Int’l cps- brag lab- wave 1 Theory

China will increase its development of methane hydrate fields in the South China Sea

In a move that could further fuel tensions in the South China Sea, China will step up exploration for methane hydrate, which is drawing attention as a future source of energy.¶ Research last summer led to the discovery of a high-purity methane hydrate reserve in the northern part of the South China Sea, according to the Land and Resources Ministry. The reserve, sitting off the coast of Guangdong Province, is estimated to span 55 sq. km and amount to the equivalent of 100 billion to 150 billion cu. meters of natural gas.¶ China will further explore the reserve, which it believes to stretch to the south. Domestic experts estimate that the body of water has methane hydrate reserves equal to 68 billion tons of crude oil, a figure amounting to 130 years of the country's energy consumption.¶ The Chinese aim to make methane hydrate commercially viable around 2030, seeing it as a promising means of coping with surging domestic demand for energy.¶ The nation also seeks to reduce its dependence on energy imports. China relies on imports for nearly 60% of its crude oil needs, making it the world's No. 2 importer by volume, after the U.S. For natural gas, the share of imports rose past 30% for the first time in 2013.¶ Methane hydrate is also expected to aid China's efforts to shift to natural gas from coal, which accounts for nearly 70% of its primary-energy consumption.¶ As China widens its search for methane hydrate in the South China Sea, it may create more frictions with such countries as the Philippines and Vietnam, with which it is embroiled in territorial disputes there.

Remote Sensing

China has been collecting oceanic data by satellite for over a decade and is able to collect data that is used to analyze and understand the composition of China’s waters

Yan 11/1/2002[Jihui, Workshop Secretariat at the National Marine Environment Forecasting Center at China’s State Oceanic Administration, “Ocean Remote Sensing and its Application in China”, http://ivy3.epa.gov.tw/OMISAR/Data/OMISAR/wksp.mtg/WOM9/01-1030Yan.htm] alla

