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Internal Link- EU key to Iran nuke program
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Internal Link- EU key to Iran nuke programThe EU is the best actor to solve problems with Iran’s nuclear arsenal because of it’s economic and soft power George Perkovich with Silvia Manzanero (Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Paralegal at Stetson U and Carnegie Junior Fellow), October 2005, GETTING READY FOR A NUCLEAR-READY IRAN, If any entity has economic and political leverage over Iran, the EU is it. Historical and current animosities between Iran and the United States make rapprochement between them extremely 194 difficult, whereas Iranian desire for community with Europe is relatively uncomplicated. The more revolutionary segments of Iran do not appear so interested in ties with Europe that they would alter policies significantly, but reformers and pragmatic conservatives wish to take steps to accommodate European concerns. Iranians desire ties with Europe for identity and political reasons and for economic interests. The EU has conditioned its willingness to open relations with Iran on Tehran’s compliance with nonproliferation rules, human rights, and disavowal of terrorism. A special trade relationship is the key incentive the EU offers conditionally. Iran Impact- Nuke terrorismPolitical instability after Iran acquires nuclear weapons would cause apocalyptic nuclear terrorism MICHAEL EISENSTADT, (Senior fellow and director of the Military and Security Studies Program at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy), October 2005, GETTING READY FOR A NUCLEAR-READY IRAN, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub629.pdf Instability in Iran. Finally, there are the implications of political instability and domestic unrest in a nuclear Iran. Should anti-regime violence escalate to the point that it were to threaten the existence of the Islamic Republic (unlikely in the near-term, but possible in the future, should Iran’s conservative leadership prove unable to better the population’s living standards, and continue to ignore calls for political change), diehard supporters of the old order might lash out at the perceived external enemies of the regime with all means at their disposal, as the regime teeters on the brink. In such a scenario, the apocalyptic possibility of nuclear terrorism by the Islamic Republic in its death throes must be treated seriously. Terrorism ImpactEU soft power key to fighting terrorism (Joseph S. Nye, 11/15/04, Harvard Distinguished Service prof., International Herald Tribune, http://www.iht.com/articles/2004/11/15/ednye_ed3_.php) European soft power has an important role to play in the struggle against terrorism. Opening Europe's doors to Turkey helps to strengthen one of the most moderate Muslim countries, and European aid for democracy reinforces America's objectives. In some cases, there can be a beneficial division of labor in which Europe's soft power and America's hard power combine in a good cop-bad cop routine. Terrorists will inevitably seek nuclear weapons to use against the U.S. (Graham Allison, gov. prof. and former director of Belfer Center, and Andrei Kokoshin, Member of Russian Academy of Natural Sciences and Member of the Board of Directors, Fall 02, the National Interest, “The New Containment: an alliance against nuclear terrorism”) In sum: even a conservative estimate must conclude that dozens of terrorist groups have sufficient motive to use a nuclear weapon, several could potentially obtain nuclear means, and hundreds of opportunities exist for a group with means and motive to make the United States or Russia a victim of nuclear terrorism. The mystery before us is not how a nuclear terrorist attack could possibly occur, but rather why no terrorist group has yet combined motive, means and opportunity to commit a nuclear attack. We have been lucky so far, but who among us trusts luck to protect us in the future? Econ Collapse= war/nationalismEuropean economic downturns will lead to a resurfacing of European nationalism, the breakup of the EU, and widespread conflict across Europe (George Friedman, Chairman and founder of Stratfor, provider of info/intelligence/international affairs, July 18 01, The Record (Bergen County, NJ), “EXPLOSIVE ABSCESS FESTERS INSIDE EUROPEAN UNION”) The creation of a trans-European entity after the massive European bloodletting in the first half of the 20th century has been an extraordinary event. The founders of the European Community, later the European Union, explained it as a rational rsesponse to that bloodletting, based on two assumptions: First, leaders on the continent agreed that another round of fighting could annihilate European civilization. Second, they assumed Europe is an inherently prosperous region. If the Europeans succeeded in building institutions to exploit their resources, they could create 1 unprecedented and lasting affluence. As the European Community demonstrated the success of the transnational experiment, more and more states would wish to join in the prosperity and the relationship would deepen. More important, as the price for membership required that minor nationality issues, both internal and external, be set aside, it was assumed that nationality issues plaguing individual states would subside. Whether this theory has been confirmed or not is more than a theoretical question. It goes to the heart of the European question and in turn to the future of the world. Recent signs of economic downturn in the economies of Western Europe indicate the long-term viability of the EU will be tested sooner rather than later. The ongoing nationalist insurgencies such as the Irish RIRA and Basque ETA stem from internal ethnic and political struggles more than from the economic prosperity that has defined most of the past decade. But the indirect connection is still relevant: If it was the prosperity facilitated by EU membership that helped marginalize these groups, a significant economic downturn could lead to their resurgence. Indeed, recent events in Italy, a member nation, and in Ireland and Austria, EU observer nations, suggest that both economic and political pressures are building against the EU goals of monetary and political integration.
(Burkard Shmitt, assistant director of the EU’s Institute for Security Studies, 2/13/03, International Herald Tribune, “Common Policy Failure: Disunity holds the EU back from a major global role”, http://www.iht.com/articles/2003/02/13/edschmitt_ed3_.php) Since Sept. 11, 2001, the limits of the EU's common foreign and defense policies have been revealed without mercy. Member states have pursued purely national policies, sidelining the EU. Multilateral initiatives, such as the recent declaration of solidarity with the United States by eight European heads of government, have been intended to demonstrate disagreement, rather than agreement, among EU partners. Honorable attempts by Greece, which currently holds the EU's rotating presidency, to revamp the EU's role have come too late to limit the damage. World politics are being decided elsewhere, while action on the common European foreign, security and defense policies has been restricted to their traditional, narrowly defined playgrounds as if nothing had happened. This is not the fault of the EU, but of national governments. In particular, Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain and Chancellor Gerhard Schröder of Germany have laid down their opposing national positions — and declared them as irreversible — without even trying to elaborate a common EU approach. In this respect, there are no "old" or "new" Europeans, only bad Europeans. From a European point of view, the conclusions are therefore rather depressing. The more important a foreign policy issue is, the less relevant the EU becomes as a framework for action. Member states might have common values and commercial interests, but they don't have a common vision of the world that could guide a common foreign and security policy. Most of them have, at best, a regionally focused foreign policy. Germany lacks both clear objectives and a strategy. France and Britain have ambitions in world politics, but these are hardly compatible with each other. Rivalry and mistrust remain basic patterns of European politics. For most EU member states, it is still unacceptable for one of their peers to gain greater influence and take the lead. Their main priority is therefore to hold one another on a leash — and not to put at risk their protection by the United States. The fact that "new Europe" prepared its famous declaration of solidarity with the United States behind the back of "old Europe," just when the Franco-German bond had regained a certain dynamic, is a case in point. Most member states are ready to undermine the common project as soon as they sense the slightest risk of a directoire, a leading group. The French-German proposal to modernize the common foreign and security policy by introducing qualified majority votes for nonmilitary decisions, for example, might well fail because of their partners' suspicions about a new Franco-German axis. Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 9.54 Mb. Share with your friends:
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