Status quo solves relations (2/2)
Status quo solves relations
YAMAGUCHI 6/6/10
MARI (Associative Press writer) http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hlQO-kyvIEyrc0I90V5l0LFN7JTwD9G5L9EO0
TOKYO — Japan's new prime minister made his diplomatic debut Sunday in a telephone call with President Barack Obama, reaffirming his country's alliance with Washington and promising to work hard on an agreement to relocate a contentious U.S. Marine base.
Naoto Kan, a straight-talking populist, was elected prime minister Friday, replacing Yukio Hatoyama who stepped down last week after breaking a campaign promise to move the Marine base off the southern island of Okinawa.
Kan told Obama that relations with Washington are a "cornerstone" of Japan's diplomacy and vowed to "further deepen and develop the Japan-U.S. alliance to tackle global and regional challenges," Japan's Foreign Ministry said.
He also promised Obama to "make a strenuous effort" to tackle the relocation of Marine Air Station Futenma, it said.
Under an agreement signed last month between the two governments, the base is to be moved to a less-crowded part of Okinawa, but Kan faces intense opposition from island residents who want it moved off Okinawa completely, as Hatoyama had promised. Because their opposition is so intense, some analysts have questioned whether the plan can actually be carried out.
A White House statement did not mention Futenma, saying "the two leaders agreed to work very closely together" and consult on the nuclear programs in North Korea and Iran. An administration official added the leaders "hit it off well on a personal level."
The Futenma issue is just one of many tough challenges facing Kan, whose foremost mission is to win back voters disgusted by Hatoyama's broken promise and the corrupt image instilled by party heavyweight Ichiro Ozawa, who also resigned last week from the party's No. 2 post.
Troops k2 deterrence (1/3)
U.S. troop presence key to stability
Nye 95
( PhD in political science from Harvard, Chairman of the National Security Council at Harvard University, “East Asian Security: The Case For Deep Engagement” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/51210/joseph-s-nye-jr/east-asian-security-the-case-for-deep-engagement)
There are a number of reasons for East Asian prosperity, including high savings rates and successful macroeconomic policies. But among the important and often neglected reasons for East Asia's success are American alliances in the region and the continued presence of substantial U.S. forces. Our national interests demand our deep engagement in the region. We back up that engagement with our steadfast commitment to sustain a forward military presence of about 100,000 American troops in East Asia, of whom 36,000 stand by our ally the Republic of Korea, while 47,000 demonstrate our commitment to regional security and the defense of Japan. The U.S. presence is a force for stability, reducing the need for arms buildups and deterring the rise of hegemonic forces. Political order is not sufficient to explain economic prosperity, but it is necessary. Analysts who ignore the importance of this political order are like people who forget the importance of the oxygen they breathe. Security is like oxygen--you tend not to notice it until you begin to lose it, but once that occurs there is nothing else that you will think about.
US troops key to deterrence in East Asia
Nye 95
( PhD in political science from Harvard, Chairman of the National Security Council at Harvard University, “East Asian Security: The Case For Deep Engagement” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/51210/joseph-s-nye-jr/east-asian-security-the-case-for-deep-engagement)
If security dilemma theory is applied to East Asia, the chance for spirals of tension in the area seems great, particularly in the absence of a U.S. military presence in the region. The theory states that, in an uncertain and anarchic international system, mistrust between two or more potential adversaries can lead each side to take precaustionary and defensively motivated measure that are perceived as offensive threats. This can lead to countermeasures in kind, thus ratcheting up regional tensions, reducing security, and creating self-fulfilling prophecies about the danger of one’s security environment. If we look at the variables that might fuel security dilemma dynamics, East Asia appears quite dangerous. From a standard realist perspective, not only could dramatic and unpredictable changes in the distribution of capabilities in East Asia increase uncertainty and mistrust, but the importance of sea-lanes and secure energy supplies to almost all regional actors could encourage a destabilizing competition to develop power-projection capabilities on the seas and in the skies. Because they are perceived as offensive, power projection forces are more likely to spark spirals of tension than weapons that can defend only a nation’s homeland. Perhaps even more important in East Asia than these more commonly considered variable are psychological factors (such as the historically based mistrust and animosity among regional actors) and political geography issues relating to the Taiwan question, which make even defensive weapons in the region appear threatening to Chinese security. One way to ameliorate security dilemmas and prevent spirals of tension is to have an outside arbiter play a policing role, lessening the perceived need for regional actors to begin destabilizing security competitions. For this reasons, most scholars, regardless of theoretical persuasion, seem to agree with U.S. officials and local leaders that a major factor in containing potential tensions in East Asia is the continuing presence of the U.S. military, particularly in Japan.
Station forces in Japan key to international security in the far east
Yoda 5
(Rand reporter, Rand Corporation: Objective Analysis. Effective Solutions. Recalibrating Alliance
Contributions Changing Policy Environment and Military Alliances, pdf)
For Japan, “Granting right to station forces in Japan” is the obligation of Article VI of the Security Treaty. “Increase of scope of Japan’s role in the Article VI emergency” is, although not obligation of the treaty, to expand the scope of cooperation in case of the U.S. military activities around Japan for “the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East” (Article VI), for example, when a conflict takes place on the Korean Peninsula. Japan’s contribution includes, for example, rear area support of the U.S. military. “Increase of scope of Japan’s role in the Article V emergency” is to increase the role of Japanese military in direct attack of Japan or to prevent the attack, for example, by increasing responsibility of sea lane defense. “Increase of scope of Japan’s role in out of the security treaty areas” is to increase the role of Japanese military in emergencies not related to either Article V or VI of the security treaty. For example, logistic support by Japan’s military for the U.S. forces in Iraq is included in this category. I include “defense spending” for Japan because buildup of defense capability of Japan contributes to the increase of deterrence of the alliance, and also contributes to the reduction of burden for the U.S. to help Japan if Japan is under attack.25
Share with your friends: |