Mattis, Jamestown Foundation China Program fellow, 2015



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Embolden Link – 2NC



Emboldens them


Gertz, Asia Times national security affairs journalist, 2015

(Bill, “Deal with China on cyber attacks is losing proposition: Gertz”, 10-5, http://atimes.com/2015/10/deal-with-china-on-cyber-attacks-is-losing-proposition-gertz/)



Overall, NSA estimated more than 1,600 network computers have been hit by the Chinese and at least 600,000 user accounts compromised. The cost of the cyber attacks: more than $100 million, mainly for the costs of rebuilding compromised networks. The summit deal on economic spying made sure that China will pay no penalty for this and other strategic cyber attacks. And reaching largely symbolic vague commitments like the one on cyber economic espionage are not likely to end the problem. Analysts say the problem for the US is that passive policies toward Chinese cyber attacks will only encourage further attacks. Obama announced before the summit that sanctions against China for its cyber attacks were being prepared. However, a few hollow promises from Xi to back off Chinese cyber economic espionage operation led to the president to shelve the sanctions against Beijing. Critics both in and out of government say the failure to respond strongly to the Chinese cyber theft will doom the US to further and potential more damaging cyber attacks.

Engagement Link – 2NC



Engagement is appeasement- encourages Chinese aggression, HR violations, wrecks hegemony and ruins alliances


Newsham, Japan Forum for Strategic Studies senior research fellow, 2014

(Grant, “China, America and the "Appeasement" Question”, 9-8, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/china-america-the-appeasement-question-11226)



We now have several decades of empirical evidence to assess this concessionary approach. It has not resulted in improved, less aggressive PRC behavior in the South China Sea or the East China Sea, or even in outer space. Indeed, it seems to have encouraged Chinese assertiveness as manifest in threatening language and behavior towards its neighbors. Nor has the PRC regime shown more respect for human rights, rule of law, consensual government or freedom of expression for its citizens. Serial intellectual property theft continues unabated, as does support for unsavory dictators. Nonetheless, we invite the PRC to military exercises [4] and repeat the “engagement” mantra expecting that one day things will magically improve. Some argue that letting the PRC see US military power will dissuade it from challenging us. Perhaps, but we are just as likely to be seen as naïve or weak. From the Chinese perspective, there is no reason to change since they have done very well without transforming and the PRC has never been stronger. Indeed, the PRC frequently claims that human rights, democracy, and the like are outmoded Western values having nothing to do with China. This is also demoralizing our allies, who at some point may wonder if they should cut their own deals with the PRC. Some revisionist historians argue that Neville Chamberlain’s 1930’s era appeasement was in fact a wise stratagem to buy time to rearm. This overlooks that even as late as 1939 when Hitler seized all of Czechoslovakia, the Western democracies still had the military advantage. One can appease oneself into a corner. And the beneficiary of the appeasement usually strengthens to the point it is too hard to restrain without great sacrifice. One worries that the Chinese seizure of Philippine territory at Scarborough Shoal in 2012 [5] – and the US Government’s unwillingness to even verbally challenge the PRC - might turn out to be this generation’s “Rhineland”. Had the West resisted Hitler in 1936 when he made this first major demand, there would have been no World War II, no Holocaust, and no Cold War. Our choice about how to deal with the PRC is not simply between either appeasement or treating China as an enemy. Our policy must accommodate options ranging from engagement to forceful confrontation. Who would not be delighted with a China that stopped threatening its neighbors and followed the civilized world’s rules? While ensuring we and our allies have a resolute defense – both in terms of military capability and the willingness to employ it – it is important to maintain ties and dialogue with the PRC and to provide encouragement and support when it shows clear signs of transforming to a freer, less repressive society. We should constantly stress that China is welcome as a key player in the international order – but only under certain conditions. The US and other democratic nations have not done enough to require China to adhere to established standards of behavior in exchange for the benefits of joining the global system that has allowed the PRC to prosper. Human nature and history are a useful guide to where appeasement (by whatever name) leads. And they also show that a strong defense and resolutely standing up for one’s principles is more likely to preserve peace.

