Mattis, Jamestown Foundation China Program fellow, 2015
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- Détente key to relations
- Sanctions Fail
- Sanctions will turn the public of China against the US which will cause retaliation.
- Fuels nationalism which increases the risk of escalation.
- Interdependence means sanctions fail
Pressure CP AnswersDoesn’t Solve RelationsPressure fails to restore trust in other areas of cooperationHarold, RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy associate director, 2016 (Scott, “Getting to Yes with China in Cyberspace”, http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1335.html) Similarly, we did not systematically investigate the option of coercing China to the negotiating table. To be sure, the United States could seek to escalate its own imposition of costs for China through a set of responses that might include a mix of public shaming and threats,32 indictments against individual Chinese hackers,33 sanctions against Chinese firms,34 or even a campaign of debilitating cyberattacks, all of which accept greater risk and thereby hopes to persuade the PRC to see negotiations as a way to lessen the pain and reduce the prospect of a further deterioration of relations.35 An approach based on coercion was certainly not the Obama administration’s first choice, but having seen lower-cost, lower-risk initiatives fail to bring China to the negotiating table, the United States appears to have concluded over the course of 2014–2015 that it needed to increase the pressure on China to see results. As President Obama said of the cyber issue with China during his speech to NSA employees on September 11, 2015: “We can choose to make this an area of competition—which I guarantee you we’ll win if we have to—or, alternatively, we can come to an agreement in which we say, this isn’t helping anybody; let’s instead try to have some basic rules of the road in terms of how we operate.”36 Still, such an approach carries the risk of escalating conflict even into the physical world or severely damaging U.S. efforts to elicit Chinese cooperation on other fronts, such as addressing climate change, preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction technology, stabilizing the global economy, or countering violent extremism. It is unclear whether China would believe that such actions were being taken simply for the purpose of coercing them to negotiations or whether they would instead view the actions simply as an escalation of what some in China are prepared to see as an already ongoing (if unacknowledged) cold war or “Silent Contest,” as one recent PLA National Defense University video terms the relationship between China and the United States.37 Some forms of cyberattack (e.g., against China’s so-called Great Firewall) could just as easily be interpreted as an effort to assault the country’s sovereignty or even undermine the CPC’s rule and engage in regime change.38 Finally, on a more practical level, we did not believe that we could find much data to evaluate the merits of such an approach; Chinese writings do not shed much light on the issue, and Chinese interlocutors would presumably not be eager to provide much in the way of useful data that could contribute to assessing such a course of action. While we were aware of this option and considered it at some length, our research did not systematically explore such an approach. Détente key to relationsAustin, EastWest Institute professorial fellow, 2015 (Greg, “The US-China cyberwar needs détente”, https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2015/08/29/the-china-cyberwar-needs-detente/p8T9GFDjbW2GuJwlGjpIZP/story.html) To be sure, as the US government reports credibly, China is engaged in an unceasing and highly successful cyberespionage campaign against the United States, its government and economic interests. Yet, this public tension with China is an international outlier. China and the European Union get along quite well on cyber issues, including joint research through the OpenChina-ICT project. Russia and China, for their part, have signed an agreement to limit hacking against each other. This is quite surprising, given that Russia trusts China even less than it trusts the United States on cyberspace issues. Beyond Russia, China’s relations with India and Japan are not so bad in this field either. If China has been able to keep business-like relations with all other partners on cyber issues, in spite of its rampant cyberespionage against them, then why is its cyber relationship with the United States so much worse than with other major powers? At one level, the answer is obvious: The United States can afford to be more strident in its diplomacy than any other Western country because it is more powerful. In addition, relative to most countries that are getting along better with China in cyber affairs, the United States also puts more stock in certain issues of principle, such as human rights protections in cyberspace or theft of intellectual property. Washington also believes that it needs to stand up to China on such issues, not least because of the way in which China’s power is disturbing American allies in the Pacific. This is, after all, one motivation of the rebalance in US strategic policy. Even so, the style and tone of current American cyber diplomacy toward China looks surprisingly messy. This is unexpected: US diplomacy toward China under Obama has generally been very impressively organized and thought through. US perceptions about China in cyberspace hinge on a few mistaken beliefs. They include the notion that there are unambiguous norms in cyberspace that China is flagrantly violating; a failure to appreciate China’s deep insecurity in cyberspace; a lack of knowledge of America’s extensive cyberespionage and cyber military operations against China; and an inflation of the threat from China’s theft of intellectual property. Of course, the US cybersecurity industry as a lobby group is very alert to all of the above and plays it for commercial gain. Yet officials rarely note that most cybersystems are inherently vulnerable and cannot be secured against a determined cyber adversary. This is not to say by any means that China is without fault. Far from it. But what is equally