Shale oil is ridiculously expensive and no new tech will solve that.
Richard Heinberg, Senior Fellow at the Post Carbon Institute, ‘4
(Powerdown: Options and Actions for a Post-Carbon World, p. 20) [Bozman]
Unconventional petroleum resources ? so-called ?heavy oil,? ?oil sands,? and ?shale oil? ? are plentiful but extremely costly to extract and process, a fact that no technical innovation is likely to change much (we will discuss hydrogen and unconventional hydrocarbon resources in more detail in Chapter 4).
AT: Shell Reports
1. Shell’s over optimistic-aside from their bias for report high numbers their figures are inncurate.
R.W. Bentley, Department of Cybernetics of the University of Reading, February, ‘2
(Energy Policy, Volume 30, Issue 3, p. 189-205) [Bozman]
So the question is: how does Shell arrive at such a different global view of oil's future from that of Campbell and Laherrère? The explanations are probably that Shell: • does not pull down the FSU and Middle-East reserves to the extent that Campbell/Laherrère do, or even at all; • has a significantly more optimistic view of the extra oil that technology can access than that held by Campbell/Laherrère. Shell asks the people in the field for estimates of ‘scope for further recovery’, where this covers a wide range of technology-related factors, not just enhanced-recovery oil. These opinions will be informed, but are opinions nevertheless. By contrast, the Campbell/Laherrère approach, in essence, extrapolates the past rate of technology improvement into the future; • despite their assurances, put more faith in the PIRA projections, and the recent USGS estimates, than the data permit. Recent Shell scenarios, for example, are said to be based on the USGS data.9 (See below for the dangers of using the USGS numbers.) • is sure that steam-assisted gravity-drainage tar sands production, and their own-technology gas-to-gasolines plants, will be able to bring in these non-conventionals at costs, and timescales, sufficient to mask the decline in conventional production. It is perhaps worth noting that in discussions, Shell said they viewed quantitative forecasting of oil production as not possible, due to the underlying uncertainties; only broad scenario modelling had validity. Moreover, in commenting on the work of Campbell, Shell appears not to have understood that the recent data on conventional oil published by Campbell exclude polar and deepwater oil, as he models these separately. Overall, in our view, perhaps the biggest problem with the Shell view is that it does not focus adequately on the probability that the resources they estimate to exist cannot be accessed in time to change the various regional dates of peak. Mankind has found so far some 1700 Gb of oil in the world, and the new field discovery trend has been declining for 35 years and now averages about 10 Gb/yr. Thus, while assumptions on the world's original endowment of oil being much above 2000 Gb might, in the long run, turn out to be correct, it is only the currently known oil, and that which will be discovered soon, that can have any impact on the date of the production peak. Indeed, this is essentially the identical analysis to that given a few years ago, after retirement, by the CEO of the Shell Oil Co. in the US (Bookout, 1989). 10 Finally, in terms of the generality of oil company views, it is probably fair to say, given what is set out in Section 4.2, that most companies, national as well as commercial, have a strong motivation to put a more optimistic gloss on the resource numbers than the latter actually warrant.
2. Insert AT: Unconventional Oils Fill In
3. That takes out their scenario-Sehll assumes that unconventional oils will fill in.
Roger Bentley, Department of Cybernetics of the University of Reading and Godfrey Boyel, Energy and Environment Research Unit of the Open University, October 29th, ‘7
(Global oil production: forecasts and methodologies, Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design 2008, volume 35) [Bozman]
Shell's scenarios are widely quoted. Their recent global ultimate of 4000 Gb is com- posed of: approximately 2300 Gb of conventional oil (including NGLs), around 600 Gb of `scope for further recovery' oil, plus 1000 Gb of nonconventional oil.(12) Shell therefore envisage that the unconventional oils will come on-stream smoothly as conventional oil declines.
AT: Slow Decrease in Production
A slow decrease still triggers the impact-small fluctuations in oil supply have huge economic impacts.
Robert L. Hirsch, Analyst at Management Information Services, February, ‘8
(Energy Policy, Volume 36, Issue 2, p. 881-889, p. Science Direct) [Bozman]
In this context, relatively small percentage changes are hugely meaningful. For example, the 3% decrease in US GDP resulting from the 1973 Arab oil embargo resulted 55in a damaging economic recession. A 1% change in current world oil production equates to over 800,000 barrels per day (bpd), which represents a huge volume. To save that level of consumption through improvements in the efficiency of the world's light duty vehicle fleet (automobiles and light trucks) would require more than a decade, assuming crash program implementation (Hirsch et al., 2005). The production of 800,000 bpd of substitute liquid fuels would require coal-to-liquids (CTL) plants costing $50–100 billion and require more than a decade under the very best of conditions. Thus, small decreases in world oil production can have large economic impacts and require very large levels of mitigation hardware and investment.
New tech can’t delay the oil peak.
Colin Cambell, PhD in Geology from Oxford, former Geologist at Amoco and Texaco and Jean Laherrere, former Surveyor for Total
(French Oil Company), March, ‘98
(The End of Cheap Oil, Scientific American, Volume 278, Issue 3, p. Ebsco) [Bozman]
A second common rejoinder is that new technologies have steadily increased the fraction of oil that can be recovered from fields in a basin--the so-called recovery factor. In the 1960s oil companies assumed as a rule of thumb that only 30 percent of the oil in a field was typically recoverable; now they bank on an average of 40 or 50 percent. That progress will continue and will extend global reserves for many years to come, the argument runs. Of course, advanced technologies will buy a bit more time before production starts to fall [see "Oil Production in the 21st Century," by Roger N. Anderson, on page 86]. But most of the apparent improvement in recovery factors is an artifact of reporting. As oil fields grow old, their owners often deploy newer technology to slow their decline. The falloff also allows engineers to gauge the size of the field more accurately and to correct previous underestimation--in particular P90 estimates that by definition were 90 percent likely to be exceeded. Another reason not to pin too much hope on better recovery is that oil companies routinely count on technological progress when they compute their reserve estimates. In truth, advanced technologies can offer little help in draining the largest basins of oil, those onshore in the Middle East where the oil needs no assistance to gush from the ground.
New tech cant overcome declining reserves.
Paul Roberts, Journalist, Finalist for the National Magazine Award, ‘4
(The End of Oil, p. 57) [Bozman]
Share with your friends: |