Mattis, Jamestown Foundation China Program fellow, 2015
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Turns Case – EconomyHacking bad---mainly economy impactNavarro, UC Irvine economics and public policy professor, 2016 (Peter, “China’s State-Sponsored Cyber Attacks Must Stop”, 5-30, http://www.theglobalist.com/china-united-states-cyber-crime-politics/) For all the talk about terrorism on the campaign trail, cyber security issues in one form or another are likely to be prominent in the 2016 presidential election. State-sponsored cyber espionage inflicts significant damage on the American economy. And just which nation is most actively engaged against the United States? According to the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property, America’s largest trading partner – China – accounts for as much as 70% of the losses the United States incurs. What American citizens should find most disturbing about China’s role in what amounts to a global IP theft ring is the outsized role its government plays. A watershed report by Mandiant reveals a military force of more than 100,000 cyber spies under the firm control of the People’s Liberation Army and under the clear direction of the Chinese Communist Party. This state-sponsored cyber theft bureaucracy exists despite repeated denials by top government officials that China is even involved in such activities. Stealing blueprints of American businesses While the military may run China’s cyber espionage programs, the People’s Liberation Army nonetheless works hand-in-glove with civilian bureaucrats in charge of advancing China’s industrial policy goals. On any given day, China’s military and civilian hackers seek to steal the obligatory blueprints and proprietary manufacturing processes of American businesses large and small. China’s cyber spies will also vacuum up everything from emails, contact lists, and test results to pricing information and partnership agreements. Sometimes such acts of IP theft can destroy most or all of the value of individual companies. A case in point noted by the IP Commission is American Superconductor: When it “had its wind-energy software code stolen by a major customer in China, it lost not only that customer, but also 90% of its stock value.” The military front Of course, it’s not just the American economy under relentless cyber attack. On the military front, defense agencies like the Pentagon and National Nuclear Security Administration (which is in charge of America’s nuclear weapons stockpile) each report up to 10 million probes a day. 10 million a day! Here again, China is at the epicenter of the attacks. As documented in Crouching Tiger: What China’s Militarism Means for the World,” the People’s Liberation Army has stolen the designs for virtually every major US weapons system. This list includes the F-22 and F-35 fifth-generation fighters America relies on to establish air dominance in theater; critical missile defense systems like the Navy’s Aegis and the Army’s THAAD; vital combat aircraft like the F/A-18 fighter, the V-22 Osprey, and Black Hawk helicopter; and virtually the entire family of American drones. Many U.S. weapons systems have also been severely compromised by what the U.S. Armed Services Committee has described as a “flood” of counterfeit parts. Here, again – and like a very broken record and relationship – the main culprit is China. In tracking “over 100 cases of suspect counterfeit parts back through the supply chain,” this Committee found China responsible for over 70% of the problem. Still a third major form of cyber threat now being refined by China, along with other nations like Russia, Iran, and North Korea, involves attacking the “industrial control systems” of critical infrastructure such as electricity grids, water purification plants, air traffic control, subways, and telecommunications. The twin goals here are to paralyze the American economy by crippling our infrastructure and to sow chaos among our population – and thereby weaken our will to fight. Theft badZhang, Counsel of Mayer Brown JSM, 2016 (Xiaoyan, “Mission Impossible: Halting Cyber Attacks”, 1-7, http://insight.amcham-shanghai.org/mission-impossible-halting-cyber-attacks/) The economic cost of cybercrimes is estimated at US$375 billion to US$575 billion annually worldwide by a 2014 McAfee study. The costs of defending cybercrimes involving intrusion detection, data recovery and remediation have also steeply increased. A survey of 59 U.S. firms by the Ponemon Institute with Hewlett-Packard found that the average annual cost of responding to cyber attacks was US$12.7 million, up 96 percent over the previous five years, with an average of 138 successful attacks each week, up 176 percent from 2009. The average time taken to detect an attack was 170 days, with an average of 45 days being spent remediating the damage. Another economic effect of cybercrimes is the shift away from jobs that create value to defensive jobs aimed at shielding attacks. Cyber attacks against U.S. targets alone could result in a permanent reduction of as many as 200,000 U.S. jobs. The sheer cost of IP theft and its chilling effect on innovation led then NSA Director Gen. Keith Alexander to state in a 2012 speech that cyber espionage represents “the biggest transfer of wealth in history.” When the Internet search engine giant Google decided to leave China, it linked its decision to sophisticated cyber attacks on its computer systems. Uniqueness – US Stronger NowChinese policymakers vote NEG – they think the US has a relative advantage nowGoldstein, Associate Prof in the China Maritime Studies Institute @ US Naval War College, 1-28-16 (Lyle, “Does China Think America Is in Decline?,” http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/does-china-think-america-decline-15042?page=2) It has been fashionable in national security circles over the last several years for U.S. experts on Asia-Pacific security to claim that Chinese strategists perceive the U.S. to be in decline. As Daniel Blumenthal queried Ambassador John Bolton at a November 2015 forum at the American Enterprise Institute: “I don’t mean to ask such a leading question… Do you think China perceives us as… declining…?” Predictably, Bolton answered in the affirmative and went on to explain that the U.S. confronts a grave credibility problem. A similar line of thinking seems also to undergird more centrist appraisals in Washington that highlight China’s “brimming confidence” as part of the problem confronting U.S. national security policy. To be