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Impact – EconomyA successful cyber attack will disrupt a company’s operationsPowers & Jablonski, 2015, Shawn Powers, former debater, is an Assistant Professor of Communication at Georgia State Universit, Michael Jablonski, is an attorney and presidential fellow in communication at Georgia State University, The Real Cyber War: The Political Economy of Internet Freedom, p. Kindle (location at end of card) Third, requirements for the localization of data and servers leave corporations vulnerable to cyberattacks. Given the nature of cloud computing today, a successful cyberattack on a company’s server in one country may corrupt its entire network, threatening proprietary information, customer data, and operational readiness. According to Daniel Weitzner, former White House deputy chief technology officer for internet policy, “These risks can constitute a price so high that U.S. companies may avoid doing business altogether in such environments.” 40 Powers, Shawn M.; Jablonski, Michael (2015-03-20). The Real Cyber War: The Political Economy of Internet Freedom (The History of Communication) (Kindle Locations 2563-2567). University of Illinois Press. Kindle Edition. Impact – Nuclear RetaliationThe US will lashout with nuclear weapons in response to a military cyber attackLawson, Professor of Communication at Utah, 09 (Cross-Domain Response to Cyber Attacks and the Threat of Conflict, 5/13, http://www.seanlawson.net/?p=477) At a time when it seems impossible to avoid the seemingly growing hysteria over the threat of cyber war,[1] network security expert Marcus Ranum delivered a refreshing talk recently, “The Problem with Cyber War,” that took a critical look at a number of the assumptions underlying contemporary cybersecurity discourse in the United States. He addressed one issue in partiuclar that I would like to riff on here, the issue of conflict escalation–i.e. the possibility that offensive use of cyber attacks could escalate to the use of physical force. As I will show, his concerns are entirely legitimate as current U.S. military cyber doctrine assumes the possibility of what I call “cross-domain responses” to cyberattacks. Backing Your Adversary (Mentally) into a Corner Based on the premise that completely blinding a potential adversary is a good indicator to that adversary that an attack is iminent, Ranum has argued that “The best thing that you could possibly do if you want to start World War III is launch a cyber attack. [...] When people talk about cyber war like it’s a practical thing, what they’re really doing is messing with the OK button for starting World War III. We need to get them to sit the f-k down and shut the f-k up.” [2] He is making a point similar to one that I have made in the past: Taking away an adversary’s ability to make rational decisions could backfire. [3] For example, Gregory Witol cautions that “attacking the decision maker’s ability to perform rational calculations may cause more problems than it hopes to resolve.. Removing the capacity for rational action may result in completely unforeseen consequences, including longer and bloodier battles than may otherwise have been.” [4] Cross-Domain Response So, from a theoretical standpoint, I think his concerns are well founded. But the current state of U.S. policy may be cause for even greater concern. It’s not just worrisome that a hypothetical blinding attack via cyberspace could send a signal of imminent attack and therefore trigger an irrational response from the adversary. What is also cause for concern is that current U.S. policy indicates that “kinetic attacks” (i.e. physical use of force) are seen as potentially legitimate responses to cyber attacks. Most worrisome is that current U.S. policy implies that a nuclear response is possible, something that policy makers have not denied in recent press reports. The reason, in part, is that the U.S. defense community has increasingly come to see cyberspace as a “domain of warfare” equivalent to air, land, sea, and space. The definition of cyberspace as its own domain of warfare helps in its own right to blur the online/offline, physical-space/cyberspace boundary. But thinking logically about the potential consequences of this framing leads to some disconcerting conclusions. If cyberspace is a domain of warfare, then it becomes possible to define “cyber attacks” (whatever those may be said to entail) as acts of war. But what happens if the U.S. is attacked in any of the other domains? It retaliates. But it usually does not respond only within the domain in which it was attacked. Rather, responses are typically “cross-domain responses”–i.e. a massive bombing on U.S. soil or vital U.S. interests abroad (e.g. think 9/11 or Pearl Harbor) might lead to air strikes against the attacker. Even more likely given a U.S. military “way of warfare” that emphasizes multidimensional, “joint” operations is a massive conventional (i.e. non-nuclear) response against the attacker in all domains (air, land, sea, space), simultaneously. The possibility of “kinetic action” in response to cyber attack, or as part of offensive U.S. cyber operations, is part of the current (2006) National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations [5]: (U) Kinetic Actions. DOD will conduct kinetic missions to preserve freedom of action and strategic advantage in cyberspace. Kinetic actions can be either offensive or defensive and used in conjunction with other mission areas to achieve optimal military effects. Of course, the possibility that a cyber attack on the U.S. could lead to a U.S. nuclear reply constitutes possibly the ultimate in “cross-domain response.” And while this may seem far fetched, it has not been ruled out by U.S. defense policy makers and is, in fact, implied in current U.S. defense policy documents. From the National Military Strategy of the United States (2004): “The term WMD/E relates to a broad range of adversary capabilities that pose potentially devastating impacts. WMD/E includes chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and enhanced high explosive weapons as well as other, more asymmetrical ‘weapons’. They