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- Rise of Chinese leadership leads to US heg collapse and Sino-US war
- 1AR Impact Extensions
2AC China Rise Add-OnPlan sets the US as a leader in OTEC developed – Prevents Chinese hegemonyMoore 6 [Bill, citing Dr. Hans Krock, founder of OCEES, April 12, "OTEC Resurfaces", http://www.evworld.com/article.cfm?storyid=1008] "The United States is the best placed of any country in the world to do this," he contends. "The United States is the only country in the world of any size whose budget for its navy is bigger than the budget for its army." ¶ It's his contention that this will enable America to assume a leadership position in OTEC technology, allowing it to deploy plants in the Atlantic, Caribbean and Pacific, but he offers a warming.¶ "If we are stupid enough not to take advantage of this, well then this will be China's century and not the American century."¶ Krock is currently negotiating with the U.S. Navy to deploy first working OTEC plant offshore of a British-controlled island in the Indian Ocean -- most likely Diego Garcia though he wouldn't confirm this for security purposes.¶ He is also working with firms in Britain and Netherlands and will be headed to China for talks with the government in Beijing.¶ "The Chinese know very well that they cannot build there futures on oil," he stated, noting that China's is investing large sums of money in a blue water navy. "The United States will be playing catch-up in this technology. We're here. We're willing to do it. We're doing it with the Navy." He expects to put his first plant to sea sometime in 2008 after constructing it, mostly likely, in Singapore.¶ "We simply have to look at the all the alternatives [to conventional fossil fuels and nuclear power] and this is, hands down, the only alternative that's big enough to replace oil." Rise of Chinese leadership leads to US heg collapse and Sino-US warMearsheimer 5 [John, Professor of Political science at the University of Chicago, “Clash of the Titans,” January, Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=2740.] China cannot rise peacefully, and if it continues its dramatic economic growth over the next few decades, the United States and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war. Most of China's neighbors, including India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia, and Vietnam, will likely join with the United States to contain China's power. ¶ To predict the future in Asia, one needs a theory that explains how rising powers are likely to act and how other states will react to them. My theory of international politics says that the mightiest states attempt to establish hegemony in their own region while making sure that no rival great power dominates another region. The ultimate goal of every great power is to maximize its share of world power and eventually dominate the system. ¶ The international system has several defining characteristics. The main actors are states that operate in anarchy -- which simply means that there is no higher authority above them. All great powers have some offensive military capability, which means that they can hurt each other. Finally, no state can know the future intentions of other states with certainty. The best way to survive in such a system is to be as powerful as possible, relative to potential rivals. The mightier a state is, the less likely it is that another state will attack it. ¶ The great powers do not merely strive to be the strongest great power, although that is a welcome outcome. Their ultimate aim is to be the hegemon -- the only great power in the system. But it is almost impossible for any state to achieve global hegemony in the modern world, because it is too hard to project and sustain power around the globe. Even the United States is a regional but not a global hegemon. The best outcome that a state can hope for is to dominate its own backyard. ¶ States that gain regional hegemony have a further aim: to prevent other geographical areas from being dominated by other great powers. Regional hegemons, in other words, do not want peer competitors. Instead, they want to keep other regions divided among several great powers so that these states will compete with each other. In 1991, shortly after the Cold War ended, the first Bush administration boldly stated that the United States was now the most powerful state in the world and planned to remain so. That same message appeared in the famous National Security Strategy issued by the second Bush administration in September 2002. This document's stance on preemptive war generated harsh criticism, but hardly a word of protest greeted the assertion that the United States should check rising powers and maintain its commanding position in the global balance of power. ¶ China is likely to try to dominate Asia the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. Specifically, China will strive to maximize the power gap between itself and its neighbors, especially Japan and Russia, and to ensure that no state in Asia can threaten it. ¶ It is unlikely that China will go on a rampage and conquer other Asian countries. Instead, China will want to dictate the boundaries of acceptable behavior to neighboring countries, much the way the United States does in the Americas. An increasingly powerful China is also likely to try to push the United States out of Asia, much the way the United States pushed the European great powers out of the Western Hemisphere. Not incidentally, gaining regional hegemony is probably the only way that China will get back Taiwan. ¶ Why should we expect China to act differently than the United States? U.S. policymakers, after all, react harshly when other great powers send military forces into the Western Hemisphere. These foreign forces are invariably seen as a potential threat to American security. Are the Chinese more principled, more ethical, less nationalistic, or less concerned about their survival than Westerners? They are none of these things, which is why China is likely to imitate the United States and attempt to become a regional hegemon. China's leadership and people remember what happened in the last century, when Japan was powerful and China was weak. In the anarchic world of international politics, it is better to be Godzilla than Bambi. ¶ It is clear from the historical record how American policymakers will react if China attempts to dominate Asia. The United States does not tolerate peer competitors. As it demonstrated in the 20th century, it is determined to remain the world's only regional hegemon. Therefore, the United States will seek to contain China and ultimately weaken it to the point where it is no longer capable of dominating Asia. In essence, the United States is likely to behave toward China much the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War. 1AR Impact ExtensionsChinese factions will seek disputes and conflicts – only U.S. heg can solve and deter this possibilityFriedberg 5 (Aaron L. Friedberg is Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. From June 2003 to June 2005, he served as Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs and Director of Policy Planning in the Office of the Vice President. “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” Friedberg, Aaron