Jurisdiction: a court’s power to decide a case or enter a decree. Types of Jurisdiction: Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction over the nature of the case and the type of relief sought

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  Important Terms: The rendering court is the court in the first lawsuit, i.e. the court that renders the initial decision. The subsequent court is any court in which the second lawsuit is filed. Interesting questions come up when the rendering court and the subsequent court are in different states or different levels (state vs. federal).
  
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  In Semtek, the Court determined that preclusion is procedural under Erie (and in that case, federal rules necessarily applied). However, mere paragraphs later, the court determines that preclusion is in fact a substantive issue. The holding in Semtek suggests that in cases where the court is sitting in diversity, the preclusion laws of the state in which the court is sitting should govern. A subsequent court must give at least as much preclusive effect as a rendering court to a rendering court’s judgment, but it is unclear whether a subsequent court can give more preclusive effect than a rendering court. A rendering court can limit the preclusive effect of its decisions.
  

Subsequent Court

Rendering Court

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  Rule 23 governs class action lawsuits. In order for a case to be certified as a class action it must meet the following four criteria: numerosity (the class must be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable), commonality (must show that the substantial questions of law or fact are common to the class), typicality (the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class), and adequacy of representation (the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class); and fall under one of the subcategories of Rule 23 B.
  
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  A B1 claim used when disallowing the class would be likely to result in inconsistent verdicts or when separate lawsuits could potentially preclude parties from arguing an issue when they have never actually had their day in court. Such a worry could come into play with things like bankruptcy cases where members who find out early can receive damages but later members are unable to do so because of the poor defendant. The policy rationale behind this category is that the court is worried about effectively adjudicating issues of class members whose interests are involved. To avoid this issue, the rule attempts to create a class where damages are equal. Thus, subdivision A looks for the possibility of prejudice to the non-class party while B seeks to protect members of the class from prejudice. B2 categorization is appropriate when the relief sought is injunctive or declaratory relief. Conduct the defendant is doing that could affect the entire class of people will usually result in an injunction. Members of the B2 class do not have to be notified (they may be but do not have to be) and similarly do not have to be given the option to opt out. B3 certification is typically used in cases where monetary damages are sought. (Such classes are called “damages classes.” In order to certify a class under B3, the parties must show that the class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy and that the questions of law or fact common to the class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members (thus the predominance standard of B3 essentially swallows the commonality requirement). Members of the B3 class must be notified of their involvement in the class and must be given the opportunity to opt out of participation in the litigation. The notice standard for B3 classes is: “best notice practicable including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.”
  
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  Settlements: In order to settle in a class action, as in Amchem, there must be a fairness hearing to determine whether the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. All class members who would be bound by the settlement (precluded from raising the claim/issue in subsequent cases) must be given notice-or there must be a reasonable attempt to give such notice.
  

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  Class action and discovery: In class actions, discovery immediately follows the filing of a complaint requesting class certification. Merits are thus adjudicated twice-once to certify the class, once in trial.
  

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  In Shutts (the case where the plaintiffs were suing for delayed royalty payments, filed in Kansas although 95% of the class made the contracts in NY, TX, and OK), the court determined that you can exercise personal jurisdiction over class plaintiffs, although there are constitutional limits in terms of whose law is applied (horizontal choice of law). You can exercise jurisdiction over the claim of an absent class plaintiff, even though that plaintiff does not possess the minimum contacts with the forum that would be required if he were a defendant. The court dealt with the issue of commonality in Falcon (employee claimed that he was not promoted because he was of Mexican-American descent and attempted to include others in the class who had been discriminated against in hiring practices-court rejected that argument). According to Exxon, each individual member of the class does not have to meet the amount in controversy requirement, but at least one of the class members must. Exxon raises interesting issues in regard to supplemental jurisdiction. The important language to consider is in §1332, particularly the “person made party” language-notably, Rule 23 is not included in the list of rules under which you cannot use supplemental jurisdiction-plaintiffs are not ordinarily considered to be “person made parties” while defendants are. In Exxon, the court also rejects the contamination theory: the idea that if a claim or party falls outside the court’s original jurisdiction it somehow contaminates every other claim in the complaint, depriving the court of original jurisdiction over any of the claims.
  
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  In Beacon Theatres, the court determined that in a case where both equity and law claims could be raised, and one claim is likely to preclude the other, the law claim should be tried before a jury first, to prevent a party being precluded from bringing issues before a jury.
  