ABSTRACT¶ With the advancement of space technology and the development of ocean science, satellite remote sensing has become an important tool for marine research as well as for marine environment observation and prediction. Over the past decade, China has exerted great effort to apply satellite data for both ocean research and operational purposes. Furthermore, China has successfully launched her first ocean satellite this year, which is an ocean color satellite designed to detect some of the marine environmental parameters in the Chinese sea waters, including chlorophyll concentration, suspended sediment concentration, dissolved organic matter, and sea surface temperature. In this paper, a brief introduction of the ocean application of remote sensing data in China is presented, and a description of the new ocean satellite program is given.¶ INTRODUCTION¶ China is a coastal country with a lengthy coastline of around 18,000 kilometers along the mainland and a vast sea area under its jurisdiction. The coastal area of China is densely populated and economically developed. The coastal area only accounts for 13.4% of the nation’s land area, but supports 40.2% of the nation’s population and produces 62% of the GNP. ¶ Observing and monitoring the ocean, protecting the marine environment, developing and exploiting ocean resources are of great importance to the social and economic development of China. Over the past decade, China has made great efforts to develop new technologies for the above-stated purposes, including the application of satellite remote sensing data to ocean research and ocean-related operational activities.¶ The research institutions under the State Oceanic Administration (SOA), a government agency in China responsible for coastal and ocean affairs, have been active in utilizing data from satellite and from aircraft in China’s coastal and ocean management, including sea area utilization, ocean functional zoning, marine environment protection, public ocean services and resource conservation. Fruitful results have been achieved. Some examples of successful remote sensing application ocean satellite data in the prediction of harmful algae bloom and in sea ice prediction in China’s coastal waters. Over the past few years, emphasis has been shifted to the development of ocean satellites for both research and operational purposes, and a program for the development of satellite for ocean observation has been launched.¶ With the increase of population and the gradual depletion of terrestrial resources, China, like many other coastal states, has to embark on new programs for harnessing ocean resources. The ocean will play an ever-increasing role in China’s future development. Within this context, ocean satellite will be one of the focuses in China’s future ocean technology development agenda.¶ APPLICATION OF SATELLITE REMOTE SENSING¶ In the late 1970's, measurements from satellites demonstrated that ocean color remote sensing is a powerful tool for understanding oceanic biological and physical process. In 1978, Nimbus-7 coastal zone color scanner CZCS started to operate, providing observations of ocean color from the space. This provides oceanographers with good opportunity to observe the variable patterns of global biological productivity. Following that, the Chinese satellites FY-1A and FY-1B were launched to orbits respectively in 1987 and 1989. In 1996, Japan’s ADEOS Ocean Color and Temperature Sensor OCTS provided ocean color data for about ten months. And in August 1997, one special ocean color satellite – SeaStar -- was successfully launched. The sea-viewing wide field-of-view sensor, SeaWiFS, installed on SeaStar, brought to oceanographers a large volume of quality ocean color remote sensing data.¶ Since the late 1980’s, a number of institutions in China have been studying the application of data from satellites to oceanographic research and operation. Since 1994, the Second Institute of Oceanography (SIO) of SOA, together with other institutes, has been implementing a project for the development of a Chinese scientific research system for SeaWiFS, which includes data receiving, processing, distribution, calibration /validation and application.¶ The ground station located in SIO is a SeaWiFS scientific research station authorized by NASA of USA to receive SeaWiFS data. Since September 1997, the station has been normally receiving and archiving SeaWiFS data. And the data has been used for various purposes, such as measuring the concentration of chlorophyll, suspended material, and for the study of red tide and the dynamics of the coastal water in China’s waters.¶ The results of studies on the application of satellite data on red tide show that SeaWiFS data has great potential in determining environmental characteristics of the coastal water around China.¶ ¶ Sea ice is present in the coastal area in winter in the northern part of China, especially in the Bohai Sea and in the northern part of the Yellow Sea. There are even sea ice disasters in these areas. Therefore, special attention has been paid to sea ice monitoring and forecasting in China.¶ Since 1970s, research has been conducted on the application of remote sensing to sea ice monitoring and forecasting in China. At the beginning, study and experiment was carried out only in aerial remote sensing. In 1980s, research was directed to satellite remote sensing. Scientists in the National Marine Environment forecasting Center carried out sea ice remote sensing research, which promoted the application of satellite remote sensing data to sea ice monitoring and forecasting. In 1990s, a study was conducted on multi-source data fusion for use in sea ice monitoring and forecasting.¶ Numerical sea ice forecasting, using remote sensing data, have been in routine operation in China now. ¶ CHINA’S OCEAN SATELLITE PROGRAM¶ The experiences of ocean satellite observations in a number of countries have exhibited the usefulness of satellite remote sensing. In order to effectively monitor the ocean and improve the accuracy and timeliness of marine environment forecasting, China has embarked on its ocean-oriented satellite program, and an operational satellite application system will be established. The first ocean satellite of the program, HY-1 (HY is the abbreviation of “Hai Yang”, which means “Ocean”), is an ocean-color satellite designed to measure marine environmental parameters such as chlorophyll concentration, suspended sediment concentration, dissolved organic matter, pollutants and sea surface temperature. It was successfully launched in May 2002.¶ General description of the satellite¶ HY-1, a three-axis stabilized small satellite, is designed to operate in orbit for about 2 years. In order to obtain a short repeat period, orbit transfer is made, making the satellite move and operate in a near sun-synchronous and near-polar orbit at the altitude of 798 km.¶ Tasks of the satellite¶ The mission of the first ocean satellite is designed to monitor marine environmental variation in the coastal and ocean areas off China, including: marine primary productivity, dynamics of meso-scale eddies, etc. It is also aimed at monitoring the variations of the coastal zone, obtaining experiences for developing space observation of the ocean, and promoting the development of small satellite platform. ¶ Sensors¶ China’s first ocean satellite is equipped with two sensors: the 10-babd Ocean Color and Temperature Scanner (COCTS) and the 4-band CCD coastal zone imager (CZI), designed and manufactured by Shanghai Institute of Technical Physics of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Chinese Academy of Space Technology. The COCTS is an optical radiometer to detect ocean color and surface temperature.¶ The COCTS has a function to detect chlorophyll concentration and dissolved substances in the water, as well as temperature distribution. The data from OCTS will be used to get information on ocean conditions for fishery and environment monitoring purposes. It has a repeat period of 3 days, and 8-channel visible and near-infrared bands and 2-channel thermal infrared band with a spatial resolution of 1.1km.¶

China has already planned two more ocean surveillance satellites—these satellites will be operational until 2025 and collect data to be analyzed by many ground stations

