New Orleans Affirmative- 7ws strategy Page
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**AT Section**Federal key genericFederal key- overarching policy key Renne et al., 2008 – Renne is a PhD from the University of New Orleans, Sanchez is a PhD from the University of Utah, and Litman is a director at the Victoria Transport Policy Institute (John Renne, Thomas Sanchez, and Todd Litman, “National Study on Carless and Special Needs Evacuation Planning: A Literature Review”, October 2008, accessed 7/3/12)//BZ The federal government must create a national policy on carless and special needs evacuation planning. This should include funding to lower-levels of government to plan, implement, test, and continually refine such evacuation plans. Such an endeavor could be embraced by the DHS’s Interagency Coordinating Council on Emergency Preparedness and Individuals with Disabilities. Targets should be set with incentives. These regional councils could encourage cooperation amongst local, county and state governments, the metropolitan planning organization, transit agencies, special needs transit providers, the American Red Cross, and other non-profits that provide services to special needs residents. Federal key- have to coordinate emergency planning and evacuation. Renne et al., 2008 – Renne is a PhD from the University of New Orleans, Sanchez is a PhD from the University of Utah, and Litman is a director at the Victoria Transport Policy Institute (John Renne, Thomas Sanchez, and Todd Litman, “National Study on Carless and Special Needs Evacuation Planning: A Literature Review”, October 2008, accessed 7/3/12)//BZ Much of the current evacuation literature focuses on automobile-based evacuations. Some studies focus on traffic models and the pros and cons of various strategies for dealing with massive volumes of congestion during an emergency (Wolshon 2001; Dow and Cutter 2002; Wilmot and Mei 2004). Other studies focus on the decision to evacuate or not (Lindell, Lu and Prater 2005; Willgen, Edwards, Lormand, and Wilson 2005; Bateman and Edwards 2002; Chakraborty, Tobin and Montz 2005) while others call for a more comprehensive model that includes alternative modes of evacuating (Litman 2006; Hess and Gotham 2007). A national survey of hurricane evacuation found that state departments of transportation (DOTs) largely ignored low mobility and special needs groups (Wolshon et al. 2001). States may view evacuation as a local issue and not own transport assets, buses, etc. The report notes that most cities do not have a sufficient number of buses to evacuate all low-mobility evacuees. Ironically, hundreds of transit and school buses were flooded in New Orleans during Katrina. The survey also found that no plans were in place to use rail as a means of evacuation. Historically, trains and buses have played an important role in the evacuation of cities. In an international study, trains and buses were important modes in 20 of the 27 evacuations. In ten of these, the majority of people used trains and buses (see Table 1) (Zelinsky and Kosinski 1991). The Report to Congress on Catastrophic Hurricane Plan Evacuation (USDOT & USDHS 2006) found that most evacuation plans were underdeveloped and ineffective, especially with respect to persons with special mobility needs. Multiple federal agencies, including the U.S. Government Accountability Office, the U.S. Department of Transportation, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, as well as Senate and House Committees found that transportation planners, providers, health care agencies, and emergency management officials need to be better coordinated and communicating on this issue long before any disaster. In an examination of the evacuation failures during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, Litman suggests that many of these failures can be attributed to a lack of resilience; the ability to absorb unexpected circumstances through redundancy within the transportation system. Littman notes that the tragedies of Katrina are “simply extreme examples of the day-to-day problems facing non-drivers due to inadequate and poorly integrated transportation services” (Litman 2006, p.18). Many evacuation plans simply suggest that during evacuations, carless residents should seek assistance with friends or neighbors who do own cars. Raphael and Berube (2006) point out, however, that due to the socioeconomic and racial segregation existing in most American cities, the lack of an automobile is often a condition shared among neighbors. Cameron (2006) also suggests that emergency planning should involve the disabled community, and recommends that local governments create a registry of all members of the community with special needs. Many examples and case studies show the importance of multimodal emergency response planning. For example, one of the main lessons learned from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita is the importance of deploying buses to evacuate large numbers of people, including those who lack automobile transport (Litman 2006). It is therefore important that emergency response and evacuation plans be multimodal. Private CPThe CP creates capitalist monopolies that assures imperialism Kolanu 12 Abhishek Bose-Kolanu, (Harvard University 2011) Lecture Ten Feb. 18th 02/20/2012 Lecture Ten – Imperialism Concluded http://thinknippon.org/en/lectureten/ I. Returning to Lenin, How do monopolies form? We know that monopolies are an inevitable result of so-called free market competition (why? Hint: Lecture Nine). And we also know that out of industrial monopolization, bank monopolization leads to an age of finance capital and total imperialism. But how do the monopolies form in the first place? What strategies do they use to extend their power? A. Crisis Causes Concentration During times of crisis, capitalists strike. They take advantage of the fact that a crisis distracts the