I. A. Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, and Pacific Fleet


Admiral Herbert F. Leary during 1941 was in command of Cruisers, Battle Force, and under the command of Admiral Pye. (p. 363)



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Admiral Herbert F. Leary during 1941 was in command of Cruisers, Battle Force, and under the command of Admiral Pye. (p. 363)

During 1941, Admiral Walter S. Anderson was Commander Battleships, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet. His superior was Admiral Pye. He was Admiral Pye's most important subordinate commander. (p. 390

During 1941, Admiral Joel William Bunkley was Commanding Officer of the USS CALIFORNIA which was attached to the Pacific Fleet. Admiral Buckley's ship was Admiral Pye's Flagship. (p. 413)
Vice Admiral Halsey was Commander of Task Force Two; Vice Admiral Brown of Task Force Three;
Admiral John Henry Newton, during 1941, was in command of Cruisers Scouting Force. His superior was Admiral Brown. (p. 314)
Admiral Bloch of Task Force Four; Rear Admiral Withers of Task Force Seven; Rear Admiral Bellinger of Task Force Nine; and, Rear Admiral Calhoun of Task Force Fifteen.

Admiral Bloch testified that during 1941 he was ComFOURTEEN,


From March 15, 1941 until the end of the year, Captain Irving H. Mayfield was District Intelligence Officer of the Fourteenth Naval District. He had had no previous experience in Intelligence work except two weeks temporary duty in Washington and two years as a Naval attaché in Chile.

After July 1, 1941, Lieutenant William B. Stephenson, USNR, was designated as head of the Counter‑Espionage Desk of the District Intelligence Office of the Fourteenth Naval District (p. 323).

Until June 9, 1941, Captain J. B. Earle was in command of Destroyer Squadron Five, thereafter he was Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Naval District (p. 368).

Commander Wesley A. Wright was Assistant Communication Officer on Admiral Kimmel's staff and was on temporary duty with the Fourteenth Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit. He had had no experience in traffic analysis, which includes the location of forces by instruments, but had had about nine years' experience in other closely related branches of communication intelligence work (p. 379).
372 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Commander Local Defense Forces Commander Hawaiian Sea Frontier, Com­mandant Navy Yard Pearl Harbor, Commander Task Force Four, as Naval Base Defense Officer. He performed his duties in cooperation with the Army.

Admiral Bloch stated that he and Admiral Kimmel worked harmoniously together and conferred four to five times weekly. Admiral Kimmel, he said, made an honest effort to keep him fully informed. He was conscious that in 1941 Japanese‑United States relations were strained. He did not disagree with deci­sions made by the High Command of the Fleet. He was not called upon to make any independent decision (page 393).

According to Vice Admiral Bellinger his duties, in general, were as:

(a) Commander Task Force Nine. This comprised Patrol Wings One and Two, plus other units as assigned by CincPac for specific operations. His senior officer was CInCPaC.

(b) Commander Hawaiian Based Patrol Wings and Commander Patrol Wing Two. The larger command included the patrol squadrons, aircraft tenders, attached to Patrol Wings One and Two, His senior officer was Commander Aircraft Scouting Force based at San Diego.

(c) Commander Fleet Air Detachment Pearl Harbor. Administrative authority in local matters over all aircraft actually based on Naval Air Station.

(d) Liaison with ComFOURTEEN for aviation development with the district, including Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnstown Island.

(e) Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force, and when performing such duties, his senior officer was Admiral Bloch (pages 60‑61).

Captain Logan C. Ramsey, who also testified, was Operations Officer to Admiral Bellinger between November 1 and December 7, 1941 (page 574).

Vice Admiral W. L. Calhoun said that he was Commander Base Force, United States Fleet, during 1941. His duties included logistic support of the Pacific Fleet assisting ComFOURTEEN with services in Pearl Harbor, command of fleet security measure until August or September when relieved by Admiral Bloch, and he was Senior Patrol Officer in charge of all naval shore patrol (page 931).



Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, during 1941, was Chief of Staff to CincPac
Vice Admiral Smith testified that he was Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet from February, 1941 to 7 December 1941 (page 335), and that his duties, as prescribed by Staff Instructions, Pacific Fleet (Exhibit 34), issued 14 July 141, which he himself signed and issued with the approval of Admiral Kimmel, were:

"112. The Commander‑in‑Chief is available to the entire Staff for consulta­tion, but all questions for decision or action should pass through the Chief of Staff whenever such a procedure will not involve an undue delay."

"200. CHIEF OF STAFF‑01‑Personal Aide.

(See Navy Regulations Articles 785‑786.)

(a) Carries out policies prescribed by the Commander‑in‑Chief.

(b) Exercises general supervision over and coordinates work by members of the Staff.

(c) Advises the Commander‑in‑Chief on all matters concerning the war readi­ness and battle efficiency of the Fleet.

(d) Supervises the preparation of campaign orders and plans, as well as strategical and tactical problems of the Fleet.

(e) Signs correspondence as follows:

(1) Routine Matters.

(2) Minor recommendations, or minor forwarding endorsements on same, to material Bureaus regarding repairs and alterations concerning which a policy has been established.

(3) Orders to and requests from officers not in Command.

(4) Matters concerning which the policy is of long standing.

(5) Letters from the Navy Department noted for compliance, information, or guidance.

(6) The Commander‑in‑Chief personally will sign correspondence regarding questions of particular importance involving criticism, approval, or disapproval of previous recommendations; action on legal papers" (NCI Rec. p. 336).
(page 528).
Admiral Smith, on December 7, 1941, was Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet which position he assumed on February 1, 1941 Previously, he served a year and a half as Captain of one of Admiral Kimmel's cruisers while Admiral Kimmel was Commander Cruisers Pacific Fleet. As Chief of Staff, Admiral Smith supervised all divisions of the Staff (p. 32) and everything which transpired between the Staff members and the Commander‑in‑Chief was brought to Admiral Smith's attention. (p. 33)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 373
Admiral Smith said that he felt that entirely too much of his time was taken up with administrative matters; when the Commander‑in‑Chief and Staff moved ashore, Admiral Smith found it difficult to keep a day‑by‑day routine going; possibly he was to blame himself for this situation, but he attempted to reduce the paper work. However, the Commander‑in‑Chief kept him too long in the Commander‑in‑Chief's office, and he knew that because Admiral Smith told him so; Admiral Smith believes that they spent entirely too much time on staff discussions. (p. 60) Admiral Smith stated that because of his preoccupation with day‑to‑day matters he was not as free as the Commander in Chief to think of future events.
Rear Admiral DeLany was Chief of Staff for Operations for Admiral Kimmel from February 1 to December 7, 1941 (page 496). Rear Admiral C. H. McMorris was War Plans Officer during the last half of 1941 (page 887).
On December 7, Captain Vincent R. Murphy was on the staff of Admiral Kimmel as Assistant to the War Plans' Officer, and on that day was Staff Duty Officer (p. 195).
Vice Admiral McMorris testified that he was War Plans Officer for CincPac from February, 1941 until the end of 1941 (page ,293). He stated that his duties, as prescribed by "Staff Instructions, Staff of 'CincPac, 1941" (Exhibit 34) were:

"207. War Plans Officer—16.

"(a) As head of the War Plans Section is responsible, under the Chief of Staff, for the preparation of War Plans for the Fleet and for all matters pertaining thereto.



"(b) Has general custody of War Plans and secret letters relative thereto.

"(e) Member of Schedule Board.

"(d) Maintains liaison with War Plans representatives of subordinate Com­manders.

"(e) Maintains liaison with U. S. Army in War Plans matters—via District Commandant if appropriate.

"(f) Makes recommendations on designs of new ships—general features—and on alterations of old ships that affect military characteristics.



