1ac heg Advantage Scenario 1 is Leadership

Solvency: Deterrence

In future wars, those who are fighting against the West—today Iran or North Korea, tomorrow, who knows?—will use ballistic missiles not only to terrorize enemy civilian populations but to build morale among their own forces and people. Missile defense is the key to winning this critical psychological battle. As long as their missiles are being shot out of the sky, claims that they are hurting the enemy and thus filling people’s need for revenge can be shown to be utterly empty.

This, however, cannot be done with terminal phase defense weapons. To hit a missile or a warhead that is descending towards its target may be a feat of technological skill, but it does nothing to decrease the emotional satisfaction that comes from striking a hated enemy. Midcourse interceptors such as the US GBI or the Israeli Arrow are better, but the best way to publicly humiliate those who are launching Scud-type missiles is to shoot them down as soon after they leave the launch pad as possible. The only weapon now in development that will—in theory—be able to do this is the Airborne Laser (ABL), which the Missile Defense Agency plans to test next year.

This is indeed a promising system, but it has its limits. Its range is, according to unclassified reports, about 300 kilometers, and the US only plans to build, at most, seven aircraft. If the goal is to prevent the enemy from using its missile attacks to build its own side’s morale and thus lengthen the war, another solution must be found.

The important point here is that, all at once, a space-based layer of weapons gives the current missile defense system a true global engagement capability. Without space, the only way to deal with threat uncertainty is to populate the world with fixed and mobile sensors and radars (on ground and at sea). As you might imagine, the cost of doing so would be prohibitive, and would probably not be politically sustainable.

Missile defense has entered a new era. With the initial missile defense deployments, the decades-long debate over wheth- er to protect the American people from the threat of ballis- tic missile attack was settled – and settled unequivocally in favor of missile defense. What remains an open question is how the American missile defense system will evolve in the years ahead to take maximum advantage of technological opportunities to meet present and emerging dangers.

There is ample reason for concern. The threat environ- ment confronting the United States in the twenty-first cen- tury differs fundamentally from that of the Cold War era. An unprecedented number of international actors have now acquired – or are seeking to acquire – ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Rogue states, chief among them North Korea and Iran, place a premium on the acqui- sition of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the means to deliver them, and these states are moving rapid- ly toward that goal. Russia and China, traditional competi- tors of the United States, continue to expand the range and sophistication of their strategic arsenals at a time when the United States debates deep reductions in its strategic nu- clear forces beyond those already made since the end of the Cold War and has no current modernization program. With a new administration, furthermore, the future development of even our limited missile defense system is in question. Furthermore, a number of asymmetric threats – including the possibility of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) ac- quisition by terrorist groups or the devastation of American critical infrastructure as a result of electromagnetic pulse (EMP) – now pose a direct challenge to the safety and se- curity of the United States. Moreover, the number and so- phistication of these threats are evolving at a pace that no longer allows the luxury of long lead times for the develop- ment and deployment of defenses.

In order to address these increasingly complex and mul- tifaceted dangers, the United States must move well beyond the initial missile defense deployments of recent years to deploy a system capable of comprehensively protecting the American homeland as well as U.S. overseas forces and al- lies from the threat of ballistic missile attack. U.S. defenses also must be able to dissuade would-be missile possessors from costly investments in missile technologies, and to de- ter future adversaries from confronting the United States with WMD or ballistic missiles. America’s strategic objec- tive should be to make it impossible for any adversary to influence U.S. decision making in times of conflict through the use of ballistic missiles or WMD blackmail based on the threat to use such capabilities.

These priorities necessitate the deployment of a system capable of constant defense against a wide range of threats in all phases of flight: boost, midcourse, and terminal. A lay- ered system – encompassing ground-based (area and the- ater anti-missile assets) and sea-based capabilities – can provide multiple opportunities to destroy incoming missiles in various phases of flight. A truly global capability, howev- er, cannot be achieved without a missile defense architec- ture incorporating interdiction capabilities in space as one of its key operational elements. In the twenty-first centu- ry, space has replaced the seas as the ultimate frontier for commerce, technology, and national security. Space-based missile defense affords maximum opportunities for inter- ception in boost phase before rocket boosters have released warheads and decoys or penetration aids.

Moreover, because no state can have sovereignty over the space above its territory, we could operate up there free of political constraints. The need for negotiating basing rights to locate sensors or interceptor fields would become less pressing.

