Status quo threats harder to respond to than previous threats
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 6 – Independent Working Group on Misile Defense, the Space Relationship and the Twenty-First Century, 2007 report, Washington D.C., August 28, 2006
Twenty-first century threats to the United States, its de- ployed forces, and its friends and allies differ fundamental- ly from those of the Cold War. An unprecedented number of international actors have now acquired – or are seeking to acquire – missiles. These include not only states, but also non-state groups interested in obtaining missiles with nucle- ar or other payloads. The spectrum encompasses the missile arsenals already in the hands of Russia and China, as well as the emerging arsenals of a number of hostile states.
The character of this threat has also changed. Unlike the Soviet Union, these newer missile possessors do not attempt to match U.S. systems, either in quality or in quantity. In- stead, their missiles are designed to inflict major devasta- tion without necessarily possessing the accuracy associated with the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals of the Cold War.1
The warning time that the United States might have be- fore the deployment of such capabilities by a hostile state, or even a terrorist actor, is eroding as a result of several fac- tors, including the continued proliferation and widespread availability of technologies to build missiles and the result- ing possibility that an entire system might be purchased out- right. Would-be possessors do not have to engage in the pro- tracted process of designing and building a missile. They could purchase and assemble components, reverse-engineer a missile after having purchased a prototype, or immediately acquire a number of assembled missiles. Even missiles that are primitive by U.S. standards might suffice for a rogue state or terrorist organization seeking to inflict extensive damage upon the United States. As the Rumsfeld Commission point- ed out in its 1998 report:
Under some plausible scenarios – including re-bas- ing or transfer of operational missiles, sea- and air- launch options, and shortened development pro- grams that might include testing in a third country – or some combination of these – the United States might well have little or no warning before opera- tional deployment.2
Threat of missiles by other nations is greater than econ crisis and is real
Kennedy 08 – Brian T. Kennedy, president of the Claremont institute, November 24, 2008, “What a Single Nuclear Warhead Could Do, Why the U.S. needs a space-based missile defense against an EMP attack,” The Wall Street Journal
As severe as the global financial crisis now is, it does not pose an existential threat to the U.S. Through fits and starts we will sort out the best way to revive the country's economic engine. Mistakes can be tolerated, however painful. The same may not be true with matters of national security.
Although President George W. Bush has accomplished more in the way of missile defense than his predecessors -- including Ronald Reagan -- he will leave office with only a rudimentary system designed to stop a handful of North Korean missiles launched at our West Coast. Barack Obama will become commander in chief of a country essentially undefended against Russian, Chinese, Iranian or ship-launched terrorist missiles. This is not acceptable.
The attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, have proven how vulnerable we are. On that day, Islamic terrorists flew planes into our buildings. It is not unreasonable to believe that if they obtain nuclear weapons, they might use them to destroy us. And yet too many policy makers have rejected three basic facts about our position in the world today:
First, as the defender of the Free World, the U.S. will be the target of destruction or, more likely, strategic marginalization by Russia, China and the radical Islamic world.
Second, this marginalization and threat of destruction is possible because the U.S. is not so powerful that it can dictate military and political affairs to the world whenever it wants. The U.S. has the nuclear capability to vanquish any foe, but is not likely to use it except as a last resort.
Third, America will remain in a condition of strategic vulnerability as long as it fails to build defenses against the most powerful political and military weapons arrayed against us: ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. Such missiles can be used to destroy our country, blackmail or paralyze us.
Yes threat from BM
Lambakis 7 – Steven Lambakis, pHd, national security and international affairs analyst specializing in space power and policy studies for National Institute for Public policy, March 2007, “Leveraging Space to Improve Missile Defense” High Frontier, The Journal for Space & Missile professionals, Volume 3, Number 2
The adversaries of the US are looking hard at ballistic missiles because they represent a challenging threat. An intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) can travel at extremely high speeds—at times more than 15,000 mph. Kinetic energy interceptors collide with targets in space thousands of miles away at closing speeds that can exceed 25,000 mph. Besides hurling very small objects through air and space at very high speeds, ballistic missiles can be launched from anywhere at any time from multiple directions, to anywhere on the globe. Adding to this challenge, we can ex- pect adversaries to employ countermeasures to foil missile de- fense calculations and disrupt system operations.