IOCCG 13 [International Ocean Colour Coordinating Group, was established in 1996 following a resolution endorsed by the Committee on Earth Observation Satellites (CEOS). The group is made up of an international Committee of experts comprising representatives from both the provider (Space Agencies) and user communities (scientists, managers). The objectives of the IOCCG are to develop consensus and synthesis at the world scale in the subject area of satellite ocean colour radiometry (OCR), “China: Ocean Colour Remote Sensing and Application in China”, 5/7/13, http://iocs.ioccg.org/wp-content/uploads/report-iocs-2013-meeting.pdf] alla

Prof. Delu Pan (Second Institute of Oceanography, China) reported on ocean -colour remote ¶ sensing and application in China, giving a review of present and future Chinese satellite ¶ missions. There are four series of satellites for ocean-colour remote sensing in China: the HY ¶ series is for ocean observation, the FY series for meteorology, the HJ series for environment ¶ and disaster monitoring, while the SZ series is the spacecraft program. China launched the first ¶ ocean satellite HY-1A in May 2002 which operated successfully for two years, and was followed ¶ by HY-1B in April 2007, which is still in operation. These missions carry two ocean-colour ¶ sensors: the Chinese Ocean Color and Temperature Scanner (COCTS) with 10 bands, and the ¶ Coastal Zone Imager (CZI) with 4 bands and a CCD Camera. There are four HY-1B satellite ¶ ground stations in China which receive the raw data in real time and process, archive, manage ¶ and distribute the data. The ground station in Hangzhou is primarily concerned with developing ¶ algorithms and software for the HY-1 mission. Products such as Chl, SST and TSM are produced ¶ routinely. Data from HY-1/2 can be requested from the National Satellite Ocean Application ¶ Service of China. Regarding future missions, the HY-1C and HY-1D satellites are planned for ¶ launch before 2016 for ocean colour and SST observation. These satellites will carry the COCTSand CZI sensors, as well as a new UV imager for CDOM retrieval and atmospheric correction in ¶ highly turbid waters. Ocean-colour sensors will be included on HY-3 Sea-watch and HY-4 SeaGeo (geostationary) ocean satellite series until to 2025. Ocean-colour data has many applications, including measuring the sea surface partial pressure ¶ of carbon dioxide (pCO2) and global air-sea CO2 flux. A number of empirical algorithms have ¶ been developed to estimate aquatic pCO2 using proxies such as SST, Chl-a and salinity although ¶ it is difficult to find a straightforward, significant relationship. Mechanistic-based, semi-analytic ¶ satellite algorithms can be used to develop more accurate, quantitative expressions using ¶ satellite products of Chl-a, SST, salinity, as well as DIC and alkalinity values. Results using ¶ satellite data provide more frequent estimates of pCO2 with less uncertainty, and can also ¶ provide air-sea CO2 fluxes. ¶

China is great at ocean satellite mapping—new tech, more data, and experience in the field

NRSCC 12 [The National Remote Sensing Center of China, the NRSCC provides recommendations and solutions to the development strategy, planning and overall policy decision of remote sensing technology, “Department of Ocean Remote Sensing”, http://www.nrscc.gov.cn/nrscc/en/departments/201205/t20120508_30907.html] alla

