The United States federal government should close the United States Department of Transportation



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A2 CP Fails – Costs




Revenue gained from privatized roads goes to area residents -- neutralizes the impact of higher costs.


Rouhani, 9 – PhD candidate Civil and Environmental Engineering Department @ UC Davis (Omid, “SUSTAINABLE TRANSPORTATION AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE”, Projections, Volume 9, MIT Journal of Planning, http://web.mit.edu/dusp/dusp_extension_unsec/projections/issue_9/issue_9_rouhani.pdf) //RI

The possibility of a new monopoly (or oligopoly) formation is another important risk. The spatial restriction of road development and the possible barriers to enter the market may result in an imperfect competition. Alternative roads are restricted for any origin-destination pair, and a new competitive alternative is costly to construct and hard to allocate space for. This is accompanied by high levels of tolls (monopolistic behavior) and even over-investment in road networks. The risk of a new monopoly necessitates regulation. With regulation, a decentralized structure can outperform a centralized one by being more responsive to travel demand patterns if flexible prices are allowed (Zhang et al, 2006). Another argument against private roads is that their revenues (may) go to the private sector and shareholders rather than government. But government can charge the private companies for the externalities produced from the roads and raise revenue for other public expenses. Moreover, area residents can be the possible shareholders of private roads. Thus, the higher revenue can be justified.



A2 CP Fails – Monopolies




Privatizing highways won’t cause monopolies.


Block 9 PhD in economics from Columbia, Harold E. Wirth Eminent Scholar Endowed Chair in Economics at Loyola University, senior fellow of the Mises Institute (Walter, “The Privatization of Roads & Highways,” book published in 2009, http://library.mises.org/books/Walter%20Block/The%20Privatization%20of%20Roads%20and%20Highways.pdf)//AM

It must be faced at the outset, however, that this scenario will strike many as unlikely in the extreme, not to say bizarre. Are not highways the sorts of things that must, by the very nature of things, be assigned to the public sector? How could private streets overcome the free-rider problem? Are not roads quintessential public goods? How could private firms surmount the difficulties associated with nonexcludability? What about monopoly? We must object to the claim that there is something intrinsic about roads that renders it necessary for them to be part of the “public” sector. The original highways, turnpike roads, were invariably private concerns; the theoretical arguments opposing vehicular thoroughfare privatization are all invalid.4 Even nowadays, there are miles of private “streets” which function exceedingly well, despite the fact that most commentators have not appreciated that they accommodate automobile traffic.5 Nor is there any theoretical reason why such a state of affairs could not prevail for the entire vehicular-transportation network of the U.S. We are accustomed to regarding long, thin entities such as highways as impossible to privatize. But railroads, which are equally “long and thin” have for many decades been built, owned and managed by profit-making firms.6 Access need not be limited by use of antiquated-coin tollbooths.7 The universal product codes, which keep track of groceries, could easily by applied to automobiles; even our “horse and buggy” highway authorities are now—at long last—in the process of introducing such automation.8 Nor need we fear that a private street owner would not allow automobile access, or would charge unreasonably high “monopoly” prices; our experience with the typical forprofit railway line is that it tried its best to induce immigration and economic development in its area in order to increase its profits, land values and value of its capital; and each hastened to do so, lest people and markets leave their areas and move to the ports, cities, and lands served by competing railroads. The same principle would be at work if all streets and roads were private as well.9 Such irresponsible behavior would be impossible in any case since everyone, in purchasing homes or street service in a libertarian society would make sure that the purchase or lease contract provides full access. . . . With this sort of ‘easement’ provided in advance by contract, no such sudden blockade would be allowed, since it would be an invasion of the property right of the landowner.10


Despite monopolies, the private sector knows that increasing prices too far will decrease demand.

Samuel, 95—freelance journalist who writes on regulatory affairs and whose work appears in Forbes and National Review (Peter, “Highway Aggravation: The Case For Privatizing The Highways”, Cato Policy Analysis, 6/27, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-231.html)//EM

One objection likely to be raised is that the facilities will be monopolistic. The degree of monopoly will vary with the alternatives available. Part of the process of tolling major highways will be restricting through traffic on untolled local access streets, first so that the business is not lost from the highway and second so that local neighborhoods are not gridlocked with toll evaders. So some element of "monopoly" will be a necessary part of any project. I asked Small to comment on how a monopoly highway owner's pricing would compare to an economist's concept of what is socially optimal. He replied, In the absence of regulatory or public relations constraints, the profit-maximizing owner of a private highway will charge a form of congestion pricing (as recommended to public highway agencies). The price would be higher at congested times and places; the only difference from "optimal" congestion pricing is that the markup is applied to the short-run marginal cost in each period. This markup, like that applied by a monopolist in any market, is inversely related to the elasticity of demand during the time period in question. The markup serves to extract additional benefits of the highway from travelers, which in some circumstances may be necessary for the road to be built in the first place. The private owner has an incentive to extract these benefits in a manner involving the least inefficiency, since it is in the owner's interest to reduce demand as little as possible consistent with good congestion management.(42)



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