Japan Aff Michigan 2010 / ccgjp lab – 7wks
Military in Japan does not affect alliance (5/5)
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- Military presence k2 alliance (1/7)
Military in Japan does not affect alliance (5/5)[CONTINUED] to an economy that is more hospitable to new, innovative corporations as well as large decades- old conglomerates. The alliance must become a more effective tool for sustaining peace and stability in Northeast Asia. Compared to the early 1990s, when the first nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula revealed a lack of preparation for actual military opera- tions, the alliance has come a long way. However, much more should be done. The sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan underscores that a military conflict in the region, a circumstance in which the alliance would play a pivotal role, is far from a hypothetical contingency. Accordingly, the United States and Japan need to upgrade the operational effectiveness of the alliance. U.S. coordination arrangements with South Korea may provide inspiration, though steps to enhance real- time coordination between the U.S. military and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces will have to take Japan’s domestic constraints (a constitutional clause and legal interpretation proscribing the use of force in all but self-defense) into account. The alliance must address the inherent contradic- tions of America’s push for a world without nuclear weapons on the one hand and a continued commit- ment to provide Japan with extended deterrence on the other. For five decades, the United States has extended its nuclear umbrella over Japan, thereby giving confidence against external attack. With the Obama administration set to reduce the American nuclear stockpile, Tokyo has begun anew to ques- tion the long-term credibility of the U.S. security guarantee. Given China’s modernization of its nuclear forces, and North Korea’s nuclear weapons tests, such concern is inevitable. To directly address Japanese doubts about the future of extended deterrence, the United States should launch a bilateral dialogue discussing what configuration of nuclear weapons and conventional capabilities is sufficient to deter would-be aggressors and then take appropriate actions once decision-makers reach accord. Otherwise, Japan may be inclined to hedge against what it perceives as a dimin- ished security guarantee by fielding long-range strike capabilities, a development that would not only destabilize the region, but also divert scarce Japanese resources to a military capability the United States can more cheaply provide. The alliance must become more than a hedge against China’s rise; it should become a means of shaping China’s future trajectory. For the alliance to effectively influence the strategic choices China makes, the United States and Japan will have to act in concert. Prime Minister Hatoyama’s dismissive approach to the possibility of a serious clash with China, and his assumption that retaining lever- age over a rising China was not as essential as the United States contended, posed a problem for bilat- eral coordination. Despite Hatoyama’s resignation, the potential for the United States and Japan to dif- fer over their respective China policies remains. To avoid the kind of miscoordination epitomized by Hatoyama’s East Asian Community concept – an ill-defined proposal for a regional bloc that initially excluded the United States – political leaders and bureaucrats on both sides should map out a shared vision of China’s desired role that transcends the generality of a “responsible stakeholder,” i.e., a state that abides by the norms and practices of the current international order and contributes to its upkeep. They should also hold a dialogue exploring the potential consequences of failing to confront the challenge that China poses, as this would serve to educate some members of the DPJ who, like Hatoyama, retain unwarranted optimism about China’s future course. Military presence k2 alliance (1/7)Current military relations key to US-Japan alliance Tkacik 4 ( Senior Fellow at “The Heritage Foundation” “China’s New Challenge to the U.S.-Japan Alliance” http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2004/07/Chinas-New-Challenge-to-the-US-Japan-Alliance) In that kind of charged atmosphere, Japan-U.S. economic negotiations held earlier in the decade took the worst turn since the end of World War II. The U.S. position was that it was no use to make general trade agreements with Japan because the Ministry of International Trade and Industry would pull strings behind the scenes to prevent private industry from buying U.S. products. So the U.S. government tried to impose numerical targets designed to secure specific market shares for U.S. goods so that the Japanese government would exercise its influence to achieve the target. Of course, that ran counter not only to free-enterprise principles, but also to the realities of Japan's administrative and economic systems. U.S.-Japan relations declined rapidly. In the end, the yen appreciated sharply against the dollar, and the pace accelerated every time a U.S. trade negotiator spoke unsympathetically of the Japanese plight. The strong yen, of course, dealt a heavy blow to Japan's export industries. The Pentagon saved Japan from the crisis. The so-called Nye Report stated that "We must not allow trade friction to undermine our security alliance." U.S. trade negotiators reportedly deplored that statement on the grounds that the U.S. would lose its most potent leverage to influence Japan. In a similar vein, the Economist magazine said that Japan, feeling assured about the alliance, would not back off in trade negotiations with the U.S. Thus Japan was saved through mutual trust between the two nations' security authorities, a relationship built in the last days of the Cold War -- the "hidden success story" as Jim Auer put it, particularly buttressed by Japan's special HNS budget as a visible symbol of cooperation. U.S. public opinion and the Congress reigned supreme in the world during the 20th century. Indeed, dealing with the U.S. Congress was, and still is, a matter of life and death to nations around the world. Granted, Japan has less talent to deal with the U.S. Congress than English-speaking nations, such as Britain and Canada. It is no exaggeration to say, however, that this special budget is the only and the biggest "brand name" Japan holds at present. Japan should not stint on this spending, in much the same sense that private-sector companies should not cut back on expenses essential to maintain their brand names. The "omoiyari" budget was conceived in the realization that Japan, being unable to cooperate with the U.S. through the use of force, should cooperate financially as much as possible. I do not think that this money-centered approach can be continued indefinitely because the alliance could be endangered if Japan watched from the sidelines when U.S. soldiers shed their blood in a military crisis in a surrounding area. In the present circumstances, however, money is the only thing Japan can provide in place of a direct military contribution. We should realize the grave implications of stinting even on such financial support. The point is that the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan is essential not only to the security of this nation and to peace in Asia, but also to the global strategy of the free and democratic nations. Therefore, Japan should maintain a firm political stance that leaves no doubt about the government's policy of providing unstinting support to help maintain the U.S. military presence. Exactly the same way of thinking should apply to the bases problem in Okinawa, for instance. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 0.59 Mb. Share with your friends:
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