undeniable is that the impact of the China cyberthreat relative to other threats is exaggerated by the US cybersecurity community. All of this is particularly ironic, given the deep integration of the cyberindustry sectors of the two countries. China depends on the United States for its own cyber power. Meanwhile, leading American suppliers of communications and information technology are heavily dependent on China in their supply chain or even as a source of final manufacturing. Their level of involvement in China is so deep that they have even lobbied against US sanctions on China for cyber espionage. The challenge from here? To unravel this entanglement of influences and to base future cyber diplomacy on a more sophisticated notion of the world as it is. The Soviet-US detente in the Cold War era suggests that less outrage about mutual espionage, and cultivating a more nuanced appreciation of its limited impacts relative to the larger military threats, could lead to better — more realistic — relations. Sanctions FailSanctions are difficult to implement and the retaliation from China would be much worse.Cooper et al., CSIS fellow, 2016 (Zack, “Sanctioning the Dragon: Using Statecraft to Shape Chinese Behavior”, 3-13, https://www.lawfareblog.com/sanctioning-dragon-using-statecraft-shape-chinese-behavior) YET EFFECTIVELY using extensive sanctions to deter Chinese economic espionage and maritime assertiveness is likely to prove difficult. First, imposing extensive sanctions would be politically difficult within the United States. Most U.S. policymakers recognize that China’s rise presents many opportunities for the United States. China’s economic dynamism has pulled hundreds of millions out of poverty and energized regional and global economies. Beijing’s growing political influence could help alleviate shared problems such as climate change and nuclear proliferation. China’s increasingly capable military could even cooperate with the United States to conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, noncombatant evacuation and peacekeeping operations abroad. For these reasons, the Obama administration has attempted to focus its relationship with China on shared interests rather than divergent perspectives. Imposing extensive economic sanctions on China would seriously damage bilateral ties. For example, to authorize sanctions against China for its activities in the South China Sea, U.S. law requires the president declare a national emergency in response to an unusual and extraordinary threat to the United States. While such a declaration is pro forma under most U.S. sanctions programs, declaring that China’s actions pose an extraordinary threat to the United States would be a major political step and appears unlikely during the current administration. Second, building international support for extensive sanctions would be treacherous, if not impossible, barring a severe Chinese escalation. U.S. efforts to pressure Iran to the negotiating table were successful because they were international. Similarly, U.S. sanctions on Russia have caused significant economic pain because they are multilateral. In both cases, European and Asian allies and partners coordinated with the United States to bring economic pressure to bear. Without this cooperation, both Iran and Russia would have been able to blunt the sanctions. Given China’s large economy and political importance, many of these countries would be unwilling to impose sanctions under anything but the most extreme circumstances. Third, the Chinese economy is inherently more resilient than smaller or more sector-specific economies like those of Russia and Iran. China’s economic weight alone means that extensive sanctions would not only take a bite out of Chinese growth, but would damage the global economy. Moreover, China plays a critical role in the international trading system as a manufacturer of finished products. Finding alternative manufacturing centers would take time. Unlike the energy markets, which were able to respond relatively quickly to sanctions on Russia and Iran, trade with China is inherently less flexible. In short, China’s size and market position insures it against the exercise of U.S. asymmetric economic leverage. Fourth, China’s response to sanctions could be very damaging. Unlike Russia or Iran, China could severely harm U.S. economic interests and those of U.S. allies and partners, both in the region and around the world. Despite the repeated use of sanctions since the end of the Cold War, the United States has never imposed them on a country with substantial economic response options. Beijing, on the other hand, could adopt both symmetric and asymmetric responses. China could impose sanctions on U.S. companies, or make it significantly more difficult for certain U.S. companies to do business in China. Numerous U.S. businesses have already encountered political challenges to operating in China, which have caused some, like Google, to withdraw from mainland China despite its huge market. Similarly, in recent months, China has threatened to impose so-called secondary sanctions on U.S. defense manufacturers that provide arms to Taiwan as part of a newly announced U.S. package, cutting these companies off from Chinese markets. Beijing could do the same to U.S. allies’ and partners’ businesses, and levy additional economic measures, such as restricting key exports to or imports from those countries. Such responses accord with China’s traditional use of subtler forms of economic statecraft. U.S. sanctions would also risk retaliation through horizontal escalation in other domains. China might adopt measures to undermine U.S. centrality in the global economic system, such as efforts to undermine confidence in the U.S. financial system or to more rapidly shift away from dollar-based trade and investment. Alternatively, China could increase the pace of land reclamation and militarization in the South China Sea or more frequently confront U.S. ships and aircraft operating in international waters and airspace. China could also become less cooperative on a host of other issues that are important to U.S. interests, from climate change to the nuclear deal with Iran. Sanctions will turn the public of China against the US which will cause