may rely more on disruptive impact than destructive kinetic effects. For example, cyber attacks on US commercial information systems or attacks against transportation networks may have a greater economic or psychological effect than a relatively small release of a lethal agent.” [6] The authors of a 2009 National Academies of Science report on cyberwarfare respond to this by saying, “Coupled with the declaratory policy on nuclear weapons described earlier, this statement implies that the United States will regard certain kinds of cyberattacks against the United States as being in the same category as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and thus that a nuclear response to certain kinds of cyberattacks (namely, cyberattacks with devastating impacts) may be possible. It also sets a relevant scale–a cyberattack that has an impact larger than that associated with a relatively small release of a lethal agent is regarded with the same or greater seriousness.” [7] Impact – GNW Cyber-attacks are on par with nuclear winter Information Week 7 Information Week June 02, 2007 The Impact Of Cyberwarfare http://www.informationweek.com/the-impact-of-cyberwarfare/199800131 Cyberwarfare: What will it look like, how will we defend against it? Those questions have taken on new urgency, as the possibility becomes more real. Recently, the Baltic nation of Estonia suffered several weeks of distributed denial-of-service attacks against both government and private-sector Web sites. And late last month, a report from the Department of Defense said the People's Liberation Army of China is building up its cyberwarfare capabilities, even creating malware that could be used against enemy computer systems in first-strike attacks. To date, there have been no proven, documented cases of one nation attacking another via cyberspace. Yet cyberwarfare is a chilling prospect that's treated among most nations with much the same reverence as Cold War players treated the idea of nuclear winter, mainly because of the potential large-scale economic disruption that would follow, says Howard Schmidt, a former White House cybersecurity adviser and former chief security officer at eBay and Microsoft. This would include shortages of supplies that could affect both citizens and the military, he says. The cyberattacks against Estonia primarily targeted the government, banking, media, and police sites, and they "affected the functioning of the rest of the network infrastructure in Estonia," the European Network and Information Security Agency, or ENISA, reported on its Web site. As a result, targeted sites were inaccessible outside of Estonia for extended periods in order to ride out the attacks and to try and maintain services within the country.
By Tony Capaccio and Roxana Tiron POSTED: 10:12 a.m. HST, Mar 28, 2012 LAST UPDATED: 10:16 a.m. HST, Mar 28, 2012 North Korea's cyber warfare capability grows, U.S. general says Bloomberg News http://www.staradvertiser.com/news/breaking/144695475.html?id=144695475 North Korea’s military has been increasing its ability to launch cyber-attacks against American and South Korean forces, the top U.S. commander in the region said. “North Korea employs sophisticated computer hackers trained to launch cyber infiltration and cyber attacks,” Army General James Thurman, the commander of U.S. Forces Korea, said in testimony prepared for a congressional hearing today in Washington. “Such attacks are ideal for North Korea” because they can be done anonymously, and they “have been increasingly employed against a variety of targets including military, governmental, educational and commercial institutions.” Thurman’s presentation for the House Armed Services Committee’s annual regional overview presented a starker appraisal of North Korea’s threat to South Korea and to U.S. forces than did his predecessor, U.S. Army General Walter Sharp, in testimony last year. Sharp didn’t cite cyber attacks as part of the North Korean arsenal, and Thurman spoke of continued improvements in conventional weaponry. North Korea can attack Seoul “and can deliver both high explosive and chemical munitions with little or no warning,” Thurman said. The regime in Pyongyang also continues to improve “the capabilities of the world’s largest special operations force, which includes 60,000 soldiers trained in a variety of infiltration methods,” he said. .
Chol 2 Chol Director Center for Korean American Peace’02 (Chol, 2002 10-24, http://nautilus.org/fora/security/0212A_Chol.html) Any military strike initiated against North Korea will promptly explode into a thermonuclear exchange between a tiny nuclear-armed North Korea and the world's superpower, America. The most densely populated Metropolitan U.S.A., Japan and South Korea will certainly evaporate in The Day After scenario-type nightmare. The New York Times warned in its August 27, 2002 comment: "North Korea runs a more advanced biological, chemical and nuclear weapons program, targets American military bases and is developing missiles that could reach the lower 48 states. Yet there's good reason President Bush is not talking about taking out Dear Leader Kim Jong Il. If we tried, the Dear Leader would bombard South Korea and Japan with never gas or even nuclear warheads, and (according to one Pentagon study) kill up to a million people." Continues…The first two options should be sobering nightmare scenarios for a wise Bush and his policy planners. If they should opt for either of the scenarios, that would be their decision, which the North Koreans are in no position to take issue with. The Americans would realize too late that the North Korean mean what they say. The North Koreans will use all their resources in their arsenal to fight a full-scale nuclear exchange with the Americans in the last war of mankind. A nuclear-armed North Korea would be most destabilizing in the region and the rest of the world in the eyes of the Americans. They would end up finding themselves reduced to a second-class nuclear power. Impact—Nuclear Terrorism Cyber warfare is the only scenario for nuclear terrorism. That causes retaliatory nuclear war. Fritz 09 Fritz ‘09, Jason, Researcher