Japan Aff Michigan 2010 / ccgjp lab – 7wks
Military in Japan does not affect alliance (4/5)
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Military in Japan does not affect alliance (4/5)The critical US-Japan alliance is deeper than just military Denmark and Kliman 6/10 Cornerstone: A Future Agenda for the U.S.-Japan Alliance Abraham M. Denmark is a Fellow at CNAS. Dr. Daniel M. Kliman is a Visiting Fellow at CNAS. http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/USJapanPolicyBrief_DenmarkKliman_June2010.pdf The center for a new American Security (cnAS) develops strong, pragmatic and principled national security and defense policies that promote and protect American interests and values. Building on the deep expertise and broad experience of its staff and advisors, cnAS engages policymakers, experts and the public with innovative fact-based research, ideas and analysis to shape and elevate the national security debate. As an independent and nonpartisan research institution, cnAS leads efforts to help inform and prepare the national security leaders of today and tomorrow. The United States and Japan have a historic opportunity to renew their 50-year-old alliance. With a new Japanese prime minister in place and an agreement on the contentious relocation of a u.S. military base on Okinawa reached, Washington and Tokyo are poised to put past disagreements behind them and to prepare the alliance for the challenges of the 21st century. Since its founding in 1960, the U.S.-Japan alliance has stood as one of the greatest successes of American foreign policy. It has contributed to Japan’s security and prosperity by extending the U.S. nuclear umbrella over Japan and by relieving Japan of the need to maintain large-scale power projection capabilities. Moreover, it has advanced U.S. interests by ensuring a stable balance of power in east Asia, providing a military platform for managing contingencies on the Korean Peninsula, and serving as a vehicle for enlisting Japan’s cooperation on regional and global security issues. Yet, the strategic environment has changed radi- cally since the alliance’s establishment. When the United States and Japan signed a Mutual Security Treaty in 1960, the alliance was intended primar- ily to counter the Soviet Union. China at that time was reeling from the aftereffects of the Great Leap Forward (a catastrophic attempt at rapid industri- alization) and North Korea only posed a threat to its southern neighbor rather than the entire region. Fifty years later, a rising China has become a major military power and the economic hub of East Asia. North Korea, though desperately poor, has developed nuclear weapons and missiles capable of reaching Japan. The region has become ever more economically and politically integrated, while climate change and resource competition have emerged as new “natural security” challenges. In response to this newly complex strategic envi- ronment, the alliance must evolve to ensure it remains useful for both sides. The alliance can help the United States and Japan to shape a ris- ing China’s future trajectory and to respond to an increasingly belligerent North Korea. It can also help them defend the global commons – the sea, air, space and cyber domains over which no country holds sovereignty – and augment preexisting U.S. efforts to address environmental security concerns.This policy brief outlines an agenda for alliance renewal. We begin by surveying the initial nine months of political transition in Japan (from the Liberal Democratic Party to the Democratic Party of Japan) beginning last August, a tumultuous period that has culminated in an opportunity to move the alliance forward. We then discuss how to get the fundamentals of the alliance right. Lastly, we set forth an agenda for enhancing U.S.-Japan security cooperation. The Transition Months The election of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) on August 30, 2009 inaugurated a new phase in the U.S.-Japan alliance. After coming to power, the DPJ embarked on a foreign policy emphasizing Japan’s relations with East Asia and calling for a “more equal” alliance with the United States. Although this rhetoric unnerved some in Washington, what most troubled the alliance was the DPJ’s attempt to fulfill a campaign pledge by renegotiating a 2006 agreement with the United States that called for closing Futenma, a U.S. Marine base in Okinawa, and building a new runway in the waters off Camp Schwab – another U.S. Marine base on the island. The U.S. government initially resisted the DPJ’s bid to reopen negotiations over Futenma, arguing that an agreement was already in place and revisions would jeopardize the entire effort to transfer U.S. forces out of Japan to reduce the basing footprint there.1 Frustration mounted in Washington and Tokyo, and some observers voiced concerns about an alliance adrift.2 The United States and Japan remained at odds over Futenma for nine months until a combination of intensive U.S. diplomacy and growing disenchant- ment in Japan with then Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s handling of the alliance finally broke the impasse. The new agreement, issued in May 2010 via a joint statement that reaffirmed the 2006 accord, clearly weakened Hatoyama. With his support in freefall, his governing coalition in revolt, and elections for Japan’s Upper House scheduled in July 2010, Hatoyama resigned shortly thereafter. Although the new agreement will likely face consid- erable resistance from vocal opposition groups in Okinawa, it nonetheless removes a major roadblock to advancing the alliance on other fronts. The agreement on Futenma coupled with Hatoyama’s resignation heralded the end of a tur- bulent period. An alliance agenda once consumed by Futenma is now open to more productive pur- suits. And in newly chosen Prime Minister Naoto Kan, Washington has a new partner in Tokyo who does not carry the baggage of Hatoyama’s approach to Futenma, is more experienced, and, by many accounts, operates more pragmatically than his predecessor.3 Thus, the 50th anniversary of the alliance’s founding, until recently considered a squandered opportunity, can still serve as a spring- board for adapting the alliance for the political and strategic challenges of the 21st century. Getting Alliance Fundamentals Right To advance U.S. and Japanese interests over the next fifty years, the alliance