Our choices are fundamental to making moral judgments. The moral issues surrounding a national security crisis are tied to considerations of operational effectiveness. Are we doing our best to provide protection against some of the worst weapons imaginable? What would the consequences of not acting be, or of not being able to act because of a blackmail threat? What would be the result if Washington were unable to respond to increased terrorist activity worldwide or an upswing in the global weapons of mass destruction trade? A space-based layer would reinforce American strength, which in turn would allow the U.S. to better defend its interests and pursue its foreign policy goals. A powerful and influential United States is good for world peace, stability, and enforcing the rule of law internationally.

National economic and commercial interrelationships thrive on the flow of invisible ones and zeros through space channels, so that timely, agile intercontinental trade is now taken for granted. U.S. and coalition forces routinely leverage earth-circling platforms to enhance military capabilities: the Global Positioning System for improved navigation and precision timing, reconnaissance and early warning sensors, and high-bandwidth communications. Space, moreover, is an open arena, a global commons increasingly used by many countries for military purposes. The proliferation of space technologies offers foreign governments and nonstate entities unparalleled opportunities to enhance diplomatic and military influence over the U.S. and strike with strategic effect. Potential enemies of the United States today have improved "vision" over the U.S. homeland and battlefield activities, a better sense of direction and geographic position, and an improved ability to mobilize forces and coordinate activities. With battle space now reaching up to at least 22,000 miles above the Earth -- the orbital altitudes for early warning and communications satellites -- protecting ourselves from future attacks will depend mightily on space power.

But the country lacks a unified, coherent approach to expanding the use of space to improve combat effectiveness, a problem that is compounded by a politically charged debate over weapons in space.1 Critics contend that weapons in space would destabilize existing security relationships, precipitate an arms race, undermine U.S. foreign policy, and seed anti-American coalitions. Not only are such criticisms based on questionable assumptions,2 but they also have not persuaded the country to forgo the advantages of space weapons. The most one could say at this stage is that the American people are indifferent, noncommittal, and confused.

Yet given the efficiencies space offers, and given the unpredictable, catastrophic, and global nature of threats we expect to face, it makes sense to explore the possible benefits of taking other combat missions to space. Once the benefits of active space defense programs and operations are made plain, the support of the American people will be forthcoming.
Deterrence advantage- SMD key

Mooney 8 – Kevin Mooney, an investigative reporter and author who writes for several Washington D.C.-area based publications, 9/23/08, “Space-Based Missile Defense Needed to Counter Global Threats, Experts Say,”http://www.cnsnews.com/node/36145

Only a space-based missile defense system capable of intercepting and destroying incoming warheads in the “boost phase” (shortly after they are launched) can adequately protect America from emerging global threats, national security experts told a forum hosted the Heritage Foundation on Tuesday, Sept. 16, 2008.

The ground- and sea-based systems deployed by the U.S. over the past few years are a promising start that can help guard against limited strikes from rogue powers such as North Korea and Iran, the Bush administration maintains.

However, the existing system is not equipped to handle the more sophisticated weaponry and countermeasures that Russia and China are now developing, warned Amb. Hank Cooper, chairman of the missile defense research organization High Frontier. 

 Moreover, rogue states like Iran “who know how to play the game” also are testing new missile technology that could be deployed against the U.S. in unconventional ways, Cooper suggested. One nightmare scenario involves a ship-borne Scud missile that could be used to launch and explode a nuclear weapon in the atmosphere over the U.S., creating an electromagnetic pulse that would fry electronics, he warned. 

 “A space-interceptor system is actually multi-layered, in and of itself, because it has a global presence and is capable of intercepting a missile in the boost phase, or mid-course phase, or even in the high endo-atmosphere before the re-entry phase,” he said.

 The boost phase is a “great time” to hit the target because the rocket is still burning, is easy to see, and can be destroyed before any decoys are deployed, Cooper observed.

 In the absence of a space-based defense, there are two systems with boost phase implications currently in development: the Airborne Laser System and Multiple Kill Vehicles. The Airborne Laser is housed inside a modified 747, where it would target moving missiles. Multiple Kill Vehicles, which are much smaller versions of the current crop of anti-missile interceptors, are capable of launching several kill vehicles at one time.

 “Neither system gets us where we need to be,” Kueter acknowledged in his talk.