Japan Aff Michigan 2010 / ccgjp lab – 7wks
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Withdrawal badWithdrawal of US troops would lead to a regional arm’s race Destler and Nacht, 91 – *Professor at the School of Public Policy, University of Maryland AND **Professor of Public Policy and former Aaron Wildavsky Dean at the Goldman School of Public Policy (Winter 1990-1991, “Beyond Mutual Recrimination: Building a Solid U.S.-Japan Relationship in the 1990s” http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538908) “Beyond Mutual Recrimination: Building a Solid U.S.-Japan Relationship in the 1990s” In security terms this scenario would severely erode the U.S. geo-strategic position in East Asia. In an across-the-board economic confrontation, anti- Japanese sentiment in the United States could easily translate into severe protectionist legislation against Japanese imports that would greatly damage Japan's economy, at least in the short run. This legislation would in turn trigger enormous anti-American sentiment in Japan. It is hard to visualize support in either Washington or Tokyo for the maintenance of U.S. forces in Japan under such circumstances. The U.S. withdrawal from Japan and from the security alliance would then stimulate a new defense debate in Japan. Without American military protection or the explicit U.S. guarantees of Jap- anese oil deliveries from the Persian Gulf, there is a serious risk that Japan would become a major new military rival capable of equalling or even sur- passing the United States in the development and deployment of high- technology weaponry. The renewed sense of threat from Japan would, in turn, stimulate an arms buildup in Korea, the People's Republic of China, Indonesia and elsewhere in East Asia. A variant of this scenario envisages the United States and Japan sliding into confrontation without an explicit intention on the part of either to intensify the rivalry. As economic conflicts continue, over time they could undermine commitment to the broader relationship. Government leaders in Tokyo and Washington would become increasingly frustrated with trying to patch over differences and bearing the burden of the relationship in domestic politics. After a while, these differences might extend beyond economic and Beyond Mutual Recrimination I 111 technological competition to fundamental disagreements over policies toward third countries in the Middle East, Europe, or elsewhere. At some point leaders in one of the countries would decide that it was in their nation's strategic interest or in their own personal political interest to visibly resist or confront the other, or perhaps even to renounce the alliance.25 Movement in this direction could be fueled by arguments that the U.S. geostrategic position in Asia no longer served any useful purpose. With the removal of the Soviet threat, some claim that American forces in the region are configured to counter an enemy that no longer exists and are incapable of influencing other troubles in East Asia-turmoil in China or the conflict in Cambodia, for example. But this logic is faulty. The United States retains enormous interest in the stability and prosperity of the region, with which its trade now substantially exceeds trade with Europe. And this stability depends on a continuing U.S. political-military presence. In contrast to Europe, with its web of long-standing and substantial multi- lateral institutions and relationships (particularly the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Community), multilateralism in Asia is very weak. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which includes Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and Brunei, has not moved beyond limited economic cooperation. The newly formed Asia- Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (APEC), which includes all the ASEAN members plus the United States, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, has yet to define its purposes. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) collapsed after the American defeat in Vietnam, and it never included East Asian nations. Instead, what has endured in U.S.-East Asian security policy has been bilateral security relationships, carefully developed and nurtured, with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, as well as strong bilateral ties with Aus- tralia, Thailand, and Taiwan. In Europe, it may be possible for the United States to curtail sharply its military presence and redefine its security role within a redefined set of multilateral institutions, but this option is not now available in Asia. Some trimming of U.S. forces may well prove feasible, but an American withdrawal and a U.S.-Japan confrontation would put the entire 25. As C. Fred Bergsten notes, such an evolution could lead to a "European-Japanese nexus" against the United States, or alternatively a U.S.-European alliance against Japan. See Bergsten, "The World Economy After The Cold War," Foreigti Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 3 (Summer 1990), pp. 102-103. International Security 15:3 | 112 East Asian security balance "up for grabs." Notwithstanding the receding of the Soviet threat, the U.S. political-military presence is the one broadly- accepted stabilizing force. This stabilizing role is especially noteworthy on the Korean peninsula, where U.S. forces not only serve as a tripwire to deter a North Korean attack on the South, but discourage the development of adventurism in Seoul toward the north. While much has changed since the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the situation remains tense and volatile; the border is one of the most heavily militarized areas in the world. It would be foolhardy and dangerous to remove U.S. forces now. Finally, there are no guarantees that Chinese or Soviet militarism in the region will not reemerge. The brutal force used by the Chinese leadership to put down the pro-democracy student movement in 1989 demonstrates that not all communist regimes are willing to fade quietly from the scene. The coming succession crisis in Beijing could bring about enormous instability and civil strife; the political situation in the Soviet Union is in extraordinary flux. While U.S. forces would not be directly engaged in shaping develop- ments in either of these great nations, it is difficult to see how reduction or removal of the American presence could lend stability to East Asia. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. 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