population to ram through economic policies that benefit themselves. Oftentimes they take advantage of the expanded political power we grant the State in times of crisis to abuse it for their own profit. Examples of crises include economic crises (subprime mortgage crisis – American banks extracted billions of dollars from the government for free), natural disasters (immediately after Hurricane Katrina New Orleans was effectively sold to private corporations, apartments were enclosed in barbed wire and people not allowed to return to their homes), war, etc. Free market leads to capitalism – growth and innovation necessitates government Clarkston 09 Charles A. Clarkson the founder and chairman of the Clarkson Group, the Chairman of IxReveal, Inc., an analytics software company. AIG Anger and the Free Market Myth Posted: 03/26/09 03:43 PM ET The fact is, our markets aren't free, nor should they be. The only really free markets we've seen in my adult lifetime were the Miami area after Hurricane Andrew and New Orleans after Katrina. For a day or so, "entrepreneurs" could sell ice, plywood or any other critical item for as much as they could get. Then civilization enforcement stepped in via law enforcement and shut them down. Civilization and a truly free market can't coexist. Even those bastions of free market capitalism, the NYSE and NASDAQ can't function without myriad rules, regulations and laws, and the go-go Alan Greenspan era of market freedom was predicated upon them (in fact, the demise of some those rules, such as the SEC uptick rule repealed in 2007, contributed mightily to the current crisis). I once asked Greenspan in person to describe his notion of a free market. In his inimitable doublespeak, he offered an oxymoronic description of a system in which "actors are free to do what they like with a minimum amount of rules and regulations." Months later he famously testified to Congress expressing some disillusionment. Whatever he once thought was "minimum" regulation, he now thinks we need much more. We now know the "free" market rhetoric of the Greenspan era turned out to be massively destructive. It owed much to Ronald Reagan's mocking catch phrase, "I'm from the government and I'm here to help," as if government involvement was inimical to a functioning market. Once our political discourse branded government as the interfering ogre, we started dismantling the investment and regulatory apparatus, and became prone to the myth that the success of the big winners was due only to their individual skills and talent within a free market. The "free" system supposedly permitted these talents to shine without government interference. Outrageous bonuses and executive compensations came to be viewed as the natural result of the free market at work. But that was just revisionist history, mixed up with Cold War ideology and lots of special interest lobbying. Before the Boomer era of indulgence, the government was viewed not as an adversary but a key player in economic and social welfare, whether it was the GI bill, the interstate highway system or huge federal grants for scientific research and public education. We would never have become the world's economic leader, never would have established our reputation for dynamic innovation and technological advancement, without the anti-free market monopolies enabled by the U.S. Patent Office, and thousands of other public sector investments that shaped markets by fiat. We don't have a free market and we don't want one. A better term for what we actually have would be a private market. The term "free" market has come to diminish or denigrate the role of government, but a private market embodies the notion of government encouraging risk-taking and innovation, capitalism within civilized norms and appropriate guidelines. It is in the private market's interest to understand, respect and support the critical role the government plays in our lives. The creation of wealth, including the bonuses of Wall Street executives, deserved or not, has always stood on the shoulders of public sector money and regulation, without which we would have anarchy and poverty. Private sector fails for evacuation – multiple reasons Sanchez et al. 09 [Thomas W. Sanchez, expert on transportation, land use, urban and regional planning, and environmental justice, John L. Renne, Associate Professor of Planning and Urban Studies at the University of New Orleans, Pam Jenkins, University of New Orleans, and Robert Peterson] Challenge of Evacuating the Carless in Five Major U.S. Cities Identifying the Key Issues http://planning.uno.edu/docs/The%20Challenge%20of%20Evacuation%20the%20Carless.pdf Private-sector issues include conflicts between private evacuation contracts and public evacuation demands, as one bus operator noted that a bus contracted to transport hotel occupants was diverted by law enforcement, with no reimbursement received. A local emergency management planner worried that liability concerns and reimbursement difficulties encourage a philosophy of risk avoidance in both public and private sectors. Massive population relocations may overwhelm the limited excess capacity of private transportation and healthcare providers. The bus, airline, and hospital industries are primarily for-profit enterprises, driven to increase efficiency through decreasing underused inventory, which results in less vehicle availability and flexibility in times of increased demand. Private efforts fail and reentrench the social disparities of the status quo. Smith 2006 – Distinguished Professor of Anthropology and Geography at the CUNY Graduate Center where he also directs the Center for Place, Culture and Politics (Neil, “There’s No Such Thing as a Natural Disaster” March 2006, http://www.ladeltacorps.org/uploads/4/3/8/1/4381788/cg-ar-packet.pdf )//ALo By contrast, post-Katrina reconstruction in the United States will be dominated by top-down government