International trends in the education of students with special educational needs

PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNINGS¹

2.1 Why we should value diversity and respect human rights

At a social level, there is an instrumental argument for valuing diversity. If societies in general and schools in particular value diversity, this can bring about several desirable outcomes. These include: (a) enhancing social development by expanding the pool of people with whom individuals can associate and develop relationships; (b) preparing students for future career success by becoming sensitive to human differences and able to relate to people of different abilities, nationalities and cultural backgrounds, both locally and globally; (c) increasing individuals’ knowledge base and creative thinking by interacting with a diverse group of people; (d) enhancing self-awareness by students comparing and contrasting their life experiences with others who differ sharply. Respect for diversity includes knowing how to relate to those qualities and conditions that are different from our own and outside the groups to which we belong, yet are present in other individuals and groups (Hyman and Jacobs, 2009). This is the challenge facing educators at all levels of the education system in all countries.

Morally, there is a strong argument for valuing diversity, arising from the doctrine of human rights (Fagan, 2014). In a nutshell, this doctrine aims at identifying the fundamental prerequisites for each human being to lead a minimally good life and to enjoy the full rights of citizenship. It rests upon belief in the existence of a truly universal moral community comprising all human beings. Within Europe, the origins of moral universalism as a basis for human rights are typically associated with the writings of Aristotle. The contemporary idea of human rights most clearly emerged during the 17th and 18th centuries with the so-called ‘doctrine of natural law’ in which it is argued that individuals possess rights independently of society or polity. The 17th century philosopher, John Locke, argued that natural rights flowed from natural law, which originated from God. However, the 18th Century German philosopher, Immanuel Kant, argued that an appeal to the authority of some super-human entity was not necessary in justifying human beings’ claims to certain, fundamental rights. Instead, he argued for the ideal of a potentially universal community of rational individuals autonomously determining the moral principles for securing rights. For him, the basis of moral reasoning must rest upon a condition to which all rational individuals are bound to assent. A related position on human rights argues that each individual owes a basic and general duty to respect the rights of every other individual because, by doing so, one’s individual self-interest is furthered. From this perspective, individuals accept and comply with human rights because this is the best means for protecting one’s interests against actions and omissions that might endanger themselves.

When considering human rights, it is useful to distinguish between ‘positive claims rights’ and ‘negative claims rights’ (Houlgate, 1980). The former enjoins us to treat individuals in a positive manner by, for example, providing medical treatment in the case of illness or injury and providing appropriate education, irrespective of an individual’s degree of disability. The latter evokes the second part of the Hippocratic Oath, namely that ‘I will use treatments for the benefit of the ill in accordance with my ability and my judgment, but from what is to their harm and injustice I will keep them.’ In other words, the guiding principle of negative claims rights is that we should do no harm to people who are different.

Another distinction can be made between ‘absolute rights’ and ‘conditional rights’. Elsewhere, the writer discussed this distinction with respect to providing medical treatment for seriously ill persons with disabilities (Mitchell, 1985). He noted that although one of the fundamental moral and legal principles held by western societies is that human life has a value that exceeds all other considerations (i.e., an absolute right), there are exceptions, for example, killing in self defence and sacrificing one’s life to save the lives of others (i.e., a conditional right). The sanctity of life position has been justified from several perspectives. A theistic view argues that since all humans are created in God’s image, or that since all humans are God’s property, or that since life is the gift of God, it would be contrary to divine will to take our own or someone’s life. As noted above, this would be the position of John Locke. In contrast, a Kantian view would have us believe that, from a natural law perspective, comes the obligation that, quite apart from any religious consideration, the duty to respect life rises from human beings’ natural ends as substances. This view was argued by Thomas Aquinas, the 13th century Italian philosopher and theologian and, more recently, by the 20th century French philosopher, Jacques Maritain, who held that, according to natural law, when a thing is looked at in terms of ‘the normality of its functioning’, it ‘should achieve fullness of being either in its growth or in its behaviour’ (Maritain 1951). While issues to do with capital punishment and warfare will not be considered in this review, the distinction between absolute and conditional rights is worth bearing in mind when we come to consider the individuals whose behaviours may jeopardise the welfare and rights of others.