for International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, Former Army Officer and Consultant, Master of Internation Relations at Bond University, “Hacking Nuclear Command and Control,” 2009. (http://icnnd.org/Documents/Jason_Fritz_Hacking_NC2.pdf.) This paper will analyse the threat of cyber terrorism in regard to nuclear weapons. Specifically, this research will use open source knowledge to identify the structure of nuclear command and control centres, how those structures might be compromised through computer network operations, and how doing so would fit within established cyber terrorists’ capabilities, strategies, and tactics. If access to command and control centres is obtained, terrorists could fake or actually cause one nuclear-armed state to attack another, thus provoking a nuclear response from another nuclear power. This may be an easier alternative for terrorist groups than building or acquiring a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb themselves. This would also act as a force equaliser, and provide terrorists with the asymmetric benefits of high speed, removal of geographical distance, and a relatively low cost. Continuing difficulties in developing computer tracking technologies which could trace the identity of intruders, and difficulties in establishing an internationally agreed upon legal framework to guide responses to computer network operations, point towards an inherent weakness in using computer networks to manage nuclear weaponry. This is particularly relevant to reducing the hair trigger posture of existing nuclear arsenals. All computers which are connected to the internet are susceptible to infiltration and remote control. Computers which operate on a closed network may also be compromised by various hacker methods, such as privilege escalation, roaming notebooks, wireless access points, embedded exploits in software and hardware, and maintenance entry points. For example, e-mail spoofing targeted at individuals who have access to a closed network, could lead to the installation of a virus on an open network. This virus could then be carelessly transported on removable data storage between the open and closed network. Information found on the internet may also reveal how to access these closed networks directly. Efforts by militaries to place increasing reliance on computer networks, including experimental technology such as autonomous systems, and their desire to have multiple launch options, such as nuclear triad capability, enables multiple entry points for terrorists. For example, if a terrestrial command centre is impenetrable, perhaps isolating one nuclear armed submarine would prove an easier task. There is evidence to suggest multiple attempts have been made by hackers to compromise the extremely low radio frequency once used by the US Navy to send nuclear launch approval to submerged submarines. Additionally, the alleged Soviet system known as Perimetr was designed to automatically launch nuclear weapons if it was unable to establish communications with Soviet leadership. This was intended as a retaliatory response in the event that nuclear weapons had decapitated Soviet leadership; however it did not account for the possibility of cyber terrorists blocking communications through computer network operations in an attempt to engage the system. Should a warhead be launched, damage could be further enhanced through additional computer network operations. By using proxies, multi-layered attacks could be engineered. Terrorists could remotely commandeer computers in China and use them to launch a US nuclear attack against Russia. Thus Russia would believe it was under attack from the US and the US would believe China was responsible. Further, emergency response communications could be disrupted, transportation could be shut down, and disinformation, such as misdirection, could be planted, thereby hindering the disaster relief effort and maximizing destruction. Disruptions in communication and the use of disinformation could also be used to provoke uninformed responses. For example, a nuclear strike between India and Pakistan could be coordinated with Distributed Denial of Service attacks against key networks, so they would have further difficulty in identifying what happened and be forced to respond quickly. Terrorists could also knock out communications between these states so they cannot discuss the situation. Alternatively, amidst the confusion of a traditional large-scale terrorist attack, claims of responsibility and declarations of war could be falsified in an attempt to instigate a hasty military response. These false claims could be posted directly on Presidential, military, and government websites. E-mails could also be sent to the media and foreign governments using the IP addresses and e-mail accounts of government officials. A sophisticated and all encompassing combination of traditional terrorism and cyber terrorism could be enough to launch nuclear weapons on its own, without the need for compromising command and control centres directly. Impact—China Cyber attacks will inevitably cause a trade war with China Poeter 10/11 ["Expert: U.S.-China Cyber Saber Rattling Could Prompt Trade War", Damon Poeter, October 11, 2012, www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2410856,00.asp] Cyber saber rattling by U.S. lawmakers over the potential security threat posed by Chinese tech firms Huawei and ZTE could lead to more cyber attacks against the U.S. and might even kick off a trade war with China, according to a computer security and forensics expert. ¶ But if anything, government officials should be tackling such threats even more aggressively and expanding the scope of their scrutiny of tech companies with close ties to the Chinese government, said Darren Hayes, a professor at Pace University's Seidenberg School of Computer Science and Information Systems in New York. ¶ "I think that the problem goes way beyond these two manufacturers. I think that it probably has implications for consumers as well, because they are another avenue where [Chinese technology companies] can gain information, individual users being one