It’s a good Topic



Download 1.51 Mb.
Page26/29
Date19.10.2016
Size1.51 Mb.
#4954
1   ...   21   22   23   24   25   26   27   28   29

Threat Construction



Cyber hype is threat construction


Maness & Valeriano, 2015, Ryan C. Maness, Northeastern University, Department of Political Science, Brandon Valeriano, University of Glasglow, Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System, Kindle Edition, page number at end of card

Our concern is that fear dominates the international system. The contention is that harm is a constant factor in international life (Machiavelli 2003; Hobbes 2009); everything is a danger to all, and all are a danger to most. It is through this prism that the international affairs community approaches each technological development and each step forward, and it does so with trepidation and weariness. Because of the hype surrounding the development of cyber weaponry, the step toward what might be called cyber international interactions is no different. With the advent of the digital age of cyber communications, this process of fear construction continues to shape dialogues in international relations as cyberspace becomes a new area of contestation in international interactions. Old paradigms focused on power politics, displays of force, and deterrence are applied to emergent tactics and technologies with little consideration of how the new tactic might result in different means and ends. We argue that these constructed reactions to threats have little purchase when examined through the prism of evidence or when judged compared to the normative implications of action. There is an advantage to bringing empirical analysis and careful theory to the cyber security debate. Valeriano, Brandon; Maness, Ryan C. (2015-04-27). Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System (pp. 1-2). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.


Foreign cyber threat rhetoric discourages a focus on domestic cyber threats


Maness & Valeriano, 2015, Ryan C. Maness, Northeastern University, Department of Political Science, Brandon Valeriano, University of Glasglow, Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System, Kindle Edition, page number at end of card

With a focus on offensive cyber operations and the inflated nature of mythical cyber threats, there seems to be a misdirected application of the technology in the policy sphere (Dunn-Cavelty 2008). Instead of a revolution in military affairs, cyber tactics just seem to have refocused the state on external threats that then escalate through the typical process of the security dilemma. In some ways, fears of cyber conflict become self-fulfilling prophecies. Dunn-Cavelty’s (2008) work is instructive here, as it dissects this growing cyber threat perception in the United States and the driving engine behind it— cyber defense contracts. By focusing on the external threats, rather than the internal criminal threat that comes from cyber enterprises, we may have missed many opportunities at collaboration and institution building. There obviously needs to be a global accounting for cyber actions and plans, even those that inflate cyber fears, as Clarke and Knake (2010) agree. Valeriano, Brandon; Maness, Ryan C. (2015-04-27). Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System (p. 42). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.


Cyber threat discourse is socially constructed


Maness & Valeriano, 2015, Ryan C. Maness, Northeastern University, Department of Political Science, Brandon Valeriano, University of Glasglow, Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System, Kindle Edition, page number at end of card

Our theory is social constructivist in nature (Berger and Luckmann 1967; Onuf 1989). As others, such as Dunn-Cavelty (2008), Eriksson and Giacomello (2009), and Hansen (2011), have suggested, cyber threats are socially constructed. The danger that cyber incidents can portray between rival factions can construct a very real threat that will then lead to escalated tensions between these entities (Hansen 2011). Furthermore, the public as well as corporate framing of cyber incidents as a threat, real or imagined, can lead to a change in a state’s perception of the threat, which in turn would demand action, either diplomatically or militarily (Nissenbaum 2005; Eriksson and Giacomello 2009). The state would find the need to securitize itself from these cyber threats, which could spill over into more conventional responses, such as airstrikes or economic sanctions (Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009). We follow these points and agree that the nature of and response to cyber threats are socially constructed by many diverse factors, such as government messages, media talking points, and popular culture. This orientation makes us question the nature of the cyber discourse and focus on empirical observations rather than the message of such attacks. Valeriano, Brandon; Maness, Ryan C. (2015-04-27). Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System (p. 51). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.


Potential cyber war initiators are deterred


Maness & Valeriano, 2015, Ryan C. Maness, Northeastern University, Department of Political Science, Brandon Valeriano, University of Glasglow, Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System, Kindle Edition, page number at end of card