Introduction Department of Ocean Remote Sensing relies on the National Satellite Ocean Application Service (NSOAS). Established in 2001, NSOAS is a national institution affiliated to the State Oceanic Administration (SOA). The mission of NSOAS is to initiate and prepare national programs for the development of ocean satellite series and related application research, and is responsible for the development and management of the ground application system for Chinese ocean satellites. At present, two ocean color satellites have been successfully launched (HY-1A, HY-1B). The ocean dynamics satellite, Haiyang-2 (HY-2), is scheduled to launch in 2011. Meanwhile, NSOAS now has a completed ocean satellite system for ocean satellite research, operation and applications, including three ground receiving stations located in Beijing, Sanya and Mudanjiang, a data processing center in Beijing, an open lab for ocean remote sensing and applications in Beijing. NSOAS thus plays a central role in China 's ocean satellite program.¶ Research Fields As an operational institution for ocean satellites, aimed at the requirements of Chinese ocean remote sensing development, the research fields of NSOAS include development and management of ocean resources, monitoring and protection of ocean environment, monitoring and forecasting of ocean hazard, international collaboration in oceanography, exploration in north and south poles,etc.. Through remote sensing applications research, NSOAS provides satellite data and information services to marine administration agencies, environment protection agencies as well as national departments for marine rights protection and law enforcement.¶ Achievements Since the founding of NSOAS, it has been actively involved in fields such as ocean satellite preliminary studies and ocean remote sensing applications. NSOAS has recently been responsible for several national research programs including the National High Technology Research and Development Program of China (863 Program), the Major State Basic Research Development Program of China （973 Program), the National Science Foundation of China (NSFC), manned space program, oceanic public service program etc.. It also achieved significant scientific achievements in plenty of research fields including "Applications of the Haiyang-2 Satellite Data in Ocean Dynamics, Environment, and Gravitational Fields Retrievals", "Synthetic Monitoring of the Ocean with Waves Spectrometer and Scatterometer", "Ocean Remote Sensing Calibration and Validation", "Open Ocean Fishery Environment Information Retrieval and Applications", "Oil Spill Monitoring Automation and Applications", "Data Processing Technique for Microwave Ocean Dynamics Environment Satellite". The research and its applications are recognized by many ocean remote sensing related communities. Especially, the National 863 Program "Open Ocean Fishery Environment Information Retrieval and Applications", was awarded the second prize in the National Science and Technology Progress Award, a prestigious award of science and technology in China. With the advance of research programs in NSOAS, many research results have been applied into operational systems and played important roles in sea ice monitoring, algae bloom monitoring, oil spill monitoring, and sea surface temperature products.¶ Staff As a research based institution, a team of high-level researchers were educated and actively involved in remote sensing research in NSOAS. Among the 90 staff in NSOAS, 41 persons have graduate-school background, 26 persons are senior professionals and technical personnel, 3 experts with special government allowances of the State Council, one national candidates of the New Century Talents Program, and the average age of all staff is 36. These young scientists are playing an important role in the long term development of ocean satellite program.¶ Equipment and Facilities NSOAS is equipped with a completed system for data receiving, processing, archiving and data distribution, as well as capacity of receiving some international ocean satellite data. NSOAS also has state-of-the-art calibration equipment for ocean remote sensing, which is fundamentally important for quantitative studies. Now, NSOAS has successfully established operational system for oil spill monitoring and prediction, as well as for green tide monitoring and prediction.¶

China has experience with using satellites to survey the ocean—China recently launched their second ocean surveillance satellite

Xinhua 12 [state press agency of the People's Republic of China, “SOA gains control of China's oceanic surveying satellite”, 3/6/12, http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/SOA_gains_control_of_Chinas_oceanic_surveying_satellite_999.html] alla

Control of China's oceanic surveying satellite Haiyang-2 was handed over Friday to the State Oceanic Administration (SOA), by its manufacturer and launcher China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation.¶ The environmental satellite was launched into the orbit in mid-August last year, and since then, it has passed all tests on all the equipment aboard and functioned in accordance with the design, said Jiang Xingwei, director of China's National Satellite Ocean Application Service.¶ Haiyang-2 is expected to play an important role in monitoring the oceanic environment, oceanographic research and resources development, the protection of China's maritime rights, and other ocean-related studies, said Jiang.¶ Jiang said the satellite can effectively monitor extreme weather conditions such as storms, typhoons and tsunamis, thus improving the early-warning system for marine disasters.¶ In addition, the data Haiyang-2 acquires will be helpful for observing changes in the sea level, globally, and polar ice caps, and supporting studies of the global climate change, he said.¶ Haiyang-2 will work in collaboration with Haiyang-1, the first Chinese oceanic surveying satellite already in orbit, according to the official.¶ "This will greatly improve the surveying and monitoring capacities of China's earth observation satellites, and end the monopoly of Western countries in the collection of remote sensing data involving the dynamic environment of oceans," Jiang said.