of the biggest areas of data leakage for corporations and other organizations today," Hayes told PCMag on Thursday. ¶ Earlier this week, the House Intelligence Committee released a report that specifically called for U.S. companies to avoid using telecommunications components from Huawei and ZTE due to security concerns. ¶ Some of the findings of the 11-month investigation were released early on Sunday to 60 Minutes (video below). The probe focused on the close relationship between the two firms and the Chinese government, a relationship the committee felt could facilitate state-controlled backdoors inside the U.S. telecommunications system. Such concerns were raised back in 2010, when Sprint Nextel was quietly steered away from a deal to buy telecommunications equipment from Huawei by government officials concerned about national security. ¶ Lawmakers have also raised concerns about the two companies' dealings with Iran in contravention of the U.S. sanction regime against that country. Networking giant Cisco this week said it was cutting ties with ZTE after an internal probe found that the Chinese maker of telecommunications equipment and consumer electronics devices had allegedly sold Cisco products to Iran without the American company's knowledge. ¶ Hayes said the escalation of tension between the U.S. and the two China-based companies would "be viewed as an affront to the Chinese Communist Party" and an accusation that the Chinese government is doing "something sinister." ¶ "This report could lead to a trade war and may prompt more cyber-attacks against the U.S.," he wrote on The Hill's Congress Blog. "This method of retribution has often been used against the U.S. and other nations when accusations of improprieties have been made against China or asylum has been granted to a Chinese political dissident. The [U.S.] government has obviously decided to take that risk." China is comparatively the biggest threat to global cyber security. RT News 11 China behind massive cyber attack on US? Published: 03 August, 2011, 20:25 Edited: 04 August, 2011, 01:02 http://rt.com/usa/news/china-cyber-hack-lewis/ Without another scapegoat to pin the blame on, Americans are naming China as the culprit of a series of cyber attacks because, well, why not? Jim Lewis of the Center for Strategic and International Studies tells Reuters that China is likely to blame for a massive series of cyber crimes that took the network of dozens of organizations by storm. Lewis, a cyber crime expert, can’t point reporters to any evidence in particular, but notes that the organizations infiltrated in the slew of attacks had information that China might want to have. "Everything points to China. It could be the Russians, but there is more that points to China than Russia," Lewis says. The United Nations, as well as the governments of the United States, India, South Korea, Canada and Taiwan are included in the list of 72 organizations targeted by a series of attacks conducted over a five year span. Security company McAgee discovered the attacks and says that a “state actor” was responsible but won’t say who. Neither McAfee nor the Chinese offered comment on if China was responsible. Vijay Mukhi, an Indian cyber-expert, adds to Reuters that he would not be surprised if the attacks came out of China because, he puts it, “that’s what China does.” Mukhi also notes, however, that India’s government barely protected their electronic data, saying their security is something out of the Stone Age. While some of the networks targeted in the attacks included information held by other Asian governments (such as Taiwan and Hong Kong)and the Olympic Committees of the runner ops to the 2008 games that went to Beijing, the majority of those targeted were American companies and nonprofits. If you ask Lewis, however, it’s got to be China. “Who else spies on Taiwan?” he asks. Lewis has long explored cyber crime and security issues in China. He is the author of the publication Building an Information Technology Industry in China: National Strategy and just last week told CNN that “China is very active in espionage.” "As are we," added Lewis. Cyber is the lynchpin of relations—Conflict inevitable without the plan. Osnos, 7/25 - an American reporter for The New Yorker, based in Beijing. Previously, he was an international correspondent for The Chicago Tribune in Beijing. Before that, he covered the Iraq War for that newspaper. (Evan, “Q. & A.: The Cybersecurity Bill, China, and Innovation” 7/25/12, The New York Times, http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/evanosnos/2012/07/adam-segal-on-cybersecurity-china-and-innovation.html#ixzz222NjIKW4)//GP Cyber is often mentioned as one of the leading potential flashpoints in the U.S.-China relationship. Where would you rank that risk compared to potential conflict in the South China Sea, Taiwan, or trade disputes? While strategic mistrust is high between the two sides, Cyber alone is unlikely to be a major flashpoint. Attacks designed to steal intellectual property and other trade secrets occur with such regularity and at such a pace and scope that General Alexander, head of U.S. Cyber Command, has called them “the greatest transfer of wealth in history”—yet the United States continues to engage China on a range of issues, from Iran and Syria to trade and the environment. Washington has raised the pressure on Beijing about cyber, publicly calling out Chinese hackers and addressing it in bilateral meetings, but clearly has not made it an issue that it is willing to go to the mat for. There is little doubt, however, that cyber will be part of any political, military, or economic conflict in the future, and that it has high a probability of making the situation more difficult to resolve. Web-site defacements were an annoyance in the standoff between China and the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal/Huangyan Island, but more serious cyber attacks could have escalated the situation, making signalling much more complicated. This is why it is so important that the United States and China continue to talk about cyber and to develop points of contact and other communication