Japan Aff Michigan 2010 / ccgjp lab – 7wks
Military presence k2 alliance (4/7)
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- Military presence key to alliance (5/7)
Military presence k2 alliance (4/7)The Okinawa base is key to the US-Japan alliance that is key to peace in the Pacific. GREEN 6/13/10 MICHAEL J. (Mr. Green is senior advisor and Japan chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and associate professor at Georgetown University.) http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703433704575303592164774492.html?mod=wsj_india_main To say the United States-Japan alliance has been strained under the Democratic Party of Japan's leadership is an understatement. Former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama opened his term in September with promises to counterbalance American influence through a closed "East Asia Community" and sowed doubt about Japan's commitment to America's forward presence in Asia by blocking implementation of a plan to build a new air base to replace a Marine Corps facility on Okinawa. He threw the policy-making process into chaos with an antibureaucracy campaign that had inexperienced ministers doing the work of clerks and a collection of playwrights and television pundits in the Prime Minister's Office trying to decide security policy. Worst of all, Mr. Hatoyama let then DPJ Secretary-general Ichiro Ozawa reverse key government decisions based on the wishes of the DPJ's anti-alliance and antimarket coalition partners, the Social Democrats and the People's New Party. Mr. Hatoyama's successor, Naoto Kan, has virtually no track record on foreign- and security-policy, but he appears keen to fix these mistakes. In his first week, he called the U.S.-Japan alliance the cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy; pledged to follow through on building the replacement for the Futenma air base; cancelled a trip to the Shanghai Expo so that he can meet President Obama before going to China; and presented plans at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation trade-ministers' summit for a Pacific free-trade area that includes the U.S. Even more encouraging, Mr. Kan has weakened the influence of Mr. Ozawa and shifted the party's center of gravity toward national-security realists associated with Land and Transport Minister Seiji Maehara. These are all positive signs, yet some American pundits still charge that the Obama administration undercut Mr. Hatoyama and will now reap the vengeance of the Japanese people. Not quite: Washington exhibited as much "strategic patience" with the DPJ government as it could without jeopardizing the prospects for finding a realistic alternative to the troop realignments on Okinawa. Across the board, the Japanese media have put the blame for the deteriorating bilateral relationship squarely on the Hatoyama government. Meanwhile, public opinion polls about the alliance and the U.S. held steady while Mr. Hatoyama's support collapsed to less than 20%. The greater problem now is that the Obama administration might breathe a sigh of relief at Mr. Kan's rise to power and slip into complacent auto-pilot mode on bilateral relations. The last nine months have been hard on a White House overwhelmed by foreign policy challenges from Afghanistan to Iran. In the former Bush administration National Security Council, where I served, there was one high level strategy session on Japan relations early on and after that coordination with Tokyo fell smoothly to officials who understood the joint strategy and had confidence in shared values and interests with Japan. The Obama National Security Council has apparently had numerous high-level sessions struggling to keep the alliance relationship with Japan on track. Now that things appear to have stabilized, Japan fatigue in Washington is a real danger. This is not the time for the U.S. to ratchet down attention to the alliance. While Washington has been playing defense with Tokyo for the past nine months, Beijing has been on the move in the East and South China seas and Kim Jong Il has shown what he thinks of deterrence on the Korean peninsula now that he has nuclear capabilities. Pyongyang's sinking of the South Korean navy ship Cheonan has once again focused attention on security issues in North Asia. The U.S. and Japan need to build a new strategy for preventing further erosion of the strategic equilibrium in the Pacific. Tokyo is preparing a midterm defense plan with an initial advisory board panel report due in a few months. The panel is now likely to advise strengthened security cooperation with the U.S. and other like-minded states in Asia. The Obama administration should synchronize its Asia strategy with this effort so that President Obama's visit to Japan in November on the 50th anniversary of the bilateral security treaty provides clear future vision for the alliance. Key elements should include strengthening bilateral roles and missions for defense of the maritime commons; coordinating support for democratic norms and sustainable development in Asia; and working for a bilateral U.S.