SMR

China solves SMR tech—investment two new types of SMRs now

WNA 14 [World Nuclear Association is the international organization that promotes nuclear power and supports the many companies that comprise the global nuclear industry, “Nuclear Power in China”, July 2014, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-A-F/China--Nuclear-Power/] alla

ACP100 Small modular PWR¶ A ‘key project’ on the 12th Five-Year Plan is CNNC’s multi-purpose small modular reactor, the ACP100. Preliminary design should be finished in 2014 ready for construction start in 2015. This is based on the larger ACP (and CNP) units, or AP1000, has passive safety features and will be installed underground. It has 57 fuel assemblies 2.15m tall and integral steam generators (287ºC), so that the whole steam supply system is produced and shipped a single reactor module. Its 310 MWt produces about 100 MWe, and power plants comprising two to six of these are envisaged, with 60-year design life and 24-month refueling. Or each module can supply 1000 GJ/hr, giving 12,000 m3/day desalination (with MED). Industrial and district heat uses are also envisaged. Capacity up to 150 MWe is possible.¶ CNNC China New Energy Corporation (CNNC-CNEC), a joint venture of CNNC (51%) and China Guodian Corp, is planning to build two ACP100 units in Putian county, Zhangzhou city, at the south of Fujian province, near Xiamen and not far from Fuqing, as a demonstration plant. This will be the CNY 5 billion ($788 million) phase 1 of a larger project. Construction time is expected to be 36-40 months, starting 2015 for the two Putian units. CNNC is seeking NDRC approval in 2014.¶ It involves a joint venture of three companies for the pilot plant: CNNC as owner and operator, the Nuclear Power Institute of China (NPIC) as the reactor designer and China Nuclear Engineering Group being responsible for plant construction. CNNC-CNEC signed a second ACP100 agreement with Hengfeng county, Shangrao city in Jiangxi province, and a third with Ningdu county, Ganzhou city in Jiangxi province in July 2013 for another ACP100 project costing CNY 16 billion. Further inland units are planned in Hunan and possibly Jilin provinces. Export potential is considered high. CNNC-CNEC will construct major parts of the reactors in Bashan, Jilin province.¶ CAP150 Small modular PWR¶ This is an integral PWR, with SNPTC provenance, being developed from the CAP1000 in parallel with CAP1400 by SNERDI, using proven fuel and core design. It is 450 MWt/ 150 MWe and has 8 integral steam generators (295°C), and claims “a more simplified system and more safety than current third generation reactors”. It is pitched for remote electricity supply and district heating, with three-year refueling and design life of 80 years. It has both active and passive cooling and in an accident scenario, no operator intervention required for seven days. Seismic design basis 300 Gal. In mid 2013 SNPTC quoted approx. $5000/kW capital cost and 9 c/kWh, so significantly more than the CAP1400.

China solves nuclear technology—experience with different systems, new methods of harnessing, and innovative design systems

Buijs 12 [Bram, Bram Buijs joined the Clingendael International Energy Programme (CIEP) in January 2009. After taking a Master’s degree in Mathematics he specialized in energy & geopolitics in a second Master Contemporary Asian Studies, writing his thesis on the future challenges facing China’s energy system. For one and a half year he combined work in China with an intensive Chinese language programme at the Shanghai International Studies University. He has continued with research on energy and Asia at CIEP, focusing on the challenges to a sustainable energy system in China and its stance in post-Kyoto climate treaty negotiations, “China and the Future of New Energy Technologies”, March 2012, http://www.clingendaelenergy.com/inc/upload/files/China_technology.pdf] alla

