Mr review 6 ignorance of law 6


Extreme Intoxication/Intoxication or Mental Disorder?



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Extreme Intoxication/Intoxication or Mental Disorder?


  • Distinction btw specific/general exists solely for purpose of determining whether there is or is not a defence of intoxication at common law.

  • Intuitively, specific intent might connote a more focus or concentrated MR..



R v Daviault 1994 SCC p 862


A charged with sexual assault of elderly woman who was an acquaintance of his wife. A was a chronic alcoholic. Had 7-8 beers that day, and likely a bottle of brandy. Blood level would induce death or coma of regular person. (5x as high as legal limit for driving) Expert evidence: individual with this level of alcohol might suffer a blackout and lose contact with reality, brain would temporarily dissociate from normal functioning. Appeal by Crown allowed to QBCA bc TJ erred in holding that intoxication is a defence to a general intent offence, such as sexual assault. Court of Appeal Convicted.

Issue: Can a state of drunkenness which is so extreme that an accused is in a condition that closely resembles automatism or a disease of the mind as defined in s 16 of the Code, constitute a basis for defending a crime which requires not a specific but only a general intent?

Decision: Daviault is Acquitted

Reasons: Cory J + 5



  • Not consistent with principles of fundamental justice and presumption of innocence for courts to eliminate (But he did – said for general intoxication, no defence for general intent crime)

  • Agrees that there is some logic for difference btw general/specific

  • Self-induced intoxication is not a sufficiently blameworthy state of mind to justify culpability or to substitute it for the mental element that is essential req of those crimes.

  • The Charter (s 7, s 11d) mandate limited exception to, or some flexibility in, the application of the Leary rule. This would permit evidence of extreme intoxication akin to automatism or insanity to be considered in determining whether the accused possessed the minimal mental element required for crimes of general intent

  • Options

    • #1: Follow: Leary rule violates the Charter and cannot be justified = NO

      • mental element = integral part of crime, may be minimal for general intent, but exists

      • Substituted MR of an intention to become drunk cannot establish the MR to commit the assault (A person intending to drink cannot be said to be intending to commit sexual assault)

      • R argued that “blameworthy nature of voluntary intoxication” justifies no violation of charter BUT voluntary intoxication is not yet a crime

      • Self-induced intoxication cannot supply the necessary link btw the minimal mental element or MR reqd for the offence and the AR (DeSousa, Theroux)

        • Minimum MR for an offence should reflect the nature of the crime (Creighton). I doubt self-induced intoxication can, in all circumstances, meet this req for all crimes of general intent

      • Leary not meet proportionality or minimum impairment req of Oakes. Not justified.

    • #2: Follow: O Connor: evidence relating to drunkenness would go to jury along with other evidence in determining whether mental element requirement had been met  cannot be followed bc of specific/general intent categories well established SO all evidence of any intoxication would have to be put to jury in general intent offences = unnecessary (+ rejected in Bernard) = NO

    • #3:M Proposed by Wilson J in Bernard = YES

      • Scholar Criticism: favours extremely drunk while ignoring less inebriated

        • Counter: A “little drunk” can readily form the requisite mental element to commit the offence

      • Only those who were in such an extreme degree of intoxication that they were in a state akin to automatism or insanity = raise reasonable doubt as to their ability to form minimal mental element req for general intent offence

        • Ie. Can move legs and arms, but incapable of forming basic or simple intent

      • Wilson J’s modification of Leary rule is a judge-fashioned remedy that can be adopted to remedy a judge-made law which, by eliminating mental element of a crime, offends the charter

      • Only used in rare occasions, simply have on hand to avoid charter infringement

      • Defence must prove it on a balance of probabilities (justified by s 1 bc only accused can give evidence as to amount of alchohol consumed and effect on him + expert evidence to confirm state of automatism/insanity

      • He chooses this as a policy compromise, to abide by charter and still convict most drunks

  • It is always open to parliament to fashion a remedy which would make it a crime to commit a prohibited act while drunk

Dissent (Sopinka J):

  • Leary: drunkenness is not a defence to a crime of general intent

    • Policy considerations:

      • Criminal law purpose is to protect the public: which would be frustrated if the more drunk a man became, better chance of acquittal

    • Does not violate s 7 or 11d of the charter

    • Principle of fundamental justice do not require the intent to perform AR of an offence of general intent to be an element of the offence

  • Alleged breach is based on 2 breaches of fundamental justice:

    • Symmetry btw AR and MR is not constitutionally required

    • We don’t care if your drunk.

