication between the air warning system and the other organizations was in, except for some of fighter dispersal areas and the lines to the civilian air warning. Communications between fighter director officers and fighter aircraft were inadequate to control fighters more than five miles off shore. The Army radar operators were well trained. For some time prior to December 7th the radar had been operated from 0800 to 1630 in the afternoon, but shortly before December 7th, General Short gave orders to close down the radar stations
On December 7th, there were no permanent radar installations: on Oahu there were five mobile sets (page 624). The permanent equipment was there, but it would take some time to put it in (page 624). He stated that the Information Center of the air warning system was not adequately set up prior to December 7th, and they were in the process of teaching controllers (page 612). At no time were there sufficient numbers of well-trained personnel to operate the radar station even partially (page 625). The Robert's Report is incorrect in stating that there were sufficient partially trained personnel on November 27th to operate the system twenty‑four hours a day (page 626). There were insufficient well‑trained personnel to operate even partially at any time. They could get fairly good 360° coverage, and he believed that in no case could a large raid come in undetected (page 626). The Chief Signal Officer, U. S. Army; was in charge of the radar, and the Navy assisted in setting up an air warning system, except that they had not furnished liaison officers (page 615). The radar was entirely under the control of the Army; his duties were advisory (page 616). At the time he came in contact with the Army, the Information Center was being organized by two junior Army officers who worked hard to get the system into operation but did not have enough force to get what they needed from various commands to get the station operating (Page 627). There was not sufficient personnel to operate the radars twenty‑four hours a day, although he felt that the station should be operated twenty‑four hours a day, fully manned. There were just enough sets to cover the area of Oahu. If any one set had gone out, it would have meant the loss of that coverage. (page 617) Directory: pha pha -> Security Education Narrative Database Patterns of Professional Education pha -> Northern health centers, inc pha -> Pharmacy Section II pha -> Pprd east Programme Final Conference and 3rd Steering Committee Meeting Brussels, 13 June 2014 pha -> Correct Answer c chlorothiazide D pha -> Document Number: V1/C/alc2/7 Submission by: United States, Government pha -> When to submit to the dna database pha -> Gordon L. Amidon Download 1.58 Mb. Share with your friends:
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