The choice between developing indigenous nuclear power technology versus importing more ¶ advanced technology from abroad has been a longstanding debate in China. In fact, ever since ¶ the very start of nuclear power development in China both tracks have been pursued, and ¶ tension between those who favour indigenous (but less advanced) technology and those in ¶ favour of imported more modern technology has continued since. ¶ Of the first two reactors that were built, one was an indigenously designed 300 MW reactor at ¶ Qinshan that developed as part of the “738” government technology development ¶ programme.156 Simultaneously, the Guangdong provincial government supported the acquisition ¶ of foreign technology for the construction of a nuclear power plant at Daya Bay, near Hong Kong. ¶ For this reactor, imported M310 technology from the French nuclear firm Framatome (later ¶ Areva) was used. Both reactors began commercial operations in 1994. ¶ In the course of the next decades, both tracks were further pursued. The 300 MW indigenously ¶ designed Qinshan reactor was upgraded to a 600 MW reactor (the ‘CNP‐600’), of which several ¶ units were built at the same site. The Daya Bay reactor was emulated and used for additional ¶ units at the Ling Ao site nearby. They are considered to be virtual ‘replicas’ of the Daya Bay units ¶ and some core technology was supplied by Framatome – the localisation rate is estimated to be ¶ 30 percent.157 ¶ The China Guangdong Nuclear Power Corporation (CGNPC) that manages the Daya Bay reactors ¶ continued by developing the CPR‐1000 reactor, which is an upgraded version of the 900 MW‐¶ class French M310 three‐loop technology used in the Daya Bay reactors. This CPR‐1000 reactor ¶ version, informally known as the ‘improved Chinese Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR)’, has been ¶ widely deployed in China, with another 57 likely to be built by the end of 2011 CGNPC managed ¶ to create an almost completely domestic supply chain, steadily increasing the localisation rate ¶ with every new unit of the CPR‐1000 that was commissioned – reaching close to 90 percent in ¶ recent projects.158 ¶ However, the struggle was not yet over between those favouring indigenously developed ¶ technology, represented by the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), and the State ¶ Nuclear Power Technology Corporation (SNPTC) that favoured imported technology. ¶ In September 2004, the Chinese State Council decided to set up an international tendering ¶ process to choose a third generation nuclear reactor design from one of the international nuclear ¶ firms that would then be used for two reactors at the Sanmen site in Zhejiang province, to be ¶ followed by at least two more reactors at other locations (see Figure 10 for map with reactor ¶ sites).159 All major nuclear industry players took part in the tendering process: Westinghouse ¶ (with its AP1000 reactor), Areva (with the EPR) and Atomstroyexport (VVER‐1000 model V392). ¶ Technology transfer was made a key condition in the evaluation criteria for the bids. After a ¶ process which lasted several years, the formal decision was announced in December 2006, ¶ selecting the AP1000 reactor on the grounds of its passive safety systems, cost and the level of ¶ technology transfer offered.160 The Shanghai Nuclear Engineering Research and Design Institute ¶ (SNERDI) was appointed as the main research institute to receive and adopt the technology. ¶ Westinghouse accepted stringent conditions regarding technology transfer, which required it to ¶ cooperate with the State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation (SNPTC) in building the first four ¶ AP1000 reactors, in order to ensure that SNPTC could build following units by itself. Following the ¶ first four reactors at Sanmen and Haiyang, there are another 4 reactors planned and at least 30 ¶ proposed, all using the AP1000 design. ¶ Moreover, it was agreed that if the Chinese parties were able to upgrade the capacity of the ¶ reactor design to 1350 MW or more, they would own the intellectual property rights for the enhanced design.161 Hence, this has become the major objective of the Chinese nuclear ¶ engineering programme led by SNERDI.162 The desired reactor has already received the name ¶ CAP1400, as a shorthand for ‘Chinese AP1400 reactor’ ¶ ¶ Despite Westinghouse having won the major tender, also AREVA – supplier of China’s original ¶ first nuclear power technology at Daya Bay, by means of its predecessor Framatom – was ¶ awarded another couple of reactors. The China Guangdong Nuclear Power Corporation (CGNPC) ¶ agreed on a deal with Areva in November 2007 