I. A. Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, and Pacific Fleet

Annex VII, Section VI to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District, dated March 28, 1941 (Exhibit 23) dealt with joint security measures and protection of the Fleet and Pearl Harbor base. It stated that in order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval base for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobilization for war, the following agreements were adopted.

Paragraph II provided for joint air operations. It stated that when the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander would take such preliminary steps as were necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as circumstances warranted in order that joint operations might be conducted in accordance with the following plans: (a) joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels to be conducted under the tactical command of the Navy; (b) defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu to be executed under the tactical command of the Army; (c) when naval forces were insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft were made available these aircraft would be under the tactical control of the naval commander, directing the search operations.

Paragraph III provided for joint communications and, among other things, stated that all information of the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu which was secured through Navy channels would be transmitted promptly to the Command Post of the Army Provisional Anti‑Aircraft. Brigade. It also stated that subsequently, when the Army aircraft warning service was established, provision would be made for transmission of information on the location or distance of hostile and friendly aircraft, and that special wire or radio circuits would be made available for the use of Navy liaison officers so that they might make their own evaluation of the available information and transmit it to their respective organizations. Information relating to the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore which would be secured through Navy channels was to be transmitted without delay to the Aircraft Warning Service Information Center.

Paragraph II of the addendum was a "Survey of Opposing Strengths." This indicated, among other things, that Orange might send into the are one or more, submarines and one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers. Also that the most difficult situation for us to meet would be when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinated their actions. The aircraft available in Hawaii were inadequate to maintain for any extended period from bases on Oahu a patrol extensive enough to insure, that an air attack from an Orange carrier could not arrive over Oahu as a complete surprise.

Paragraph III of the addendum dealt with "Possible Enemy Action." This stated that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area, a surprise attack on Oahu, including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor, or a combination of these two. Further, that it appeared that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be
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an air attack, which would most likely be launched from one or more carriers, which would probably approach inside of 300 miles. That a single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes waiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust. It was also stated that: "(d) any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undiscovered surface force, probably composed of fast ships ac­companied by a carrier." It was further stated that in a dawn air attack there was a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrol that we might be using.

Paragraph IV of the addendum dealt with "Action Open to Us." This stated that it would be desirable to run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360°, but this could only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable measure could not therefore be undertaken unless other intelligence indicated that a surface raid was probable within rather narrow limits of time. It contained other types of action open in the event of .a surprise attack on ships in the operating area or on the Island, and stated that none of the outlined courses of action could be initiated by our forces until an attack was known to be imminent or had occurred.

Paragraph V contained the "Decisions." The primary decision was that this force would locate and attack forces initiating hostile actions against Oahu or fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a surprise attack, and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory measures. There were a number of subsidiary decisions, including decisions for the establishment of a search and attack group, an air combat group, assignment of missions to the groups, and definitions of conditions of readiness. The search and attack group was to be under the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force‑Commander Patrol Wing Two, and was to include various units in accord­ance with current conditions of readiness. These units included patrol squadrons and Army bombardment and reconnaissance squadrons, among others.

Admiral Bloch, as Naval Base Defense Officer, issued his Operation Plan No. 1‑41, on February 27, 1941 (Exhibit ‑53): The Task Organization prescribed was (a) Destroyer Patrol (Commander Inshore Patrol), consisting of two destroy­ers, a boom patrol, a harbor patrol, an A/B boom and minesweepers, (b) Base Defense Air Force, (Commander Patrol Wing Two). In conjunction with the Army, (c) Antiaircraft Defense (District Marine Officer) in conjunction with the Army, (d) Harbor Control Post (District Operations Officer) in conjunction with the Army. This plan directed attention to, among other things, the Hawaiian Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and stated:

"By cooperation in support of the Army, Naval security measures will be established as, necessary for the joint protection of PEARL HARBOR Base in order to safeguard the Fleet.

"In conjunction with the Commanding General Hawaiian Department, the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) will arrange to coordinate joint effort; to set conditions of readiness; to hold required drills; to make "alarm" and "all clear", signals.

"(1) Sabotage from small craft on ships based in PEARL HARBOR.

"(2) Block the entrance channel to PEARL HARBOR by sinking an obstruc­tion in the channel.

"(3) Lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to PEARL HARBOR.

"(b) That a declaration of war might be preceded by:

"(1) A surprise submarine attack on ships in base area—probable.

"(2) A surprise air attack on ships in PEARL HARBOR—possible.

"(3) A combination of these two—possible."

A detailed Inshore Patrol Plan was Annex "A" to Operation Plan 1‑41, a de­tailed Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan was Annex "Baker," a detailed Anti­-Aircraft Defense Plan was Annex "C", a detailed Harbor Control Post Plan was Annex "D", and a detailed Communications Plan was Annex "Easy."

Annex "Baker", the detailed Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan, was dated April 9, 1941, prepared by Admiral Bellinger and approved by Admiral Bloch.

General Short testified that the local joint defense plan was in effect prior to the attack, but was not in operation because, he said, it was predicated on the Rainbow Plan which had not been executed, and, therefore, the action taken under it prior to the attack was only drills (pages 259‑260).

Admiral Bellinger testified that about March 1, 1941, CincPac directed him to report to ComFOURTEEN to prepare an air defense plan in conjunction with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Force. He did so and worked with Major General Martin, Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force. The operations plan for the Naval Base Defense Force included several subsidiary plans, the most im­portant of which was the plan for the Naval Base Defense Air Force, which out­lined the proposed employment of all units made available to that force (page 661):

Army and Navy orders he said, were based on the estimate of the situation dated March 31, 1941. He believed this estimate was sound, but that unity of command was missing (page 662). The plan was to function through mutual cooperation of the Army and Navy, and the Naval Base Defense Air Force could. function only in an emergency or when proper authority directed. The composition varied with the planes made available by the various Army and Navy commanders; the determining factor of availability was the daily employment schedule of planes belonging to various units. Available planes were subject to operational control only when the Naval Base Defense Air Force was in a function­ing status.

The normal procedure for vitalizing this organization for drill was an "air raid" dispatch from ComFourteen, as Base Defense Force Commander; then Bellinger, as Base Defense Air Commander, would send a dispatch to all units which made planes available to that organization, except Army pursuits, ordering them to
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place all available planes in highest readiness; searches would immediately be started then, and an attack on enemy surface forces when located (page 662).

The authority of "Commander Naval Base Defense Air Officer" was non­existent until an emergency was apparent or appropriate authority placed that force in a functioning status, and when called into existence covered not pursuit, but only the search and attack groups of that force (page 663). The planes ac­tually present on Oahu were not free until ordered to concentrate on naval base defense (page 663) .

Admiral Kimmel, he said, made final approval for naval aircraft operation. He or ComFourteen could vitalize the NBDA Force. ComFourteen worked under CincPac. NBDA Force was not composed of all aircraft but only of aircraft reported available (page 665).

Their estimate, he said, that "it appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our Intelligence service" was an estimate of hostile action and not of Japa­nese war plans (page 666).