mechanisms in case of crisis. Extinction Straits Times 00 June 25, 2000 lexis Straits Times THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilization. Impact—Iran US retaliation against Iran causes wildfire proliferation and extinction. Hirsch 6 Jorge, Professor of Physics at the University of California San Diego, 2006 “America and Iran: At the Brink of the Abyss”, Feb 20, http://www.antiwar.com/orig/hirsch.php?articleid=8577. The U.S. has just declared that it will defend Israel militarily against Iran if needed. Presumably this includes a scenario where Israel would initiate hostilities by unprovoked bombing of Iranian facilities, as it did with Iraq's Osirak, and Iran would respond with missiles targeting Israel. The U.S. intervention is likely to be further bombing of Iran's facilities, including underground installations that can only be destroyed with low-yield nuclear bunker-busters. Such nuclear weapons may cause low casualties, perhaps only in the hundreds [.pdf], but the nuclear threshold will have been crossed. Iran's reaction to a U.S. attack with nuclear weapons, no matter how small, cannot be predicted with certainty. U.S. planners may hope that it will deter Iran from responding, thus saving lives. However, just as the U.S. forces in Iraq were not greeted with flowers, it is likely that such an attack would provoke a violent reaction from Iran and lead to the severe escalation of hostilities, which in turn would lead to the use of larger nuclear weapons by the U.S. and potential casualties in the hundreds of thousands. Witness the current uproar over cartoons and try to imagine the resulting upheaval in the Muslim world after the U.S. nukes Iran. - The Military's Moral Dilemma - Men and women in the military forces, including civilian employees, may be facing a difficult moral choice at this very moment and in the coming weeks, akin to the moral choices faced by Colin Powell and Dan Ellsberg. The paths these two men followed were radically different. Colin Powell was an American hero, widely respected and admired at the time he was appointed secretary of state in 2001. In February 2003, he chose to follow orders despite his own serious misgivings, and delivered the pivotal UN address that paved the way for the U.S. invasion of Iraq the following month. Today, most Americans believe the Iraq invasion was wrong, and Colin Powell is disgraced, his future destroyed, and his great past achievements forgotten. Daniel Ellsberg, a military analyst, played a significant role in ending the Vietnam War by leaking the Pentagon Papers. He knew that he would face prosecution for breaking the law, but was convinced it was the correct moral choice. His courageous and principled action earned him respect and gratitude. The Navy has just reminded [.pdf] its members and civilian employees what the consequences are of violating provisions concerning the release of information about the nuclear capabilities of U.S. forces. Why right now, for the first time in 12 years? Because it is well aware of moral choices that its members may face, and it hopes to deter certain actions. But courageous men and women are not easily deterred. To disobey orders and laws and to leak information are difficult actions that entail risks. Still, many principled individuals have done it in the past and will continue to do it in the future ( see [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9].) Conscientious objection to the threat and use of nuclear weapons is a moral choice. Once the American public becomes fully aware that military action against Iran will include the planned use of nuclear weapons, public support for military action will quickly disappear. Anything could get the ball rolling. A great catastrophe will have been averted. Even U.S. military law recognizes that there is no requirement to obey orders that are unlawful. The use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear country can be argued to be in violation of international law, the principle of just war, the principle of proportionality, common standards of morality ([1], [2], [3], [4], [5]), and customs that make up the law of armed conflict. Even if the nuclear weapons used are small, because they are likely to cause escalation of the conflict they violate the principle of proportionality and will cause unnecessary suffering. The Nuremberg Tribunal, which the United States helped to create, established that "The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him." To follow orders or to disobey orders, to keep information secret or to leak it, are choices for each individual to make – extremely difficult choices that have consequences. But not choosing is not an option. - America's Collective Responsibility - Blaming the administration or the military for crossing the nuclear threshold is easy, but responsibility will be shared by all Americans. All Americans knew, or should have known, that using nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear country like Iran was a possibility given the Bush administration's new policies. All Americans could have voiced their opposition to these policies and demand that they be reversed. The media will carry a heavy burden of responsibility. The mainstream media could have effectively raised public awareness of the possibility that the U.S. would use nuclear weapons against Iran. So far, they have chosen to almost completely hide the issue, which is being increasingly addressed in non-mainstream media. Members of Congress could have raised the question forcefully, calling for public hearings, demanding public discussion of the administration's plans, and passing new laws or resolutions. So far they have failed to do so and are derelict in their responsibility to their constituents. Letters to the president from some in Congress [1], [2] are a start, but are not likely to elicit a meaningful response or a change in plans and are a far cry from forceful action. Scientific organizations and organizations dealing with arms control and nuclear weapons could have warned of the dangers associated with the Iran situation. So far, they have not done so ([1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8]). Scientists and engineers responsible for the development of nuclear weapons could have voiced concern [.pdf] when the new U.S. nuclear weapons policies became known, policies that directly involve the fruits of their labor. Their voices have not been heard. Those who contribute their labor to the scientific and technical infrastructure that makes nuclear weapons and their means of delivery possible bear a particularly heavy burden of moral responsibility. Their voices have barely been heard. - The Nuclear Abyss - The United States is preparing to enter a new era: an era in which it will enforce nuclear nonproliferation by the threat and use of nuclear weapons. The use of tactical nuclear weapons against Iran will usher in a new world order. The ultimate goal is that no nation other than the U.S. should have a nuclear weapons arsenal. A telltale sign that this is the plan is the recent change in the stated mission of Los Alamos National Laboratory, where nuclear weapons are developed. The mission of LANL used to be described officially as "Los Alamos National Laboratory's central mission is to reduce the global nuclear danger" [1] [.pdf], [2] [.pdf], [3] [.pdf]. That will sound ridiculous once the U.S. starts throwing mini-nukes around. In anticipation of it, the Los Alamos mission statement has been recently changed to "prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and to protect our homeland from terrorist attack." That is the present and future role of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, to be achieved through threat (deterrence) and use of nuclear weapons. References to the old mission are nowhere to be found in the current Los Alamos documents, indicating that the change was deliberate and thorough. It is not impossible that the U.S. will succeed in its goal. But it is utterly improbable. This is a big world. Once the U.S. crosses the nuclear threshold against a non-nuclear country, many more countries will strive to acquire nuclear weapons, and many will succeed. The nuclear abyss may turn out to be a steep precipice or a gentle slope. Either way, it will be a one-way downhill slide toward a bottomless pit. We will have entered a path of no return, leading in a few months or a few decades to global nuclear war and unimaginable destruction. But there are still choices to be made. Up to the moment the first U.S. nuclear bomb explodes, the fall into the abyss can be averted by choices made by each and every one of us. We may never know which choices prevented it if it doesn't happen. But if we make the wrong choices, we will know what they were. And so will future generations, even in a world where wars are fought with sticks and stones. Extinction Hirsch 5 - Professor @ UC San Diego (Jorge, “Can a nuclear strike on Iran be averted,” November 21st) The Bush administration has put together all the elements it needs to justify the impending military action against Iran. Unlike in the case of Iraq, it will happen without warning, and most of the justifications will be issued after the fact. We will wake up one day to learn that facilities in Iran have been bombed in a joint U.S.-Israeli attack. It may even take another couple of days for the revelation that some of the U.S. bombs were nuclear. Why a Nuclear Attack on Iran Is a Bad Idea Now that we have outlined what is very close to happening, let us discuss briefly why everything possible should be done to prevent it. In a worst-case scenario, the attack will cause a violent reaction from Iran. Millions of "human wave" Iranian militias will storm into Iraq, and just as Saddam stopped them with chemical weapons, the U.S. will stop them with nuclear weapons, resulting potentially in hundreds of thousands of casualties. The Middle East will explode, and popular uprisings in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other countries with pro-Western governments could be overtaken by radical regimes. Pakistan already has nuclear weapons, and a nuclear conflict could even lead to Russia's and Israel's involvement using nuclear weapons. In a best-case scenario, the U.S. will destroy all nuclear, chemical, and missile facilities in Iran with conventional and low-yield nuclear weapons in a lightning surprise attack, and Iran will be paralyzed and decide not to retaliate for fear of a vastly more devastating nuclear attack. In the short term, the U.S. will succeed, leaving no Iranian nuclear program, civilian or otherwise. Iran will no longer threaten Israel, a regime change will ensue, and a pro-Western government will emerge. However, even in the best-case scenario, the long-term consequences are dire. The nuclear threshold will have been crossed by a nuclear superpower against a non-nuclear country. Many more countries will rush to get their own nuclear weapons as a deterrent. With no taboo against the use of nuclear weapons, they will certainly be used again. Nuclear conflicts will occur within the next 10 to 20 years, and will escalate until much of the world is destroyed. Let us remember that the destructive power of existing nuclear arsenals is approximately one million times that of the Hiroshima bomb, enough to erase Earth's population many times over. Middle East conflict causes nuclear war Steinbach 2 [John Steinbach, Analyst, Center for Research on Globaization, DC Iraq Coalition, “Israeli Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Threat To Peace,” March 2002, http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/STE203A.html] Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon - for whatever reason - the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44) Iran war creates an oil shock that collapses the global economy. Fontevecchia 11 – writer at Forbes [Agustino, 12/13/2011, Forbes, “Oil: Iran’s Hormuz Strait Threats Could Wreak Global Economic Havoc,” http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2011/12/13/oil-irans-hormuz-strait-threats-could-wreak-global-economic-havoc/] On the markets front, Iran could cause substantial crude oil price movements if it chose to take action. From Stratfor: A single ship striking a naval mine (or even