Mexico proves cap is sustainable and has long term benefits in the long run – outweighs the cost
Lugo, Ph.D in Anthropology at Stanford, Professor of Latina/Latino Studies at University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2008
(Alejandro, “Fragmented Lives, Assembled Parts: Culture, Capitalism, and Conquest at the U.S.-Mexico Border,” University of Texas at Austin Press, pp 228-230)//SG
By examining Gramsci's notion of the state and its dispersal, Foucault's notion of power and its deployment, Anderson's critique of the nation, and R. Rosaldo's critique of culture, I have tried to spell out my critique of cultural analysis, Cultural Studies, and culture and border theory as these overlap one another in nationalist, capitalist, late-capitalist, colonialist, and related projects of politically legitimated force. My specific argument throughout this final chapter, how- ever, has been fourfold. First, I have argued that our own folk conceptions of culture and society have been historically constituted by such dialectic dualities as beliefs and practices (Boas 1940), "symbolic structures and collective behavior" (Geertz 1973a, 251), structure and agency (Bourdieu 1977; R. Rosaldo 1980, 1993), human action and intention (Ortner 1984), and culture as constituted and culture as lived (Sahlins 1981, 1982, 1985)?3 Second, I have asserted that our received academic conceptions of culture and border, and of social life for that matter, have been heavily (but, for the most part, unconsciously) influenced by our capacity and incapacity to acknowledge the distinct transformations that the nature of the Westernized "state" has gone through in the past two hundred years (the academic recognition of everyday experiences along the U.S-Mexico border region is a manifestation of this transformation, especially with the creation of Free Trade [Border) Zones around the world). Third, I have contended that these academic conceptions of culture and border have been the historical products of either political suppressions or political persuasions and other types of resistance (i.e., the emergence of minority scholars who have experienced life at the borderlands) to the center's domination. Finally, I have argued in this chapter that culture, constituted by both beliefs and practices, is not necessarily always shared or always contested, and that the crossroads and the limits or frontiers of these beliefs and practices (border theory) create, in turn, the erosionfrom within of the monopoly of culture theory as "cultural patterns" (to follow Martin-Rodriguez 1996, 86).Regarding anthropology as a discipline, we must ask: What is the role of anthropologists in the production of a cultural theory of borderlands in the inter- disciplinary arena? Anthropologists today can certainly redefine themselves vis a vis the emergent and newly formed academic communities that now confront us. At the turn of the twenty-first century, as Renato Rosaldo has argued, anthropologists must strategically (re)locate/(re)position themselves in the current scholarly battlefield of power relations.To be effective in this conceptual political relocation, however, both anthropologists and nonanthropologists who think seriously about the cultural must ask themselves the following question (which Roland Barthes would pose to anybody regarding the nature of interdisciplinarity): Is the concept of culture an object of study that belongs to no particular discipline? Only an antidisciplinary mood would allow us to answer in the affirmative. A cultural theory of border- lands challenges and invites academics to recognize the crossroads of interdisciplinarity, where "ambassadors" are no longer needed. Once the challenge and the invitation are accepted, border theorizing in itself can simultaneously transcend . and effectively situate culture, capitalism, conquest, and colonialism, as well as the academy, at the crossroads (including the inspections), but only if it is imagined historically and in the larger and dispersed contexts of the nation, the state, the nation-state, and Power (Foucault 1978).Finally, at certain times we must question the tropes we tend to privilege the most-"culture," "nature," "humanity," "class," "race," "mestizaje," "border," "gender," "power." In this case, I prefer the "nonimagined community" as op- posed to the "imagined one," for as Anderson told us, imagined communities kill people and people die for them. More importantly, we need to understand and explain the symbolic process - the structure of the conjuncture, that is, the complex articulation of culture, capitalism, and conquest both in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as well as in the late twentieth century and into the present- that has made it possible, over the past five hundred years, for so many millions of people, in this case in the Americas, not so much to die as to die slowly (and at times abruptly) so that others may live well-off.
