Iran 2AC Shell (4/4)
The result of Iranian nuclear capabilities will be widespread proliferation,
terrorism, and even higher oil prices all culminating in major power wars.
Henry Sokolski, (Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center), October 2005, GETTING READY FOR A NUCLEAR-READY IRAN, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub629.pdf
These workshops identified three threats that are likely to increase following Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapons option.
1. Even More Nuclear Proliferation. Iran’s continued insistence that it acquired its nuclear capabilities legally under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) would, if unchallenged, encourage its neighbors (including Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Turkey, and Algeria) to develop nuclear options of their own by emulating Iran’s example, by overtly declaring possession (in Israel’s case) 2 or by importing nuclear weapons (in Saudi Arabia’s case). Such announcements and efforts, in turn, would likely undermine nuclear nonproliferation restraints internationally and strain American relations with most of its key friends in the Middle East.
2. Dramatically Higher Oil Prices. A nuclear-ready Iran could be emboldened to manipulate oil prices upward. It might attempt this either by threatening the freedom of the seas (by mining oil transit points as it did in the l980s, or by threatening to close the Straits of Hormuz), or by using terrorist proxies to threaten the destruction of Saudi and other Gulf state oil facilities and pipelines.
3. Increased Terrorism Designed to Diminish U.S. Influence.
With a nuclear weapons option acting as a deterrent to the United States and allied action against it, Iran would likely lend greater support to terrorists operating against Israel, Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Europe, and the United States. The aim of such support would be to reduce American support for U.S. involvement in the Middle East, for Israel, and for actions against Iran generally, and to elevate Iran as an equal to the United States and its allies on all matters relating to the Persian Gulf and related regions. An additional aim of the terrorism that Iran would support would be to keep other nations from supporting U.S. policies and the continued U.S. military presence in the Middle East.
All of these threats are serious. If realized, they would undermine U.S. and allied efforts to foster moderate rule in much of the Middle East and set into play a series of international competitions that could ultimately result in major wars. Most U.S. and allied policymakers understand this and are now preoccupied with trying to prevent Iran from ever acquiring a nuclear weapons option. As Iran gets closer to securing this option, though, two questionable courses of action―bombing or bribing Iran―have become increasingly popular. Neither, however, is likely to succeed and could easily make matters worse.
Uniqueness- Nukes
Iran could have nukes in 2-7 years
MICHAEL EISENSTADT, (Senior fellow and director of the Military and Security Studies Program at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy), October 2005, GETTING READY FOR A NUCLEAR-READY IRAN, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub629.pdf
By contrast, according to public statements by U.S. intelligence officials and news reports summarizing authoritative U.S. and Israeli intelligence assessments, Iran could have a nuclear weapon by early to mid-next decade—that is, within 5-10 years. 4
Iranian nuclear program nearing completion
(BBC, 2-10-7, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6348797.stm)
But just how close is Iran to mastering nuclear technology?
Both Iran and some of its critics may have their own reasons for exaggerating the progress - but the real truth is hard to establish.
In its announcement, Iran may claim to have begun large-scale industrial enrichment of uranium.
But any statement is likely to be as much about political positioning as real technical progress, according to nuclear analysts.
The announcement may focus on work Iran has conducted in installing two cascades of more than 300 centrifuges in an underground industrial size plant at Natanz with the aim of moving towards a total of 3,000 machines.
The centrifuges are used to enrich uranium. This is in addition to two existing cascades in a pilot plant above ground.
But Iran's plan to initially run 3,000 centrifuges before moving towards an ultimate goal of 54,000 has run into obstacles and delays and is well behind target. Even the cascades in the pilot plant have seen problems.
However, once Iran has mastered the technology of enrichment and the ability to enrich gas at high speeds in a centrifuge then transferring it to a larger scale presents a lesser challenge.
Uniqueness- Nukes
Despite uncertainties and unknown factors, estimates point to the completion of the Iranian nuclear program in 1-5 years.
(BBC, 2-10-7, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6348797.stm)
Arguably it is human expertise in the form of trained scientists rather than equipment which is the most important element of a nuclear programme.