fair, there has been some evidence from Chinese sources, particularly in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, for that line of reasoning. But even during that unstable time, key Chinese sources, including analyses by military experts, did not forecast any diminution of America's military advantage. Undoubtedly, sound U.S. policy toward China will take account of how Chinese strategists assess American power. Indeed, the prevailing wisdom that China perceives U.S. frailty seems to form an important tenet of the logic of those arguing for more robust U.S. military deployments to the western Pacific, lest Beijing sense that Washington is weak in either resolve or capabilities. However, a spate of new Chinese analyses from 2015 seem to call into question these assumptions regarding Beijing’s view of the emerging balance of power. A series of articles and two fora were published on the subject of hypothetical “U.S. decline” [美国衰落] during 2015 by the two major Chinese journals Contemporary International Relations [现代国际关系] and The Chinese Journal of American Studies [美国研究]. This edition of Dragon Eye will examine these discussions with the hope of shedding additional light on current Chinese perceptions of America’s trajectory. With respect to the theme of Chinese perceptions of the United States, one article from these journals may be of considerable importance. This article was the leader piece in a summer 2015 edition of Contemporary International Relations [现代国际关系]. Written by Wang Honggang, a director at China Institute for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) -- an important think tank in Beijing, the piece bears the provocative title “21 世纪的美国病: 美国的现代国家治理难题初析” translated by the journal itself as “An Analysis of American Syndrome: The Difficulties in Modern State Governance.” However, the use of the word “syndrome” for the Chinese character “病” may be too polite, since more common translations are “sickness” or even “disease.” The article is not a tally of aircraft carriers, nor of intercontinental nuclear missiles. Rather, it is a thoughtful attempt to explore America’s problems in a holistic way. In its sweep, the piece is almost Tocquevillian. The author probes for imbalances between American society, government and the market, concluding that the United States has confronted two similar periods of “sickness,” during the late nineteenth century (the Gilded Age) and then once again during the post-Vietnam malaise of the 1970s. Realizing that the United States had made major reforms to escape these previous periods of crisis rather successfully, Wang suggests that this third major crisis could be even more daunting. Among the many problems that Wang describes include high levels of violence, racial tensions and economic difficulties, such as “America’s trend toward a hollowing out of the economy” [美国经济的’空心化’的趋势] and the “ever more serious [issue] of the widening gap between rich and poor in American society.” Rather than gloating over this situation, however, Wang warns his colleagues not to underestimate the ability of the American political structure, market forces and U.S. scholarship to reform the country’s direction. Indeed, much of the conclusion of the article is devoted to praising American responses—such as the Dodd-Frank Act—to recent challenges. When Wang turns to the implications of his analysis for global politics, he hardly highlights the opportunity presented by American problems as some of Washington’s hawks might predict, but rather points out that America’s internal problems “increase global risk” and concludes that this instability “could impact the more and more sensitive [nature] of U.S. -China relations.” Another issue of the same journal (an English-language version) featured a series of short articles (translated from Chinese) attempting to gauge “U.S. fitness” or “the ups and downs of its comprehensive national power” without falling “into the trap of accepting the American outlook.” A summary of the U.S. political context constitutes the first in this series of articles and claims, similarly to a recent piece in The Atlantic, that “the long term trend will… lean left”—a trend partly attributable to increasing U.S. racial diversification. Another piece appraising overall political trends in the U.S. is quite harsh in claiming that “the American political system is flawed” and that “political elites are unable to solve problems at the national level.” However, the same piece also suggests that polarization in the U.S. is overhyped and that, in fact, “American society is highly stable” in part because the American “masses are very practical.” A report on the U.S. economy asserts that “U.S. manufacturing is reviving,” while a close examination of the Pentagon’s budget concludes that there is “no sharply decreasing trend.” Likewise, the forum on “The Rise and Fall of the United States” reported out in an early 2015 edition of The Chinese Journal of American Studies yields up no consensus on “American decline.” While a couple of scholars highlight that “America’s economic power is declining relatively” and suggest that the simultaneous emergence of the Tea Party and the Occupy Wall Street movement “was no coincidence,” the vast majority of Chinese “America hands” cited in this forum do not interpret the U.S. to be “in decline.” As one relates: “compared to other countries in the world, American power is still without peer (including both hard and also soft power), so it is very difficult to say the U.S. has declined.” A second Chinese specialist states emphatically that “over the next fifty years, the U.S. will not decline.” Another cleverly interprets Washington’s predilection to “lead from behind” as a kind of U.S.-style “keeping a low profile” [美国的韬光养晦] (after Deng Xiaoping’s famous dictum), but concludes that its “technological and institutional innovation, as well as its very strong civil society have not changed, so therefore the U.S. will not rapidly decline.” Directory: wp-content -> uploads -> sites sites -> 587 Return function, r i(X) r i(0) r i(1) r i(2) r i(3) 1 0 2 4 6 Thermal Station, I 2 0 1 5 6 3 0 3 5 6 10 sites -> Medical Radiography Program sites -> Background on the Haitian Earthquake sites -> Desk review yemen sites -> Safe Transitions for the Elderly Patient (step) sites -> District profile Haripur Introduction sites -> Germanie VanTrease and Tyler Tetzloff sites -> For more information sites -> To be completed by the cerf secretariat. 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