L., 1956. International Security, Volume 30, Number 2, Fall 2005, pp. 7-45 (Article) Published by The MIT Press, 5/21/13) ELJ Constructivist Optimists Constructivists believe that international relationships (like all political relations) are “socially constructed.” The nature of the interactions between two states is not simply the product of objective, material factors, such as the balance of trade or the balance of military power or the structure of domestic institutions. Interstate relations are also shaped to a considerable degree by subjective factors, by the beliefs and ideas that people carry around in their heads and that cause them to interpret events and data in particular ways. The most important of these can be grouped into three categories: “identities” (i.e., the collective self-perceptions of political actors and their shared perceptions of others); “strategic cultures” (i.e., sets of beliefs about the fundamental character of international politics and about the best ways of coping with it, especially as regards the utility of force and the prospects for cooperation); and “norms” (i.e., beliefs not only about what is efficacious but also about what is right or appropriate in the international realm).66 Identities, strategic cultures, and norms are strongly shaped by the prevailing interpretations of a society’s shared historical experiences. They are transmitted across generational lines by processes of education and acculturation and, though not cast in stone, they do tend to be highly resistant to change. The primary mechanism by which widely held beliefs evolve and are some- times transformed is through interaction with others. Such interactions convey new information and ideas that can help to displace prevailing conceptions.67 Because their theoretical perspective causes them to be attentive to the potential malleability of social relationships, constructivists tend to be optimists. If international politics is truly governed by scientific laws rooted in material reality, like the laws of physics, then what people believe about how the world works will matter only to the extent that it conforms to or deviates from reality. A man who chooses to step off the roof of a tall building because he prefers not to believe in the force of gravity will nevertheless fall quickly to the ground. Similarly, in the view of the pessimistic realists, the leader of a dominant state who does not believe that his country’s position will be challenged by a rising power (or who believes that such a power can be dissuaded from pursuing its ambitions by gentle diplomacy) is destined to be disappointed. But if relations between nations are shaped above all by beliefs, rather than objective material factors, there is always the possibility that people can change the world by changing how they think. At the most general level, constructivists assert that international politics tends to be competitive and violent, not because some immutable principles of human behavior require that it be so but rather be- cause, across the centuries, national leaders have tended to believe this to be the case. By acting in accordance with their pessimistic expectations, leaders have helped to make them come true. As Alexander Wendt puts it, “Realism is a self-fulfilling prophecy.”68 Provided that it was widely shared among the world’s most powerful nations, a more optimistic assessment of the prospects for, and benefits of, international cooperation could achieve similar status. As regards the U.S.-China relationship, optimistic constructivists generally emphasize the possibility that China’s increasing participation in international institutions of various kinds will lead to shifts in its strategic culture, in the norms of international behavior accepted by its leaders, and ultimately in their conceptions of national identity. In contrast to liberal optimists, who stress the role of institutions in altering the narrow cost-benefit calculations of rational decision-makers, constructivists believe that repeated interactions can actually change the underlying beliefs, interests, and mental categories of those who participate in them. Thus it may be true that some significant fraction of China’s rulers are still in the grips of old-fashioned ideas about the zero-sum character of international relations and about the potential utility of deception, surprise, and force in resolving interstate disputes. These ideas may appear to be deeply rooted in traditional Chinese statecraft, as passed down in ancient texts, taught in military academies, and absorbed through the skin, as it were, by anyone raised in Chinese culture. But what Iain Johnston has referred to as the “parabellum paradigm” can be softened over time by repeated contacts between Chinese statesmen, scholars, and soldiers and their less fatalistic foreign counterparts.69 Optimistic constructivists believe that it was exactly these types of interactions between Soviet and Western scientists and arms control experts that helped to alter the course of Soviet foreign policy in the 1980s and to bring the Cold War to a peaceful conclusion.70 A similar process of externally induced intellectual evolution is certainly possible in China and indeed, in the view of some optimists, it may already be well under way. At the same time as China’s strategic culture is shifting, its leaders may be moving toward a much broader embrace of what are essentially liberal norms and expectations regarding international behavior. Again, the mechanism at work here is not merely a calculation of material benefits but a process of socialization that reflects China’s profound desire to be accepted as a modern, advanced country and a citizen in good standing of the world community. According to Johnston and coauthor Paul Evans, China’s recent willingness to enter into multilateral international institutions such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty reflects the fact that its leaders are becoming “more sensitive to social incentives” and more fearful “of appearing to be the pariah.”71 Whereas only a few years ago China’s rulers would have shunned participation in international institutions in the belief that it would impose unacceptable constraints on their freedom of action, today they are increasingly ready, even eager to join up. Participation and norm change are thus mutually reinforcing mechanisms: the more deeply embedded China becomes in the web of regional and global institutions, the more the beliefs and expectations of its leaders will come to conform to the emerging universal consensus that those institutions embody.72 Directory: file -> fetch fetch -> 11 th Lit Semester 1 Final Study Guide!!! fetch -> Industrial Revolution Inventors fetch -> Analysis for Galveston Hurricane of 1900 fetch -> The Illuminators (Team 2) 1900 Galveston Hurricane Cycle a team Assignment fetch -> Team csi-utb ruth Reyes Jose Ferrer fetch -> Galveston Hurricane of 1900 Cycle a-teacher as a Problem Solver fetch -> Is Climate Change Starting a New Dust Bowl? Cycle A fetch -> What makes a storm a hurricane fetch -> The 1950s were the "Happy Days" because it was a time of economic prosperity, technology development, new entertainment, new fashion and family growth. 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