With intercontinental flight times measured in minutes, ballis- tic missiles are the surest and fastest way to destroy a distant city or military asset. They can give a state regional or even global prestige and are a potentially significant military weapon and tool of terror, especially if those missiles are married to weapons of mass destruction. Longer-range systems would give hostile rogue states a capability to vault over the oceans to strike Ameri- can cities and blackmail US leaders.
In the future, we may face adversaries unknown to us today, fight in unexpected regions, or have to defend against new types of ballistic missiles and countermeasures. The significance of this uncertainty for missile defense planners is enormous. This means that we cannot be totally focused on “who” poses the threat today because the “who” can change with a political de- cision or by a surprise shift in capabilities from one region to another. Similarly, a focus on the “how” does not mean we can ignore today’s enemies or their present-day capabilities. On the contrary, today’s ballistic missile threats continue to drive our Nation’s near-term missile defense fielding and long-term development efforts. Today’s threats provide “ground truth,” a measure of what is possible today and, therefore, a low-end representation of what we must be prepared to defeat tomorrow. The “high end” represents ballistic missile threats that today are either unrealized or unknown but yet are possible to develop.
There has been steady interest and investment of scarce re- sources by some 20 to 30 countries in acquiring ballistic missiles and improving payload destructive power, warhead accuracy, and delivery range. Turnkey missile systems have been trans- ferred from one state to another and may one day be purchased by terrorists. So why must we pay attention? Because a missile strike involving nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons could wreak catastrophic damage, far surpassing the levels of destruc- tion, economic dislocation, and terror produced by the 11 Sep- tember 2001 attacks.
Yes threat from BM
Lambakis 7 – Steven Lambakis, pHd, national security and international affairs analyst specializing in space power and policy studies for National Institute for Public policy, March 2007, “Leveraging Space to Improve Missile Defense” High Frontier, The Journal for Space & Missile professionals, Volume 3, Number 2
The international web of trading relationships in ballistic mis- siles and related technologies is extensive. Short-range ballistic missile systems are plentiful and available for sale on the in- ternational black market. Equally worrisome is the heightened interest in longer-range systems. For example, North Korea is developing an improved performance intermediate-range ballis- tic missile that can travel about 3,200 km. North Korea also has an intense development program to produce an ICBM. The Taepo Dong-2 ICBM may have a two-stage variant (and travel around 10,000 km) and a three-stage variant (15,000 km). The 4 July 2006 test of the Taepo Dong-2 failed moments after lift-off, demonstrating that the North Koreans have more work to do. There is every indication, however, they will continue to strive for a viable long-range strike capability in addition to producing and selling shorter-range systems that may be used to threaten its neighbors, such as Japan.
Iran also has a significant ballistic missile development pro- gram. Besides its numerous short-range systems, Iran is devel- oping a medium-range ballistic missile (Shahab-3) based on North Korean No Dong technology. In its quest for longer reach, Iran is developing an extended range Shahab-3 (which can travel 1,300 km and threaten Israel) and a new medium-range system (which may travel 2,000 km and reach into portions of Europe). In November 2006, Iran showcased on television several ballis- tic missile launches, to include the Shahab-3, demonstrating for the world the importance Tehran places on its ballistic missile development program. Iran is believed to be working on inter- continental range ballistic missiles, which may be in its arsenal by 2015, that is if it does not import longer-range systems from proliferators like North Korea earlier than that.
Countries like China and Russia have done considerable work on ballistic missile and countermeasure technologies.4
Having developed and deployed advanced ballistic missiles of all ranges and done extensive research on nuclear weapons, we are right- fully concerned, not only about the tremendous and devastating offensive potential of these foreign ballistic missile forces, but also about the willingness of these two governments to prolifer- ate ballistic missile technologies abroad and sell their expertise to other countries.
In other words, there are significant technological and politi- cal uncertainties to weigh as we consider how to proceed with the development of US missile defenses. How China and Russia will play in the use and proliferation of ballistic missiles is no small part of this consideration. How will our adversaries fight today and tomorrow and with what capabilities? How can we technologically and operationally defend ourselves against an array of ballistic missile threats? The truth is, we cannot know for certain, so we must be ready for many contingencies.
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