"(g) Makes recommendations on matters pertaining to reserves of material, particularly ammunition, mines, bombs, torpedoes, fuel, provisions, etc., and their distribution.

"(h) Maintains liaison with Commandants of Naval Districts in War Plans matters.

"(i) Is responsible for the review of War Plans of subordinate commanders and of District Commandants and Coastal Frontier Commanders insofar as these Plans may affect the Fleet." (page 294)
Captain E. T. Layton testified that between October and December 7th, he was Fleet Intelligence Officer for CincPac (page 904).
Captain Layton testified that for one year prior to 7 December 1941, and subsequently, he had been Fleet Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet, (page 182) and that his duties, as prescribed by "Staff Instructions, Commander 2n Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, 1941" (Exhibit 34) were:

"214. Intelligence Officer—25.

"(a) Directs assembly of Enemy Information and evaluates same, disseminat­ing to various members of staff, indicating where action is required.

"(b) Provides Operation Officer and War Plans Officer information essential for current estimates (monograph material).

"(c) Maintains Section 11 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g) of Estimate of Situation (Enemy Forces). Maintains location plot of Fleets of possible enemy or allies.

"(d) Directs counter espionage and counter information.

"(e) Maintains Intelligence Records (See Naval Intelligence Manual.).

"(f) Prepares Fleet Intelligence Bulletins.

"(g) Evaluates Intelligence Information received of procedures or practices of other navies and prepares definite recommendations as to any action to be taken within own Fleet.

"(h) In charge of censorship.

"(i) Internal Security of ships.

"(f) Supervises reconnaissance photographic activities.

"215. Assistant Intelligence Officer—26.

In addition, to assisting "25" an all duties of the Intelligence section, performs the following additional assignments:

(e) Maintains Merchant Marine plot and analysis.
374 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"(b) Prepares silhouettes of own and enemy ships and planes for dissemination to Fleet.

"(c) Assembly, evaluation and dissemination of Enemy information.

"(d) Maintenance of Current Estimate of Situation (Enemy Forces) and loca­tion plot of Fleets of possible enemy or allies" (page 188).
Rear Admiral Kitts was Fleet Gunnery Officer on Admiral Kimmel's staff and was in charge of training (pages 511‑12). (3)
On December 7, 1941, Admiral Arthur C. Davis was Fleet Aviation Officer of the Pacific Fleet. He had been performing these duties for about a year and a half (p. 96). His duties primarily were concerned with technical training and logistics matters (p. 97).

On December 7, 1941, M. E. Curts, Captain, U. S. N., was Pacific Fleet Communication Officer and had served in that capacity for about two years.
D. GENERAL ORDERS NOS. 142 AND 143
General Order No. 142, dated January 10, 1941, of which the Court took judicial notice, assigned a dual status to the Commandants of various Naval districts, including the Fourteenth, in that as Commandants they were to operate under orders of the Navy Department, and as officers of one of the fleets they were to operate under the orders of the Commander‑in‑Chief thereof, (1) with duties corresponding to those of the Senior Officer Present Afloat, when their relative rank made them such, and (2) in command of task groups of the fleet in question when and as directed by its Commander‑in‑Chief. It was further pro­vided that as Commandants they were to be governed by all instructions relating to, the duties of Commandants of Naval districts and the units under their com­mand would be those prescribed in existing regulations and instructions, and would include the local naval defense forces. Their duties as officers of a fleet were to be guided by such instructions as the Commander‑in‑Chief of that fleet might consider desirable.

General Order No. 143, dated February 3, 1941, which the Court also judicially noticed, provided for the organization of naval forces of the United States, which included the United States Fleet, composed of the Atlantic, Pacific, and Asiatic Fleets. These were described as administrative and task organizations normally operating under the instructions of the Navy Department. The United States Fleet was said to be an administrative organization for training purposes only and a task organization when two or more fleets were concentrated or operating in conjunction with each other. Under the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander‑in‑Chief, United States Fleet, was to prescribe standards and methods of training. It was also stated that the Commandants of Naval districts had administrative responsibility direct to the Navy Department for naval local defense forces.


III. THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS—HIS STAFF AND DUTIES
A. THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
Admiral H. R. Stark, USN was Chief of Naval Operations through the period when Admiral Kimmel was Commander‑in‑Chief Pacific Fleet.
B. ADMIRAL STARK'S STAFF
Admiral Stark's principal advisers during this period, he said, were Admiral R. E. Ingersoll, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Vice Admiral R. K. Turner, head of War Plans.
Captain Robert O. Glover was in the plans division of the office of the Chief of Naval Operations and was assigned various planning duties. (p. 171)
Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirmann, head of Central Division, Admiral Wilkinson, Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence.
From May until October, 1941, Admiral Howard F. Kingman was head of the Domestic Intelligence Branch of ONI, and from October on was Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence. As head of the Domestic Intelligence Branch, he had general supervision of the activities of the several districts' intelligence organizations. (p. 335‑6)
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 375
Captain L. F. Safford was in charge of the Communications Security Section of Naval Communications during 1941. (p. 355)
the heads of the Divisions of Ship Movements,
(3) During 1941, Admiral Roland Munroe Brainard was Director of the Ship Movements Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations. (p. 399)

The duties of the Ship Movements Division were summarized by Admiral Brainard as follows:

"The general functions of the Ship Movements Division involved prepara­tion of the publications "Operating Force Plan," "Assignment of Vessels to Fleets and Forces," "Assignment of Vessels to Districts," assignment of home ports; and collaboration and coordination with the Fleet Mainte­nance Division of overhauls, schedules of Fleet activities as submitted by the Commanders of the forces afloat, these tentative schedules being sub­mitted to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and circulated for the approval or modification by the divisions under the CNO, and final approval; then returned to the forces afloat by the Chief of Naval Operations; sched­uling and itinerarying of NTS ships, the recording and accountability of ship locations in rather detailed form as the result of position reports and location reports from the ships operating individually and from Fleet units, as reported by Fleet Commanders. During the period of my incumbency, a War Information Room was started under the late Rear Admiral F. T. Leighton for the purpose of plotting and keeping track of all combatant ships of the navies of the world. Also a section of Convoy and Routing, as now called, whose duties were the plotting and as close an accountability as possible to keep track of the merchant shipping of the world. Positions of our own naval vessels also was obtained through a movement report system. Information on merchant shipping and foreign shipping and men‑of‑war was obtained through the various sources of ONI, naval observers at ports of the world, Naval Attachés, Maritime Commission, and other such sources. The ac­quisition of small craft was accomplished by the NTS Section which, later, grew into a sizeable division, and the assignments to Districts and Sea Fron­tiers was determined by the Chief of Naval Operations as set forth in the publication previously mentioned as prepared and distributed by this Division." (p. 399‑400)

Admiral Brainard said that the assignment of important naval units was determined by echelons higher than his division. (p. 400)

Admiral Brainard said that the Ship Movements Division was primarily a record keeping division and something of an information bureau, available to proper authorities, as regards the location of shipping and that he and his division did not participate in questions of broad general policy. (p. 402)
Ship Maintenance, Fleet Training, and his Flag Secretary (pages 2, 18).
During 1941, Captain John L. McCrea was an aide to Admiral Stark. He was assigned special duties by Admiral Stark.