a serious Iranian move to sow mines) could quickly and dramatically drive up global oil prices and maritime insurance rates. This combination is bad enough in the best of times. But the Iranian threat to the Strait of Hormuz could not be more effective than at this moment, with the world just starting to show signs of economic recovery. The shock wave of a spike in energy prices — not to mention the wider threat of a conflagration in the Persian Gulf — could leave the global economy in even worse straits than it was a year ago. Impact—Terrorism The Pentagon has said independent hackers will be assumed aided from that country—Triggers response. Wall Street Journal 11 [http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304563104576355623135782718.html, May 30, 2011, Cyber Combat: Act of War, SIOBHAN GORMAN And JULIAN E. BARNES] The strategy will also state the importance of synchronizing U.S. cyber-war doctrine with that of its allies, and will set out principles for new security policies. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization took an initial step last year when it decided that, in the event of a cyber attack on an ally, it would convene a group to "consult together" on the attacks, but they wouldn't be required to help each other respond. The group hasn't yet met to confer on a cyber incident. Pentagon officials believe the most-sophisticated computer attacks require the resources of a government. For instance, the weapons used in a major technological assault, such as taking down a power grid, would likely have been developed with state support, Pentagon officials say.
There's nothing virtual about cyber attacks By Bob Greene, CNN Contributor updated 10:10 AM EDT, Sun October 7, 2012 http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/07/opinion/greene-cyber-real/index.html In 1997, according to a report in the New York Times that year, a White House commission found that the U.S. was vulnerable to computer-based attacks "upon crucial industries like electrical power, telecommunications, transportation and significant centers of the economy." The concern appeared to be shared by people on both sides of the political aisle. At a 2004 Senate subcommittee session, Democratic Sen. Dianne Feinstein of California said: "We don't take cyberterrorism as seriously as we should. A terrorist could theoretically use a computer to open up floodgates of a dam, disrupt the operations of an aircraft control tower or shut down the New York Stock Exchange." Republican Sen. Jon Kyl of Arizona, at the same hearing, said: "We've seen reports that al Qaeda has explored the possibility of damaging some of our key computer systems, seeking to cripple electric power grids, transportation systems, even financial institutions. Just imagine what chaos would result if a cyberattack were coordinated with a more conventional strike, such as bombing a highly populated area and then tampering with emergency systems to thwart hospitals and first responders caring for wounded civilians."
Stefano Mele September 2010 Cyberwarfare and its damaging effects on citizens pg.10-13 (Stefano Mele is a lawyer specializing in IT, privacy, security and intelligence law. He holds a PhD from the University of Foggia. He is also an expert in security, cyber-terrorism and cyberwarfare. He is a senior researcher at the Department of Strategic Intelligence and Security studies at the Link Campus University of Rome, and teaches the cyber-terrorism and cyberwarfare modules of its “Masters Degree in Intelligence Studies and National Security”.) What has been said thus far should lead to serious (and urgent) consideration being given not just to the general aspects of cyber-war and its related strategies of attack, defence and the mitigation of damage, but above all to the precise identification of what the primary targets within our national territory which can be attacked via the internet8 might be, even in the case of individual acts of cyberwarfare. If we wish to refer only to targets where an attack could lead to the loss of human lives, we must highlight: - electronic airport, civil and military air traffic and airspace control systems: although under current security procedures it does not seem possible that these could be used to cause mid-air collisions or other problems for aircraft coming in to land9, it is however highly plausible that these airspace control systems10 could be remotely disabled, allowing, for example, carpet bombing of the territory by hostile aircraft without any early-warning alarms being set off11. - electronic control systems on civil and military aircraft: these systems becoming compromised can cause problems for aircraft during take-off and landing12, in addition to, as was sadly demonstrated by Air France flight 447 in June 200913, aircraft falling out of the sky in mid-flight. Despite this, at least as far as is known, not being the result of an actual malicious attack, this tragic event has demonstrated how current aeronautic (fly-by-wire) technology, in the event of any problems with the on-board computer, can irredeemably compromise the safety of the flight and of the passengers on that flight, giving the pilot very little chance to regain control of the aircraft. - the electronic systems of companies which design and develop the hardware and software used in airports, in air traffic control and in the construction of aircraft, both civil and military: here, the objective is that of manipulating, in the design phase, software or hardware which will eventually come to be used in critical environments14. The events linked to the theft of designs relating to the American F-35 project15 are an example of this kind of act. It is also possible (although this would be difficult) that a hostile Government would not limit itself to simply copying confidential information, or carrying out acts of simple electronic espionage, but would aim to gain access to the plans, have them analyzed by its specialists, and introduce into the millions of lines of code which form the basis of the flight control software of an aircraft a small‘backdoor’ – which would be hard to single out amongst the