Deterrence Uniq: Threats High

Deterrence Uniq: Threats High

Twenty-first century threats to the United States, its de- ployed forces, and its friends and allies differ fundamental- ly from those of the Cold War. An unprecedented number of international actors have now acquired – or are seeking to acquire – missiles. These include not only states, but also non-state groups interested in obtaining missiles with nucle- ar or other payloads. The spectrum encompasses the missile arsenals already in the hands of Russia and China, as well as the emerging arsenals of a number of hostile states.

The character of this threat has also changed. Unlike the Soviet Union, these newer missile possessors do not attempt to match U.S. systems, either in quality or in quantity. In- stead, their missiles are designed to inflict major devasta- tion without necessarily possessing the accuracy associated with the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals of the Cold War.1

The warning time that the United States might have be- fore the deployment of such capabilities by a hostile state, or even a terrorist actor, is eroding as a result of several fac- tors, including the continued proliferation and widespread availability of technologies to build missiles and the result- ing possibility that an entire system might be purchased out- right. Would-be possessors do not have to engage in the pro- tracted process of designing and building a missile. They could purchase and assemble components, reverse-engineer a missile after having purchased a prototype, or immediately acquire a number of assembled missiles. Even missiles that are primitive by U.S. standards might suffice for a rogue state or terrorist organization seeking to inflict extensive damage upon the United States. As the Rumsfeld Commission point- ed out in its 1998 report:

Under some plausible scenarios – including re-bas- ing or transfer of operational missiles, sea- and air- launch options, and shortened development pro- grams that might include testing in a third country – or some combination of these – the United States might well have little or no warning before opera- tional deployment.2

Although President George W. Bush has accomplished more in the way of missile defense than his predecessors -- including Ronald Reagan -- he will leave office with only a rudimentary system designed to stop a handful of North Korean missiles launched at our West Coast. Barack Obama will become commander in chief of a country essentially undefended against Russian, Chinese, Iranian or ship-launched terrorist missiles. This is not acceptable.

First, as the defender of the Free World, the U.S. will be the target of destruction or, more likely, strategic marginalization by Russia, China and the radical Islamic world.

Second, this marginalization and threat of destruction is possible because the U.S. is not so powerful that it can dictate military and political affairs to the world whenever it wants. The U.S. has the nuclear capability to vanquish any foe, but is not likely to use it except as a last resort.

Third, America will remain in a condition of strategic vulnerability as long as it fails to build defenses against the most powerful political and military weapons arrayed against us: ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. Such missiles can be used to destroy our country, blackmail or paralyze us.

With intercontinental flight times measured in minutes, ballis- tic missiles are the surest and fastest way to destroy a distant city or military asset. They can give a state regional or even global prestige and are a potentially significant military weapon and tool of terror, especially if those missiles are married to weapons of mass destruction. Longer-range systems would give hostile rogue states a capability to vault over the oceans to strike Ameri- can cities and blackmail US leaders.

The international web of trading relationships in ballistic mis- siles and related technologies is extensive. Short-range ballistic missile systems are plentiful and available for sale on the in- ternational black market. Equally worrisome is the heightened interest in longer-range systems. For example, North Korea is developing an improved performance intermediate-range ballis- tic missile that can travel about 3,200 km. North Korea also has an intense development program to produce an ICBM. The Taepo Dong-2 ICBM may have a two-stage variant (and travel around 10,000 km) and a three-stage variant (15,000 km). The 4 July 2006 test of the Taepo Dong-2 failed moments after lift-off, demonstrating that the North Koreans have more work to do. There is every indication, however, they will continue to strive for a viable long-range strike capability in addition to producing and selling shorter-range systems that may be used to threaten its neighbors, such as Japan.

Having developed and deployed advanced ballistic missiles of all ranges and done extensive research on nuclear weapons, we are right- fully concerned, not only about the tremendous and devastating offensive potential of these foreign ballistic missile forces, but also about the willingness of these two governments to prolifer- ate ballistic missile technologies abroad and sell their expertise to other countries.