2.2 Theories of distributive justice

In understanding the basis of human rights, we must consider arguments about which economic framework and which resulting distribution of wealth is morally preferable. Deciding on the principles of ‘distributive justice’ that should apply is extremely significant for determining how societies respond to differences among its citizens, particularly how they behave towards those who are disadvantaged – and especially towards SWSEN.

Various notions of distributive justice have been advanced. This issue is a complex one to explore, involving the intersection of philosophy and economics. Nevertheless, it is one that underpins our approach to the education of people who are different, not least SWSEN, and must be addressed. The following is but a brief summary of the five main approaches to distributive justice.

Strict egalitarianism. This is perhaps the simplest idea of distributive justice. It calls for the allocation of equal material goods to all members of society, on the grounds that people are morally equal. As noted by Harvard philosopher Michael Sandel (2009), Kurt Vonnegut portrayed an extreme interpretation of this principle in his short story, Harrison Bergeron. In the year 2081, goes the story, ‘everybody was finally equal…Nobody was smarter than anybody else. Nobody was better looking than anybody else. Nobody was stronger and quicker than anybody else.’ To enforce this equality, a ‘United States Handicapper General’ had wide powers to handicap individuals who did not conform to reduce them to the desired norm.

Two matters need to be resolved in egalitarianism: how to index any distribution and the time frame for any distribution. Using money is the most common way of indexing distributive principles. The time frame problem cannot be solved as simply. One version requires that all people should have the same wealth at some initial point, after which they would be free to use it in whatever way they choose, with the consequence that future outcomes are bound to be unequal. The most common form of strict equality principle specifies that income should be equal in successive time-frames, though even this may lead to significant disparities in wealth if variations in savings are permitted. It is not surprising, perhaps, that the strict egalitarian principle of distributive justice has been criticised as being untenable and that it conflicts, for example, with what people might deserve and their freedom rights (see below). Partly as an attempt to avoid some of the pitfalls of strict egalitarianism, some economists design distributive principles that are sensitive to considerations of responsibility and luck in economic life; unsurprisingly, this approach is known as luck egalitarianism.

Although it is superficially attractive, strict egalitarianism is not advanced as the moral basis for educating SWSEN. It is recognised, however, that the current trend in many countries to significantly move away from the principles of egalitarianism carries risks for SWSEN.

Libertarianism. This approach centres on the moral demands of liberty or self-ownership. Advocates of such libertarian principles argue for unrestricted markets and limited government regulation or interference, not in pursuit of economc efficiency, but in the name of human freedom. We have a right to do whatever we want with what we own (including our own bodies, our own self), provided we respect the rights of others to do the same. Just distribution of wealth arises in the free exchange of goods and services in an unfettered market. Persons should not be required to ensure the welfare of others for this would violate their right of self-ownership. Libertarians such as Robert Nozick (1974), thus believe in a minimal state, which is restricted to enforcing contracts, protecting private property and keeping the peace. Consequently, they reject any interference by the state to achieve any egalitarian redistribution of wealth, as outlined above. This view was promulgated, for example, by Milton Friedman (1962), the American economist. However, Nozick does concede that if it can be shown that one’s advantages have been derived from past injustices (e.g., through the enslavement of others or the illegal confiscation of property), then some redistribution of one’s wealth is acceptable. As well, libertarians reject paternalism (e.g., requiring people in vehicles to wear seatbelts or cyclists to wear helmets) and morals legislation (e.g., laws controlling prostitution).

Libertarianism, some believe, is part of the problem, not the solution, in addressing the needs of SWSEN. Neoliberalism, with its emphasis upon individualism, managerialism, and competition within education, is not a strong philosophical basis for achieving equity for SWSEN (see Chapter Eight, section 8.1 for an elaboration of this point).