sea of information present – which would allow it to gain complete remote control of the aircraft. This manipulated code would then be reinserted into these previously violated systems. Once these are put into large-scale production, this ‘backdoor’ could then be used to make the aircraft fall out of the sky, or, in the case of military aircraft, to make it launch, for example, a missile with different target coordinates than had previously been set. - electronic national defence systems, via which a ‘non-willed’ attack could be launched (even a simple long-range missile) towards the territory of a specific nation. - fully-automated subway control systems: these do not require conductors or drivers to be present on trains, but feature, and are driven automatically, by ‘VAL’ systems. Compromising the security of these could lead to two trains colliding, or could cause individual trains to derail or travel beyond the end of the line, with a probable consequent loss of human lives. - water supply and control systems, which, if compromised, might not just leave large areas without water (and for long periods), but most importantly may not reveal, or cover up for, the presence of impurities or of substances which are highly toxic and damaging to the health of citizens. - hospital electronic systems: the electronic systems for managing patient’s clinical records could be compromised and/or, even worse, manipulated. - electronic emergency management systems (such as the Italian 118 services and the fire brigade): this could cause a late response, or even the total lack of a response, to emergencies, with the result that the health and/or lives of one or more citizens would be put at risk. - electricity grid management systems: the manipulation of these could represent the greatest threat thus far analyzed and, therefore, must be thought of as the absolute priority issue in terms of defending our nation. It is enough to remind ourselves that without electricity, nothing would work: computers, trains, aircraft, hospitals, telecommunications services, supply systems, etc. This would most likely cause a popular civil revolt, resulting in unmanageable damage to the Government’s image, and causing people to lose faith in it. Also, in the event of a serious, targeted attack, and not a simple, temporary malfunction, there is little that the systems which control energy continuity could do to compensate for the system being compromised and for damage which could not be repaired within 24 hours, which would have the domino-effect of causing further blackouts as attempts were made to make up for the deficit in the supply of electricity. In order to provide a complete overview, two further cases must be highlighted, in which at first glance it would seem possible that human lives could be put directly in danger. However, for two different reasons, this could not in fact occur. These two cases are: - railway electronic systems, which, despite ‘taking on’ the locomotive as soon as the train arrives at the barrier at stations such as Rome or Milan and electronically managing its speed, time of arrival, and scheduling its route with respect to other trains on the same line and any stops to be made, are always subject to a procedure which means that overall control is never completely taken out of the hands of the driver of the train or the operator working within the train station control centre. These two operatives in fact, in a reciprocal, duplicate manner, control the operations undertaken electronically by the two computers (on the train and at the control centre), and are always, at any moment, able to manually intervene and override this automated process. - financial and banking systems, which, in the same way as was explained with regards to the manipulation of the national electricity grid, despite not being able to cause the direct loss of human lives, control an asset so critical to the State that, at all times, they must be taken into direct consideration. The economic or financial collapse of an entire nation, in fact, could easily bring about public uprisings which would have a high risk of causing human lives to be lost. More evidence—literal and symbolic death of society. Shimaell et. Al. 02 Timothy Shimaell, Phil Williams Casey Dunlevy 2002 Countering cyber war (Timothy Shimeall is a senior analyst with the CERT Analysis Center of Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, with specific interests in cyber war and cyber terrorism. Phil Williams, a former NATO fellow, is a profes- sor at the University of Pittsburgh and a visiting scientist at the CERT Analysis Center. Casey Dunlevy is a former intelligence analyst, and leads the CERT Analysis Center.) Denial-of-service attacks would take on new meaning where the services do not simply provide access to the internet but are systems supporting critical, national infrastructures; systems that are not designed for prolonged outages. A chronic loss of power generation and transmission capabilities, for example, would have a major impact on medical and other emergency services, communications capabilities and the capacity to manage. A failure of emergency services in major cities would not only result in the deaths of those requiring such services but also in a loss of confidence in the government’s ability to provide basic services and protection. As it became apparent that the attack was impacting other infrastructure such as communications, transportation and water, the levels of fear and loss of confidence would begin to impact the basic social fabric. Attacks against the financial infrastructure would erode the capacity of business to function normally and raise questions among the public about the security of their personal finances, including retirement accounts, investments and personal savings. Military networks, all of which utilise commercial communications pathways, would also be hampered, undermining command and control, logistics and both preparedness and operations. In unrestricted cyber warfare, virtual attacks can have consequences that are real, profound and far-reaching. 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