to purchase two 1700 MW EPR reactors for the ¶ site at Taishan, including contracts for the supply of fuel and other related services. An ¶ engineering joint venture was set up between Areva and CGNPC as a vehicle for technology ¶ transfer and the possible development of more EPR reactors in China and abroad. In this joint ¶ venture CGNPC and other Chinese parties together hold a 55 percent stake, against 45 percent ¶ held by Areva.163 ¶ ¶ The variety of different types of nuclear power plants that are being used in China has been ¶ criticized by some Chinese analysts. Earlier, still other reactor types were bought and installed, ¶ such as the Canadian‐designed CANDU‐6 heavy‐water reactor and Russian VVER AES‐91.164 The ¶ decision to purchase these reactors appears to have sometimes been motivated by politics and ¶ the desire to create goodwill in international relations, rather than stemming from a well‐¶ thought‐out nuclear power development strategy.165 Opponents of these decisions argue that ¶ this practice is hampering standardization, which is one key factor in bringing down construction ¶ and operating costs, as it has been in France. On the other hand, those in favour of diversification ¶ argue that in this way China is hedging its bets and functioning as a testing ground for different ¶ nuclear reactor designs, being able to gain experience with all of them. ¶ ¶ Concerning domestically designed reactors, the CPR‐1000 is being deployed in large numbers ¶ alongside the ‘new’ standard of the AP1000. This CPR‐1000 reactor is based on the French M310 ¶ technology used in the Daya Bay reactors. In the current expansion plans this CPR‐1000 reactor ¶ also takes a prominent role; 20 of the 27 reactors under construction as of November 2011 are of ¶ this type. Of all the reactors that are either under construction or planned, the CPR‐1000 ¶ accounts for almost half (34 reactors out of a total of 78) while another 30 are AP1000 reactors. ¶ ¶ The development of the CAP1400 reactor is progressing, and China is also improving its capacity ¶ in building some of the core reactor components for the AP1000, such as the primary reactor ¶ coolant pipes.166 Research has also started on a second, even larger version of the reactor, ¶ designated CAP1700 with an intended capacity of 1700 MW.167 Still further away from commercialization but indicative of China’s push to become a world ¶ leader in advanced nuclear power technology are the efforts to develop alternative nuclear ¶ power technologies such as fast breeder reactors and high‐temperature gas‐cooled pebble‐bed ¶ reactors. Fast neutron breeder reactors can be used to ‘breed’ plutonium from fissile materials ¶ and thus prolong the effective use of nuclear fuel supplies. The technology has been identified by ¶ the Chinese government as a longer‐term objective, as it would allow China to continue its ¶ nuclear expansion without dramatically increasing its need for imported uranium.168 A first ¶ experimental fast neutron reactor with a thermal capacity of 65 MW (and 20 MW of electric ¶ power output) was successfully connected to the grid in July 2011, partly using Russian imported ¶ technology.169 ¶ ¶ Finally, China is researching modular high‐temperature gas‐cooled pebbled‐bed reactors, which ¶ operate using nuclear fissile material shaped in pellets, coated and encapsulated inside a ceramic ¶ material. The key feature of this design is that it has very strong passive safety characteristics, ¶ since the pebbles and ceramic material are designed in such a way that a total lack of cooling ¶ would not cause the overall structure to disintegrate. Moreover, it can be used to build small ¶ reactors at a modular design basis, which can be easily expanded. The technology was originally ¶ developed in South Africa but not further pursued there. A first small 10 MW experimental ¶ reactor was developed by Tsinghua University in the context of the 863 Program for national ¶ research and reached criticality in 2003. Construction of a larger demonstration project with two ¶ reactor modules driving a 210 MW steam turbine was begun at the Rongcheng Shidaowan site in ¶ Shandong province in 2009 and is scheduled for completion in 2013. Regarding this Chinese ¶ effort, the report China’s Program for Science and Technology Modernization: Implications for ¶ American Competitiveness prepared for the US‐China Economic and Security Review Commission ¶ in 2011 remarks: ‘Scientists predict that if the PRC program to make a commercially‐viable pebble ¶ bed reactor is successful, it will represent a revolution in reactor technology—perhaps the largest ¶ advance in a quarter of a century.’170