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  Shady Grove: Conflict between Federal Rule 23 and New York law §901 regarding class actions (New York law prohibited the filing of class actions in cases where the remedy was derived from penalties in statutes). Thus it was primarily a vertical choice of law question, in which the court was trying to determine which law would properly dictate whether or not the class was allowed to be certified. Scalia applies the Hanna test, asking first, whether there is a valid and applicable federal law. The rule is obviously applicable, but in order to make a determination of validity the court has to look to the Rules Enabling Act (which states that a federal rule which seeks to modify, abridge, or enlarge a substantive right cannot stand). Ginsberg argues that Hanna should be understood under Walker, by narrowly interpreting federal rules with sensitivity to state policies in mind, thus articulating a fourth Erie “test”: Take Walker seriously! Narrowly interpret federal rules to avoid conflict with State law- to avoid invalidating a federal rule, narrowly interpret it.
  
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  (Turner v. Rogers deals with questions of access to justice-not super important beyond remembering that the court favored certain dispositive tests instead of favoring the idea of “civil Gideon”-mandating counsel in civil cases in which personal liberty or a substantive right is at stake).
  

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  Anytime you see “long arm statute,” think that it answers the following questions: 1) Does the statute authorize the exercise of personal jurisdiction under the circumstances of the case? 2) If so, is it constitutional under the due process clause to do so?*
  

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  If a state simply follows the “limits of the Constitution,” if the court has the constitutional power to assert jurisdiction, it has the statutory power as well.
  
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  If it is limited (restricted to enumerated categories of cases), it may go beyond the minimum contacts requirement. All long arm statutes that base personal jurisdiction on specific enumerated acts require that the claim sued upon arise out of the act itself.
  

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  Remember, the due process clause imposes fundamental limitations on the power of state courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants in civil suits. Under the clause, states may only assert jurisdiction over defendants who have:
  
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    established a significant relationship to the forum state through domicile,
    
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    in-state presence,
    
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    continuous and substantial business within that state,
    
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    consent to suit in that state, or
    
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    minimum contacts with the state that gave rise to the claim in the suit.
    

Questions for office hours:

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  Exxon handout: In thinking about situations in regard to persons made parties, what happens in a situation where a plaintiff is brought in through cross or counter claim?
  
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  Rules Deciding Act and Rules Enabling Act (in relation to Erie and its progeny, do we just need to understand the acts limit the federal rules in terms of their application/interpretation of state statutes?)- rule is not supposed to enlarge, modify, abridge a substantive right-Hanna majority (applicable <- Walker; a statute can be rendered invalid if its unconst.; FRCP- ok so validity is the highest consideration…; no federal court has ever held a rule invalid instead make it narrower so that it doesn’t apply because if it did it would be valid.
  
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  Confused about the tolling issue in Walker…?
  
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  Where does Aldinger fit in the supplemental jurisdiction chart?
  
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  General confusion about 1292 (1): how to understand double discretion and the collateral order rule in consideration of Cohen. Two separate bases of appellate jurisdiction, 1292: District court has to make explicit findings (issue about which there could be substantial difference in opinion, and appellate decision would materially advance the case) in writing and then the circuit court has to give permission to appeal. Cohen exception: district court doesn’t have to do anything, just issue: collateral to the merits, has to be final with respect to that subject matter, issue has to be effectively unreviewable.
  
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  In terms of subject matter jurisdiction, what is the significance of the idea of broadly/narrowing construing the Constitution/Congressional statutes?
  
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  Who makes the law on the issue of intersystem preclusion?
  
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  Public rights exception-only applies with government? Government has to be a party and has to be a regulator
  
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  Aldinger/Finley overruled by supplemental jurisdiction rule.
  
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  Jones v. Flowers: duty to follow-up (certified mail versus open mail)
  
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  Hoffman can only be transferred to a place where venue could have been proper; happy if there is ipjurisdiction and subject jurisdiction  Berman.
  
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  Clean-up rule (predated merger of law and equity): if a set of facts including both legal and equitable claims, you went to equity, which would allow you to litigate everything-Morese not out yet.
  
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  23 (f) as a response to Cooper; Rule 60/Title a circuit split is not enough;
  
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  See overview in CivPro binder
  

(Re-read Semtek, Exxon, Shady Grove-insofar as Scalia describes Erie).