    • Punishment must be proportionate to moral blameworthiness of offender (Martineau, Creighton)

      • Few crimes which special level of MR is constitutionally required by reason of stigma attaching to conviction and by reason of severity of penalty

        • Deal with it in sentencing!

      • Sexual assault does not fall into category that demands subjective MR to commit AR

        • They deserve stigma, and sentence is not fixed so it can be amended

        • I cannot see how stigma and punishment associate with offence of sexual assault are disproportionate to moral blameworthiness of a person like A who commits offence after voluntarily so intoxicated to be incapable of knowing what he is doing

  • Keep Leary. If different approach required, parliament can intervene

R v Penno 1990 SCC p 868 [Intoxication could not be defence to offence in which it is an element]


  • Even if accused is too drunk = irrelevant, since mental element of offence lies in voluntarily becoming intoxicated.

Parliament responds to Daviault

Bill C72 (1994-1995)


  • Parliament did not respond with intoxication-based offence, but with legislation that effectively deprives accused of Daviault defence of extreme intoxication for SOME offences

  • Preamble

    • P recognizes association btw violent and intoxication  concerned of self-induced intoxication as social and legal excuse to violence

    • P considers it necessary and desirable to legislate a standard of care, in order to make it clear that a person who, while in a state of incapacity by reason of self-induced intoxication, commits an offence involving violence against another person, departs markedly from the standard of reasonable care that CDNs owe to each other and is thereby criminally at fault

  • Amending Code by adding following after section 33

  • Self-induced intoxication:

    • 33.1(1) Defence not available: not a defence to an offence in subsection (3), that accused, by reason of self-induced intoxication, lacked basic intent/voluntariness req to commit offence, when accused departed markedly from standard of care in (2)

    • (2)Criminal fault by reason of intoxication:

      • Marked departure from standard of care recognized in CDN society = criminally liable when person in a state of self-induced intoxication that renders them unaware of, or incapable of consciously controlling their behavior, voluntarily or involuntarily interferes or threatens to interfere with bodily integrity of another person

    • (3): Section applies to offence under Code that includes as an element an assault or any other interference or threat of interference by a person with the bodily integrity of another person

      • Essentially deny the defence even if the effect of intoxication was to make the conduct of the accused involuntary

Current Law on defence of intoxication

STEPS TO INTOXICATION



    1. Is the crime one of specific or general intent?

    2. If specific = intoxicant can negate MR for SPECIFIC intent (leading to acquittal or guilt on lesser offence)

    3. If general intent offence, is the crime involves harm to other person’s bodily integrity

    4. If it does not harm person’s bodily integrity  Daviault extreme intoxication defence available (applies if self-induced or not self induced)

    5. If it does harm bodily integrity, then it is self-induced?

      • If yes, No extreme Intoxication defence

      • If no, Extreme intoxication is available under the statute (reverse onus)

    6. All of this is subject to SCC approval on Constitutionality of s 33.1




  • There are three variations on defence of intoxication

  1. Common law rule (Bernard) that restricts defence of intoxication to specific intent still applies (so still must classify offence as general/specific)

  2. Expanded defence of extreme intoxication (Daviault), applies even to offences of general intent

      • Requires expert evidence concerning nature/effect of intoxicant

      • Cannot succeed unless proven on balance of probabilities

      • Reverse onus

      • Note: strong evidentiary foundation on nature, quantity and effect of drug

  1. S 33.1: denies the defence of extreme intoxication to any offence of general intent that involves interference or threatened interference with bodily integrity of another person, provided that the act was performed in state of intoxication that shows marked departure from standard of reasonable care

      • Vailliantcourt: SCC requires that substitution of one standard of fault for another that is constitutionally required for the offence is only valid if substituted element was functionally equivalent to req element (otherwise it may violate the presumption of innocence if proof of substituted element does not lead inexorably or byd to proof of essential element of offence)

TH: Jack is charged with illegally possessing two vials of heroin contrary to s. 4 of the CDSA, which makes it a crime "to possess" a prohibited substance. Jack argues that he was extremely intoxicated when his buddy gave him the vials to hold, and that he never really "processed" what they were - just thinking they were energy shots. He concedes that he has a vague idea of what heroin vials look like, but did not know he was holding heroin on that occasion. Assuming the Judge believes Jack, how should the Judge proceed:



  • Consider whether a reasonable, non-drunk person in Jack’s circumstances would have known the vials contained heroin

  • Puts it on an objective standard (can’t use subjective, since they’re claiming no awareness)



Self Induced Intoxication


  • Limited defence of intoxication in s 33.1 applies only where consumption of intoxicants is self-induced or voluntary.

