Iranian oil revenues are used to fund the military and test launch missiles
(The Associated press, 7/9/08, http://channels.isp.netscape.com/pf/story.jsp?floc=FF-APO-1310&idq=/ff/story/0001%2F20080709%2F0739268290.htm&sc=1310)
VIENNA, Austria (AP) - Oil prices rebounded from consecutive days of steep declines after Iran test-fired nine missiles long- and medium-range missiles Wednesday.
Expectations that a U.S. crude supply report later in the day will show stocks at continued lows also supported prices.
Iran's elite Revolutionary Guards fired the missiles during war games that high-ranking military officials say are a response to U.S. and Israeli threats.
Gen. Hossein Salami, a top commander, was quoted on state television saying the exercise ``is to demonstrate our resolve and might against enemies who in recent weeks have threatened Iran with harsh language.''
Light, sweet crude for August delivery rose $1.80 to $137.84 a barrel in electronic trading on the New York Mercantile Exchange by afternoon in Europe. Tuesday the contract fell $5.33 to $136.04 a barrel in New York - a two-day, $9 slide.
``Iran is certainly sending mixed signals,'' said Victor Shum at Purvin & Gertz in Singapore. ``There was an apparent easing of tensions, but then the missile tests had an impact on prices today.''
Impact- War
Iran going nuclear risks dangerous U.S. invasion
George Perkovich with Silvia Manzanero (Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Paralegal at Stetson U and Carnegie Junior Fellow), October 2005, GETTING READY FOR A NUCLEAR-READY IRAN,
Of course, the United States and/or a multilateral coalition, or the UN Security Council could decide that a nuclear Iran poses a threat to international peace and security sufficient to warrant military action to remove the current government in Iran. Regime removal in Iran would be more demanding than the invasion of Iraq. Without pretending a detailed analysis, one can say that current military and international political and economic conditions militate against such a risky enterprise. Among other things, it is practically impossible to estimate how events in Iran would evolve following a military action to remove the current government, even if such action were feasible. Those who would contemplate forcible regime change would be obligated to posit realistic scenarios and means to effect a future in Iran better than the current situation.
Impact- War
Continued development of the Iranian nuclear program risks U.S. Iranian war
(BBC, 2-10-7, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6348797.stm)
'Accidental war'
But conflict between the US and Iran is still possible.
President Ahmadinejad is facing his own domestic problems with mounting criticism of not just his approach to foreign policy and the nuclear issue but also his failure to deal with economic concerns at home.
This could lead to other power centres in Iran forcing him to back down but could also encourage him to take a harder line on the nuclear programme in order to try and rally support.
At the same time, Washington has been increasing the pressure over Iran's alleged involvement in Iraq.
With US troops so close to Iran's borders, a small event could easily ignite a wider escalation and even trigger an "accidental" war - although conspiracy theorists might argue that there are some in both Tehran and Washington who would like to engineer just such a confrontation and blame the other side.
Impact- Nuclear Terrorism
Political instability after Iran acquires nuclear weapons would cause apocalyptic nuclear terrorism
MICHAEL EISENSTADT, (Senior fellow and director of the Military and Security Studies Program at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy), October 2005, GETTING READY FOR A NUCLEAR-READY IRAN, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub629.pdf
Instability in Iran. Finally, there are the implications of political instability and domestic unrest in a nuclear Iran. Should anti-regime violence escalate to the point that it were to threaten the existence of the Islamic Republic (unlikely in the near-term, but possible in the future, should Iran’s conservative leadership prove unable to better the population’s living standards, and continue to ignore calls for political change), diehard supporters of the old order might lash out at the perceived external enemies of the regime with all means at their disposal, as the regime teeters on the brink. In such a scenario, the apocalyptic possibility of nuclear terrorism by the Islamic Republic in its death throes must be treated seriously.
Neg Answers- Iran won’t use nukes
Even if Iran was to get nuclear weapons, it would not use them violently or provocatively.