Neolib Inevitable Neoliberalism is an inevitable system—it thrives on crisis and reinterpretation—current and future crises will not overcome it
Peck et. al, Professor of geography at the University of British Columbia 10 (Jamie, Nik Theodore, Neil Brenner, “Postneoliberalism and its Malcontents”, Antipode 41, January 2010, Wiley Online)//AS
“Neoliberalism's transformation from a marginalized set of intellectual convictions into a full-blown hegemonic force”, Mudge (2008:709) writes, “began with economic crisis”. More than this, as an historically specific, fungible, contradictory, and unstable process of market-driven sociospatial transformation, neoliberalization has been repeatedly and cumulatively remade through crises. Even during the first half-life of neoliberalism—when it existed largely as an ideational project, almost completely detached from state power—it represented a form of crisis theory (Peck 2008). The neoliberalism of the late 1940s, the 1950s, and the 1960s was an amalgam of free-market utopianism on the one hand, and a pointed, strategic critique of the prevailing Keynesian order on the other. This project later achieved traction in the structural dislocations and macroregulatory failures of the 1970s—the crisis moment that it had long anticipated and which it was designed to exploit. In this sense, neoliberalism was both conceived and born as a crisis theory. In the wake of the Reagan–Thatcher ascendancy, as neoliberalism mutated into a series of state projects, recurrent crises and regulatory failures would continue, in effect, to animate the lurching, uneven advance of transnational neoliberalization. Indeed, crises might be considered to be a primary “engine” of neoliberalism's transformation as a regulatory project, since (historically and geographically, socially and institutionally) specific crises of Keynesian welfarism and developmentalism established the socioinstitutional stakes and the fields of action for the first rounds of regulatory struggles, during the project's roll-back phase, while crises and contradictions of neoliberalism's own making have since shaped cumulative rounds of roll-out, reconstruction, and reaction (Brenner and Theodore 2002a;Peck and Tickell 2002). The legacies of these tawdry, crisis-driven historical geographies of neoliberalism remain starkly present in the current conjuncture. They underscore the claim that the uneven development of neoliberalism is contextually genetic rather than simply contingent (Brenner et al 2010), that neoliberalism is a reactionary credo in more than just a pejorative sense (Peck 2008). It follows that programs of neoliberal restructuring are substantially absorbed not only with the (always-incomplete) task of dismantling inherited institutional forms, but also with the open-ended challenges of managing the attendant economic consequences, social fallout, and political counteractions. Neoliberal strategies are deeply and indelibly shaped by diverse acts of institutional dissolution, but this destructive moment is more than just a “brush-clearing” phase; it is actually integral to the origins, dynamics, and logics of neoliberalization. Each and every actually existing neoliberalism carries the residues, therefore, of past regulatory struggles, which recursively shape political capacities and orientations, and future pathways of neoliberal restructuring. Perversely, programs of neoliberal restructuring are in many ways sustained by repeated regulatory failure; typically, they “progress” through a roiling dynamic of experimentation, overreach, and crisis-driven adjustment.
Neoliberalism is inevitable and any attempt to reform it will fail – Alt can’t solve
Snyder, He is a Professor of Political Science at Brown University 2001 (Richard, Politics After Neoliberalism: Reregulation in Mexico Pub. Cambridge University Press in 2001 pg 216)//JS
In sum, cross-sectoral variation in the number of producers, the flexibility of assets, and dependence on trade should have an important impact on how reregulation works. Depending on the sector, politicians may be more or less likely to make the first move in reregulation processes, international factors may impose stronger or weaker constrainst on the strategies available to domestic actors, and the politics of reregulation may pivot around distinct issues ranging from access to export markets to protection from cheap imports. Despite differences such as these, the core regularities: (1) neoliberal reforms will result in a new politics of reregulation, not an end to regulation; (2) different kinds of new institutions for market governance will emerge; and (3) these institutions will result from strategic interactions among ambitious politicians and organized societal interest as they compete to control the policy areas vacated by neoliberalism.
Even if neoliberalism is disposed of, it will inevitably make a violent return.
Burbach, Director at the Center for the Study of the Americas, 2001 – (Roger, “Globalization and postmodern politics: From Zapatistas to high-tech robber barons,” pages 3-4, 2001, http://pol.atilim.edu.tr/files/kuresellesme/kitaplar/globalization_and_postmodern_politics.pdf)//CS
lt is often forgotten that just a short time ago socialism and third world revolutionary movements, rather than Western capitalism, had an air of inevitability.ln the 1960s and 1970s the consolidation of the Cuban revolution, the rise of revolutionary struggles in much of Latin America, the stunning defeat of the United States in southeast Asia, the installation of national liberation governments in the Portuguese colonies of Africa, the overthrow of the Shah in Iran, and the victory of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua numbered among the more critical setbacks experienced by the United States and its allies.But the empire struck back with violence and impunity. Even where it did not achieve outright victory, it so weakened the revo-lutionary societies through military and economic aggression that by the 1990s they effectively ceased to be viable alternatives. ln South America, the victory of the U.S. against all major challenges was already complete by the mid-1970s.'l`he elected Socialist government of Salvador Allende in Chile was violently overthrown in 1973, and by 1976 nationalist governments and revolutionary movements throughout the southern cone had been crushed asthree-quarters of the continent's population fell under the rule of U.S.-backed military regimes. With the victory of the Sandinistas in 1979,Central America became the new battleground. With hindsight it is little short of astounding thatthis region, so historically dominated by the United States and with a population of only about 20 million, became a critical arena of revolutionary struggle in the 1980s. In an effort to crush these movements, U.S.-supported regimes, particularly inGuatemala, lil Salvador and Honduras, along with the CIA-backedcontra army in Nicaragua, waged a brutal war against the revolu- tionary movements, killing well over 100,000 innocent civilians.
Government regulation of the market is inevitable - Anti-neoliberalism reforms only
Share with your friends: |