In subsequent revisions of Bentham’s theory by John Stuart Mill (1859), he mounted the classic defense of individual freedom, arguing that people should be free to do whatever they wanted, provided they did no harm to others. As he wrote, ‘Independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign’. Mill couches this notion in utilitarian terms, arguing that, over time, respecting individual liberty will lead to the greatest human happiness overall. For example, a dissenting view may turn out to be true and so offer some correction to the prevailing view.

At first glance, utilitarianism, applied to children with disabilities is inappropriate simply because they constitute a minority and are not part of the ‘greatest number of people’. However, it could be argued that by allocating extra resources to such children and reducing the gaps described later in this review, the collective happiness of society as a whole could result. If equalisation policies succeed, we could well see improved educational, social and health outcomes – to the benefit of all members of society.

Kant’s view of rationally determined moral principles. Immanuel Kant argued for the ideal of a potentially universal community of rational individuals autonomously determining the moral principles for securing rights. Michael Sandel (2009) describes Kant as providing ‘one of the most powerful and influential accounts [of duties and rights] any philosopher has produced’ (p.104) and that Kant’s emphasis on human dignity ‘informs present-day notions of universal human rights’ (p.105).

Kant saw people as having three essential qualities. First, we are rational beings, capable of reason. Second, we are each of us, worthy of dignity and respect. Third, we are autonomous beings, capable of acting freely. Together, these features set us apart from a mere animal existence.

For Kant, the basis of moral reasoning must rest upon a condition to which all rational individuals are bound to assent. He believed that we can arrive at such principles of morality through ‘pure practical reason’ and through acting autonomously. This means acting according to laws we give ourselves, not according to the dictates of nature or social convention. When we act in this way, we do something for its own sake, as an end in itself, or, in the case of others, treating persons as ends in themselves. As Michael Sandel expresses it: ‘What matters is doing the right thing because it is right, not for some ulterior motive’. (p.111). This is Kant’s ‘motive of duty’. While it may also bring one pleasure, this should not be the prime motive for an action toward others. As Kant (1785, p.122) expressed it, ‘Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.’ Moral law, he asserts, can rest neither on the interests and desires of individuals, nor on the interests or desires of a community. It can readily be seen how this principle underpins the modern-day concept of universal human rights and of our obligations towards those who are disadvantaged – including SWSEN.

Kant also referred to a ‘universal law’ which, briefly, refers to the principle that one should ‘Act only on that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law’ (Sandel, 2009, p. 120). In a nutshell: what if everyone did or did not do something? This is a good test of whether one’s actions put one’s own interests ahead of everyone else’s.

Rawls was not opposed in principle to a system of strict equality per se, but nor was he arguing that he was seeking it; rather his concern was about the absolute position of the least advantaged group rather than their relative position. Further, Rawls believed that it was possible to correct for the unequal distribution of talents without handicapping the talented, as in the case of Kurt Vonnegut’s Harrison Bergeron. How to do this is rather controversial and, some would say, unrealistic. For example, he argued that gifts and talents should be allowed, even encouraged, to flourish, but the rewards accruing to those who possess them should belong to the community as a whole, with some redistribution to the least advantaged. As he stated: ‘Those who have been favored by nature, whoever they are, may gain from their good fortune only on terms that improve the situation of those who have lost out.’

Libertarians, of course, object to the difference principle on the grounds that it involves unacceptable infringements on liberty, property rights, or self-ownership. It is also criticised on the grounds that it ignores claims that people deserve certain economic benefits because of their hard work or contributions. Utilitarians object to it because it is does not maximise utility. And, finally, advocates of luck egalitarianism argue that the principle does not fully capture the moral roles they believe luck and responsibility should play in principles of distributive justice.

Overall, in his review of theories of justice, Sandel (2009, p.166) concluded that even when all criticisms have been taken into account, Rawls’s theory ‘represents the most compelling case for a more equal society that American political philosophy has yet produced.’ It forms a substantial basis for determining our obligations towards children who are disadvantaged by their socio-economic or cultural background, or by their ability. It should drive our perception of what constitutes equity in education.