It’s a good Topic
A2: Economy/New York Times
Download 1.51 Mb.
|
- Navigate this page:
- A2: Russia
- Empirically denied and ineffective for Russia
- A2: Cyber Arms Race
- No significant threat from state and non-state actors
A2: Economy/New York TimesNo empricial support for the New York Time’s economy claimManess & Valeriano, 2015, Ryan C. Maness, Northeastern University, Department of Political Science, Brandon Valeriano, University of Glasglow, Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System, Kindle Edition, page number at end of card The New York Times reported, “a major cyberattack on the United States could cripple the country’s infrastructure and economy, and . . . such attacks now pose the most dangerous immediate threat to the United States, even more pressing than an attack by global terrorist networks.” 4 While empirics do not match this rhetoric, the statement was still made in the major US daily newspaper, and it was taken as a fact. Valeriano, Brandon; Maness, Ryan C. (2015-04-27). Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System (p. 190). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition. A2: RussiaRussia has aggressive cyber capabilities but does not use themManess & Valeriano, 2015, Ryan C. Maness, Northeastern University, Department of Political Science, Brandon Valeriano, University of Glasglow, Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System, Kindle Edition, page number at end of card One important observation from the analysis of this data is that there has only been one cyber dispute that accompanied a conventional armed conflict. Several vandalism and DDoS incidents disrupted government and telecommunications companies in the tiny state of Georgia during its five-day conflict with Russia. These incidents were not part of any military strategy; rather, they were propagandist messages and disruptive measures utilized to instill fear and confusion in the Georgian government and population. As noted in Chapter 2, Russia is one of the most cyber-capable states on the globe; therefore Russian restraint, even during a military campaign, is evident given the lack of severity of their incidents. Thus no state has opted to open the Pandora’s box of escalated cyber conflict during conventional military campaigns. Opportunities are replete: the Iraq War of 2003, the NATO Libya campaign, and possibly Syria, if international intervention is ever initiated, are all examples. We have observed evidence for cyber restraint even among the most capable states in the international system. Valeriano, Brandon; Maness, Ryan C. (2015-04-27). Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System (p. 95). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition. Empirically denied and ineffective for RussiaManess & Valeriano, 2015, Ryan C. Maness, Northeastern University, Department of Political Science, Brandon Valeriano, University of Glasglow, Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System, Kindle Edition, page number at end of card That restraint exists in the realm of cyber conflict is an idea few seem ready to engage. Some have begun to make this point in various forums. Rid (2011, 2013) argues that cyber war in the extreme sense that death will result has not yet occurred, and is unlikely to occur. “Cyber war has never happened in the past, it does not occur in the present, and it is highly unlikely that it will disturb our future” (Rid 2013: xiv). Likewise, Gartzke (2013) develops the logic for cyber war being utilized by states as a low-level form of conflict. We (2014) have made this point in our research on Russian foreign policy, which argues that cyber conflict is literally the least damaging and easiest option that Russia could use to retaliate against Estonia during their dust-up in 2007. Valeriano, Brandon; Maness, Ryan C. (2015-04-27). Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System (p. 41). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition. A2: Cyber Arms RaceCyber arms race claims are just conjectureManess & Valeriano, 2015, Ryan C. Maness, Northeastern University, Department of Political Science, Brandon Valeriano, University of Glasglow, Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System, Kindle Edition, page number at end of card According to the cyber prognosticators, cyber weapons are no different. Rapid increases in cyber technology will make it easier, cheaper, and more likely that states will utilize these technologies because there is a reduced cost and a psychological aspect of wanting to leverage new weapons to new situations. When applied to cyber conflict, all these factors are still dubious and afflicted with conjecture. At best, they are guesses, open to empirical and theoretical investigation. It is unclear whether or not weapons technology developed in this area will be used in other arenas. Actually, due to the connection to the civilian sphere, it seems less likely that these technologies will be used. Even Clarke and Knake (2010) frequently note the