To this point, the discourse on cyber conflict, weapons, policy, and security clearly lacks an engagement of theory and evidence in relation to the international system. There are many questions that scholars and policymakers raise; however, there are few real deductive or inductive explorations of cyber processes by these people. Cyber strategies and analysis at this point are entirely anti-theoretical. Many misapply basic international relations concepts and ideas as they see fit. There is a sizable gap between a constructive analysis of a critical international process and the actual evaluation of cyber interactions. New tactics sometimes require new modes of thought to deal with their implications. Instead, cyber theorists seem to be focused on either predicting a constant use of cyber tactics or misapplying deterrence logics to the study of cyber interactions. The main flaw of the entire cyber security enterprise is a complete lack of theoretical engagement beyond a few atypical examples— one of the few being Choucri’s (2012) examination of cyber power and lateral pressure. We hope to rectify this problem by laying out a theory of cyber political interactions based on the principle of restraint in cyberspace and the issue-based perspective of international politics. We argue that cyber options are usually removed from the toolkit of responses available to a state because massive cyber operations would escalate a conflict beyond control, would lead to unacceptable collateral damage, and would leave the initiating side open to economic and computational retaliation. When cyber operations are used, they typically are low-scale events akin more to propaganda and espionage than warfare. This leads to cyber restraint, a form of operations derived from deterrence theory but not dependent on it. We also argue that there will be a large amount of regional interactions in cyberspace because these conflicts are tied to traditional reasons that states disagree, namely territorial conflicts. Understanding these perspectives will be critical in analyzing emerging cyber security threats Valeriano, Brandon; Maness, Ryan C. (2015-04-27). Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System (p. 46). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.

An updated version of Chapter 5 is available in a forthcoming 2015 article in Armed Forces and Society titled ‘The Impact of Cyber Conflict on International Interactions’. Valeriano, Brandon; Maness, Ryan C. (2015-04-27). Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System (Kindle Locations 132-134). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.

“Cyber ATTACK K”



Cyber “incidents” is a better term because it doesn’t contribute to threat construction


p. 4

Understanding the past and current uses of cyber power and reactions to the tactic

can help us explain and predict future uses and responses to the tactic. With a focus

on offensive cyber operations and the inflated nature of mythical cyber threats, we

seem to have misdirected the application of the technology in the policy sphere.19

Instead of a revolution in military affairs, cyber tactics just seem to have refocused

the state on external threats. By focusing on the external threats, and not the actual

reaction to the cyber actions, as a community we fail to provide proper analysis of

the true conduct of cyber foreign policy interactions.

Cybersecurity is the framework for state defense against any potential malicious

cyber incidents entering its borders and networks through digital channels. Choucri

gives a more broad definition and refers to cybersecurity as ‘‘a state’s ability to protect

itself and its institutions against threats, espionage, sabotage, crime and fraud,

identity theft, and other destructive e-interactions and e-transactions.’’20 The often

used term ‘‘cyber attack,’’ used liberally by media pundits and academics alike, is

a loaded term and can lead to inflated connotations of what is actually going on

in terms of interactions in cyberspace between states. Therefore, the preferred term

‘‘cyber incidents’’ is used throughout this article, in place of the more hyperbolic

and nebulous ‘‘cyber attack’’ term.

Reproducibility, blowback, and cost make cyber attack unlikely


Maness & Valeriano, 2015, Ryan C. Maness, Northeastern University, Department of Political Science, Brandon Valeriano, University of Glasglow, Armed Forces & Society, The Impact of Cyber Conflict on International Relations, p. 35

We have elaborated on a theory of cyber restraint elsewhere, but it would be useful to briefly review this process as it has an impact on our ultimate perspective that guides action in this study.22 Cyber actions are difficult to undertake because by nature the weapon is reproducible. This makes it unlikely that any cyber option utilized will not be released to all, thus making the weapon now free to anyone who would wish to utilize it. Because of this factor, blowback is highly likely, and with the very same method used at the onset. Added to this is the fact that cyber weapons are costly to develop and not at all cheap or easy to use as some seem to think. These three factors, the reproducibility, blowback, and costly nature of the weapons, make it likely that states will be restrained in using cyber options


Cyber attacks don’t escalate


Maness & Valeriano, 2015, Ryan C. Maness, Northeastern University, Department of Political Science, Brandon Valeriano, University of Glasglow, Armed Forces & Society, The Impact of Cyber Conflict on International Relations, p. 6

Cyber actions have not escalated in severity through time, as demonstrated by our

past research.24 Stuxnet was the most famous and drastic cyber action so far, yet

analysis of the event demonstrates little impact.25 If anything, cyber operations typically

represent probes and faints to harass an enemy and demonstrate capabilities.

States are capable of so much more in cyberspace, yet they seem to hold back from

unleashing their full cyber capabilities. Norms and taboos also reinforce this process

and are critical because cyber weapons are not controllable and manageable, as the

makers of Stuxnet found when it escaped into civilian sectors.



Download 1.51 Mb.

Share with your friends:
1   ...   21   22   23   24   25   26   27   28   29




The database is protected by copyright ©ininet.org 2024
send message

    Main page