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- Countries deterred from destroying the power grid
A2: Power Grid AttacksRestraint means no significant attacks, such as on the power grid and nuclear infrastructureManess & Valeriano, 2015, Ryan C. Maness, Northeastern University, Department of Political Science, Brandon Valeriano, University of Glasglow, Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System, Kindle Edition, page number at end of card The suggestion has been that cyber methods of international disputes are proliferating and expanding. Kello (2013) argues that theories and empirical assessments of cyber conflict in international relations scholarship are lacking or underdeveloped. He notes that cyber conflict and its dynamics are “expanding the range of possible harm and outcomes between the concepts of war and peace— with important consequences for national and international security” (Kello 2013: 8). We challenge these assertions on both counts: international relations scholarship is deeply engaged in the cyber debate; and the cyber threat is not proliferating to the point where the conceptions of war and peace need to be altered and reconstructed. The operations of Stuxnet, Flame, Titan Rain, and Ghost Net are often given as examples of the increased usage of the tactic. The coming future should include and expand to the digital battlefield (Nye 2011). Each cyber incident is given a catchy name and is repeated breathlessly by the media. In reality, cyber methods appear to be empty and hollow, lacking the impact they are thought to be capable of, given the novelty of the tactic. 7 Here we elucidate a theory of cyber interactions focused on restraint as an operational process. Our ideas about cyber conflict are based on a complete theory of cyber interactions, as states learn to use cyber power as a new tactic. New tactics have a history of being enfranchised early in their life. Airpower, for example, was weaponized early in its history; nuclear weapons, however, were used against Japan, and the normative revulsion to these actions was so complete that usage again is considered unforgivable. Innocuous cyber tactics might be part of what Azar (1972) called the normal relations range for a rivalry. They may function as methods of signaling displeasure or discord to a rival. The surprising finding in relation to conventional wisdom could be that rivals will tolerate cyber combat operations if they do not cross a line that leads directly to the massive loss of life. This is why it is so important to account for the severity of the operation in a theoretical frame. Cyber actions are expected to occur and even to be tolerated, as long as total offensive operations are not conducted. By total offensive operations, we mean direct and malicious incidents that might lead to the destruction of the energy infrastructure of a state, or incidents meant to take control of army units or facilities. These options are off the table for states, since they will lead directly to war, collateral damage, and economic retaliation, which would then escalate the conflict beyond the control of the state leadership. Actors in cyberspace will therefore be restrained in their use of cyber weapons. As Nye (2011) notes, the vulnerabilities evident in the Internet make the tactic dangerous to utilize since a cyber method can be replicated right back against the initiator. A cyber worm can be examined and reproduced, then used to target the origin location (Farwell and Rohozinski 2011). Cyber weapons are not like conventional weapons; once used, they do not expire. Their life span can be unlimited if the code is altered in slight ways or if they escape the environment for which they were built. Stuxnet was launched in 2010, and in 2013 it was found in a Russian nuclear plant. 8 Methods used in one cyber incident can be developed further for the next incident with little cost to the initiating side. For these reasons, cyber weapons can be more dangerous than conventional weapons, but also for these reasons, cyber weapons are less likely to be utilized. No state wants to show its hand and expose its technology to outside sources. This is the current contention with Stuxnet, as while it was a powerful cyber incident, it also was set out into the wild, and others likely will utilize the weapon for their own ends. This same problem exists for zero day exploits (security flaws that are unknown) that are used by initiators in cyberspace. These sorts of vulnerabilities Valeriano, Brandon; Maness, Ryan C. (2015-04-27). Cyber War versus cease to be weak points once they are used because the program operator now knows how the cyber method works and how to stop it. They are no longer zero day exploits since the vulnerability is usually patched at this point. Another factor contributing to restraint is collateral damage. States are now limited in offensive actions due to functional norms of limited harm against civilians. An example of this logic can be inferred from the 2003 US invasion of Iraq or the 2011 NATO operations against Libya. In 2003, Bush administration officials worried that the effects of cyber combat would not be limited to Iraq, but would instead create worldwide financial havoc, spreading across the Middle East to Europe, and perhaps back to the United States. 