Offense Key



Offense better than defense


Herman, Hudson senior fellow, 2016

(Arthur, “Wanted: A Real National Cyber Action Plan”, 2-11, http://www.hudson.org/research/12202-wanted-a-real-national-cyber-action-plan)



The second is that the Action Plan is entirely focused on defensive cyber-security measures — judging from news reports, measures that will cost up to $19 billion, including $3.1 billion to replace outdated government computer systems. Throw in Obama’s proposed “cyber czar” — or federal information security officer, to be housed at the Department of Homeland Security — and you have a formula for investing still more money in a cyber-security strategy that the government, as well as private industry, has pursued for more than a decade and a half, with less than satisfactory results. Certainly the costs have been enormous. Trying to stop cyber attacks by safeguarding information systems has become a multi-billion-dollar industry — in the U.S. private sector alone, the cyber-security market will grow to $170 billion by 2020. Over the past decade, the federal government has spent $100 billion on cyber security, and yet — as we learned last year with the cyber break-in at the Office of Personnel Management, when 22 million Americans had their personal information stolen — the government remains as vulnerable to attack as ever. In fact, the real problem isn’t money but mindset. In cyber-war terms, we’ve been pouring money and resources into a World War One–style trench-warfare defensive strategy, while cyber attackers large and small have been practicing a World War Two–style Blitzkrieg offense — and making full use of two other advantages the cyber attacker enjoys, namely anonymity and deniability. In the cyber sphere, all experts agree, the attacker will always be one step ahead of the defender. While the cyber-security engineer has to be able to plug every leak or vulnerability, the hacker needs only one successful exploit to steal the data he wants or shut down the system he wants to disable. Therefore, it’s time for Washington to move to a new, more proactive approach to threats in the cyber realm. It is time to focus on how to deter cyber aggressors before they strike, and to take the necessary steps to persuade them not to attack at all. In short, we need to shift from thinking about cyber security to cyber deterrence. Admiral Mike Rogers, the commander of U.S. Cyber Command and director of the National Security Agency, has already called for a national cyber-deterrence strategy, and has warned that the current purely defensive approach “will be both late to need and incredibly resource-intense” — in plain English, it will lock the barn door after the horse is stolen and will eventually push us into bankruptcy. So what would an effective cyber-deterrence strategy look like? First and foremost, it would warn all bad actors in the cyber realm, whether individuals, terrorist organizations, or nation-states, that their actions will be met with a scale of escalating responses, depending on the gravity of the threat — including responses outside the cyber realm, up to and including military action. Students of deterrence, including nuclear deterrence during the Cold War, agree that a deterrence strategy needs to be credible, meaning that we have to make it clear to cyber aggressors that we are both ready and able to take countermeasures to defend ourselves; clear, meaning that any would-be transgressor has a pretty good idea what kind of retribution he can expect; and consistent, meaning that actions follow words — i.e., that the promise to retaliate against an attack on our banking system or on our power grid will be carried out without fail. Finally, an effective cyber-deterrence strategy has to inspire fear. Herman Kahn, key theorist of Cold War nuclear deterrence, wrote that of all the “desirable characteristics of a deterrent,” the most important was that it be “frightening.” That’s what our nuclear deterrence was in the Cold War in the Sixties and Seventies, and it’s precisely what Obama’s National Action Plan isn’t. Instead, it’s an open invitation to cyber criminals — as well as to Russia, China, North Korea, and ISIS — to keep on hacking because they know that eventually they’ll get through. A cyber-deterrence strategy, by contrast, will warn potential cyber enemies before they attack that they are going to suffer more pain than gain, and it will tell countries like Russia and China that if we determine that any cyber attack has originated from inside their borders, we will hold them responsible. As a nation, we face real threats in the cyber realm. It’s time to develop a real strategy to deal with them, instead of just throwing more money at the problem — or appointing another well-paid bureaucrat to be our “cyber czar.”


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