retaliation.Pickrell, Central China Normal University international politics PhD student, 2015 (Ryan, “A Dangerous Game: Responding to Chinese Cyber Activities”, 9-29, http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/a-dangerous-game-responding-to-chinese-cyber-activities/) Four, “punishment diplomacy,” a dangerous yet popular expression that is already quite prominent in China and appears every time the United States sells weapons to Taiwan, meets with the Dalai Lama, flies spy planes through what is perceived as Chinese air space, and sails naval vessels through Chinese waters, is likely to become even more popular, which will increase domestic support for assertive and aggressive Chinese actions abroad. Since Xi Jinping stepped up in 2013, China has become increasingly assertive; however, public opinion in China, which encourages peace and restraint in most state-to-state interactions, excluding those with China’s long-time enemy Japan, has actually helped to keep Chinese assertiveness in check. Since the decentralization of Chinese foreign policy, public opinion, especially online, has had a greater effect on Chinese foreign policies. If Chinese citizens feel that the United States is threatening China, which is, considering China’s culture and history, exactly how Chinese citizens will feel, public opinion will shift, and the public will start to encourage government officials to take a tougher stance against the United States. Without public support for restraint, the world may see the emergence of a China that is significantly more assertive than anything seen previously. Five, the United States must never overlook the fact that China is a master of moves and countermoves. Just as is true in physics, in international politics, for every action, there is an opposite reaction; however, it may not be equal. In response to the U.S. rebalance, China launched the Asia-Pacific Dream, which proposed that Asian affairs be handled by Asian states. When Obama promised to strengthen alliances in the Asia-Pacific, China nearly started a war over territorial issues with Vietnam. In response to America’s Trans-Pacific Partnership, China launched its massive “One Road, One Belt” initiative. When the United States and Japan failed to respect China within the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, China started the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. All previous actions were simple moves and countermoves in a geopolitical power struggle; sanctioning will, however, be perceived as a direct attack, and China will not respond well to being publicly shamed. It is difficult to say how China will respond to sanctions against it, but it will respond, and the result may very well be more than the United States can handle. Is it necessary for the United States to find a way to deal with Chinese criminal activity in cyberspace? Absolutely. But, this is a very dangerous game. It is important that the United States have no illusions about what it is getting itself into. Some have suggested that punishing China for its unwillingness to adhere to international norms will encourage China to get in line and follow the rules. Considering Chinese culture and past Chinese reactions, this is highly unlikely. Sanctions may very well lead to a serious deterioration of Sino-American relations and increased confrontation and, possibly, conflict between China and the United States. American officials need to approach this situation with the understanding that the end result may be very problematic. For nearly two decades now, China and the United States have maintained a superficial friendship; that era is likely to end if the United States puts sanctions on China. Anyone who thinks that sanctions will bring about a stronger relationship between these two countries and further integrate China into the international system needs to abandon idealism and look at this situation for what it is, a major spark which could start a very serious fire. Fuels nationalism which increases the risk of escalation.Pickrell, Central China Normal University international politics PhD student, 2015 (Ryan, “A Dangerous Game: Responding to Chinese Cyber Activities”, 9-29, http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/a-dangerous-game-responding-to-chinese-cyber-activities/) Third, in mainland China, American sanctions will likely go a long way towards bolstering support for Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Chinese nationalism is based on feelings of humiliation, fear, and pride. China is proud of its long history, for much of which China was the dominant power in Asia, and is very aware of its fall from glory in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. China is primarily motivated by the “Century of Humiliation” national narrative, a tale of victimization at the hands of imperial powers that simultaneously promotes a fear and a distrust of the international system, the liberal world order, and the United States, which is seen as the last of the imperialist powers. This story encourages the widely held belief that China should take steps to correct past mistakes and reclaim its position atop of the Asian hierarchy. The government often uses external enemies to bolster support for the party. Chinese government officials have convinced the people that China has never done anything to harm another state and that all actions that negatively affect China are nothing more than attempts to once again humiliate China; this increases domestic support for party leadership and presents the party as the savior and protector of the Chinese nation. As a result of domestic censorship, patriotic education initiatives, and state control over the media, the Chinese people view the world and the actions of other states through this lens. China always plays the victim, and it will be no different this time around. If the United States imposes sanctions against China, it will be presented domestically as an attempt by the United States to humiliate China and prevent it from rising to great power status. Rather than make political reform in China, which has long been an American aspiration, more likely, it will actually strengthen party leadership and make reform, already unlikely, an impossible dream.