must stand on a firm founda- tion. That means getting the fundamentals of the alliance right: a clear rationale based on shared inter- ests and values, effective institutions to manage the alliance, public support and long-term fiscal health. The alliance’s raison d’être is not military coop- eration – a fact obscured by the Futenma dispute. Rather, the military dimension of the alliance is merely a means for achieving shared political ends: deterring North Korea, shaping the course of China’s rise, providing the regional stability necessary for economic growth and promoting democratic values. Thus, at the next bilateral summit, the United States and Japan should begin by reemphasizing that the alliance transcends a transactional bargain in which the United States offers military protection in exchange for basing rights in Japan. To strengthen the alliance, mechanisms for manag- ing the alliance must be updated to reflect political and strategic realities. A handful of bureaucrats in Tokyo, plus a few politicians from the long- dominant Liberal Democratic Party, once served as the primary Japanese interlocutors for this vital alliance. The advent of a DPJ administration has shattered this cozy arrangement. Furthermore, the so-called “two-plus-two,” a conclave where the U.S. Secretaries of Defense and State along with their Japanese counterparts meet to chart the future of the alliance, reflects a bygone era. Many of the security challenges the alliance now confronts require cooperation across a broader spectrum of government agencies such as the United States Agency for International Development and Japan’s International Cooperation Agency, the U.S. Treasury Department and Japan’s Ministry of Finance, and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and Japan’s Council for Science and Technology Policy Future institutions for alliance management should therefore be inclusive, encompassing members of all the major political parties in Japan and repre- sentatives from more than just the Defense and State Departments and their Japanese equivalents. In practice, this will mean creating alliance task forces on specific issues rather than simply expand- ing the “two-plus-two” into an unwieldy whole of government dialogue. To buttress these updated institutions, the United States and Japan should create supporting networks among the next gen- eration of leaders across government, the private sector, academe, science and technology, and civil society. Washington and Tokyo also must do more to rein- force Japanese domestic support for the alliance. For most Americans the alliance is a rather abstract concept, one they occasionally see in the news. But for the Japanese people, it is a daily fact of life. Many Japanese communities host U.S. military bases and are subject to the noise, inconvenience and potential danger of living in such close prox- imity to active military training. Even Japanese communities located far from U.S. military bases encounter the alliance nearly every day in the news and political discourse. As such, the Japanese public’s support for the alliance is essential for its long-term viability. Polling in Japan shows general support for the alliance running at close to 80 per- cent, but bubbling under the surface is a good deal of pent-up frustration, especially (and critically) in Okinawa.4 The U.S. and Japanese governments must address the frustration of the Japanese public. The Japanese government and its citizens need a strategic dialogue, especially in Okinawa, which hosts a dis- proportionate number of U.S. bases and is also the poorest of Japan’s 47 prefectures. The United States must also come up with more creative – and effec- tive – ways to convey the value of the alliance to the Japanese public. Outreach to Okinawa is critical. A major public diplomacy effort in Okinawa – one that explains the purpose of American bases, listens to local concerns, and effectively addresses them – is in order. It is also time for the United States to revive long-dormant efforts to revitalize Okinawa’s economy with foreign investment, educational aid and exchanges, and infrastructure improvements, gestures more than warranted by the basing burden Okinawa has long shouldered. Putting the alliance on a firmer foundation will also require a focus on fiscal health. Japan’s declin- ing and aging population, coupled with a large national debt, will likely reduce its potential to cooperate with the United States on a host of regional and global challenges. Japan’s defense spending and foreign aid are already decreasing, and Japanese politicians are preoccupied with issues that affect an elderly population, such as health care and social security. Fiscal constraints could also limit America’s capacity to contribute to the alliance. As the baby-boomer generation retires, social spending will compete with funding allocated to defense and foreign affairs. Add to that payments on a mushrooming national debt, and the United States may have little choice but to dimin- ish its foreign commitments, including the military capabilities it brings to the alliance. Getting the alliance fundamentals right will provide a robust foundation for enhanced U.S.-Japan security coop- eration. Together, the two countries can renew the alliance to meet traditional challenges and new threats. Consequently, implementing policies to brighten the respective fiscal outlooks of both Japan and the United States is essential to the long-term health of the alliance. The United States and Japan can cooperate in ways that will boost economic growth, the ultimate solution to the looming budget squeeze. The two can expand collabora- tive research in technological fields with high commercial potential and promote demand-led growth in emerging markets to generate new export opportunities. Japan, an “infrastructure superpower,” can help bring the United Statesinto the 21st century by partnering with it on high-speed rail and starting other initiatives to modernize America’s aging infrastructure. This would create jobs in both countries, enhance the overall competitiveness of the American economy and renew the bonds of affection that undergird the alliance. Likewise, the United States, a “start- up superpower,” can support Japan’s transition [CONTINUED] Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. 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