Nuclear fission



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1.3Structure of the report


The first chapters of this document are dealing with the characterization of the man-made hazards (chapter 3 for single events and chapter 4 for hazard combinations) and the methodologies for their assessment.
The second part of the report deals with the introduction of relevant external hazards in an existing (internal events) L1 PSA. Chapter 6 presents the general structure of man-made hazards PSA. The developed solutions for modelling man-made hazards are covering the modelling of external fire, explosions and aircraft crash in L1 PSA (chapter 7), the modelling of SSC (chapter 8), the modelling of human errors for these particular hazards (chapter 9), the modelling of additional emergency response (including mobile equipment, special provisions and help from outside the plant – in chapter 10) and the modelling of multi-unit PSA (chapter 11).

The quantification aspects are covered in chapter 12. Conclusion and recommendations of the document are presented in chapter 13, along with a list of open issues presented in chapter 14. The last section includes a list of references to the document chapters. Appendix 1 contains general principles of the French approach to characterize and assess man-made hazards. It includes also an example of the used methodology. Appendix 2 contains a description of various methods for calculating frequencies of aircraft crashes. In Appendix 3 additional material on emergency response related to aircraft crash hazard is included.



2DATA FOR HAZARD CHARACTERISATION


The data necessary for appraisal and evaluation of hazards resulting from human activities discussed in this report can be divided into two groups:

  • Data related to hazard sources;

  • Data related to plant design.
    1. Data related to hazard sources


In general, the sources may be stationary (located around or near the plant site), or mobile (moving in vicinity of the plant). This data is always considered to be site-specific.

The stationary sources represent mainly industrial and storage facilities, in which combustible or explosive substances are produced or stored. The mobile sources represent mainly transport of such substances. Within the hazards resulting from the mobile sources air transport is considered separately due to its specifics and possible direct physical contact of the aircraft with the plant or its part(s).


The data on stationary sources should include information on:

  • structure of industry in vicinity of NPP site,

  • distance of stationary industrial facilities from NPP site with emphasis on those, in which chemical, flammable or combustible materials are stored or transported via pipelines,

  • types and amount of hazardous substances produced and stored in the facilities or transported via pipelines,

  • information on storage, manipulations and internal safety measures adopted in these facilities in relation to the hazards resulting from their operation,

  • meteorological and Hydrological data.

It should be mentioned that, if available, safety reports of chemical installations can be used as a basic source of the information needed. The safety reports typically contain data on frequency and possible consequences of the accidents in stationary installations, which can be relevant for surrounding region. They can also contain data from the simulations of the development of major accidents.

The data on mobile sources should include information on:



  • structure of transport lines (roads, railways, water roads, product lines1), piping) in vicinity of NPP site,

  • distances of the transport lines from NPP site,

  • type and amount of transported hazardous substances,

  • data on technical means used for transport of hazardous substances,

  • frequency of the transports.

As a part of this data, also the national legislative measures related to hazardous materials (requirements for storage and transport of such substances) may be considered.

The above mentioned data are intended to be used mainly for appraisal of hazards related to external fires and explosions. Among the fires there is also a special category of “forest fires“ for which also data on surrounding vegetation and landscape are required.


The data base on air traffic should include information on:

  • nearby airfields or airports (civil, military) and their distances from NPP site; data related to the type (unpaved or hard surfaced) and orientation of runaways,

  • number of airport operations (take-offs, landings) related to the airports,

  • airways around and across the NPP site; data on transit civil transport flights within airways (statistics on number of flights in these corridors, types of aircraft operated within area of interest, etc.),

  • other aviation activities within region of interest (military bases or training areas, agriculture, sport and special purpose flights).

The above mentioned data are intended to be used in the analysis of the aircraft crash hazard.
    1. Data related to plant design


To be able to evaluate real effects of the external events to NPP, data on NPP design are needed. This data represents a group of data covering both plant specific and generic data.

The main sources of plant specific data are:



  • plant design technical documentation,

  • plant specific analyses (elaborated for SAR, PSA studies, etc.),

  • plant historical data from operational experience.

The main sources of generic data are:

  • generic data from or for plants of the same or similar design,

  • internationally accepted databases (IAEA, OECD, NRC) especially as a source of frequencies and screening values,

  • knowledge and results from analyses of real external events similar to those under consideration for specific plant,

  • data from available calculation/simulation studies.

The above mentioned data are intended to be applied in analysis of potential effects of external events on the NPP.

As far as numerical simulation data are considered, the following can be useful (mostly for fires and toxic releases):



  • meteorological data from the numerical weather forecasts made in the past. This can be particularly useful if re-analysis data and/or the results from weather forecast systems are available, as they can improve statistics.

  • meteorological data from the simulations of climatic models, as they provide projection of the development of weather conditions in the period of the future operation of NPP.

  • optionally data from the simulations of fires and explosions in the vicinity of NPP ;this may be relevant if advanced calculations are used to produce such data (for example using models of the class of computational fluid dynamics), as otherwise simple models can be applied,

  • optionally data on simulations for similar facilities as the ones located in the vicinity of NPP.

An important issue is data completeness and quality assessment. This pertains to the following problems:

  • identification of the methods for assessing key input parameters: this can be done mostly by detailed analysis of the consequences of the external events related to man-made hazards and the response of NPP to such events; in principle, a full risk analysis (like QRA – Quantitative Risk Assessment) for the external event could provide good initial data for the response analysis; however this can be hardly done, therefore, the analysis of the major or enveloping accidents outside the NPP, should be performed at least,

  • assessing data completeness via statistical methods and/or expert judgement: in a number of cases there are mathematical rules when and how to apply statistical methods. However, in the considered case, typical situation is the lack of data, then missing or censoring techniques can be applied, but in any case this should be supported by expert judgement,

  • accuracy or uncertainty of the measurement and numerical simulation data: in most cases observations or simulated numerical data should include information on their accuracy; if not, they should be treated carefully and additional analysis of their uncertainty could be performed.

It should be added that the last two items mentioned above, are far beyond what is normally used in Hazards PSA, hence it is an open question to what extend this is needed and feasible.




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