(Rogier, “Why the U.S.’ Cyber Sanctions Against China Will Have Little Effect, 9-7, http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/why-the-u-s-cyber-sanctions-against-china-will-have-little-effect/) The overarching problem is the difficulty to adequately define the harm that these policies are trying to avert. While it is understandable that corporations are, perhaps rightly, peeved at continuous efforts to access their sensitive information, few convincing examples of exactly how such information is used to their detriment have come forward so far. There are some good reasons for this. First, much intellectual property held by corporations is public to some degree: patent applications, for instance, require a full description of the protected inventions. Second, absorbing such information is difficult: imagine how hard it would be for a novice cook to recreate a three Michelin star recipe based only on the succinct notes of the highly experienced chef. And even if said cook would be able to recreate that particular recipe after much trial and error, s/he would still not be able to display the expertise and experience to create a menu full of dishes of the same quality. In that sense, the theft of technological information might be a blessing in disguise: there are good reasons to believe that a focus on absorption as a mode of innovation is holding back the development of managerial structures and soft skills within Chinese businesses that are necessary to transform them into true global leaders and serious competitors of established multinationals. Civil aviation is only one example. Despite the fact that China has had access to first-rate technology from all over the world, its first airliner, the ARJ-21, is now eight years late and has yet to carry its first fee-paying passenger. Third, even if harm could be clearly demonstrated, there already are ample legal means to counter such activities, primarily in intellectual property law, but also through criminal procedure. What would sanctions further bring to the table in terms of deterrent? A second challenge is that these sanctions seem to start from the assumption that there are clear and universal norms of state behavior in cyberspace that China breaches – which there are not. Instead, they further muddle the already hard-to-define difference between commercial espionage (which the U.S. denies engaging in) and more traditional intergovernmental forms of intelligence-gathering. It is, of course, both right and politically expedient for governments to defend the interests of “their” companies against wrongdoing by other governments. Nor should China be exculpated from what is a growing body of evidence against it. Yet in the absence of demonstrable serious harm, it is urgently necessary to find common priorities and challenges in the cyberspace realm. China and the United States face common issues in countering cybercrime, ranging from financial fraud to child pornography. The reform of the governing structure of ICANN, the Internet’s addressing authority, is only one aspect of technical and governance changes that will be necessary to ensure the Internet’s continued development. Yet for the foreseeable future, competition – not cooperation – will remain the norm. More than anything else, this is an issue of political prestige. Leadership in information technology has, like nuclear technology in an earlier age, become the hallmark of a primordial global power. Ideologically, the Chinese Communist Party seeks to portray technological development as a vindication of its political project as much as the American side wants to believe that its technological prowess is the result of its exceptional commitment to liberty and creativity. Both also want to define the norms for the continued development of the global Internet – with almost diametrically opposed propositions. And perhaps most importantly, both countries see each other as the most important threat to future welfare and security, making it politically profitable to engage in chest-thumping at home and obstinacy abroad. The ironic fact is, however, that both countries remain mutually dependent on each other economically. In other words, they will need to find a way towards a more nuanced approach, recognising that 21st century statecraft always comes with its hypocrisies and frictions, and that prioritization of concerns is therefore necessary. 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