Whether or not there has been extensive covert activity directed at Iran (and by definition it is hard to discern the truth), the variety of technical problems mean that its hard to know if Iran is actually far away from mastering nuclear technology or relatively close to it and thereby able to make the relatively short journey from "peaceful" civilian technology towards manufacturing nuclear material for a bomb.
The problem is that there remain many "unknowns" when it comes to the Iranian programme.
One of the most important is exactly how much help Tehran received from the Khan network.
The network first sold centrifuge designs to Iran in 1987 and provided on-off help for more than a decade after, including parts and designs for more advanced machines.
But international investigators remain unsure that they have an understanding on the full extent of the assistance, not least because no-one outside Pakistan has been able to question Khan directly whilst he remains under a form of house-arrest in Islamabad.
The biggest question surrounds the more advanced P2 centrifuge design that Khan passed to the Iranians.
Iran initially said it had conducted little work on the design but last year Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said that Tehran was working on the machine (which would be far more efficient than the model in Natanz).
However, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has not been provided any information on such work.
No rush?
If Iran was able to run a parallel, second enrichment program which it had managed to keep secret, then many of the estimates of how far Iran was from mastering the technology might be way of the mark. But this remains an unknown.
The degree of uncertainty can cut the debate over action against Iran in both directions.
Some voices argue that Iran remains at least five years away from nuclear weapons capability, and US intelligence estimates have consistently pushed back when that might be - so some argue there is no rush.
Other hawkish and pessimistic voices argue that Iran could soon master the technology and the time-frame for action lies this year.
Israel is keen to emphasise that it sees the shorter time-frame as the valid one and is willing to take action.
The US has been playing down its willingness to engage in military action but is currently pushing the Europeans to squeeze Iran financially.
Uniqueness/Link- Oil Revenue
Iran is now taking in huge amounts of revenue from high oil prices
Patrick Clawson, (senior editor of the Middle East Quarterly and director for research at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy), WINTER 2007, Middle East Quarterly, VOLUME XIV: NUMBER 1, http://www.meforum.org/article/1068
As Iranian confidence has grown in recent years, the West's ability to pressure Tehran has eroded. Iranian leaders are self-assured: the collapse of both the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Baath Party in Iraq has lifted the chief threats on Iran's borders. Insurgency and Iranian-backed militias have transformed the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq into a vulnerability and liability for Washington. Pro-Iranian forces won both Palestinian and Iraqi elections. The Iranian regime has also reaped an economic windfall: oil and gas exports have shot up from US$23 billion in 2002-03 to $55 billion in 2005-06.[4] This windfall has enabled an explosion of off-budget spending that has sent economic growth shooting up on average 6.2 percent a year from 2002 to 2006, discounting for inflation. Foreign exchange reserves have reached $47 billion, more than twice the amount of Iran's foreign debt, and will only rise further as oil prices remain high.
Impact- Corruption
New Oil revenues will be used to fuel Iranian corruption.
(Meir Javedanfar, ME Analyst with Masters in IR and Strategic Studies, 5/29/08, Pajamas Media blog, http://pajamasmedia.com/blog/mega-scandal-in-iran-35-billion-in-oil-money-missing-from-state-coffers/)
In what appears to be the biggest case of corruption in Iran, and perhaps in the Middle East, the Tehran-based Shahab News reported that the chief auditing office of the Iranian parliament (Majlis) has revealed that close to $35 billion of oil income from the financial year 2006-07 is missing.
According to Iranian law, this money should have been paid by the government of President Ahmadinejad into Iran’s central bank. Once there, the government can request the withdrawal of funds for projects, depending upon the approval of the Majlis. However, the new investigation shows that the government never paid the money into the central bank, and no one knows what has happened to it. Although it has not yet been proven, many suspect that the money has been used to finance corrupt activities of politicians surrounding the president, or the president himself. After all, it is very unlikely that this could have happened without his knowledge.
This is a serious allegation, as this amount constitutes almost half of Iran’s total oil income for that year.
To make matters worse, this is not the first time since the start of the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad that money has been used without the Majlis’ knowledge. One other famous case took place during the 2007-08 financial year. It was revealed later that $2 billion was used to import gasoline, without any consultation or approval of the members of the Iranian parliament.
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