R v Chaulk 2007 p 871 [Test for whether intoxicated state was self-induced]


Facts: Severly Drunk Mr. Chaulk breaks neighbours door down to find female neighbour hiding in Mr. MacDougall’s apartment. He threatened to kill him, then rushed him, took clothes off, was subdued, switching btw compliant and combative. Charged with assaulting Mr. MacDougall, threatening to cause bodily harm, break & enter with intent to committing assault (specific intent), mischief by willfully damaging property. At Trial, acquitted due to defence of non-mental disorder automatism/extreme intoxication.

Issue: Whether TJ erred in concluding that Mr. Chaulk’s intoxicated state was not self-induced?

Decision: Not decided

Reason:


  • Tj conclusion based on evidence of Mr. Chaulk’s drug + alcohol consumption that night

  • Crown argued A’s intoxication was self induced, therefor s 33.1 precludes reliance on defence of extreme intoxication for all but property offence (because for property he can raise daviult)

  • A said: went to party, consumed 6-8 beers, might have had weed. Getting bored planned to leave, Matt offered him “wake up pill” which he took. He thought substance was caffeine pill (but was actually an intoxicating substance)

    • Heart pounded, things look weird. Had no further recollection of events, until he woke up at hospital at 10:30 am next morning.

  • Expert evidence

    • Drs: confirm hat state was consistent with exposure to chemicals/stimulant-type drugs; He told Dr. he had consumed mixture of acid, ecstacy and weed

    • Forensic Psychiatrist: reasonable probability that Mr. CHaulk’s mental state fulfilled non-insane automatism

  • Self Induced Intoxication

    • Vickberg: For intoxication to be self-induced, the accused must intend to become intoxicated, either by voluntarily ingesting a substance knowing or having reasonable grounds to know it might be dangerous, or by recklessly ingesting such a substance

    • Brenton: A argued that he took marijuana to relax, did not intend to become intoxicated = not self induced. WRONG. If ingestion is voluntary, and risk of becoming intoxicated is within contemplation, or reasonably should be, then any resulting intoxication is self-induced

    •  Involuntary= spiked drink, or accused becomes intoxicated while taking prescription drugs and their effects not known

  • Case At Hand: Accepts VIckberg

    • Crown does not have to prove that substance is illegal, or that A must know precisely what he took

    • King: if impairment was result of doctor’s order or recommendation, and effect unknown to patient, = involuntary

    • Voluntary Intoxication: The consuming of a substance where the person knew or had reasonable grounds for believing such might cause him to be impaired. The accused need not contemplate the extent of the intoxication or intend a certain level of intoxication.

    • Test:

      • 1. The accused voluntarily consumed a substance which;

      • 2. He knew or ought to have known was an intoxicant and;

      • 3. The risk of becoming intoxicated was or should have been within his contemplation

Class Notes

Note at para 45:



  • Courts have consistently held that voluntary intoxication means the consuming of a substance where the person know or had reasonable grounds for believing such might cause him to be impaired

    • Imports test: they objectively should have know that they were going to get intoxicated when they took this pill.

    • Taking away the subjective nature of the CHOICE to get intoxicated is to far

    • Should subjectively know

Note at para 46:

  • The accused need not contemplate the extent of the intoxication or intend a certain level of intoxication

R v Bouchard-Lebrun 2011 SCC [Malfunction of mind resulting exclusively from self-induced intoxication NEVER considered “disease of the mind”; but if underlying mental condition – then depends on source]


Facts: A takes intoxicant (pill). Then brutally assault 2 individuals which in psychotic state (religious delirium, believed apocalypse was coming) caused by chemical drugs taken few hours earlier. Stomped on one victim’s head caused serious and permanent harm.

Issue: Whether toxic psychosis resulting from state of self-induced intoxication caused by use of chemical drugs constitutes a mental disorder and thus exempts A from criminal responsibility for bodily integrity charge? How does the psychosis affect A’s criminal responsibility?