George Perkovich with Silvia Manzanero (Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Paralegal at Stetson U and Carnegie Junior Fellow), October 2005, GETTING READY FOR A NUCLEAR-READY IRAN, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub629.pdf
Finally, although this paper assesses the challenge of reversing Iran’s proliferation, it also would be wise to consider the alternative strategy of adaptation to a nuclear Iran. If Iran effectively resisted roll back, the United States and others would shift to a strategy of deterring Iran from “using” its nuclear capability as an instrument of coercive diplomacy (nuclear blackmail) or military aggression (using a nuclear umbrella to shield low-intensity conflict in other states). A shift from roll back to a strategy of deterrence and containment would come early if Iran indicated it is deterrable and desired nuclear weapons only to protect its own autonomy, not to alter the status quo in the Gulf and Middle East. Iran’s more pragmatic international policy since 1997 suggests that it is moving toward a more status quo orientation and would not wield nuclear weapons provocatively. If this were to prove true, the United States would find it extremely difficult to sustain international cooperation in seeking to coerce Iranian roll back. This paper, however, does not explore the adaptive strategy of deterrence and containment because such a strategy would not be nearly so difficult for the United States to execute as would be the strategy of rallying international cooperation in roll back.
Neg Answers- Oil revenues temporary and have no effect
Iranian oil revenues give Iran no strategic leverage over other countries, don’t influence the Iranian nuclear program, and won’t be sustained for a long period of time
Patrick Clawson, (senior editor of the Middle East Quarterly and director for research at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy), WINTER 2007, Middle East Quarterly, VOLUME XIV: NUMBER 1, http://www.meforum.org/article/1068
Many senior officials and policymakers in both the United States and Europe suggest that the West cannot apply significant economic pressure because Tehran has too much leverage over oil supplies. They argue that were Iran to cut off its oil exports of 2.5 million barrels per day, the West might have no choice but to mitigate its pressure against Iran's nuclear program.
Perhaps—but perhaps not. Firstly, there is no evidence that the Iranian government has been able to use its oil to influence other countries to turn a blind eye to its nuclear violations. Secondly, even if Tehran did throw its oil weight around, it could not do so for long. Production outside of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is increasing, in part in response to the stimulus of high prices, and the return of Hurricane Katrina-damaged facilities will only add to the higher output.[27] Despite the red-hot Chinese and Indian economies, world demand is growing more slowly as price influences consumption. It was the experience after both the 1973-74 and 1980-81 price increases that, within four years, the oil market softened. Iran's strategic leverage regarding oil may well decline with time.
In April 2006, world oil production was one million barrels per day higher than demand according to the prestigious Petroleum Intelligence Weekly. OPEC countries had excess production capacity of about 1.5 million barrels per day.[28] Further, the world refinery situation is changing so that heavier Saudi crude oils can be more readily absorbed whereas before, refineries were unable to take advantage of low Saudi prices because they simply could not refine its heavy crude. These two factors alone more than offset any potential cutoff of Iranian oil exports.
What about Iran's threats to disrupt oil shipments from the Persian Gulf? On June 4, 2006, Khamene'i warned, "If the Americans make a wrong move toward Iran, the shipment of energy will definitely face danger, and the Americans would not be able to protect energy supply in the region."[29] The Iranians have persuaded themselves that they have this capability. Ali-Ashgar Kazemi, a retired Iranian admiral now a political science professor at Tehran University, said, "Iranians are preparing for guerilla war at sea ... In an enclosed, narrow, and rather shallow region such as the Persian Gulf, this tactic can be very decisive against large units and can deny the enemy from effective deployment, sea lines of communication, and power projection."[30] Such a threat demonstrates Iran's ambitions: it wants to be a regional power whose wishes are accommodated by its neighbors. Defense News writer Riad Khawaji warned, "Iran could sortie nearly 400 small, high-speed craft armed with rocket launchers, torpedoes, and mines."[31]
But the Iranian government cannot cut off oil exports without considerable harm to its economy. The Iranian government relies on oil revenue to fund 75 percent of its expenditures. While Iran's foreign exchange reserves would cushion the impact, those reserves could only pay for a year's imports.[32]
Perhaps Iran's most immediate vulnerability is its dependence on imported gasoline, which provides about 40 percent of the 350,000 barrels of gasoline sold daily.[33] This vulnerability may be less than meets the eye. The price of gasoline at the pump is 800 rials per liter, or about 35 cents a gallon. Such a cheap price encourages gasoline smuggling to neighboring countries where gasoline prices are more than ten times higher and leads the Iranian government to hemorrhage revenue. Customer payment does not even cover the cost of fuel distribution. The Iranian government is, however, preparing. It is well along with gasoline ration plans to allow a quick response in the event of a gasoline import cutoff. Nevertheless, oil rationing remains politically unpopular.[34]
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