1ac heg Advantage Scenario 1 is Leadership
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- Layer Missile Defense Key
MD k2 deterrenceRobust missile defense system key to deterrence Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 6 – Independent Working Group on Misile Defense, the Space Relationship and the Twenty-First Century, 2007 report, Washington D.C., August 28, 2006 Given this multiplicity of ballistic missile threats, the Unit- ed States must deploy a missile defense that deters hostile states from developing or acquiring missile capabilities that could threaten the United States, its allies and coalition part- ners, and its forces deployed abroad. Furthermore, America’s missile defense R&D programs, together with planned de- ployments, must be sufficiently robust to dissuade would-be missile possessors from attempting to challenge the United States. Washington must deter future enemies from acquir- ing ballistic missiles, just as in the past it dissuaded them from developing strategic bombers because of America’s abil- ity to overwhelm such systems. Finally, U.S. missile defense must be capable of defeating those ballistic missiles, what- ever their range and type, that could be launched against the United States. BMD checks rogue states -kills momentum - try to kill civilians - win psychology of the battle - ABL has ineffective range and is limited - SBMD destroys morale of attacking countries, shortening conflicts Dinerman 8- Taylor Dinerman is a Senior Editor at the Hudson Institute’s New York office, and a part time consultant for the US Defense Department, September 8, 2008, “Space-based missile defense and the psychology of warfare”, The Space Review, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1205/1 It is exactly this need for revenge that should get the attention of those in the US government who are trying to design a realistic missile defense policy for the next fifty years. Tyrannical regimes and terrorist movements share the need to excite people with dramatic and violent events. The more spectacular the attack, the better. Firing long-range missiles at an enemy, even if you only hit an empty parking lot, can provide followers with a level of emotional satisfaction. This in turn can motivate them to continue to fight even in a seemingly hopeless battle. In future wars, those who are fighting against the West—today Iran or North Korea, tomorrow, who knows?—will use ballistic missiles not only to terrorize enemy civilian populations but to build morale among their own forces and people. Missile defense is the key to winning this critical psychological battle. As long as their missiles are being shot out of the sky, claims that they are hurting the enemy and thus filling people’s need for revenge can be shown to be utterly empty. This, however, cannot be done with terminal phase defense weapons. To hit a missile or a warhead that is descending towards its target may be a feat of technological skill, but it does nothing to decrease the emotional satisfaction that comes from striking a hated enemy. Midcourse interceptors such as the US GBI or the Israeli Arrow are better, but the best way to publicly humiliate those who are launching Scud-type missiles is to shoot them down as soon after they leave the launch pad as possible. The only weapon now in development that will—in theory—be able to do this is the Airborne Laser (ABL), which the Missile Defense Agency plans to test next year. This is indeed a promising system, but it has its limits. Its range is, according to unclassified reports, about 300 kilometers, and the US only plans to build, at most, seven aircraft. If the goal is to prevent the enemy from using its missile attacks to build its own side’s morale and thus lengthen the war, another solution must be found. Space-based interceptors, such as a new version of the Brilliant Pebbles program that was canceled in 1993, could, in combination with space- and ground-based sensors, knock down missiles of this type in the boost phase. Significantly, they would do so over the launching country’s own territory and at least some of the citizens would witness the destruction of their leader’s vengeance weapons. This news would spread through word of mouth. This might be one of the keys to undermining their will to make war and help shorten the conflict. Layer Missile Defense KeyLayered Defense needed Near term (within a decade) options exist for comprehensive system Allow to destroy in all 3 phases Make counter measures less effective because can destroy in all 3 phases Boostphase (lasers) are the best Space based don’t need to operate on another countries territory Pfaltzgraff and Van Cleave et al. 9, Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. is Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies The Fletcher School, Tufts University President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, and Dr. William R. Van Cleave is Professor Emeritus Department of Defense and Strategic Studies Missouri State University, with Ambassador Henry F. Cooper Chairman, High Frontier former Director Strategic Defense Initiative Organization former Chief U.S. Negotiator to the Geneva Defense and Space Talks, 2009, “Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, & the Twenty-First Century” The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, www.ifpa.org/pdf/IWG2009.pdf, p. 128-129 A global layered defense capability is necessary to counter these threats. Near-term options exist for augmenting seabased defenses and deploying space-based defenses within the next decade, resulting in a comprehensive, global layered missile defense system. Layered defenses provide multiple opportunities to destroy attacking missiles in all three phases of flight from any direction regardless of their geographic starting point. Furthermore, a layered defense makes the countermeasures available to the offensive systems much less effective than would be the case if interdiction was only possible in one (or two) phase(s) of the missile’s flight. Boostphase intercepts, most effciently conducted by components deployed in space, are particularly desirable because a missile is most vulnerable during this segment since it is relatively slow moving, presents a readily identifiable target (bright rocket plume), and has not released any of its warheads or countermeasures that would complicate interception in subsequent phases. Boost-phase interception has the added advantage that the missile’s payload may, depending on how early interdiction occurs, fall back on the attacking nation. This situation could deter the launching state if it is confronted with the likelihood of serious damage to its own territory. In addition, depending on the number of assets deployed, a space-based boost-phase defense could always be on station on a world-wide basis, unfettered by sovereignty issues of overflight and operations on another nation’s territory. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 1.32 Mb. Share with your friends:
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