China DA Links

Chinese and US interests are a zero-sum game in the South China Sea and Pacific Ocean—military interests, resources, and diplomatic influence

Wallis 12 [Dr. Joanne, is a lecturer in the Strategic and Defense Studies Centre at the Australian National University, where she convenes the Bachelor of Asia-Pacific program. She researches politics and security in the South Pacific, 9/19/12, http://www.e-ir.info/2012/09/19/the-south-pacific-microcosm-of-future-us-china-competition/] alla

United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s decision to attend the Pacific Islands Forum meeting in late August 2012 suggests that the South Pacific’s strategic importance in the broader Asia-Pacific region is increasing. Indeed, the South Pacific may become a microcosm of how the Asia-Pacific’s changing power structure could develop, as it provides a small-scale and relatively low-risk testing-ground where the United States and China can explore their capacity to project power, judge each others’ responses, and potentially develop mechanisms for cooperation, rather than competition.¶ The theme of the 2012 Pacific Islands Forum meeting was ‘Large Ocean Island States – the Pacific Challenge’,[1] which highlighted that the islands of the South Pacific between them hold sovereignty over 20 million square kilometres of the Pacific Ocean. These islands lie across vital sea lines of communication between the United States, Australia, New Zealand and Southeast Asia. Therefore, they could offer strategically-important locations for military and naval access.¶ The South Pacific consists of three broad geographic and cultural areas: Melanesia, which comprises the arc of islands to the immediate north and east of Australia; Polynesia, which comprises the triangle of states above New Zealand and stretching up to Hawaii; and Micronesia, the band of islands to the north of Melanesia.¶ The United States’ focus in the region is in Micronesia, where it controls Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. It also has Compacts of Free Association with the Marshall Islands, Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia, according to which it is obliged to provide public services, security and defence support. In Polynesia the United States also controls American Samoa. Most significantly, the United States has the Anderson Air Force Base on Guam, and the Ronald Reagan Missile Defence test site at its base on Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands.¶ During the Cold War the United States engaged in strategic competition with the Soviet Union for influence in the South Pacific. However, after the end of that war the United States largely withdrew its presence in the region. Consequently, it reduced its aid program, halved the number of Peace Corps volunteers and closed aid and diplomatic posts.[2]¶ In contrast, China has been increasingly active in the South Pacific in the last few decades. China’s interest was initially driven by its competition with Taiwan for diplomatic recognition. Although a truce (of sorts) has held since 2008, this competition has seen China and Taiwan engage in ‘chequebook diplomacy’ to win the favour of South Pacific states, and has resulted in China becoming the third-largest aid donor in the region, behind Australia and the United States.[3]¶ China’s more recent interest may be due to its desire to access the South Pacific’s natural resources, which include fisheries, timber, mineral and hydrocarbon deposits. And, regardless of their small size, each independent South Pacific state has a vote in international organisations, which China can seek to persuade them to use in pursuit of its interests. China also appears to have strategic interests in demonstrating its ability to project power in the region, and in potentially obtaining military and naval access as part of its ‘island chain’ defence strategy.[4] Although China will remain militarily inferior to the United States long into the future, there are claims that in the event of conflict China could use locations in the South Pacific to approach the United States asymmetrically, perhaps as part of a sea denial strategy.[5] The region also offers opportunities for signals intelligence monitoring, and China has already constructed a satellite tracking station in Kiribati (although it later had to be dismantled after Kiribati switched diplomatic recognition to Taiwan), which it is alleged to have used to monitor missile defence system tests in the Marshall Islands.[6]¶ China’s Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cui Tiankai, declared at the recent Pacific Islands Forum meeting that China is ‘here in this region not to seek any particular influence, still less dominance’.[7] Despite this, China has invested heavily in diplomacy, and is now said to have the highest number of diplomats in the region.[8] High-level Chinese officials have also undertaken a number of visits to the region, which have been reciprocated by South Pacific politicians and officials. China has also used tools like language training, student exchanges and tourism to build links. It also engages in military assistance and capacity-building programs.[9] China also seized the opportunity created by Australia’s and New Zealand’s attempts to isolate the military regime in Fiji by building links with the Melanesian Spearhead Group, in which Fiji is an active memb.er¶ Clinton has admitted United States’ concern about China’s increasing presence. For example, in her testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in March 2011 she stated: ‘let’s just talk… straight Realpolitik… We are in a competition with China. Take Papua New Guinea, huge energy find… ExxonMobil is producing it. China is there every day in every way trying to figure out how it’s going to come in behind us, come in under us’.[10] At the 2012 Pacific Islands Forum meeting Clinton was more circumspect, and in response to questions concerning China’s presence in the region, declared that ‘the Pacific is big enough for all of us’.[11]¶ However, the fact that Clinton attended the Forum meeting highlights Washington’s increased sensitivity to growing Chinese influence in the South Pacific. Consequently, the United States has resumed a more active role in the region. Senior officials have conducted tours, the United States has bolstered its diplomatic presence and it has opened a USAID office in Papua New Guinea. It has also increased its military presence, with the relocation of marines from Okinawa to Guam, and via the expansion of its ‘shiprider’ program, under which ships and aircraft from the United States Coast Guard (and now Navy), host law enforcement officers from South Pacific states and patrol their sovereign waters.[12]¶ Given the United States’ and China’s increasing focus on the South Pacific, the region might become a microcosm of broader emerging strategic rivalry between the two powers. Pessimistic analyses would predict that China and the United States (and its ally Australia) will engage in a zero-sum competition for regional influence, as occurred during the Cold War. Robert Kaplan has argued that it is ‘not hard to imagine… a replay of the decades-long Cold War, with the center of gravity not in the heart of Europe but, rather, among Pacific atolls’.[13] If this competition took on a military dimension it could come to a head if there is a clash between China’s island chain strategy and the United States’ presence in Micronesia. Military bases in the region might also mean that South Pacific states could be dragged into a conflict elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific, such as in the South China Sea.¶

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