During 1941, Captain Charles Wellborn, Jr. was Administrative Aide to the Chief of Naval Operations (p. 383).
Admiral Royal Ingersoll said that he was Assistant Chief of Naval operations in 1941, and as such generally acted for the Chief of Naval Operations in matters where policy had been established, and in an advisory capacity. He knew generally what was going on in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations (page 816).
During 1941, Admiral Ingersoll was Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. He described his duties as follows:

"As Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, I had no duties that pertained solely to the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations; that is, I did not have original cognizance of any matters. All matters for the consideration of Chief of Naval Operations were taken up with me before presenting to the Chief of Naval Operations. All matters of policy, of course, were referred to the Chief of Naval Operations. Once he had decided upon a policy, I then endeavored to carry out the details without further reference to him unless it was a question of which I thought he should know. I signed most of the correspondence except letters going to heads of other government departments or letters to Commanders‑in‑Chief which embodied orders to them. I frequently released many dispatches that had previously been
376 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
considered by the Chief of Naval Operations after I knew they were in the form in which he wished them sent." (p. 417)

Concerning Admiral Ingersoll's familiarity with matters coming before Admiral Stark, he said:

"Generally speaking, I now feel that Admiral Stark kept me fully informed of all matters of which I should have had knowledge. I was usually present when conferences were held with other officers of the Navy Department or officers of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. I was not always present when Admiral Stark conferred with officials of the State Department or with officials of the War Department. Frequently these conferences took place in the State Department or in the War Department and I usually did not accompany Admiral Stark for such conferences. I felt, however, that when these were over that Admiral Stark told me everything that I should know. I do not recall now anything that transpired of which I was not told and of which I thought I should have been told. There may have been conferences between Admiral Stark and the President and the Secre­tary of State of which he did not tell me all the details." (p. 417)
Vice Admiral R. K. Turner said that between July and December 7, 1941, he was Director of War Plans in the office of CNO. He was a professional adviser to CNO in the preparation of plans for war (page 988).

Admiral Schuirmann testified that he was Director of the Central Division during 1941 and was the liaison with the State Department.


The liaison between the Chief of Naval Operations and the State Depart­ment was summarized by Admiral Turner as follows:

"The Chief of Naval Operations had, a close personal association with the Secretary of State and Under Secretary of State. He consulted them fre­quently and they consulted him, I might say invariably, before making any particular diplomatic move. In the Office of Naval Operations, the Chief of the Central Division was appointed as liaison officer with the State Depart­ment. He visited the State Department and discussed problems with them practically every day. There was a weekly meeting in the State Department conducted by the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Welles, usually attended by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of the War Plans of the Army, Chief of War Plans of the Navy, the Chief, of the Central Division of the Office of Naval Operations, an officer of the General Staff not in the War Plans Division, and two or three representatives of the State Department. The matters discussed at these meetings usually related to events in Western Hemisphere countries. The Army was build­ing a lot of air fields in the Caribbean and South America. The Navy and the Army, both, had sent missions to those countries, and at the meetings with the Under Secretary it was chiefly American affairs that were discussed. Occasionally, possibly once a month, the Secretary of State would hold a conference with representatives of the War and Navy Departments, and at these meetings events outside of the Americas were discussed. From time to time, the Secretary of State would call individuals from the War and Navy Department to discuss particular aspects of world events. There were other unscheduled conferences between the State and War and Navy Depart­ments. I participated in a great many such conferences. From time to time, informal memoranda were exchanged between individuals of the State and Navy Departments or exchanged between the Secretary of State and the Chief of Naval Operations. I would say that relations between the State and War and State and Navy Departments were very close and were characterized by good feeling." (p. 257)

Admiral Turner summarized the situation in regard to the State Depart­ment by stating that on the whole, he was satisfied and had no complaint or criticism on the attitude of the State Department. (p. 258)

Captain Wellborn discussed the general exchange of information with the State Department. (p. 385)

The records kept of the meetings with the State Department officers were described by Admiral Schuirmann as follows:

"A 'Liaison Committee' consisting of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, and the Under Secretary of State was set up while Admiral Leahy was Chief of Naval Operations. This Committee was mainly occupied with questions other than the Far East, but occasionally questions relating to the Far East were discussed. About the middle of May, 1941, the practice of having a stenographer present to record the discussion was
PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY 377

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