9 The United States restrained itself from initiating cyber methods against its rival (Valeriano 2013) during outright war, as the potential fallout of such operations would, through complex networks of interdependence, extend to civilians. In addition, the United States failed to use cyber tactics against Libya during the operation to support the National Transition Coalition forces, due to concerns about the civilian impact. 10 Of course, there could be other reasons that the United States failed to use cyber tactics, but the evidence clearly suggests that civilian harm was the primary concern. Globalization is a process whereby states are more interconnected than in the past. The other fact about the current age of globalization is that these connections occur at a pace that sometimes can defy typical measurement. The speed of interactions makes vulnerabilities in systems more devastating because proliferation of errors and cyber incidents can happen quickly. While many fear this development, the corresponding result— restraint— keeps these worst-case inclinations from becoming a reality. 11 States tend to be to be responsible, despite protestations of recklessness. Cyber states are no more reckless than other states. The next form of restraint relates to the idea of collateral damage limiting cyber actions. We must also consider the role of norms in cyber interactions. Norms are shared standards of behavior. It has become increasingly clear that cyber operations are increasing, but only in terms of small-scale actions that have limited utility or damage potential. The real cyber actions that many warn against have not occurred. The longer this remains the case, the more likely it is that states will set up normative rules to govern cyber behaviors. This could include institutional restraints, international consultations, or legal standards. For now, however, we can only really observe functional restraints to cyber actions. As will be explored in more detail in Chapter 8, cyber actions are a sacred taboo that must not be violated. There remain red lines that no one has yet crossed. There is a chance they will be crossed, but for now we have observed states being limited in cyber actions. Valeriano, Brandon; Maness, Ryan C. (2015-04-27). Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System (p. 63). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition. Countries deterred from destroying the power gridManess & Valeriano, 2015, Ryan C. Maness, Northeastern University, Department of Political Science, Brandon Valeriano, University of Glasglow, Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System, Kindle Edition, page number at end of card It would be useful to summarize our theory of rivalry interactions in cyberspace before we proceed with our analysis. In terms of conflict operations, the attractiveness of the target in relation to the capability used is a critical equation that is rarely examined. What good would a cyber conflict between rivals be if it does little physical and psychological damage to a rival state? Much is made about the secret nature of cyber operations, yet we know very little about the impact of basic operations on foreign policy dynamics. The value of the tactic seems minimal when one thinks of the potential devastation that can arise from direct attacks between states. At the extreme end, a large-scale operation that might wipe out the United States’ Eastern Seaboard Power Grid would be catastrophic, but it would likely be punished with immense retaliation and is thus not a realistic option short of total war. We are then left with minor incidents that are basically speculative ones, with few operations resulting in considerable damage. Restraint exists in the realm of cyber conflict, and we have covered this issue in Chapter 3. Rid (2011, 2013) argues that cyberwar in the extreme sense that death will result has not yet occurred, and is unlikely to occur. Likewise, Gartzke (2013) develops the logic for cyberwar being utilized by states as a low-level form of conflict. We (2013) concluded, in an examination of Russian foreign policy, that cyber conflict was literally the least and the easiest option Russia could have used to infiltrate Estonia during their dust-up in 2007. We also contend that cyber interactions will take a regional tone in that rivals typically are constricted to regional interactions. Restraint plays a critical role in the cyber realm. Derived from Schelling’s analysis that military strength can be used as coercion, deterrence theory has heavily influenced post-atomic foreign policy (Schelling 1966). Instead of risking engagement in direct conflict, great powers developed nuclear arsenals to prevent attack from other states. Jervis explains this buildup for deterrence as an extension of diplomacy, where expressions of force are communicated between sides to deter moves rather than using overt force (Jervis 1979, 1989). States are effectively trying to avoid a conflict spiral and a never-ending situation of continuous threats by making severe threats. Comprehensive restraint relates to deterrence from spectacular attacks such as nuclear weapons or devastating Internet operations focused at power systems and health services. States are restrained from such action through fears of retaliation and escalation of the conflict beyond control, even during rivalries. Valeriano, Brandon; Maness, Ryan C. (2015-04-27). Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System (p. 80). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition. 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