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A2: China Scenario



When China engages in cyber attacks, the US responds with diplomacy to de-scalate


Maness & Valeriano, 2015, Ryan C. Maness, Northeastern University, Department of Political Science, Brandon Valeriano, University of Glasglow, Armed Forces & Society, The Impact of Cyber Conflict on International Relations, p. 2-3

Based on our results, we find that only one method of cyber malice, distributed denial of service (DDoS), affects conflict–cooperation dynamics between states. The effect is a souring of relations between pairs of states when DDoS tactics are utilized as a foreign policy tool. We also find that regional powers and dyads containing the United States have important conflict–cooperation effects when cyber incidents are involved. The latter effects are all negative, except for one pair of states, the United States and China. When China uses cyber conflict directed toward the United States, the United States will respond with diplomacy and try to improve relations with the rising power. These results challenge the typical conventional wisdom proposed by pundits and academics suggesting that cyber interactions are a revolutionary new way of conducting interstate interactions.


China engages in espionage, but not cyber war


Maness & Valeriano, 2015, Ryan C. Maness, Northeastern University, Department of Political Science, Brandon Valeriano, University of Glasglow, Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System, Kindle Edition, page number at end of card

We see this cyber-dominated espionage process at work in China. While the Chinese are active in cyberspace and have their own offensive cyber command, in reality they have used cyber incidents minimally, usually for espionage rather than outright cyber warfare. In response to negative articles about the premier of China, Wen Jiabao, the Chinese launched a series of denial of service incidents and phishing methods against the New York Times and the Washington Post. Some New York Times’ employees’ computers, passwords, and e-mail accounts were infiltrated. The media outlet had been the victim of these incidents for at least four months until security experts were able to finally shut down these phishing attempts. More interesting is that the New York Times and its security firm traced the incidents to a Chinese government operation known as Unit 61,398, which is part of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army General Staff Department, an entity that has been troubling government and private networks in the United States for years. 14 While disconcerting, these cyber incidents failed to reach the extreme levels that most prognosticators suggest when they analyze cyber interactions. Instead of destroying American media operations, they have only sought to disrupt, punish, and steal information from those they feel prompted the aggression. There is a cause, a means, and a will displayed during these interactions, but the outcome is purely a demonstration of capabilities that fall in the category of espionage. Beyond the theoretical gap we have outlined, there is also a gap in the literature developing an explanation for why cyber espionage is used between states or state-based targets. Cyber intelligence operations are proliferating, but at a low level, mainly in the area of espionage, where the goal is to either steal, harass, or make known the ability to penetrate networks. Rid (2013: 82) suggests that most cyber activities we see are really espionage efforts. Considering this process, why then would states utilize cyber espionage operations over full-scale cyber offensive operations? What sort of defensive intelligence mechanisms does the United States have for thwarting or launching cyber espionage campaigns? To develop the logic behind this process, we must understand the intention of cyber operators in the system. Valeriano, Brandon; Maness, Ryan C. (2015-04-27). Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System (pp. 67-68). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.


China and Russia not escalating cyber war


Maness & Valeriano, 2015, Ryan C. Maness, Northeastern University, Department of Political Science, Brandon Valeriano, University of Glasglow, Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System, Kindle Edition, page number at end of card

The first connection between cyber abilities and actions is the observation that states do literally the least they can do in the cybersphere. The point for a state-supported cyber operation seems to be to demonstrate capabilities, rather than destroy systems and operations— extreme incidents such as Stuxnet and Flame excluded. It is as if the initiators only want to make their existence and capabilities known. As with conventional deterrence policies, actions and responses are only effective if they are communicated to the target. China and Russia have achieved this goal in their cyber operations. They have made known their capabilities and reach, and then have chosen to go no further. Valeriano, Brandon; Maness, Ryan C. (2015-04-27). Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System (p. 68). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.


No significant impact to Chinese theft


Maness & Valeriano, 2015, Ryan C. Maness, Northeastern University, Department of Political Science, Brandon Valeriano, University of Glasglow, Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System, Kindle Edition, page number at end of card

The most significant cyber disputes are ones that either severely damage states’ strategic plans or are attempts to steal sensitive state and military secrets. Stuxnet, Flame, Gauss, and Duqu are all incidents that were part of the larger “Olympic Games” nuclear program dispute that was launched against Iran in order to discourage the Iranians from continuing their nuclear program. This is the only significant cyber dispute to have attempted to alter a state’s behavior. We found similar incidents to be scarce in our data, which indicates that cyber tactics are usually only used to steal from or cause minor disruptions to an enemy. The Chinese theft of the F-35 plans is a good example from the years-long Chinese theft operations against the United States. While traumatic to the country and military establishment, these events are by no means critical in terms of severity or impact. Stuxnet and Flame may have set back the Iranian nuclear weapons program, yet most estimates suggest that the recovery time was a few months to three years (Sanger 2012). While the Chinese may have stolen advanced jet plans, they have yet to develop the capabilities necessary to replicate American technology at a level capable of supplying its troops with steady weaponry, particularly jet engines. Far more devastation would result from the potential Chinese theft of stealth helicopter technology in relation to the Bin Laden assassination raid in 2011 and the capture in 2001 of signals from an intelligence plane (the Hainan Island incident). Valeriano, Brandon; Maness, Ryan C. (2015-04-27). Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System (pp. 94-95). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.




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