difficulty in applying cyber tactics against terrorists in the banking sector. It is unclear why a state that is restricted in the real world by norms and institutions will suddenly have a free hand to act in the hypothetical-future world. This is the conjecture most writers make in this area, and it is perplexing. It is not even clear that we are in an era of cyber arms races, given that there has yet to be a study that quantifies the buildup of cyber weapons in the framing of military buildups. Just because a weapon is available does not mean it will be used. It must be remembered that states must have a reason for conflict for operations to break out (Mansbach and Vasquez 1981). Even the worst offenders in international history had demands and revisionist claims that motivated action. The cyber world will be no different; issues will continue to matter, and weapons will be used in a clear context, not just because a state has them. Finally, it is unclear if conflicts in expected areas will actually develop. There are vigorous debates as to whether there really will be future conflict with China. Some, like Valeriano and Vasquez (2011), argue that there is no set course for major power conflict. Certainly, there will be cyber conflicts between states already fighting, like India and Pakistan, and Russia and its former vassal states, but it is unclear if other global powers will use the technology in combat. Choucri (2012) uses Lateral Pressure theory (see Choucri and North 1975) to develop logic for when actors will seek change in the international system. The model is based on a configuration of variables that include population, resources, and technology that will push states to expand beyond their boundaries. There needs to be a proper configuration in place to propel states toward cyber conflict. 17 This effort to articulate a clear theory of cyber action is one of the few in the field. We hope to push further in this volume. Using a rationalist and bargaining (Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Snidal 1985; Fearon 1995; Powell 1999) framework would lead others to suggest that cyber war between states, where cyber conflict functions like war, will not occur. As Gartzke (2013: 1) notes, “put another way, advocates have yet to work out how cyber war actually accomplishes the objectives that typically sponsor terrestrial military violence. Absent logic of consequences, it is difficult to believe that cyber war will prove as devastating for world affairs and for developed nations in particular as many seem to believe.” Valeriano, Brandon; Maness, Ryan C. (2015-04-27). Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System (p. 39). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition. No significant threat from state and non-state actorsManess & Valeriano, 2015, Ryan C. Maness, Northeastern University, Department of Political Science, Brandon Valeriano, University of Glasglow, Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System, Kindle Edition, page number at end of card Furthermore, there is a danger in equivocating the threat that comes from non-state cyber individuals and the threats that come from state-affiliated cyber actors not directly employed by governments. If the discourse is correct, non-state entities such as terrorist organizations or political activist groups should be actively using these malicious tactics in cyberspace in order to promote their goals of fear and awareness of their plight. If the goal is to spread fear and instability among the perceived enemies of this group, and cyber tactics are the most effective way to do this, we should see these tactics perpetrated— and perpetrated often— by these entities. This book examines how state-affiliated non-state actors use cyber power and finds that their actual capabilities to do physical harm via cyberspace are quite limited. This then leaves rogue actors as the dangerous foes in the cyber arena. While these individuals can be destructive, their power in no way compares to the resources, abilities, and capabilities of cyber power connected to traditional states. Valeriano, Brandon; Maness, Ryan C. (2015-04-27). Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System (p. 4). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition. Directory: uploads uploads -> 587 Return function, r i(X) r i(0) r i(1) r i(2) r i(3) 1 0 2 4 6 Thermal Station, I 2 0 1 5 6 3 0 3 5 6 10 uploads -> Department of science and humanities department of mathematics part-a questions and answers uploads -> The Case Against the nypd’s Quota-Driven ‘Broken Windows’ Policing What Is It? uploads -> For want of a nail uploads -> Ownership Models There are two different types of ownership models uploads -> Police Militarization uploads -> City of rising star regular meting thursday, july 14, 2016 uploads -> Township of winfield uploads -> Stop Militarizing Law Enforcement Act of 2014 uploads -> The Black Panther Party’s Ten-Point Program What We Want Now! Download 1.51 Mb. Share with your friends:
|