Decision: His underlying mental condition is irrelevant, if it is determined that the cause of his lack of knowledge was intoxication.

Reason:


  • Not disputed that A had serious psychotic condition at time of offences (confirmed by expert evidence)

  • At trial  acquitted on breaking and entering due to extreme intoxication and suffering from toxic psychosis at time of offence. Convicted A of aggravated assault (as per s 33.1 = self-induced intoxication cannot be defence to offence against bodily integrity of another person

  • A agrees it was induced from self-intoxication. BUT argues that it was a single episode of a mental disorder producing abnormal effects on the accused arguing indirectly that toxic psychosis developed after taking the pill resulted from underlying disease of the mind that became apparent as result of his intoxication

    • A argues that Sopinka J’s dissent in Daviault supports this

  • Defences of Intoxication and Insanity are Mutually Exclusive!

    • For Intoxication to apply (s 33.1): court must reach conclusion in law that A lacked general intent or voluntariness required to commit offence by reason of self-induced intoxication.

    • Absence of intent/voluntariness preclude finding that incapacity was caused by disease of mind

    • Conversely, fact that A was intoxicated at material time, cannot support finding that s 33.1 applies if accused establishes that he was incapable of appreciating the nature of quality of his act by reason of mental disorder.

    • Bottom line: If A was intoxicated and in psychotic condition at material time, court must identify a specific source of mental condition: either self induced intoxication or a disease of mind

      • Determines if A is criminally liable

      • More difficult when they have underlying mental condition

    • 1. Start with Disease of the Mind

      • “any illness, disorder or abnormal condition which impairs human mind and its functioning, excluding self-induced states caused by alcohol or drugs, as well as transitory mental states as hysteria or concussion” (Cooper)

      • THe Mental disorder must go to the CAUSE of the lack of knowledge.

    • 2. If s 16 does not apply, court can consider s 33.1

  • Question remaining: whether a toxic psychosis that results exclusively from state of intoxication with abnormal effect, constitutes mental disorder for purposes of s 16 or is excluded by cooper?

    • Insanity rests on fundamental level: exemption from criminal liability due to incapacity for criminal intent. Their actions are not a product of their free will

    • Characterizing a mental condition as “mental disorder” is a legal exercise with a medical and scientific substratum

      • So A cannot argue that Toxic Psychosis is ALWAYS mental disorder, since it rests on argument that legal characterization of s 16 depends exclusively on medical diagnosis

      • In each new situation, the case turns on its own facts  must use contextual approach not broad approach

    • The general exclusion of Cooper can be rebutted by showing that, at material time, he was suffering from disease of the mind that was unrelated to intoxication-related symptoms

      • Burden of Proof = holistic approach (Stone) to enable the court to determine whether mental condition of A at material time constitutes “mental disorder” for purposes of s 16

  • Applied

    • TJ found A highly intoxicated. In psychotic condition.

    • Taking of the pill is external factor that contraditcts A’s argument, since reaction of normal person to such a pill would be toxic psychosis. strongly suggests lack of mental disorder

    • First Factor from Stone: Rapid appearance of psychotic symptoms generally indicates specific external factor = substance intoxication

      • Such delusions do not result from disease of mind within Code

    • Second Factor from stone:

      • No evidence indicating that mental condition of A is inherently dangerous. provided that abstain from such drugs, no threat to public safety

      • (If A was addicted, SCC might have concluded that he was a risk to public safety  so maybe s 16 if addiction constitutes disease of the mind)

    • Part XX.1 of code is not intended to apply to persons whose temporary madness was induced artificially by state of intoxication

    • IS s 33.1 Applicable?

      • 1) The accused was intoxicated at material time 2) it was self induced and 3) A departed from reasonable care generally recognized in Canadian society by interfering with bodily integrity of another.

      • If these three above are proved = no defence that A lacked general intent or voluntariness required to commit offence

      • S 33.1 applies to any mental condition that is direct extension of state of intoxication. No distinction based on seriousness of effects of self-induced intoxication.

    • S 33.1 was applicable rather than s 16

At para. 20, LeBel J. sets out how the law should generally operate where a person with a mental disorder is intoxicated. Basically:

It depends exclusively on the reason why the accused is claiming an absence of AR/MR
TH: The difficulty in regulating the interaction between s 16 and 33.1 lies primarily in the fact that:

Its not always easy, as a factual matter, to separate symptoms of the mental disorder from symptoms of the intoxicant




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