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Chapter 7: Multilateral & US. Efforts to



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Chapter 7: Multilateral & US. Efforts to
Counter the Kremlin’s Asymmetric Arsenal
In addition to the measures that individual states have taken to build resiliency against malign influence operations within their own borders (see Chapters 5 and 6), many countries, especially those that belong to the EU and NATO, have also launched or joined multilateral efforts. These efforts include building collective defenses against disinformation and cyberattacks, improving cross- border cooperation on energy diversification, applying sanctions on malicious actors, and more. Although the United States participates in some of these multilateral efforts and has taken a few stepson its own to address Russian government hybrid warfare, its response lags far behind what is necessary to defend against and deter the threat. COLLECTIVE DEFENSES AGAINST
DISINFORMATION AND CYBER ATTACKS
Over the past several years, European governments and institutions have recognized that Russia’s disinformation operations area challenge that requires increased attention and resources. In response, they have launched several multilateral and regional initiatives to improve Europe’s resilience, with varying levels of success. One of the first such organizations was the NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence, established by seven NATO member states in July of 2014, and headquartered in Riga, Latvia. The Center provides analysis, advice, and support to the NATO alliance, including research into identifying the early signs of hybrid warfare and the study of Russia’s disinformation operations in
Ukraine.
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The EU’s External Action Service, which works under the EU’s foreign affairs chief, launched a similar operation in 2015, known as the EU East StratCom Task Force. The Task Force uses a wide volunteer base from around the EU and elsewhere to collect examples of pro-Kremlin disinformation and analyze and publicize them in a searchable database.
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While the Task Force has only about a dozen full-time employees, its volunteer network has over
400 experts from more than 30 countries. It publishes news and analysis on the website EU vs. Disinfo, and is responsible for communicating EU policies toward the Eastern Partnership countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and
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142 European Union External Action Service, Questions and Answers about the East
StratCom Task Force https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/2116/-ques- tions-and-answers-about-the-east-stratcom-task-force—en (visited Dec. 14, 2017). The head of the EU’s External Action Service, Federica Mogherini, has come under fire from scores of analysts and academics for keeping the team absurdly understaffed and underfunded. See European Values, Open Letter from European Security Experts to Federica
Mogherini, Mar. 20, 2017, http://www.europeanvalues.net/mogherini/. One EU official told Polit-
ico that Mogherini is considered to be soft on Russia compared to others in the Commission, or what some Eastern countries would like. Officials who work on these issues get no support from her Ryan Heath, ‘‘Federica Mogherini Soft on Disinformation, Critics Say Politico, Mar.
22, 2017. European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, About Us https:// www.hybridcoe.fi/about-us (visited Dec. 15, 2017).
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See Chapter 6, Finland. Committee Staff Discussion with Finnish Government Officials. European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, About Us https:// www.hybridcoe.fi/about-us (visited Dec. 15, 2017). As of publication, there was no designated country lead for the work strand on terrorism and radicalism. Committee Staff Discussion with Finnish Government Officials. NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, About Cyber Defence Centre https://www.ccdcoe.org/about-us.html (visited Dec. 15, 2017).
Ukraine.
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To promote a positive narrative of the EU, the Task Force constructs simple messages meant to resonate in each country about the benefits of cooperation with the EU. The Task Force has a very broad mandate, but relatively little funding.
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To combine the efforts of both EU and NATO countries and broaden the scope beyond disinformation, Finland launched the European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki in July 2017. Currently comprised of 12 EU and NATO countries, including the United States, it uses research and training to improve participants readiness to respond to cyberattacks, disinformation, and propaganda.
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Finland started the Center after it experienced Russian attempts to use social media to interfere in it 2015 elections.
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After the election, the Finnish government ordered all of its ministries to imagine worst-case scenarios of foreign interference, which they compiled into a report and shared with EU and NATO partners.
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The report led to the creation of the Center, which has three work strands, also known as communities of interest (1) hybrid influencing, led by the UK (2) terrorism and radicalism and (3) vulnerabilities and resilience, led by Finland.
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The Center’s officials also hope to work with Google, Facebook, and other social media companies to track online content and identify threats.
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NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence, based in Tallinn, Estonia, also focuses on helping member states secure their cyber infrastructure. The Center draws on experts with military, government, and private industry experience from 20 nations to provide training and expertise to NATO nations and partners.
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Although these initiatives were conceived and launched on an ad hoc basis, collectively they form a network of institutions that address overlapping threats and vulnerabilities facing Europe and its allies, including the United States. A number of NGOs and think tanks have also launched their own regionally focused programs to counter disinformation. One of the first such operations was the Kremlin Watch Monitor, launched by the European Values Think Tank in 2015 and headquartered in Prague. With the support of private and public donors, including several European governments, this initiative focuses on fact checking and analysis of Russian government-backed
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143 European Values, Kremlin Watch, What We Do http://www.europeanvalues.net/ kremlinwatch/what-we/ (visited Dec. 31, 2017). Center for European Policy Analysis, Information Warfare Initiative http:// infowar.cepa.org/About (visited Dec. 15, 2017). European Endowment for Democracy, Bringing Plurality & Balance to Russian Language
Media—Final Recommendations https://www.democracyendowment.eu/news/bringing-plurality-
1/ (visited Dec. 15, 2017). Andrew Rettman, ‘‘Dutch-Polish Content Factory to Counter Russian Propaganda

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