contracts for tens if not hundreds of billions of dollars to major corporations and by billions of dollars of insurance payments to property owners so that they can reconstruct in the same vulnerable locations already destroyed. Such a solution may be good if measured by the yardstick of capitalist profit—a new buying binge by the Gulf raises all yachts, and, incredibly, insurance company stocks tend to rise following major disasters – but the same private market logic that caused such social destruction spells social and environmental disaster for those not in line to profit from government contracts and property insurance payments. But there is an alternative. “We will not stand idly by while this disaster is used as an opportunity to replace our homes with newly built mansions and condos in a gentrified New Orleans,” reads a statement from a citywide coalition of New Orleans low-income groups, Community Labor United (Klein 2005). They went on to insist that the rebuilding of the city not be dominated by top-down corporate welfare but that those evacuated from New Orleans have the primary power over how the reconstruction proceeds. The billions of dollars already committed by Congress and the funds raised by charities belong by rights to the victims. Some will respond that reconstruction is very complicated, and it is, but the record of companies like Bechtel and Haliburton in Iraq are hardly evidence for the defense of a top-down Iraq model for New Orleans. In the end, the reconstruction question is only secondarily technical. It is in the first place political, and the same corporate and federal abandonment that fostered such a widespread disaster can hardly be expected to perform an about-turn by empowering a disempowered population. Given the visceral response to the hundreds of unnecessary deaths resulting from Katrina, any attempt to impose a top-down solution by force is likely to incite an equally visceral response from below. If the Bush administration’s first instinct was to eschew government and trust private charities to help the victims of Katrina, it should follow that instinct as regards the ordinary refugees of New Orleans and their ability to rebuild from the bottom up. There is no such thing as a natural disaster, and the supposed naturalness of the market is the last place to look for a solution to this disastrous havoc. Privatized efforts to rebuild New Orleans causes more oppression. Smith 2006 – Distinguished Professor of Anthropology and Geography at the CUNY Graduate Center where he also directs the Center for Place, Culture and Politics (Neil, “There’s No Such Thing as a Natural Disaster” March 2006, http://www.ladeltacorps.org/uploads/4/3/8/1/4381788/cg-ar-packet.pdf )//ALo The final lesson of environmental geography concerning disasters is that far from flattening the social differences, disaster reconstruction invariably cuts deeper the ruts and grooves of social oppression and exploitation. And so, while abolishing competition by giving no-bid contracts to some of the same companies that operate in Iraq – Bechtel, Fluor Corp., Haliburton – the Bush administration has mandated cutthroat competition among desperate workers by suspending the federal law that requires federal contractors to pay at least the prevailing local wage. Meanwhile, with many of the dead still unaccounted for, developers descended on New Orleans with wallets bulging and chops smacking. In anticipation that the city will be rebuilt with higher and better levees and with many fewer working class and African Americans, New Orleans two weeks after Katrina already looked like a developers’ gold rush (Streitfeld 2005; Rivlin 2005). These people, these developers and these corporations, say many New Orleanians, are the “true looters.” By contrast, those displaced, with no private property to reclaim, face lower wages, escalating costs for scarce housing, and as the initial sympathy wears away, increased stigmatization. When President Bush insists that “out of New Orleans is going to come that great city again,” it is difficult to believe that good quality, secure and affordable social housing is what this administration has in mind. Wholesale gentrification at a scale as yet unseen in the United States is the more likely outcome. After the Bush hurricane, the poor, African American and working class people who evacuated will not be welcomed back to New Orleans, which will in all likelihood be rebuilt as a tourist magnet with a Disneyfied BigEasyVille oozing even more manufactured authenticity than the surviving French Quarter nearby. We can look back and identify any number of individual decisions taken and not taken that made this hurricane such a social disaster. But the larger picture is more than the sum of its parts. It is not a radical conclusion that the dimensions of the Katrina disaster owe in large part not just to the actions of this or that local or federal administration but the operation of a capitalist market more broadly, especially in its neo-liberal garb. The refusal to tackle global warming is rooted in the global power of the petroleum and energy corporations which fear for their profits and which, not coincidentally, represent the social class roots of the Bush administration’s power; the New Orleans population were vulnerable not because of geography but because of long term class and race abandonment – poverty – exacerbated by the dismantling of social welfare by Democratic and Republican administrations alike; the incompetence of FEMA preparations expressed cocooned ruling class comradery, cronyism and privilege rather than any concern for the poor and working class; and the reconstruction looks set to capitalize on these inequalities and deepen them further. Not at any point in the next few decades will African Americans again account for two-thirds of New Orleans’ population. 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