-Japan economic partnership agreement and trade liberalization in the region. Both governments will also need a strategy to rebuild support in Okinawa for the air base replacement facility. Mr. Hatoyama's flip-flopping and populism have left Mr. Kan with a real political mess on the island. In the worst-case scenario, an antibase candidate could capitalize on mounting frustration with Tokyo to win the gubernatorial election in November. Mr. Kan would then have to abandon his pledge to Washington on base realignment or pass legislation in the Diet overruling the governor. The damage to Mr. Kan and the alliance would be bad either way. Things are looking better for the U.S.-Japan alliance. Mr. Kan has taken important steps to remove uncertainty about Japan's foreign policy trajectory under the DPJ. Now the rest of Asia—friends and foes alike—will be watching to see if the Obama administration has a strategy with Japan that goes beyond defense of the status quo. Military presence key to alliance (5/7)Current military relations key to US-Japan alliance Tkacik 4 ( Senior Fellow at “The Heritage Foundation” “China’s New Challenge to the U.S.-Japan Alliance” http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2004/07/Chinas-New-Challenge-to-the-US-Japan-Alliance) In that kind of charged atmosphere, Japan-U.S. economic negotiations held earlier in the decade took the worst turn since the end of World War II. The U.S. position was that it was no use to make general trade agreements with Japan because the Ministry of International Trade and Industry would pull strings behind the scenes to prevent private industry from buying U.S. products. So the U.S. government tried to impose numerical targets designed to secure specific market shares for U.S. goods so that the Japanese government would exercise its influence to achieve the target. Of course, that ran counter not only to free-enterprise principles, but also to the realities of Japan's administrative and economic systems. U.S.-Japan relations declined rapidly. In the end, the yen appreciated sharply against the dollar, and the pace accelerated every time a U.S. trade negotiator spoke unsympathetically of the Japanese plight. The strong yen, of course, dealt a heavy blow to Japan's export industries. The Pentagon saved Japan from the crisis. The so-called Nye Report stated that "We must not allow trade friction to undermine our security alliance." U.S. trade negotiators reportedly deplored that statement on the grounds that the U.S. would lose its most potent leverage to influence Japan. In a similar vein, the Economist magazine said that Japan, feeling assured about the alliance, would not back off in trade negotiations with the U.S. Thus Japan was saved through mutual trust between the two nations' security authorities, a relationship built in the last days of the Cold War -- the "hidden success story" as Jim Auer put it, particularly buttressed by Japan's special HNS budget as a visible symbol of cooperation. U.S. public opinion and the Congress reigned supreme in the world during the 20th century. Indeed, dealing with the U.S. Congress was, and still is, a matter of life and death to nations around the world. Granted, Japan has less talent to deal with the U.S. Congress than English-speaking nations, such as Britain and Canada. It is no exaggeration to say, however, that this special budget is the only and the biggest "brand name" Japan holds at present. Japan should not stint on this spending, in much the same sense that private-sector companies should not cut back on expenses essential to maintain their brand names. The "omoiyari" budget was conceived in the realization that Japan, being unable to cooperate with the U.S. through the use of force, should cooperate financially as much as possible. I do not think that this money-centered approach can be continued indefinitely because the alliance could be endangered if Japan watched from the sidelines when U.S. soldiers shed their blood in a military crisis in a surrounding area. In the present circumstances, however, money is the only thing Japan can provide in place of a direct military contribution. We should realize the grave implications of stinting even on such financial support. The point is that the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan is essential not only to the security of this nation and to peace in Asia, but also to the global strategy of the free and democratic nations. Therefore, Japan should maintain a firm political stance that leaves no doubt about the government's policy of providing unstinting support to help maintain the U.S. military presence. Exactly the same way of thinking should apply to the bases problem in Okinawa, for instance. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 0.59 Mb. Share with your friends:
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